28th Annual Midwest/Midsouth Estate Planning Institute by Office of Continuing Legal Education at the University of Kentucky College of Law
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Continuing Legal Education Materials Kentucky Legal History
7-2001
28th Annual Midwest/Midsouth Estate Planning
Institute
Office of Continuing Legal Education at the University of Kentucky College of Law
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/uky_cle
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Kentucky Legal History at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Continuing
Legal Education Materials by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Repository Citation
Office of Continuing Legal Education at the University of Kentucky College of Law, "28th Annual Midwest/Midsouth Estate Planning




















OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW
FROM THE LAW LIBRARY OF:
Written materials and oral presentations offered through the University of Kentucky College of
Law Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) are designed to assist lawyers in maintain-
ing their professional competence. The Office of Continuing Legal Education and its volunteer
speakers and writers are not rendering legal or other professional services by their participation in
continuing legal education activities. Attorneys and others using information obtained from UK/
CLE publications or seminars must also fully research original and current sources of authority to
properly serve their or their client's legal interests. The forms and sample documents contained in
our continuing legal education publications are intended for use only in conjunction with the
professional services and advice of licensed attorneys. All parties must cautiously consider whether
a particular form or document is suited to specific needs. The legal research presented herein is
believed to be accurate, but is not warranted tq be so. These written materials and the comments
of speakers in presentation of these materials may contain expressions of opinion which do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Continuing Legal Education, the University of Ken-
tucky, the Commonwealth of Kentuck)T, or other governmental authorities. UK/CLE strives to
make its written materials and speaker presentations gender-neutral; however, gender-specific
references may remain where it would otherwise be awkward or unclear. It should be understood
that in such references the female includes the male, and vice-versa.
Copyright 2001 by the University of Kentucky College of Law,
Office of Continuing Legal Education.
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
COLLEGE OF LAW
OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION








PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY:









UKICLE: A Self-Supporting Entity
The University of Kentucky Office of Continuing Legal
Education (UK/CLE) is an income-based office of the Uni-
versity of Kentucky College of Law. As such, it is separately
budgeted and financially self-supporting. UK/CLE opera-
tions are similar to not-for-profit organizations, paying all
direct expenses, salaries and overhead solely from revenues.
No public funds or tax dollars are allocated to its budget.
Revenues are obtained from registrant enrollment fees, and
the sale of publications. Our sole function is to provide
professional development services. In the event surplus
funds become available, they are utilized to offset deficits or
retained in our budget to improve the quality and variety of
services we provide.




2000-2001 NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST
TO ESTATE PLANNERS SECTION A
Turney P. Berry
PLANNING AND DRAFTING FOR FLEXIBILITY:
A PRACTICAL CHECKLIST SECTION B
Theodore B. Atlass




ASSET PROTECTION IN A DIVORCE CONTEXT SECTION D
Dwayne W. Barrett
James C. Worthington
DEALING WITH LIFE INSURANCE IN THE ESTATE PLANNING
PROCESS SECTION E
Barbara B. Lewis




RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PLANNING FOR DISTRIBUTION
OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS BEFORE AND AFTER DEATH SECTION G
Edward A. Rothschild
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND THE U.S. TAX COURT SECTION H
Scott D. Hakala
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE ESTATES AND TRUSTS LAWYER .. SECTION I
Bruce S. Ross
PLANNING FOR THE GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX SECTION J
Kelly S. Henry




DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTATE PLANNING: 2000-2001
Legislative, Case Law and Regulatory Changes
Turney P. Berry
Ogden Newell & Welch
Louisville, Kentucky
Copyright 2001, Turney P. Berry
SECTION A

2000-2001 NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST TO ESTATE PLANNERS
A. INCOME TAX MATTERS A-I
1. Taxable Income Upon Termination of Life Insurance Policies A-I
2. Final Regulations on Estate Separate Share Rules A-I
3. Application of Section 1014 A-3
4. Deductibility of Legal Fees A-4
5. General Parmer Fees A-6
6. Application of Section 121 to Trust A-6
7. Court-Ordered Payments Deductible A-6
8. Section 67 - Application of2% Floor for Miscellaneous Deductions A-7
9. Proposed Regulations on Revocable Trusts as Part of Estate A-8
B. CHARITABLE AND TAX-EXEMPT MATTERS -
Sections 170, 642, 664, 501, 509,2055,2522, and 4940-4947 A-II
1. Gain on Stock Taxable to Donor When Gift is Not Made Soon Enough . A-II
2. Generosity In Allowing Reformation for Scrivener's Error A-13
3. Insurance Policy in Charitable Remainder Trust A-14
4. Specificity of Charitable Beneficiaries A-14
5. No Income Tax Deduction Available to an Estate for a Charitable Bequest A-18
6. Private Inurement A-18
7. Charitable Remainder Trust Final Regulations A-18
8. Division of Charitable Lead Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-20
9. Borrowing by Charitable Remainder Trust to Make Payment A-20
10. Securities Purchased on Margin Give Rise to UBIT A-22
11. LLC as Grantor of Charitable Remainder Trust A-23
12. Charitable Bequest of Deferred Compensation A-23
13. What is in a CRT? A-25
14. IRA Proceeds and Qualified Plan Proceeds - IRD Consequences A-25
15. Lead Trust May Invest in FLP A-25
16. Division of CRT to Meet 10% Test A-25
17. Division of CRT in Divorce A-25
18. Failure to Operate as a CRT A-25
19. Payments from CRAT to Charitable During Annuitant's Lifetime A-28
20. Final Regulations for Lifetime Charitable Lead Trusts A-28
21. Transfer of Stock But Not Voting Rights A-30
22. Accrual Basis S Corporation May Not Make §170(a)(2) Election A-30
23. Collective Investment of CRUT Assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-31
C. SECTION 408 --IRAs AND RETIREMENT PLANS A-32
1. New Proposed Regulations Dealing With Minimum Distributions A-32
2. Qualified Plan Benefits and IRAs Payable to QTIP Trust A-37
3. Effect of Facility of Payment Clause on Designated Beneficiary Rules A-37
SECTION A
D. SECTIONS 671-678 - GRANTOR TRUST RULES A-38
1. Income Tax Consequences of Powers of Withdrawal A-38
2. Grantor Trust Status for GRAT A-38
E. SECTION 1361- S CORPORATIONS A-38
1. Power to Make Distributions From ESBT A-38
2. Proposed ESBT Regulations A-38
F. SECTIONS 2031 AND 2512 - VALUATION A-43
1. Valuation of Voting Stock of Closely-Held Corporation A-43
2. Partnership Interests A-46
3. Aggregation of Stock A-48
4. Valuation of Construction Company Using Discounted Cash Flow Method A-50
5. Importance of Reliable Experts A-50
6. Discount for Built-in Capital Gains A-53
7. Blockage Discount A-55
8. Real Estate Corporation A-55
9. Actuarial Factors A-55
10. Comparison With Public Companies A-56
11. Valuation of S Corporation Shares A-56
12. Bank Stock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-56
13. Blockage and Fractional Interest Discounts for Real Property A-57
14. Majority of Operating Company A-57
15. Closely-Held Company With an ESOP A-57
16. Tax Court Values Decedent's Stock in Two Nonpublicly Traded Corporations A-57
17. Value of Partnership with Pre-2703 Options A-57
18. Use of Capital Asset Pricing Model A-59
19. Burden of Proof A-59
20. Tax Court Recommends Settlement A-60
21. Discounts, Closely-Held Stock A-60
22. Discounts, Real Estate A-60
G. SECTION 2032 - ALTERNATE VALUATION AND SECTION 2032A-
SPECIAL USE VALUATION - A-62
1. Protective Election of Alternate Valuation A-62
2. Minority Interest A-62
3. Use of Comparables A-62
4. Grant of Development Easement is a Disposition A-66
5. Time to Make Election A-66
H. SECTIONS 2035-2038 - RETAINED INTERESTS A-66
1. Requirement that Trustees Pay Grantor's Income Taxes A-66
2. Sale of Remainder Interest A-67
3. Stock Transferred to Partnership is Includable in Gross Estate A-71
4. Retained Interest in Residence A-73
SECTION A
I. SECTION 2040 - JOINT INTERESTS A-74
No Developments.
J. SECTIONS 2041 AND 2514 - GENERAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT A-74
1. Power of Appointment Among Descendants A-74
K. SECTIONS 83, 2042 AND 7872 - LIFE INSURANCE A-75
1. Interim Guidance on Split-Dollar Life Insurance A-75
L. SECTION 2053 and 2054 - DEBTS AND ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES A-82
1. Deduction for An Uncertain Amount A-82
2. Deduction for Interest A-86
3. Environmental Claims A-86
M. SECTIONS 2056 and 2056A - MARITAL DEDUCTION A-88
1. Coordination With Tax Payment Clause A-88
2. QTIP Regulations: Effect of Estate Expenses A-89
3. Savings Clause A-93
4. Minority Interest Passing to Spouse A-94
5. Nonqualified Disclaimer ofQTIP Income Interest A-95
6. Disclaimers Save Marital Deduction A-95
7. Joint Revocable Trust A-98
8. Division of Trust for Section 2519 Purposes A-IOO
N. SECTIONS 2501 TO 2524 - GIFTS A-I00
1. Gift Tax Disclosure Regulations A-IOO
2. No Annual Exclusion for Gifts to Corporation A-I04
3. Prepaid Tuition Payments A-I04
4. Stock Options A-I04
5. Reciprocal Gifts and Indirect Transfers A-I07
6. Use of Unified Credit A-II2
7. Gift of Estate Income A-II3
8. Excess Trustee Fees as Gifts A-113
9. Redemption for Less Than Fair Market Value Creates A Gift A-II3
10. Gifts by Attorney-in-Fact A-II6
11. Relation-Back Doesn't Apply to Non-Charitable Gifts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-I20
o. SECTION 2519 - DISCLAIMERS A-120
1. Reasonable Time A-120
SECTION A
P. SECTIONS 2601 - 2654- GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX A-121
1. Final Regulations Discuss Modification to Grandfathered Trusts A-121
2. Effective Date Rule A-128
3. Substantial Compliance in Allocating GST Exemption A-132
4. Transfer ofCLAT Remainder Does Not Shift Transferor A-132
5. Rule Against Perpetuities A-133
Q. SECTIONS 2701 - 2704 --SPECIAL VALUATION RULES A-133
1. Application to Family Limited Partnerships A-133
2. Use ofNotes in GRATs A-152
3. Valuing Annuity Interest in GRAT A-156
4. Commutation of GRIT A-162
5. Change of Interest Rate in Buy-Sell Does Not Violate Sections 2703 or 2704 A-162
6. Joint Purchase of Residence A-164
R. SECTION 6166 - EXTENSION OF TIME TO PAY TAX A-164
1. Transfer of Sole Proprietorship Assets to LLC A-164
S. TAX ADMINISTRATION A-166
1. Attachment of Federal Tax Lien to Disclaimed Property A-166
2. Recalculation of State Death Tax Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-167
3. Reopening Audit After Erroneous Closing Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-167
4. Fiduciary Liability for Unpaid Income Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-168
5. Post-Death Events Relevant to Whether Failure to Pay Estate Tax Was Reasonable . . . . . .. A-170
6. Collateral Estoppel Prevents Estate From Excluding Ranch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-I70
7. Refund Suit Under Section 6166 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-172
T. MISCELLANEOUS A-172
1. Tax Apportionment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-172
2. Resulting Trust Argument Rejected A-I74
3. Biological Twins Conceived By In-Vitro Fertilization and Born Eighteen Months
After Decedent's Death Were Heirs at Law of Decedent A-175
4. Ability of Attorney in Fact to Make Gifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-I76
ADDENDUM A: H.R. 1836 - THE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX RELIEF
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2001 A-179
ADDENDUM B: PLANNING IN VIEW OF H.R. 1836 A-189
SECTION A
2000 - 2001 NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST
TO ESTATE PLANNERS
A. INCOME TAX MATTERS
1. Taxable Income Upon Termination of Life Insurance Policies. In Stephen L. Atwood, et ux. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-61, the tax court held that the taxpayers received taxable income when insurance
companies terminated life insurance policies where the taxpayers had borrowed amounts in excess ofthe premiums they
had paid. The taxpayers had borrowed the maximum available against the policies and then had not paid the interest.
The companies terminated the policies and sent the taxpayers Forms 1099.
2. Final Regulations on Estate Separate Share Rules. The purpose ofthe separate share rules is to
produce fairness by limiting the application of sections 661 and 662 to distributions to beneficiaries so that no
beneficiary pays income tax on more than the beneficiary's pro rata share ofestate (or trust) income. The IRS statement
of the General Separate Share rule is as follows:
The proposed regulations define a separate share as a separate economic interest
in one beneficiary or class of beneficiaries of the decedent's estate such that the
economic interests ofthe beneficiary or class ofbeneficiaries (for example, rights
to income or gains from specified items ofproperty) are not affected by economic
interests accruing to another beneficiary or class of beneficiaries. The proposed
regulations conclude that there are separate shares in an estate when a beneficiary
or class of beneficiaries has an interest in a decedent's estate (whether corpus or
income, or both) that no other beneficiary or class of beneficiaries has.
***
Generally, the fmal regulations clarify the definition and narrow the application of
the separate share rules that are in the proposed regulations. The final regulations
generally defme a separate share as a separate economic interest in one beneficiary
or class ofbeneficiaries ofthe decedent's estate such that the economic interests of
the beneficiary or class ofbeneficiaries neither affect nor are affected by economic
interests accruing to another beneficiary or class of beneficiaries. The fmal
regulations add "nor are affected by" to clarify the defmition of a separate share.
Under this revised definition, a separate share generally exists only if it includes
both corpus and the income attributable thereto and is independent from any other
share. Thus, income earned on assets in one share (fIrst share) and appreciation and
depreciation in the value of those assets have no effect on any other share.
Similarly, the income and changes in value ofany other share have no effect on the
first share.
The separate share rules do not change the traditional understanding ofpayments ofsums or specific property
under section 663(a)(I):
The fmal regulations provide that bequests described in section 663(a)(I) are not
separate shares. The separate share rules are applicable only to determine the
distributable net income of each share when applying the distribution provisions
of sections 661 and 662 to the trust or estate and its beneficiaries. Bequests
described in section 663(a)(I) are not subject to the distribution provisions and
therefore are not separate shares.
A·l
On a related issue the explanation states:
Under these fmal regulations, any pecuniary formula bequest that is entitled to
income and to share in appreciation or depreciation under the governing instrument
or local law constitutes a separate share under the general definition. Further, under
a special rule, a pecuniary formula bequest that is not entitled to income or to share
in appreciation or depreciation is also a separate share ifthe governing instrument
does not provide that it is to be paid or credited in more than three installments.
This provision regarding three or fewer installments parallels the specific bequest
requirements in section 663(a)(I).
One important area ofclarification deals with the income tax consequences ofa spouse's elective share. This
issue attracted considerable discussion when the proposed regulations were issues. The IRS explanation states:
The proposed regulations provide that a surviving spouse's statutoI)' elective share
constitutes a separate share of an estate. As a result, the surviving spouse may be
taxed on the estate's gross income only to the extent ofthe surviving spouse's share
of that income under state law.
One commentator recommended that separate share treatment for a surviving
spouse's elective share should be reconsidered. Elective shares should be a matter
of further study because they are forced by state law, differ from state to state, and
usually are part of an acrimonious conflict. Another commentator requested
clarification ofwhether a surviving spouse's statutoI)' elective share is included in
the subchapter J estate. Further, this commentator recommended that an elective
share that is not entitled to income or appreciation should be excluded from the
subchapter J estate, but an elective share that is entitled to income and appreciation
should be included in the subchapter J estate.
Conversely, other commentators agreed that separate share treatment should apply
to a surviving spouse's statutoI)' elective share regardless ofwhether the surviving
spouse is entitled to income and shares in appreciation or depreciation. One
commentator suggested that the separate share examples in the proposed
regulations be revised to track more closely the Uniform Probate Code model
because it will likely be adopted by most states.
These final regulations do not change the result of the proposed regulations.
However, under these final regulations, a surviving spouse's elective share that
under local law is entitled to income and to share in appreciation or depreciation
constitutes a separate share under the general definition. Further, under a special
rule in the final regulations, a surviving spouse's elective share that is not entitled
to income or does not share in appreciation or depreciation is also a separate share.
The final regulations make some changes to the section 645 election:
The proposed regulations provide that a qualified revocable trust that elects under
section 645 to be treated as part of the decedent's estate for income tax purposes
constitutes a separate share. In response to comments, these final regulations
include a reference that the electing revocable trust itself may have two or more
separate shares. These final regulations further provide that qualified revocable
trusts within the defmition of section 645(b)(1) are subject to the separate share
rules applicable to estates rather than trusts whether or not an election is made to
be part of the estate.
A·2
The fmal regulations make several other points:
1. Separate shares come into existence "at the earliest moment that a
fiduciary may reasonably determine, based upon the known facts, that a separate
share exists."
2. In response to commentators' concerns about making adjustments after
IRS audits the fmal regulations provide that a fiduciary must use a "reasonable and
equitable method to determine the value of each separate share and the allocation
of taxable income to each share. This approach gives the fiduciary flexibility,
within limits, in applying the separate share rules. However, redeterminations in
value of those separate shares must be taken into account."
3. When calculating distributable net income for a separate share income as
determined under section 643(b) must be allocated to each share based on the
instrument or applicable state law. With respect to IRD under section 691(a) the
explanation states:
These final regulations clarify that such gross income is allocated among
the separate shares that could potentially be funded with these amounts
irrespective ofwhether a share is entitled to receive any income under the
terms of the governing instrument or applicable local law. The amount
allocated to each share is based upon the relative value of each of those
shares that could potentially be funded with such amounts.
The importance of this rule is that pecuniary bequests normally should state that
they may not be funded with IRD.
4. No change is made to rules under Treas. Reg. S 1.663(c)-2 that an
expense attributable solely to one separate share of a trust is not available as a
deduction under another.
5. Interest owed on pecuniary bequests or delayed estate distributions is
treated as a payment of interest by the estate and not a distribution for purposes of
sections 661 and 662. Section 163(h) disallows a deduction for personal interest
and Treasury regards that provision as determinative.
6. The effective date provisions h~ve been modified from the proposed
regulations:
These final regulations are applicable for estates and qualified revocable trusts
within the meaning of section 645(b)(I) with respect to decedents who die after
December 28, 1999. However, for estates and qualified revocable trusts with
respect to decedents who died after the date that section 1307 of the Tax Reform
Act of 1997 became effective but before December 28, 1999, the IRS will accept
any reasonable interpretation of the separate share provisions, including those
provisions provided in 1999-11 I.R.B. 41 (see section 601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b)). For
trusts other than qualified revocable trusts, section 1.663(c)-2 is applicable for
taxable years of such trusts beginning after December 28, 1999.
A·3
3. Application ofSection 1014. Suppose Personal Representative values an asset on an estate tax return
at 100, which value is accepted by the Internal Revenue Service. Beneficiary who inherits the asset sells it for 110. May
beneficiary claim that 110 was the asset's actual fair market value at date of death?
TAM 199933001 considers a similar situation: the beneficiaries inherited corporate stock which was redeemed
by the company seven years after the decedent's death. The IRS cited the following relevant authority:
Section 1.1014-3(a) of the Income Tax Regulations provides that the value of
property as of the date of the decedent's death as appraised for the purpose ofthe
Federal estate tax shall be deemed to be its fair market value.
In Rev. Rul. 54-97, 1954-1 C.B. 113, the Service held that for the purpose of
determining the basis under section 113(a)(5)(the predecessor ofsection 1014) of
property transmitted at death (for determining gain or loss on the sale thereofor the
deduction for depreciation), the value ofthe property as determined for the purpose
of the Federal estate tax shall be deemed to be its fair market value at the time of
acquisition. Except where the taxpayer is estopped by his previous actions or
statements, such value is not conclusive but is a presumptive value which may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
There are two issues: fIrst, doe the duty ofconsistency estop the beneficiary, and, second, can the beneficiary
rebut the presumption of estate tax correctness which clear and convincing evidence.
As to the fIrst issue, in Shook v. U.S., 713 F.2d 662 (11th Cir.1983), the court held that Mrs. Shook was not
estopped because, the IRS recited,
The court found nothing in the record to suggest that anyone other than the
decedent's executors and their attorney had or exercised any authority in handling
the resolution of the estate's tax liability. In addition, Mrs. Shook never had any
contact with the IRS in connection with settling the decedent's estate nor did the
IRS rely on any representation made by her. Finally, the court found that the
executor's attorney's discussion ofthe estate's tax settlement with Mrs. Shook and
the obtaining ofan expression ofher approval was a prudent measure based on the
parties' animosity and not a legal necessity. Thus, the court was unwilling to
extend the estoppel doctrine to an estate beneficiary for "merely indicating
approval of the executor's handling over which they have total control and the
beneficiary none."
4. Deductibility of Legal Fees. In 1990, Red Stevens established a revocable trust. He died in 1991.
The trust provided for certain payments to be made to his son by a prior marriage with the remaining assets passing into
a marital trust with wife as trustee, son sued wife, as trustee, claiming lack ofcapacity and undue influence and seeking
to void the trust. Trustee wife defended and won.
In Ruby Jean Stevens v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-259, the issue was, are the legal fees deductible?
The court held that the fees must be capitalized. The opinion states:
Section 212 authorizes a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred for, inter alia, the management, conservation, or maintenance ofproperty
held for the production of income. To satisfy the requirements of section 212, the
expenditure must be reasonable in amount and must bear a reasonable and
proximate relationship to the management, conservation, or maintenance of
A·4
property held for the production of income. See Bingham Trust v. Commissioner,
325 U.S. 365, 370 (1945).
The terms "management", "conservation", and "maintenance" have been construed
to refer to the protection, safeguarding, or upkeep ofphysical assets and not to the
taxpayer's retention of ownership of the property. See United States v. Gilmore,
372 U.S. 39,44 (1963); Reed v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 32,42 (1970); Duntley v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-579. Therefore, to be deductible under section
212, professional expenses must be directly connected or proximately related to the
management, conservation, or maintenance ofthe property. See Bingham Trust v.
Commissioner, supra at 375; Duntley v. Commissioner, supra.
Conversely, expenditures paid or incurred in defending or perfecting title to
property, such as legal expenses in a suit to quiet title to real estate and expenses
paid to protect one's right to property of a decedent as a beneficiary under a
testamentary trust, constitute a part of the cost of property and are not deductible
expenses. See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 575 (1970); Boagni v.
Commissioner, 59 T.e. 708, 711-712 (1973); sec. 1.212-1(k), Income Tax Regs.;
see also sec. 1.263(a)-2(c), Income Tax Regs., which classifies "The cost of
defending or perfecting title to property" as a capital expenditure.
Petitioner contends that the disallowed professional fees at issue in this case are
deductible under section 212, because (1) defending against the lawsuit protected
her taxable income stream, and (2) the fees were ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred in that effort. Petitioner also contends that the disallowed professional fees
qualify as ordinary and necessary litigation expenses incurred in connection with
the performance of her duties of administration within the meaning of section
1.212-1(i), Income Tax .Regs. Respondent contends that the disallowed
professional fees represent capital expenditures within the meaning ofsection 263,
because the fees were incurred to defend the validity of the Trust and its title to
Trust property. We agree with respondent.
Whether professional fees incurred in connection with litigation are deductible
expenses under section 212, or are capital expenditures under section 263, requires
an examination of the origin ofthe claims giving rise to the professional fees. See
United States v. Gilmore, supra at 49 ("the origin and character of the claim with
respect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential consequences
upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether the
expense was 'business' or 'personal"'); Boagni v. Commissioner, supra at 712-713.
******
Petitioner cites Estate of Kincaid v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-543, in
support ofher contention that, where the origin ofthe claim was the prevention of
conduct which would be detrimental to her interest as income beneficiary, the
litigation costs are deductible. Petitioner argues that,just like the taxpayer in Estate
of Kincaid, she defended the lawsuit in her capacity as income beneficiary to
prevent impairment of the production and collection of income from Trust assets.
******
A·5
In the case before us, however, it is clear that the lawsuit had nothing to do with
alleged abuses in the administration of the Trust. In fact, the lawsuit was a direct
attack on the validity of the Trust. Garland's claims -- undue influence, lack of
capacity, conversion, fraud, etc. -- were all alternate theories to invalidate the Trust
and gain a larger share of his father's estate. Each claim for relief was based on
allegations that Mr. Stevens was mentally incompetent and that petitioner caused,
induced, deluded, misled, forced, and/or otherwise unduly influenced Mr. Stevens
to execute the Trust. None of the claims included allegations of mismanagement
or waste of Trust assets, or diversion of Trust income.
Garland's claims originated in his attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to invalidate the
Trust and acquire an interest in the Trust assets. Unlike the Estate ofKincaid case,
the professional fees were incurred by petitioner in a dispute over title to property
between Garland and the Trust. Such expenses are nondeductible capital
expenditures. See sees. 1.212-1(k) and 1.263(a)-2(c), Income Tax Regs.; see also
Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. at 713; Arthur H. DuGrenier, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 931, 938 (1972); Seidler v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 256
(1952); Duntley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-579.
Petitioner bases a second argument for deductibility ofher professional fees on the
fact that she incurred the expenses in her role as Successor Trustee. Petitioner
argues that her fiduciary duty to defend the Trust renders the professional fees
deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses of Trust administration, citing
section 1.212-1(i), Income Tax Regs. There is no higher or more important duty
than defending a trust against attack, petitioner contends, and thus her legal fees
must be deductible. Respondent counters that, since the legal fees associated with
petitioner's duties ofadministration originated in the defense ofthe Trust, the fees
are capital expenditures under the origin-of-the-claim test.
5. General Partner Fees. It is often suggested that a general partner charge a fee for managing a family
partnership. In Matthew W. Norwood, et ux. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-84 (2000), the court held that a
general partner's interest automatically gave rise to self-employment income, regardless of the general partners'
activities.
6. Application of Section 121 to Trust. In PLR 200018021 the IRS detennined that section 121
(allowing a $250,000 or $500,000 capital gain exclusion for the sale ofa residence) does not apply to a residence held
by a trust, because the taxpayer -- the trust -- is not using the residence as a residence. The exception is for a grantor
trust (such as a revocable trust or, generally, a QPRT).
7. Court-Ordered Payments Deductible. In Sharon Purcell Dileonardo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2000-120 (2000), the court held that the income beneficiary ofa trust may deduct payments ordered after the taxpayer
objected to a trustee's accounting. The objections were determined to be frivolous and the payments were essentially
sanctions. The opinion states:
In general, if the origin and character of the claim arise out of a taxpayer's
personality as a seeker after profit rather than satisfier ofhuman needs, it does not
matter that the taxpayer's expenditures are made because of the imposition of a
sanction to compensate the victims of the taxpayer's improper actions. See, e.g.,
Ostrom v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 608 (1981), in which the taxpayer was allowed
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to deduct his payment of a jury award of damages imposed on account of the
taxpayer's fraudulent misrepresentation on which the plaintiff had relied to his
detriment. To the same effect are the cases described in Ostrom v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. at 611-613. In the instant case, the origin and character of the claim from
which the liability arose are petitioner's personality as a seeker after profit. This is
not affected by whether petitioner won or lost the underlying litigation or even by
whether the California Court imposed the obligation on petitioner because that
Court concluded that petitioner had acted in bad faith and out ofvindictiveness.
8. Section 67 - Application of2% Floor for Miscellaneous Deductions. The Court ofFederal Claims
has rejected the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in O'Neill v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), in Mellon
Bank, N.A., et al. v. United States, 47 Fed. CI. 186 (2000). The issue was whether investment advisory fees were
subject to the 2% floor of section 67(a) or were within the exception of section 67(e)(i).
Section 67, in relevant part, provides:
In the case ofan individual, the miscellaneous itemized deductions for any taxable
year shall be allQwed only to the extent that the aggregate of such deductions
exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross income.
I.R.C. section 67(e) applies subsection (a) to trusts as follows:
For purposes of this section, the adjusted gross income of an estate or trust shall
be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual, except that --
(1) the deductions for costs which are paid or incurred in connection with
the administration of the estate or trust and which would not have been
incurred if the property were not held in such trust or estate ...
The opinion states:
The Sixth Circuit's conclusion that different legal obligations apply depending
upon whether or not assets are held in trust is correct. A trustee has a legal
obligation to exercise proper skill and care with respect to the assets of the trust
while an individual holding assets in a nontrust context ordinarily has no similar
legal obligation. But the wording of the second prerequisite in I.R.C. section
67(e)(1) does not refer to legal obligations, trustee fees, or fiduciary
responsibilities, but rather focuses on the particular costs incurred and whether
those costs "would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such
trust." The absence ofa legal obligation in nontrust context arguably leaves open
the possibility, for example, that in certain circumstances investment advisory fees
MAY not have been incurred if the property were not held in trust, but it hardly
supports the conclusion that in all situations investment advisory fees "WOULD
not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust" (emphasis
added). The absence ofa legal obligation to incur particular costs simply does not
mean that an individual investor would not reasonably be expected to have incurred
those costs.
As to plaintiffs proposed characterization of the investment advisory fees as
trustee fees, assuming this characterization is appropriate, the fact that costs can be
characterized as trustee fees in a trust context says nothing about whether those
costs would not have been incurred in a nontrust context. When a trustee assumes
responsibility over trust property, the trustee must perfonn a variety oftasks, some
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ofwhich are unique to a trust and some ofwhich would have to be performed even
if the property were not held in trust. hence, characterizing the fees paid for the
performance of these tasks as trustee fees and determining whether or not those
fees would have been incurred in the absence of a trust are independent and not
logically related inquires. Whether costs for particular services can be
characterized as trustee fees is not mentioned as a factor in I.R.e. section 67(e)(I)
and is simply not relevant to the application of the statute's plain meaning.
The Court did not grant summary judgment to the government, stating:
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is deficient for a different reason. As
described above, the dispositive issue before this court is whether the disputed
costs involving investment advice and RKM&S services [an investment advisory
firm] "would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust."
To support its motion for summary judgment, defendant does not present any
affidavits or point to any portions of the record that show that there is a lack of
evidence to support a fmding that the disputed costs "would not have been incurred
if the property were not held in such trust." Instead, in its motion, defendant asks
this court "to take judicial notice of facts manifested on the fmancial pages ofany
newspaper: individuals OFTEN pay investment-advisory fees for property not held
in trust, and individuals also pay accounting and management fees for property not
held in trust" (emphasis added). But with respect to the fees paid by the trustees to
private investment advisors, assuming the court were to take such judicial notice,
that notice itself would not be sufficient to support summary judgment. The term
"often" is defined as follows: "on many occasions ... frequently." Webster's Third
New Int'l Dictionary 1568 (1976). Hence, the fact that individuals "often" pay
investment advisory fees for property not held in trust suggests that "on many
occasions" they do not. In support of its motion, defendant offers no guidance as
to why, on the particular facts ofthis case, the court should conclude that this case
falls within the frrst group where investment advisory fees would have been
incurred in the absence of a trust. With respect to the fees for accounting, tax
preparation, and management services paid to RKM&S, defendant contends that
the services RKM&S provides for individuals are"generally similar to the services
it provides for trusts, except in format. " But in their response to defendant's motion,
plaintiffs present deposition testimony to support the conclusion that such services
when provided for a trust are "more onerous" than those provided for individuals.
Iftrue, this indicates that at least some ofthe fees paid to RKM&S "would not have
been incurred if the property were not held in such trust." Before the grant of
summary judgment could be warranted, further amplification is needed as to the
precise services provided by RKM&S and the extent to which each of these
services is ofa type which "would not have been incurred if the property were not
held in such trust.
The result while less favorable to the taxpayer is sounder as a matter of policy.
9. Proposed Regulations on Revocable Trusts as Part of Estate. On December 18, 2000, the IRS
published proposed regulations on electing to treat Qualified Revocable Trusts as part ofan estate. REG - 106542-98.
The regulations would become effective when final. Under section 645, if both the executor (if any) of an estate and
the trustee ofa qualified revocable trust (QRT) elect the treatment provided in section 645, the trust shall be treated and
taxed for income tax purposes as part of the estate (and not as a separate trust) during the election period.
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A Qualified Revocable Trust (QRT) is explained as follows:
A QRT is any trust (or portion thereof) that on the date of death of the decedent
was treated as owned by the decedent under section 676 by reason ofa power held
by the decedent (determined without regard to section 672(e)). In accordance with
the legislative history accompanying section 645, the proposed regulations provide
that a trust that was treated as owned by the decedent under section 676 solely by
reason ofa power held by a nonadverse party is not a QRT. See H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 220, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. at 711 (1997). In addition, a trust that was treated
as owned by the decedent under section 676 by reason of a power held by the
decedent that was exercisable by the decedent only with the approval or consent of
another person is not a QRT. Further, a QRT must be a domestic trust under
section 7701 (a)(30)(E). A section 645 election for a QRT must result in a domestic
estate under section 7701(a)(30)(D). A section 645 election may be made with
respect to more than one QRT.
This definition is used in the carryover basis provisions of the 2001 Act.
Several areas dealt with are discussed as follows by the Supplementary Information:
1. Making the Election.
The section 645 election may be made whether or not a personal representative is
appointed for the decedent's estate. Under the proposed regulations, if a personal
representative is appointed for the decedent's estate, the personal representative and
the trustee ofthe QRT make the section 645 election by attaching a statement to the
Form 1041, "U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts," filed for the fIrst
taxable year ofthe decedent's estate (related estate). Ifa personal representative is
not appointed for the decedent's estate, the trustee makes a section 645 election for
the QRT by attaching a statement to the Form 1041 filed for the fIrst taxable year
of the trust treating the trust as an estate.
Rev. Proc. 98-13 (1998-1 C.B. 370) sets forth procedures for making the section
645 election. These proposed regulations, when finalized, will replace Rev. Proc.
98-13. The proposed regulations, in some instances, contain different procedures
than those provided in Rev. Proc. 98-13. Rev. Proc. 98-13, in most situations,
requires a trust that will make a section 645 election to obtain a taxpayer
identification number (TIN) and file a Form 1041 for the trust's short taxable year
beginning with the decedent's death and ending December 31 ofthat year. In these
situations, Rev. Proc. 98-13 provides that the section 645 election is made at the
time the Form 1041 is filed for the trust. If a Form 1041 is not required to be filed
for the trust, the election is considered made when the Form 1041 is filed for the
estate. The proposed regulations, however, provide that if a section 645 election
will be made for a trust, the trustee and the personal representative, if any, may
choose not to obtain a TIN for the trust or file a Form 1041 for the trust's short
taxable year. Under the proposed regulations, the section 645 election is considered
made only upon the filing of a Form 1041, with the required election statement
attached, for the fIrst taxable year of the related estate, or, if there is no personal
representative, the fIrst taxable year of the trust filing as an estate.
2. Form 1041 Filing.
During the election period, the personal representative files one Form 1041 for the
combined electing trust and related estate under the name and TIN of the related
estate. Thus, the electing trust must furnish payors ofthe trust with the TIN ofthe
related estate. Except as required under the separate share rule of section 663(c),
for purposes of filing the Form 1041 and computing the tax, the items of income,
deduction, and credit ofthe electing trust and the related estate are combined. The
proposed regulations do not provide rules for apportioning the tax liability of the
combined estate and electing trust. The' personal representative and trustee must
allocate the tax burden ofthe combined electing trust and related estate to the trust
and the estate in a manner that reasonably reflects the tax obligations ofeach. Ifthe
tax burdens are not reasonably allocated, gifts may be deemed to have been made.
If there is no personal representative, the trustee of the electing trust must file a
Form 1041 treating the trust as an estate under section 645 during the election
period. The trustee ofthe trust must obtain a TIN to be used by the trust during the
election period to file as an estate and must furnish this TIN to payors ofthe trust.
3. Taxation ofEstate and Trust.
Under the proposed regulations, the personal representative treats the electing trust
as part of the related estate for all purposes of subtitle A of the Internal Revenue
Code.
The electing trust and related estate are treated as separate shares under section
663(c) for purposes ofcomputing distributable net income (DNI) and applying the
distribution provisions ofsections 661 and 662. The proposed regulations provide
rules for adjusting the DNI ofthe separate shares with respect to distributions made
from one share to another share ofthe combined electing trust and related estate to
which sections 661 and 662 would apply had the distribution been made to a
beneficiary other than another share. Under the proposed regulations, the share
making the distribution reduces its DNI by the amount ofthe distribution deduction
that it would have been entitled to under section 661 had the distribution been made
to a beneficiary other than another share ofthe combined related estate and electing
trust, and, solely for purposes of calculating its DNI, the share receiving the
distribution increases its gross income by this amount.
Ifthere is no personal representative, the trustee ofthe electing trust treats the trust
as an estate for all purposes ofsubtitle A ofthe Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the
trustee of the electing trust may adopt a taxable year other than a calendar year.
4. Termination of Election Period and Tax Treatment.
The proposed regulations provide that the election period begins on the date ofthe
decedent's death and terminates on the day before the applicable date. If a Form
706 is not required to be filed for the decedent's estate, the applicable date is the
day which is two years after the date of the decedent's death.
Ifa Form 706 is required to be filed, the applicable date is the day that is 6 months
after the date of final determination of liability for estate tax. The proposed
regulations provide that the fmal determination of liability for estate tax is the
earliest day on which any of the following has occurred: (A) the issuance of an
estate tax closing letter, unless a claim for refund with respect to the estate tax is
filed within six months after the issuance of the letter; (B) the final disposition of
a claim for refund that resolves the liability for the estate tax, unless suit is
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instituted within six months ofthe disposition ofthe claim; (C) the execution ofa
settlement agreement that resolves the liability for estate tax; (D) the issuance of
a decision, judgment, decree, or other order by a court of competent jurisdiction
resolving the liability for estate tax unless a notice of appeal or petition for
certiorari is filed within 90 days after the issuance of the decision, judgment,
decree, or other order of a court; or (E) the expiration of the period of limitations
for assessment of the estate tax provided in section 6501.
******
At the close of the last day ofthe election period, the combined related estate and
electing trust, if there is a personal representative, or the electing trust, if there is
no personal representative, is deemed to distribute all the assets and liabilities of
the share (or shares) comprising the electing trust to a new trust in a distribution to
which sections 661 and 662 apply. Thus, the combined related estate and electing
trust, or the electing trust, as appropriate, is entitled to a distribution deduction to
the extent permitted under section 661 in the taxable year in which the election
period terminates as a result ofthe deemed distribution. The new trust must include
the deemed distribution in gross income to the extent required under section 662.
At the end ofthe election period, the new trust must obtain a new TIN. The related
estate continues to report under the TIN assigned to the combined related estate and
electing trust during the election period.
Following the termination of the election period, the taxable year of the new trust
must be the calendar year. The related estate must continue to use the taxable year
chosen by the combined related estate and electing trust during the election period.
B. CHARITABLE AND TAX-EXEMPT MATTERS - Sections 170, 642, 664, 501, 509, 2055, 2522, and
4940-4947
1. Gain on Stock Taxable to Donor When Gift is Not Made Soon Enough. The Tax Court opinion
in Ferguson v. Commissioner, 174 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) has been upheld. This is an important case that must be
considered when advising clients about funding charitable gifts including charitable remainder trusts. On July 18, 1988
American Health Companies, Inc. ("AHC") entered into a merger agreement with COl Holding, Inc. through its wholly
owned subsidiary DC Acquisition C9rp. The plan was for DC Acquisition to purchase the majority of the AHC stock
through a tender offer and then have DC Acquisition merge into AHC leaving AHC as a wholly owned subsidiary of
CDI. The tender offer, and merger, were conditioned on the acquisition by DC Acquisition of at least 85% of the
outstanding shares of AHC by August 30, 1988, but that condition was waivable at the sole discretion of DC
Acquisition, and was in fact extended to September 9, 1988. On September 12, 1988 DC Acquisition announced its
acceptance of all tendered or guaranteed AHC shares and on October 14, 1988 the merger was effectuated.
Between August 9, 1988 and August 26, 1988 the Fergusons "transferred" AHC shares to certain charitable
organizations. The date was a matter of dispute before the court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the tax court factual
findings that there was no completed delivery to the charities until September 9, 1988. The specific facts are worth
quoting in detail:
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The evidence shows that Brett Floyd was not acting on behalfof the Charities (as
their agent, as the trustee of a voluntary trust created for their benefit, or in any
other capacity) until the time that the Merrill Lynch clearance process had been
completed, the AHC stock had been transferred on the books of Merrill Lynch
from the Fergusons' account to the Charities' account, and the Fergusons had
authorized the transfer, finally and effectively. Even if Brett Floyd had ceased to
be acting under the control ofthe Fergusons at any time, not until Merrill Lynch's
legal department had completed its two-week clearance process, would he even
have been capable ofacting at the Charities' behest with respect to any disposition
of the AHC stock, which still remained in the Fergusons' personal accounts.
Moreover, in the memorandum disposition cited by the Fergusons as support for
their contentions, the Tax Court there held that, under Montana law, a voluntary
trust would not be formed without some sign, some overt act, which demonstrated
that, after receiving stock on behalfofa named beneficiary, the recipient bank had
accepted its position as trustee for the benefit of the named beneficiaries. See
Richardson v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) P 84,595 (T.C. Nov. 9, 1984). In that
case, the contribution thus was not completed for tax purposes until the recipient
bank had tendered the received shares on behalfofthe named beneficiaries. See ide
Likewise, in the present case, although controlled as to the formation ofa voluntary
trust by Idaho law (which does not address this issue), logic and common sense
dictate that the Fergusons' gift could not be completed until Merrill Lynch, through
its legal department and Brett Floyd, finally had decided that it was willing to
transfer the shares according to the Fergusons' wishes and to tender the shares on
behalf of the Charities.
Furthermore, contrary to the Fergusons' assertion, Brett Floyd's testimony as to the
existence ofthe original letters ofexecution and as to the intended purpose ofthose
letters, if they indeed existed, was not uncontroverted. The total absence of any
trace ofthe original letters and the "substantial documentary evidence" that the Tax
Court relied upon in its decision, easily could have supported a fmding that Brett
Floyd was not a credible supporting witness. This documentary evidence included:
(1) the donation-in-kind records completed and dated "9-9-88" by Brett Floyd
himself; (2) the donation-in-kind receipts submitted and dated September 9, 1988,
by the Church; (3) the sole existence of "final versions" (as opposed to "new
copies") of the signed letters of authorization; and (4) the disclosure documents
dated September 9, 1988, submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission
and completed by Billy G. DuPree, Jr., AHC's very own vice president of legal
affairs and secretary. Thus, the evidence in the record clearly supports the Tax
Court's implicit finding that there were no original letters ofauthorization that were
intended to be anything other than rough drafts, mere working copies, which in fact
were thrown away once they had been replaced by fmal versions.
Therefore, in the absence of Brett Floyd's role as anything other than an agent of
the Fergusons or Merrill Lynch, there could have been no contribution until the
delivery ofthe AHC stock to the Charities' account had been completed. And in the
absence of any earlier letters of authorization that were intended to be fmal and
effective, there was no completed delivery to the Charities, no transfer that was
legally binding and irrevocable, until the date that the Fergusons' letters of
authorization were fmally and effectively executed -- September 9, 1988.
The next issue before the court was whether a contribution on September 9, 1988 was too late to avoid the
assignment ofincome doctrine. The tax court had found that by August 31, 1988 over 50% ofthe AHC stock had been
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tendered and, thus, that it was "quite unlikely" that any ofthe relevant parties would back out ofthe tender offer for the
merger or that the requisite number of shares could not be tendered by the close of the tender offer window. In
particular, the court stated:
Third, the Fergusons and at least one commentator, see Note, Taxpayers Liable for
Gain in Stock Donated to Charity During a Tender Offer: Ferguson v.
Commissioner, 51 Tax Law. 441 (1998), contend that the Tax Court's analysis of
the likelihood that as of August 31, 1988, the merger would proceed, was
fundamentally flawed because it failed to take into account the bilateral nature of
a merger. More specifically, they claim that as of August 31, 1988, even though
more than 50% ofthe AHC shareholders had expressed their tacit approval of the
pending merger by tendering their shares, there was still a significant possibility
that DC Acquisition's own shareholders might not approve ofthe merger -- a threat
until 90% ownership had been obtained by DC Acquisition, thereby eliminating the
need for any formal shareholder vote. However, further analysis shows that it is the
Fergusons' and the one commentator's analyses that are fundamentally flawed. Both
make it sound as if there was much uncertainty as to how the many shareholders
of DC Acquisition would vote. Both seem to have completely forgotten that DC
Acquisition's sole shareholder was CDI, and that CDl's board of directors (along
with DC Acquisition's single director -- another corporate insider) therefore
effectively could approve the merger without turning to any outside shareholders.
And for the reasons discussed above, it was most unlikely as ofAugust 31, 1988,
that CDl's board ofdirectors was not fully committed to approving the merger once
the tender offer had been completed. Thus, the Tax Court's analysis was sound.
******
On a fmal note, the Fergusons raise two policy considerations, but these
considerations do not support their contentions. First, the Fergusons rightly point
out that there is a distinction between tax evasion (Le., choosing an impermissible
path) and tax avoidance (Le., choosing the least costly permissible path) and that
so long as they are acting in accordance with the existing tax laws, the motives for
their actions should not dictate the consequences oftheir actions. However, simply
because the Fergusons have the right to choose the least costly path (from a tax
perspective) upon which to walk, they do not have the right to be free from taxation
if they decide to walk the line between what is and what is not permissible, and
happen to stray across it, as they have here. Second, the Fergusons note that the
logic ofthe Tax Court's decision implies that their AHC stock already might have
ripened by some date even earlier than August 31, 1988. In essence, they note that
there is no clear line demarcating the frrst date upon which a taxpayer's appreciated
stock has ripened into a fixed right to receive cash pursuant to a pending merger.
However, from the perspective oftaxpayers, walking the line between tax evasion
and tax avoidance seems to be a patently dangerous business. Any tax lawyer worth
his fees would not have recommended that a donor make a gift ofappreciated stock
this close to an ongoing tender offer and a pending merger, especially when they
were negotiated and planned by the donor. See, e.g., Gain on Tendered Stock
Taxable Despite Charitable Donation, 26 Tax'n for Law. 114 (1997). Therefore, we
will not go out ofour way to make this dangerous business any easier for taxpayers
who knowingly assume its risks. Moreover, from the perspective ofjudging such
cases, there is no special reason that we should curtail the application of this
doctrine simply because it requires "engaging in an exercise in line drawing, a
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difficult task which nevertheless is part of the daily grist ofjudicial life. " Badger
Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) P 856 (T.C. Oct. 8, 1997)
(Tannenwald, J.) (discussing generally the determination of the character of a
transferred interest).
[Emphasis added.]
2. Generosity In Allowing Reformation for Scrivener's Error. PLR 199923013 allowed the
proposed reformation of a charitable remainder unitrust where the drafting attorney provided a sworn affidavit that
various disqualifying provisions were the result ofdrafting errors. The drafting errors were substantial: among other
things, the trust gave the grantor a power ofacquisition described in section 675(4)(C), allowed the trustee to pay death
taxes from the trust assets, and allowed the trustee to terminate the trust if after the death of both of the grantors was
not economically feasible to continue the trusts existence.
3. Insurance Policy in Charitable Remainder Trust. PLR 199915045 approved the transfer ofa life
insurance policy to a charitable remainder unitrust. A husband would create the trust for the benefit ofhis stepdaughter,
purchase an insurance policy on his wife's life, and transfer the policy to the trust. The trust would be a net income with
makeup unitrust described in section 664(d)(3).
The first issue for the Service was whether the trust would be a grantor trust because of the trustee's powers
to pay premiums on the life of the wife of the grantor under section 677(a)(3). A trust that is a grantor trust may not
be a charitable remainder trust. Section 677(a)(3) provides that a grantor is treated as the owner ofany portion of the
trust whose income, without the approval or consent ofany adverse party, is, or in the discretion of the grantor, a non-
adverse party, or both, may be, applied to the payment ofpremiums on insurance policies on the life ofthe grantor and
the grantor's spouse, except with respect to policies irrevocably payable for a purpose specified in section 170(c). The
trust provided that the insurance proceeds would be allocated to trust principal and not income. Thus, because the trust
was a net income unitrust, the Service concluded that the insurance proceeds would never be payable to a non-charitable
beneficiary and thus that the insurance policies would be irrevocably payable for a charitable purpose.
The ruling also concluded that the husband would be entitled to an income tax charitable contribution deduction
for the present fair market value of the remainder interest in the insurance policy, and for a similar gift tax charitable
deduction, and that the trust would not be included in the grantor's estate. Neither the grantor nor the grantor's spouse
was trustee of the trust.
4. Specificity ofCharitable Beneficiaries. At issue in Estate ofKenneth E. Starkey v. United States,
83 AFTR2d 'jJ99-843 (U.S. S.D. IN 1999) was whether the following disposition ofresidue created a charitable trust:
All ofthe rest, residue and remainder ofmy property, I give and bequeath to Norma
Jeanne Starkey, Cynthia Starkey Robinson, Christopher Kenneth Starkey, Theresa
Carole Starkey, and Carrie Jeanne Starkey, whom I nominate and appoint as
Trustees, to be held by said Trustees, in trust for the uses and purposes herein set
forth.
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Half of the income from the trust is to go to Lawndale Community Church in
Chicago, Illinois provided that Wayne Gordon is still the pastor of it at the time of
my death and that church will receive this until the time that he is no longer pastor.
The Trustees are to manage the property of the Trust for the benefit of this
beneficiary, missionaries preaching the Gospel of Christ, and Milligan College.
Subject to the provisions . . . relative to the termination of this trust and the
provisions for distribution, the Trustees may distribute to a beneficiary or apply for
such beneficiary's sole benefit, so much of the net income and corpus of the trust
at any time and from time to time as the Trustees deem advisable. Any income
which is not distributed may be accumulated as income or added to the trust.
The court held that it did not. The Will had been drafted by the decedent's son who was not an estate planning
attorney. After death, the estate filed for section 501(c)(3) status for the trust and the application was rejected by the
IRS. The estate attempted to "reform" the trust in Indiana Probate Court, which was affmned by the Indiana Court of
Appeals in an unpublished decision. The United States was not a party to the action. The court declined to give effect
to the reformation because, the court determined, that the court did not receive "the type of full and fair presentation
of the issues that is the hallmark ofadversariaI proceedings."
The court also determined that the post mortem reformation would not relate back to the date of death citing
the case of Van Den Wymelenberg v. United States, 397 F.2d 443 (7th Cir.), Cert. Denied, 393 U.S. 953 (1968) in
which the 7th Circuit stated that "not even judicial reformation can operate to change the federal tax consequences of
a completed transaction. II
The Seventh Circuit reversed, 223 F.3rd 694 (2000). The court held that the Indiana court's construction was
reasonable. The opinion states:
To qualify for the charitable deduction, the charitable bequest must be ascertainable
at the time ofthe transfer. Estate ofMarine v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
990 F.2d 136, 138 (4th Cir.1993) ("AscertainabiJity at the date of death of the
amount going to charity is the test."). If a will provides a trustee with discretion to
distribute trust assets to charities and to individuals for their personal use, the
amount bequeathed to the charities might not be ascertainable at the time of the
transfer. See Merchants Nat. Bank ofBoston v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue,
320 U.S. 256, 257-58, 263, 64 S.Ct. 108, 88 L.Ed. 35 (1943); see also Estate of
Marine, 990 F.2d at 138-39. Such a trust, where the assets are "split" between
charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries, is known as a "split-interest" trust. See
26 U.S.C. § 2055(e)(2). With such a trust, the estate can only take a charitable
deduction ifthe charitable interest ofthe trust is presently ascertainable. See ide at
§§ 2055(e)(2)(A) & (B), 2055(e)(3); see also Treas. Reg. §20.2055-2(a) ("Ifa trust
is created or property is transferred for both a charitable and a private purpose,
deduction may be taken of the value of the charitable beneficial interest only
insofar as that interest is presently ascertainable, and hence severable from the
noncharitabIe interest.").
The will's codicil clearly states that Mr. Starkey intended to set up a charitable
trust, and the IRS acknowledges that this was indeed his intent. Its dispute with the
Estate is over the type of charitable trust he intended to create and, more
specifically, whom he intended to benefit. The IRS acknowledges that if Mr.
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Starkey intended the "missionaries" phrase to create two beneficiaries (Lawndale
Community Church and Milligan College, both ofwhich are qualified charities),
then the value of the charitable interest would be ascertainable and hence
deductible. In that case, the trust would not be a split-interest trust because both the
trust beneficiaries would be qualified charities and the trust assets could only be
used for their benefit. As a result, the charitable portion of the trust would be
ascertainable (it would be the entire value of the trust). If, however, Mr. Starkey
intended to benefit a group of missionaries in addition to the church and the
college, the IRS argues that then Mr. Starkey will have created a split- interest trust
with both charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries. In that case the trust assets
would not have been specifically divided among the charitable and noncharitable
beneficiaries. Because the charitable portion of the trust would thus not be
ascertainable, the Estate would not qualify for a charitable deduction. See Treas.
Reg. § 20.2055-2(a). We agree with the IRS that this is the "ultimate issue" and
thus must now determine whom Mr. Starkey intended to assist financially in
preaching the Gospel of Christ, and if the will sufficiently expresses his intent.
Both parties agree that Indiana law governs our analysis of Mr. Starkey's will.
Estate ofBowgren v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, 105 F.3d 1156, 1161 (7th
Cir.1997). In Indiana, the primary goal in interpreting a will is to determine and
give effect to the testator's intent as expressed in the will, and determining this
intent is a question of law. Gladden v. Jolly, 655 N.E.2d 590, 592
(Ind.Ct.App.1995); Hershberger v. Luzader, 654 N.E.2d 841, 842
(Ind.Ct.App.1995). The Estate notes that the probate court determined that Mr.
Starkey intended the charitable trust to have only two beneficiaries, and it argues
that the district court should have adopted this determination ofMr. Starkey's intent
because it was affrrmed by the Indiana Court of Appeals, "the highest Indiana
Court which has addressed the issue."
The Supreme Court has made clear that we are not bound by the probate court's
decision: "where the federal estate tax liability turns upon the character of a
property interest held and transferred by the decedent under state law, federal
authorities are not bound by the determination made ofsuch property interests by
a state trial court." Commissioner ofInternal Revenue v. Estate ofBosch, 387 U.S.
456, 457, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1967). Intermediate state appellate
decisions, however, are presumed to be a correct indicator (or "datum") ofstate law
which we may not disregard unless other decisions convince us "that the highest
court of the state would decide otherwise." Id. at 465, 87 S.Ct. 1776 (emphasis
omitted). But Bosch also tells us that if a state's supreme court has not resolved an
issue, we have to apply what we "find to be the state law after giving 'proper regard'
to relevant rulings ofother courts of the State." Id.
While the Supreme Court did not expand upon what it meant by "proper regard,"
we note that the Indiana Court ofAppeals did not publish its decision. As a result,
it is questionable whether we may simply presume that it correctly indicates Indiana
law--whether we may "properly regard" it as precedent--even though it is, of
course, directly on point. See Ind. R.App. P. 15(A)(3) (unpublished decisions shall
not "be regarded as precedent nor cited before any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense ofres judicata, collateral estoppel or the law ofthe case.");
Hom v. A.O. Smith Corp., 50 F.3d 1365, 1370 n. 10 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting Ind.
R.App. P. 15(A)(3)) ("Although admittedly on point, Colglazier [v. A.O. Smith
Corp., No. 28AOI-8810-CV-00310, 541 N.E.2d 316 (Ind.Ct.App. June 22, 1989)]
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is an unpublished memorandum opinion, and Indiana's rules make plain that such
opinions shall not 'be regarded as precedent....' "). But while an unpublished
opinion is normally not presumed to be an indicator or "datum" of state law as a
published (precedential) decision would be, Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465, 87 S.Ct. 1776,
we note that arguably (although no one seems to have made the argument) it is the
law ofthe case, which is one of the exceptions under Ind. R.App. P. 15(A)(3) for
when unpublished decisions "may be regarded as precedent." Supra. Anyway,
regardless ofthe extent to which it may be viewed as a "datum" ofstate law, we are
persuaded by the Indiana Court of Appeals' analysis in this matter.
The Court ofAppeals concluded that the "missionaries" phrase was ambiguous and
then construed this ambiguity. A will is ambiguous ifit is reasonably susceptible
to different interpretations. Hauck v. Second Nat'l Bank of Richmond, 153
Ind.App. 245, 286 N.E.2d 852, 863 (1972). In this case, the Estate contends that
the "missionaries" phrase is unambiguous and modifies "this beneficiary" (which
everyone agrees refers to the Lawndale Community Church). This is an entirely
reasonable grammatical construction. See In re City of Fort Wayne's Petition to
Establish a Conservancy Dist., 484 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) ("in the
phrase 'freeholder ..., who owns land,' the clause 'who owns land' is a descriptive
clause. Note the clause is set off from the antecedent noun by a comma indicating
a rather loose relationship to 'freeholder.' "). The IRS, though, seems to contend
that this phrase is ambiguous and that it should be construed to denote a second
beneficiary in a series of three beneficiaries. On its face, this construction is also
plausible. Cf. Pleasureland Museum, Inc. v. Dailey, 422 N.E.2d 754, 756
(Ind.Ct.App.1981) (In "the phrase 'stores and shops'... the words are connected with
the conjunctive 'and,' and are set apart from the other items in the [series] by a
comma."). Because the "missionaries" phrase is reasonably susceptible to different
meanings, we agree that it is ambiguous. As a result, and like the Indiana Court of
Appeals, we must use rules of construction to determine Mr. Starkey's intent. See
ide (ambiguity must exist before a court may construe a will).
Rules of grammar may be used to construe a will. See Donahue v. Watson, 411
N.E.2d 741,750 (Ind.Ct.App.1980); Nichols v. Alexander, 90 Ind.App. 520,152
N.E. 863,864 (1926) (en bane); cf. Faris Mailing, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of State
Revenue, 557 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ind.Tax 1990) ("rules ofgrammar can be used to
construe an ambiguous statute"). We are reluctant, however, to hang our hat on the
cases the parties have cited to support their competing interpretations of the
"missionaries" phrase (modifier versus an item in a series). In the case the Estate
cites, the court was determining what a phrase modified; it was not passing upon
the question presented in this case: whether a phrase is a modifying phrase or a
separate item in a series. See Donahue (and other cases), note 4, supra. And the
case the IRS cites, Cape v. State, 272 Ind. 609,400 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1980), also
did not address this specific issue. See also Pleasureland Museum, Inc., supra.
However, Dr. Franken (the English professor whom the Indiana courts relied upon
as a grammatical aid) did address this precise question. She concluded that the
"missionaries" phrase most likely modified "this beneficiary" because for the
phrase to denote an item in a series would be "inconsistent ... with the parity of
value generally intended by such a seriatim listing. It is not a reasonable
interpretation that the decedent could have intended an elaborate item in the middle
surrounded by two very specific and short items." She also rejected the notion of
a seriatim listing because "[rlead as three items in a series, the phrase fails to
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produce three distinct categories." Dr. Franken's expert opinion provides a sound
grammatical reason for the Indiana Court ofAppeals to conclude "that the phrase
'missionaries preaching the Gospel of Christ' is most logically interpreted in the
context of the will as standing in apposition to, and describing, the Lawndale
Community Church."
[Footnotes omitted.]
The opinion suggests that if lower courts issue reasonable opinions they may be accepted for tax purposes.
5. No Income Tax Deduction Available to an Estate for a Charitable Bequest. In Crestar Bank, et
ai. v. IRS, et aI., 83 AFTR2d ~ 99-839 (V.Va. 1999) the District Court determined that an estate was not entitled to an
income tax deduction for a charitable bequest. The decedent died in 1989 bequeathing halfofcertain closely-held stock
to a charitable trust. The estate claimed an estate tax deduction under section 2055 for the bequest. Some years later,
the estate claimed an income tax deduction for the value ofthe bequest, approximately $1 million, under section 642(c).
The court found that the stock was not part of the estate's gross income and thus no income tax deduction would be
allowed.
6. Private Inurement. In an important case to the tax-exempt community, the 7th Circuit has held that
there was no private inurement in the relationship ofa fund raiser to the charity where about 90% ofthe contributions
received by the charity during the period the fund raiser was employed were paid to the fund raiser for fund raising
costs. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner, 83 AFTR2d ~ 99-416 (7th Cir. 1999). In a very direct opinion,
Judge Posner stated that the private inurement prohibition was designed "to prevent the siphoning ofcharitable receipts
to insiders of the charity, not to empower the IRS to monitor the terms of arm's length contracts made by charitable
organizations with the firms that supply them with essential inputs." The Tax Court had not considered the private
benefit claim made by the IRS so the court did not either, although the opinion suggests that the court might view such
a claim favorably.
7. Charitable Remainder Trust Final Regulations. Final regulations dealing with certain aspects of
a charitable remainder trust have been issued. T.D. 8791.
(1) Flip Unitrusts. A charitable remainder unitrust may change from a net income unitrust (with
or without makeup) and a fixed percentage unitrust, upon a date or event outside the control ofthe trustee or any other
person. Examples given include marriage, divorce, death or birth ofa child, or the sale of an unmarketable asset. The
conversion is effective for the tax year following the tax year in which the conversion event occurs. Upon conversion
any makeup amount, under section 664(d)(3)(b), will be forfeited.
An unmarketable asset is an asset other than cash or cash equivalents, or other assets that can readily be sold
for cash or cash equivalents. Examples include real property, closely-held stock, an unregistered stock exemption which
would allow a public sale.
The existing charitable remainder trust may be reformed if proceedings are begun by June 8, 1999, or, as
extended, completed by June 30, 2000.
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(2) Time ofPayment ofUnitrust or Annuity Amount. Applicable for tax years ending after April
18, 1997, an annuity or unitrust amount may be paid in a reasonable time after the close of the year for which it is due
so long as the character ofthe amount in the recipient's hands is income under section 664(b)(I), (2), or (3) or the trust
distributes other property that it owned as ofthe close ofthe taxable year to pay the annuity or unitrust amount and the
trustee elects to treat any income generated by the distribution as occurring on the last day ofthe tax year for which the
amount is due. Such an election is made on a Form 5227, trust Information Return.
For a trust created before December 10, 1998, the annuity or unitrust amount may be paid within a reasonable
time up to the close ofthe tax year for which is due ifthe original percentage used to calculate the annuity, or the annual
unitrust percentage, is 15% or less.
A "reasonable time" will normally be up until the time required to file the trust information return, Form 5227.
(3) Appraising Unmarketable Assets. Ifa charitable remainder unitrust has unmarketable assets
and the only trustee is the grantor, a non-charitable beneficiary, or a related insubordinate party to the grantor, grantor's
spouse, or non-charitable beneficiary (as defined in section 672(c)), the trustee must value those assets using a current
qualified appraisal from a qualified appraiser, as both are defined in Treas. Reg. §1.170A-13. A co-trustee who is an
independent trustee may value the trust in marketable assets. PLR 200029031 approved the grantor serving as sole
trustee where the trust can invest only in assets with an objectively ascertainable market value.
The rules for valuing unmarketable assets are effective for trusts created on or after December 10, 1998.
(4) Application ofSection 2702 to NIMCRUTs. The abuse that the regulations are attempting
to prevent may be illustrated as follows. Suppose a parent creates a NIMCRUT for herself for five years with
subsequent payments to child for life. The trust is to pay the lesser of net income or 5% each year. If the trust is
invested during the parents' term to produce 1% it will generate a 4% arrearage annually. After the child becomes the
beneficiary the trust could be reinvested to produce a greater than 5% return, with the arrearage being paid to the child.
The valuation of the parent's retained interest would have been overstated, and the gift to the child understated.
The regulations provide that unitrust interest in a NIMCRUT that are retained by the donor or any applicable
family member will be valued at zero when a non-charitable beneficiary of the trust is someone other than the donor,
the donor's spouse who is a u.S. citizen, or both.
(5) Allocation ofPre-contribution Gain to Trust Income and Makeup Amount as liability. The
regulations prohibit allocation of pre-contribution gain to trust income for a NIMCRUT. However, the governing
instrument may, ifallowable under applicable state law, allow the trustee to allocate post-contribution capital gains to
trust income. The makeup amount in a NIMCRUT does not need to be taken into consideration as a liability when
valuing the assets ofthe NIMCRUT. PLR 199907013 continues the Service's ruling position that a trust provision may
allow the trustee to allocate capital gain to income so long as the trust provision is not directly adverse to applicable state
law and that it pertains only to post-contribution appreciation.
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8. Division ofCharitable Lead Trust. In PLR 199929021 the IRS allowed three children -- co-trustees
of one lead trust -- to divide the trust into three shares without adverse income or transfer tax consequences or self-
dealing penalties.
9. Borrowing by Charitable Remainder Trust to Make Payment. Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-8, T.D.
8926 (January 4,2001) provides:
(a) Purpose and scope. This section is intended to prevent the avoidance of
the purposes ofthe charitable remainder trust rules regarding the characterizations
of distributions from those trusts in the hands of the recipients and should be
interpreted in a manner consistent with this purpose. This section applies to all
charitable remainder trusts described in section 664 and the beneficiaries of such
trusts.
(b) Deemed sale by trust. (1) For purposes of section 664(b), a charitable
remainder trust shall be treated as having sold, in the year in which a distribution
of an annuity or unitrust amount is made from the trust, a pro rata portion of the
trust assets to the extent that the distribution of the annuity or unitrust amount
would (but for the application of this subparagraph (b» be characterized in the
hands ofthe recipient as being from the category described in section 664(b)(4) and
exceeds the amount of the previously undistributed
(i) cash contributed to the trust (with respect to which a deduction was
allowable under section 170, 2055, 2106, or 2522), plus
(ii) basis in any contributed property (with respect to which a deduction was
allowable under section 170, 2055, 2106, or 2522) that was sold by the trust.
(2) Any transaction that has the purpose or effect ofcircumventing the rules
in this paragraph (b) shall be disregarded.
(3) For purposes of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, "trust assets" do not
include cash or assets purchased with the proceeds of a trust borrowing, forward
sale, or similar transaction.
(4) Proper adjustment shall be made to any gain or loss subsequently realized
for gain or loss taken into account under paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
(c) Examples. The following examples illustrate the rules ofparagraph (b) of
this section:
Example 1. Deemed sale by trust. Donor contributes stock having a fair market
value of $2 million to a charitable remainder unitrust with a unitrust amount of 50
percent of the net fair market value of the trust assets and a two-year term. The
stock has a total adjusted basis of$400,000. In Year 1, the trust receives dividend
income of$20,000. As ofthe valuation date, the trust's assets have a net fair market
value of $2,020,000 ($2 million in stock, plus $20,000 in cash). To obtain
additional cash to pay the unitrust amount to the noncharitable beneficiary, the
trustee borrows $990,000 against the value of the stock. The trust then distributes
$1,010,000 to the beneficiary before the end of Year I. Under section 664(b)( I),
$20,000 of the distribution is characterized in the hands of the beneficiary as
A - 20
dividend income. The rest ofthe distribution, $990,000, is attributable to an amount
received by the trust that did not represent either cash contributed to the trust or a
return of basis in any contributed asset sold by the trust during Year I. Under
paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the stock is a trust asset because it was not
purchased with the proceeds of the borrowing. Therefore, in Year I, under
paragraph (b)(I) of this section, the trust is treated as having sold $990,000 of
stock and as having realized $792,000 ofcapital gain (the trust's basis in the shares
deemed sold is $198,000). Thus, in the hands of the beneficiary, $792,000 of the
distribution is characterized as capital gain under section 664(b)(2) and $198,000
is characterized as a tax-free return ofcorpus under section 664(b)(4). No part of
the $990,000 loan is treated as acquisition indebtedness under section 514(c)
because the entire loan has been recharacterized as a deemed sale.
Example 2. Adjustment to trust's basis in assets deemed sold. The facts are the
same as in Example I. During Year 2, the trust sells the stock for $2,100,000. The
trustee uses a portion ofthe proceeds ofthe sale to repay the outstanding loan, plus
accrued interest. Under paragraph (b)(4) of this section, the trust's adjusted basis
in the stock is $1,192,000 ($400,000 plus the $792,000 ofgain recognized in Year
1). Therefore, the trust recognizes capital gain (as described in section 664(b)(2»
in Year 2 of $908,000.
Example 3. Distribution ofcash contributions. Upon the death of 0, the proceeds
of a life insurance policy on D's life are payable to T, a charitable remainder
annuity trust. The terms of the trust provide that, for a period of three years
commencing upon D's death, the trust shall pay an annuity amount equal to $x
annually to A, the child of D. After the expiration of such three-year period, the
remainder interest in the trust is to be transferred to charity Z. In Year 1, the trust
receives payment of the life insurance proceeds and pays the appropriate pro rata
portion of the $x annuity to A from the insurance proceeds. During Year 1, the
trust has no income. Because the entire distribution is attributable to a cash
contribution (the insurance proceeds) to the trust for which a charitable deduction
was allowable under section 2055 with respect to the present value of the
remainder interest passing to charity, the trust will not be treated as selling a pro
rata portion of the trust assets under paragraph (b)(1) of this section. Thus, the
distribution is characterized in A's hands as a tax-free return of corpus under
section 664(b)(4).
(d) Effective date. This section is applicable to distributions made by a
charitable remainder trust after October 18, 1999.
The fmal regulations provide an exception to the general rule explained as follows:
In addition, in order to make it less likely that a non-abusive trust would violate the
payment rule, two new exceptions have been added to sections 1.664-2(a)(I)(i)(a)
and 1.664-3(a)(1)(i)(g). These new exceptions provide that a distribution ofcash
made within a reasonable period of time after the close of the year may be
characterized as corpus under section 664(b)(4) to the extent it was attributable to
(i) a contribution of cash to the trust with respect to which a deduction was
allowable under section 170, 2055, 2106, or 2522, or (ii) a return of basis in any
asset contributed to the trust with respect to which a deduction was allowable under
section 170, 2055, 2106, or 2522, and sold by the trust during the year for which
the annuity or unitrust amount was due.
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10. Securities Purchased on Margin Give Rise to UBIT. The Second Circuit has decided Henry E.
& Nancy Horton Bartels Trust v. United States, 85 AFTR2d Par. 2000-572; No. 98-6141 (April 11 ,2000). A trust that
was a supporting organization as defined in section 509(a)(3) bought securities on margin. The opinion states:
Under the plain language of the UBIT, the purchase of securities on margin is a
purchase using borrowed funds; therefore, under section 514(c), the securities are
subject to an "acquisition indebtedness." See Elliot Knitwear Profit Sharing Plan
v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d347, 348-51 (3d Cir. 1980). Thus, the margin- financed
securities constitute "debt-fmanced property" under section 514(b)(1). As "debt-
financed property," section 512(b)(4) and section 514(a)(1) require that the income
derived from these securities be treated "as an item ofgross income derived from
an unrelated trade or business" (in the proportion that the basis of the property
bears to the amount fmanced), and, therefore, this income is included in the section
512 computation of unrelated business taxable income. See, e.g., ide (holding
securities purchased on margin are subject to UBIT, as margin-fmanced securities
are debt- financed property, and section 514(a) requires treating income derived
therefrom as income from unrelated trade or business). Thus, Taxpayer's reliance
on Supreme Court decisions construing "trade or business" in other contexts and
under the general test for detennining unrelated business taxable income is
misplaced because section 512(b)(4) and section 514(a)(1) require that Taxpayer's
income derived from margin-financed securities be treated as income derived from
an unrelated trade or business.
The opinion rejected the argument that because there was no unfair competition there was no UBIT. The court
rejected a final argument:
Next, Taxpayer argues that its margin-financed securities are not "debt-financed
property" because section 514(b)(I) defines "debt-fmanced property" as property
that is "held to produce income," and this phrase should be interpreted to include
only "periodic" income. We find no merit to this argument for at least two reasons.
First, Taxpayer cites no authority for this construction of section 514(b)( I), and
there is nothing in the statutory language or legislative history of the UBIT
supporting this restrictive interpretation. Second, the applicable regulation
specifically construes "income" under section 514(b)( I) as including both capital
gains and recurring or "periodic" income (e.g., dividends). In this respect, Treasury
Regulation section 1.514(b)-1(a) defines "debt- financed property" as
any property which is held to produce income (e.g., rental real estate,
tangible personal property, and corporate stock), and with respect to
which there is an acquisition indebtedness (detennined without regard to
whether the property is debt-financed property) at any time during the
taxable year. THE TERM "INCOME" IS NOT LIMITED TO
RECURRING INCOME BUT APPLIES AS WELL TO GAINS FROM
THE DISPOSITION OF THE PROPERTY.
Treas. Reg. section 1.514(b)-1(a) (emphasis added). Although Taxpayer
urges us to reject the Commissioner's interpretation ofthe UBIT, we must
sustain the regulation unless it is "unreasonable and plainly inconsistent"
with the statute. Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533 (1978);
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-51 (1969).
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Section 61(a) of the Code broadly defmes income to include "all income from
whatever source derived," and lists, as examples, both periodic income (e.g.,
dividends and interest) and nonperiodic income (e.g., compensation for services;
gross income derived from business; and gains derived from dealings in property).
26 U.S.C. section 61(a)(I), (2), (3), (4), (7). There is nothing in the statutory
language to suggest that this general defmition of "income" is inapplicable to
section 514(b)( I) or to justify limiting section 514(b)( I) to "periodic" income.
Moreover, the legislative history of the UBIT does not indicate that Congress
intended to tax only "periodic" income under those provisions. Accordingly, we
reject Taxpayer's argument that section 514(b)(I)'s reference to "debt-financed
property" includes only "periodic" income.
11. LLC as Grantor ofCharitable Remainder Trust. PLR 199952071 detennined that an LLC may
be the grantor and recipient of a tenn ofyears charitable remainder trust.
12. Charitable Bequest of Deferred Compensation. PLR 200002011 dealt with a bequest to charity
of the following items by a corporate executive:
During the course of Taxpayer's employment, the has elected to defer receipt of
certain amounts to which he was entitled, consisting of(1) compensation that had
been payable to Taxpayer but the receipt ofwhich he elected to defer pursuant to
Corporation's deferred compensation plan, (2) shares ofCorporation stock that had
been payable to Taxpayer as a result ofhis exercise ofcompensatory stock options
granted to him by Corporation, the receipt ofwhich he elected to defer pursuant to
Corporation's deferred stock option plan. Furthennore, Taxpayer negotiated with
Corporation for the Corporation to provide a death benefit to his estate or
designated beneficiaries upon his death. Collectively, these three items are referred
to as the deferred compensation.
Pursuant to Taxpayer's agreement with Corporation with respect tot he deferred
compensation, Taxpayer may designate anyone or more beneficiaries within a
certain class, which would include charitable organizations, to whom the deferred
compensation would be payable in the event of his death.
Taxpayer intends to name as the designated beneficiaries of the deferred
compensation one or more charitable organizations, each ofwhich qualifies for tax-
exempt status pursuant to section 501(a) as an organization described in section
501(c)(3).
During the course ofhis employment with the corporation, Taxpayer also has been
granted certain rights (options) to purchase shares ofcorporation stock at specified
option prices. No option price was less than the fair market value of the stock to
which it applied on the date the option was granted.
It is represented that the options are the type of options commonly known as
"nonstatutory options" because they do not meet the requirements for special
income tax treatment under sections 421 through 424 ("statutory options"). It is
further represented that at the time oftheir grant, the options did not have a readily
ascertainable fair market value.
A - 23
Pursuant to Taxpayer's agreement with Corporation under which the options were
granted, in the event ofhis death, Taxpayer may transfer the options by will to any
one or more beneficiaries within a certain class, which would include charitable
organizations. Taxpayer intends to bequeath the options under his will to one or
more of the charitable organizations.
The IRS ruled:
1. Taxpayer's estate will be eligible for a federal estate tax charitable
deduction under section 2055(a) for the deferred compensation passing to the
charitable organizations and for the value of the options passing to the charitable
organizations.
2. The deferred compensation to which the charitable organizations will
become entitled following Taxpayer's death will be income in respect ofa decedent
under section 691 which will be included in the gross income of the charitable
organizations in the year in which the charitable organizations receive such income.
3. When, following Taxpayers death, the charitable organizations exercise
the options which Taxpayer bequeaths to them under his Will, the charitable
organizations will recognize income in respect of a decedent under section 691
which will be included in the gross income of the charitable organizations.
The IRS referred to the application of section 83 as follows:
Section 83(a) of the Code provides that if, in connection with the performance of
services, property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom the
services are performed, the excess of -- (1) the fair market value of the property
(determined without regard to any restriction other than a restriction which by its
terms will never lapse) at the first time the rights ofthe person having the beneficial
interest in the property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier, over (2) the amount, if any, paid for the
property, will be included in the gross income of the person who performed the
services in the fIrst taxable year in which the rights of the person having the
beneficial interest in the property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable. Under section 83(e)(3) of the Code,
section 83 does not apply to the transfer of an option without a readily
ascertainable fair market value.
Section 1.83-1(d) provides that if substantially nonvested property has been
transferred in connection with the performance of services and the person who
performed the services dies while the property is still substantially nonvested, any
income realized on or after such death with respect to the property under this
section is income in respect ofa decedent to which the rules ofsection 691 apply.
In such a case the income in respect ofthe property shall be taxable under section
691 (except to the extent not includible under section 10I(b)) to the estate or
beneficiary of the person who perfonned the services, in accordance with section
83 and the regulations thereunder.
Section 1.83-7(a) of the regulations provides, in part, that if there is granted to an
employee or independent contractor (or beneficiary thereof) in connection with the
performance of services, an option to which section 421 (relating generally to
certain qualified and other options) does not apply, section 83(a) shall apply to the
grant if the option has a readily ascertainable fair market value (determined in
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accordance with section 1.83-7(b)) at the time the option is granted. If section
83(a) does not apply to the grant of the option because it does not have a readily
ascertainable fair market value at the time of the grant, sections 83(a) and 83(b)
will apply at the time the option is exercised or otherwise disposed of, even though
the fair market value of the option may have become readily ascertainable before
such time. Ifthe option is exercised, sections 83(a) and 83(b) apply to the transfer
of property pursuant to the exercise, and the employee or independent contractor
realizes compensation upon the transfer at the time and in the amount determined
under section 83(a) or 83(b). If the option is sold or otherwise disposed of in an
ann's length transaction, sections 83(a) and 83(b) apply to the transfer ofmoney
or other property received in the same manner as sections 83(a) and 83(b) would
have applied to the transfer ofproperty pursuant to the exercise ofan option. See
section 1.83-7(b) of the regulations for the test to be applied in determining
whether an option has a readily ascertainable fair market value. However, section
1.83-7 is silent regarding the transfer ofa nonstatutory option in a non-arm's length
transaction.
13. What is in a CRT? John T. Jorgl v. Commissioner, TCM 2000-10, considered an interesting issue.
The taxpayers transferred a corporation (a child care center) into a charitable remainder trust which sold the corporation.
Ofthe sale proceeds $300,000 were allocated to a covenant not to compete for the officers ofthe corporation, who were
the taxpayers. The $300,000 was paid to the trust and the taxpayers tried to avoid paying income tax on it. The court
held that income tax was owed.
14. IRA Proceeds and Qualified Plan Proceeds - IRD Consequences. In PLR 199939039 the IRS
ruled that a private foundation would have IRD when it received IRA and qualified plan proceeds but that the decedent's
estate would not have IRD.
15. Lead Trust May Invest in FLP. PLR 200018062 detennined that the investment by a charitable lead
trust in a limited partnership would not be self-dealing nor would payments to the general partners be prohibited
transactions. The issue of excess business holdings was not considered.
16. Division ofCRT to Meet 10% Test. In PLR 200022014 the IRS allowed a trustee to divide a trust,
pursuant to court order, so that instead of being one trust with four beneficiaries, and flunking the 10% remainder
interest rule of section 664(d)(2)(D), it became four trusts each with one beneficiary.
17. Division ofCRT in Divorce. Husband and wife were joint grantors, trustees and unitrust recipients
who upon their divorce desired to divide the CRT into two CRTs, in PLR 200045038. The IRS allowed the division.
Interestingly, however, the IRS declined to rule on whether the division was an income tax event under sections 61,170,
1001, or 1041.
18. Failure to Operate as a CRT. In Atkinson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. No.3 (2000) no estate tax
charitable deduction was allowed where a charitable remainder annuity trust never made any annuity payments and
failed to require that the secondary recipients, those after the grantor, pay the estate tax due on account ofthe trust being
included in the grantor's estate before receiving their annuity interests. With respect to the frrst issue, the opinion states:
Section 664 provides for a narrow exception to the general disallowance of
deductions for charitable remainder interests under section 2055(e)(2)(A). In order
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to qualify, all section 664 requirements for CRAT's must be met upon creation and
must continue to be met throughout the existence of the CRAT. See sec.
1.664-1(a)(4), Income Tax Regs. One of those requirements is that a minimum
payment of 5 percent of the initial fair market value of the trust's assets be
distributed each year to the noncharitable beneficiary. Petitioner argues that this
distribution requirement should be set aside or ignored because it only serves to
decrease the charitable contribution and because decedent had no need for the
distribution. One ofthe primary reasons for sections 2055 and 664 was to ensure
that any amount set aside for charity was not diminished by payments to
noncharitable beneficiaries.
The trust here, however, provides for four potential secondary beneficiaries who
could have survived decedent and elected to receive payments that could have
reduced the amount due to charity. An expressed focus ofCongress in enacting the
5-percent distribution requirement was to prevent a charitable remainder trust from
being used to circumvent the current income distribution requirements imposed on
private foundations. See S. Rept. 91-552 (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423, 481. If there
were no such requirement, a charitable remainder trust could be used to accumulate
trust income tax-free, while a private foundation would remain limited in the
amount of income it might accumulate. See ide
Though the terms of the annuity trust met the letter of the statutory requirement
providing for distributions equal to 5 percent annually, the trust did not operate in
accordance with those terms. Petitioner bears the burden of proof in this matter,
including the burden of substantiation. See Rule 142(a). Petitioner has presented
no persuasive evidence that checks for the 5 percent annuity ever existed or were
ever sent to decedent. Purportedly, MacQuarrie [the trustee] remitted checks to
decedent that were not cashed. However, there is no record of canceled or
uncanceled checks, nor did petitioner present any evidence demonstrating a gap in
the check sequence. Though MacQuarrie testified that he made copies of checks
written on the trust account, no such copies were presented to evidence these
alleged payments. On the other hand, we do have evidence that no payments were
ever actually consummated before decedent's death. The trust was never diminished
by any payments during decedent's life. Because the trust value was undiminished
and no transfer of funds occurred, operationally the trust did not meet the express
5-percent requirement ofthe statute and cannot qualify for treatment as a charitable
remainder trust. Accordingly, section 2055 applies, and the estate is not entitled to
a deduction for the bequest of a charitable split-interest.
As for the payment of estate taxes the court notes that the decedent's estate and
revocable trust are insufficient to pay debts, expenses, and taxes, thus: The
shortfall will have to come out of the trust corpus. Pursuant to section
664(d)(I)(B), no amount of the trust, other than the annuity, may be paid to or for
the use of any person other than an organization described in section 170(c).
Because the trust corpus will be invaded to pay expenses or debts of the estate,
including estate taxes, a substantial part ofthe trust funds may be diverted from the
charitable remainder. This is an additional reason for concluding that the trust
failed to function exclusively as a CRAT from the date of its creation. See sec.
1.664-1(a)(6), Example (3 ), Income Tax Regs. (reservation of power to pay
grantor's debts precludes qualification as eRAT); see also Rev. Rul. 82-128,
1982-2 C.B. 71 (ruling *that "a trust does not qualify as a charitable remainder trust
and no deduction is allowable under sections 170 and 2522 of the Code if it is
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possible that federal estate and state death taxes may be payable from the trust
assets").
The court also pointed out that this is an operational problem which is not reformable:
Though only mentioned in passing by petitioner, we also note that reformation of
the trust pursuant to section 2055(e)(3) would not be an available remedy to
petitioner. Section 2055(e)(3) provides that a trust or will may be reformed ifit was
improperly created and yet conforms to the CRAT requirements. The definition of
"qualified reformation" demonstrates that the reformation is meant to address only
those problems arising in the documentation of the trust. Section 2055(e)(3)(B)
defines qualified reformation as "a change ofgoverning instrument by reformation,
amendment, construction, or otherwise". The legislative history indicates that
reformation under section 2055 was created to address problems in trust creation
as follows: "The bill provides a permanent rule permitting reformation ofgoverning
instruments of charitable split-interest trusts which do not meet the requirements
ofthe 1969 Act rules." Staffofthe Senat~Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong.2d Sess.,
Explanation Of Provisions Approved By The Committee On March 21, 1984, S.
Prt. 98-169, Vol. I at 732 (Comm. Print 1984). Here the trust was validly
formulated, and its terms were within the statutory threshold requirements.
Accordingly, reformation ·is not needed to "rewrite" incorrect terms. The
operational failure cannot be corrected by reformation. Therefore, the concept of
reformation has no application here.
Ifthe trust had been a charitable remainder unitrust then the argument could have been made that the payments
were made but were recontributed tot he trust, which might save the CRT but would not affect the recipients income
tax reporting. In PLR 200052026, a CRUT did not allow additional contributions but they were made anyway. The
ruling states:
Hand W established Trust under the laws of State on 01. At that time, Hand W
contributed shares ofX, having an aggregate value of$x, to Trust. H and Ware the
trustees and income beneficiaries of Trust. Trust was intended to qualify as a
charitable remainder unitrust under section 664(d)(2) of the Code.
On 02 ofYear 1, Hand W made an additional contribution ofshares ofX to Trust.
The X stock ofthe second contribution was sold by Trust on 03 ofYear 1 for $y.
Article Sixth of Trust's governing instrument provides that no additional
contributions shall be made to Trust after the initial contribution. Soon after the
second contribution was made, Hand W realized that the second contribution was
not permitted under Article Sixth. After this discovery, the custodian of Trust, at
the instruction ofH and W, identified and maintained records of the proceeds of
the second contribution. No charitable deduction was taken by Hand W relating
to the second contribution, and the proceeds of the second contribution was not
used when calculating any unitrust payments of Trust.
Hand W, as trustees, propose to return the proceeds of the second contribution to
themselves as the grantors. Hand W represent that they will amend their individual
tax returns for the Year 1and Year 2 taxable years. H and W will report any capital
gains and dividend income generated by the second contribution ofX stock while
it was in Trust's account.
*.****
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Based solely on the information submitted, we conclude that the second
contribution of X stock will be ignored for federal tax purposes and will not
disqualify the Trust as a charitable remainder unitrust under 664(d)(2) ofthe Code,
provided that Hand W amend their Year 1 and Year 2 taxable years tax returns to
report any capital gains and dividend income generated by the second contribution
of X stock while it was in the Trust's account.
19. Payments from CRAT to Charitable During Annuitant's Lifetime. PLR 200052035 approved
a modification to a CRAT as follows:
The information submitted states that X established Trust on D1. X died on D2,
and was survived by A. Pursuant to the terms ofTrust, a trust represented as being
a charitable remainder annuity trust under section 664 (the CRAT) was established
for the benefit of A.
Article 4.01 (A) of Trust provides for the trustees of the CRAT to distribute
annually to A, for the duration ofA's life, an annuity amount equal to 5 percent of
the initial fair market value ofthe assets placed in the CRAT. Upon A's death, the
trustees shall distribute the remaining principal and undistributed income of the
CRAT to anyone or more charities selected by the trustees that are organizations
described in sections 170(c) and 2055(a) (Qualified Charities).
The trustees ofthe CRAT propose to modify Trust to authorize the trustees to make
distributions ofprincipal and income from time to time during A's lifetime to any
one or more Qualified Charities selected by the trustees, but only to the extent that
the fair market value of the assets of the eRAT exceeds $x at the time of such
distribution. The trustees shall make no distribution ofprincipal or income from the
CRAT to the extent that such distribution would endanger the ability ofthe CRAT
to pay the required fixed 5 percent annuity to A for the duration of A's lifetime.
The trustees have obtained the consent of A to the proposed modification. The
trustees have also obtained the consent ofthe attorney general ofState, the laws of
which govern the rights and duties of the parties and beneficiaries of Trust,
pursuant to the terms of Trust. The trustees have petitioned Court for an order
directing the modification of Trust as described above.
20. Final Regulations for Lifetime Charitable Lead Trusts. Final regulations have been issued whose
purpose is to prevent use as a measuring life a person with a short, but not too short, life expectancy. T.D. 8923
(January 4, 2001). The final regulations are more lenient than the proposed regulations. The Treasury explanation
states:
In general, in order to qualify as a guaranteed annuity interest or unitrust interest
for purposes ofthe income, estate, and gift tax charitable deductions under sections
170(c), 2055(e)(2), and 2522(c)(2), respectively, the permissible term for the
charitable lead interest must be either a specified term ofyears, or the life or lives
of individuals living at the date of the transfer. The proposed regulations limit the
individuals who may be used as measuring lives to the donor, the donor's spouse,
and a lineal ancestor ofall the remainder beneficiaries. This proposed limitation is
intended to eliminate abusive schemes utilizing seriously ill individuals, who are
unrelated to the grantor or the remainder beneficiaries, as measuring lives for
charitable lead trusts.
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Commentators argued that by limiting the class of individuals who can be used as
measuring lives in a charitable lead trust, the regulations preclude the use of these
trusts in certain nonabusive situations. In response to these comments, several
changes were made to the fmal regulations to provide a greater degree offlexibility
for selecting a measuring life.
The fmal regulations expand the class ofpermissible measuring lives to include an
individual who, with respect to all noncharitable remainder beneficiaries, is either
a lineal ancestor or the spouse of a lineal ancestor of those beneficiaries. Thus,
remainder beneficiaries can include step-children and step- grandchildren of the
individual who is the measuring life, and charitable organizations (described in
section 170, 2055, or 2522).
The fmal regulations also provide that a trust will satisfy the requirement that all
noncharitable remainder beneficiaries are lineal descendants ofthe individual who
is the measuring life, or that individual's spouse, if there is less than a 15%
probability that individuals who are not lineal descendants will receive any trust
corpus. This probability must be computed at the date oftransfer to the trust taking
into consideration the interests of all individuals living at that time. This change
will afford drafters the flexibility to provide for alternative remainder beneficiaries
in the event the primary remainder beneficiary and his or her descendants
predecease the individual who is the measuring life for the term of the charitable
interest.
The probability test is illustrated by the following example:
The application of the probability test may be illustrated by assuming a grantor
establishes a charitable lead annuity trust (CLAT) that provides for the annuity to
be paid to a charity for the life ofA who is age 75 on the date the CLAT is created.
On A's death, the corpus is to pass to A's only child, B, age 50 on the date the
CLAT is created. If B predeceases A, the corpus is to pass to B's issue then living
and ifB has no living issue at that time, then to A's heirs at law (which class could
include A's siblings, uncles, aunts, nieces and nephews). B has no living children
on the date the CLAT is created. Based on the current applicable Life Table
contained in section 20.2031-7 ofthe Estate Tax Regulations (Life Table 90CM),
the probability that B will predecease A, and the trust will pass to individuals who
are not lineal descendants of A is 10.462%, taking into account the interests of
remainder beneficiaries living at the time the trust was created. Since the
probability that any trust corpus will pass to beneficiaries who are not lineal
descendants ofA is less than 15%, the CLAT will satisfy the requirement that all
noncharitable remainder beneficiaries are lineal descendants of A or A's spouse.
The final regulations provide for transitional relief and for potential reformation:
The rule in paragraphs (e)(2)(vi)(a) and (vii)(a) of this section that guaranteed
annuity interests or unitrust interests, respectively, may be payable for a specified
term ofyears or for the life or lives ofonly certain individuals is generally effective
in the case of transfers pursuant to wills and revocable trusts where the decedent
dies on or after April 4, 2000. Two exceptions from the application of this rule in
paragraphs (e)(2)(vi)(a) and (vii)(a) of this section are provided in the case of
transfers pursuant to a will or revocable trust executed on or before April 4, 2000.
One exception is for a decedent who dies on or before July 3,2001 without having
republished the will (or amended the trust) by codicil or othetwise. The other
exception is for a decedent who was on April 4, 2000, under a mental disability to
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change the disposition of the decedent's property, and either does not regain
competence to dispose ofsuch property before the date ofdeath, or dies prior to the
later of: 90 days after the date on which the decedent first regains competence, or
July 3, 2001 without having republished the will (or amended the trust) by codicil
or otherwise. If a guaranteed annuity interest or unitrust interest created pursuant
to a will or revocable trust where the decedent dies on or after April 4, 2000, uses
an individual other than one permitted in paragraphs (e)(2)(vi)(a) and (vii)(a) of
this section, and the interest does not qualify for this transitional relief, the interest
may be reformed into a lead interest payable for a specified term ofyears. The term
of years is determined by taking the factor for valuing the annuity or unitrust
interest for the named individual measuring life and identifying the term ofyears
(rounded up to the next whole year) that corresponds to the equivalent term of
years factor for an annuity or unitrust interest. For example, in the case of an
annuity interest payable for the life of an individual age 40 at the time of the
transfer, assuming an interest rate of7.4% under section 7520, the annuity factor
from column 1 ofTable S(7.4), contained in IRS Publication 1457, Book Aleph,
for the life ofan individual age 40 is 12.0587 (Publication 1457 is available from
the Superintendent ofDocurnents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC 20402). Based on Table B(7.4), contained in Publication 1457, Book Aleph,
the factor 12.0587 corresponds to a term of years between 31 and 32 years.
Accordingly, the annuity interest must be reformed into an interest payable for a
term of 32 years. A judicial reformation must be commenced prior to the later of
July 3, 2001, or the date prescribed by section 2055(e)(3)(C)(iii). Anyjudicial
reformation must be completed within a reasonable time after it is commenced. A
non-judicial reformation is permitted if effective under state law, provided it is
completed by the date on which a judicial reformation must be commenced. In the
alternative, ifa court, in a proceeding that is commenced on or before July 3, 2001,
declares any transfer made pursuant to a will or revocable trust where the decedent
dies on or after April 4, 2000, and on or before March 6, 2001, null and void ab
initio, the Internal Revenue Service will treat such transfers in a manner similar to
that described in section 2055(e)(3)(J).
21. Transfer of Stock But Not Voting Rights. Rev. Rul. 81-282, 1981-2 C.B. 78, provides that a
contribution of stock with retention ofvoting rights by the donor is a gift of a partial interest for which a deduction is
denied. In PLR 200108012 the IRS ruled differently where the voting ofthe stock was subject to a 1992 agreement and
had been transferred for a business purpose.
22. Accrual Basis S Corporation May Not Make § 170(a)(2) Election. Section 170(a)(2) allows an
accrual basis corporation to "deduct a charitable contribution in the year in which the board ofdirectors authorizes the
contribution, if the payment is made by the 15th day ofthe third month following the close ofthe taxable year." Rev.
Rul. 2000-43, 2000-41 IRB 333, determined that an S corporation may not make the election:
Under section 1363(b), a subchapter S corporation computes its taxable income in
the same manner as an individual. The election in section 170(a)(2) is not available
to an individual. An individual taxpayer may deduct a charitable contribution only
in the year in which payment is actually made to the charitable organization.
Furthermore, the rationale behind section 170(a)(2), a corporation's difficulty in
determining its charitable contribution limit under section 170(b)(2), does not apply
to subchapter S corporations because a subchapter S corporation is not subject to
the same section 170(b)(2) limit.
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23. Collective Investment ofCRUT Assets. In PLR 200043047 husband and wife fonned 15 charitable
remainder trusts for their children and grandchildren. Subsequently, an LLC was fonned to invest the family's assets.
The ruling described the purpose and operation of the LLC:
In recent years, the family of A and B established K, a limited liability company
("the LLC"), to coordinate the investment of the family's assets. The LLC is
managed by its Voting Members, who consist ofthe children ofA and B (and any
descendants to whom the children may transfer all or part of their Voting
Membership Interest). The 15 CRUTs propose to invest in the LLC, in order to (1)
diversify their portfolios, (2) pool their assets to obtain economies of scale and
more negotiating power, and (3) obtain access to investments with higher
minimums than each could satisfy using its assets alone.
The LLC is expected to be a disqualified person with respect to each ofthe CRUTs
from time to time, as disqualified persons with respect to each CRUT will be
deemed to own more than 35% ofthe profits interest in the LLC from time to time,
either directly or under the attribution rules of section 267(c).
The LLC currently maintains multiple investment funds. Each fund has its own
rules of governance ("Fund Rules"), including investment and redemption rules.
Some funds that invest in nonmarketable, illiquid-type investments impose
significant restrictions on the right of a fund participant or investor to withdraw.
In contrast, those funds that invest solely in marketable securities grant each fund
participant the right as of the end of each month upon reasonable advance notice
(typically seven days) to withdraw from the fund in whole or part upon written
request to the fund manager, and to receive fair market value in return for such
withdrawal based on the participant's allocable share ofthe value ofthe securities
held by the fund. The CRUTs will participate only in funds that invest solely in
marketable securities and which, therefore, have liberal withdrawal rights.
L represents that its contribution to an LLC fund in exchange for a membership
interest does not constitute a sale or exchange of property under the applicable
State law. The LLC has elected partnership treatment for federal tax purposes.
The combined assets ofthe CRUTs to be contributed equal about 80% ofthe LLC's
current assets. The percentage is expected to decline over time as individual family
members contribute more assets to the LLC.
The LLC does not charge a member any fee for investing in its funds other than the
member's pro rata share ofexpenses (investment, legal, accounting, administrative).
However, each CRUT will not be charged for any expenses other than the marginal
increase in investment expenses attributable to the CRUTs participation in the
fund. Thus, no disqualified person will have fees reduced as a result of a CRUT's
participation. Neither the LLC nor any disqualified person with respect to any of
the CRUTs will, as a result of the participation in a fund by the CRUTs, receive
compensation or any benefit other than some benefits also accruing to the CRUTs
from the arrangement (i.e., increased negotiating power and access to investments
with higher minimums). The CRUTs will incur substantially lower investment
expenses in the LLC than they currently incur for essentially equivalent
investments, which will increase the value of the charitable remainder interest of
theCRUTs.
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Under the representations made, there is no participation in the investment
activities of the LLC by an organization described in section 501(c)(3) and
classified as a private foundation.
In compliance with section 494 I(d)(I)(A) of the Code, it is represented that the
LLC will not buy, sell, or lease property in a sales or lease transaction with any
disqualified person with respect to any ofits members. In compliance with section
4941 (d)(2)(A), neither the LLC nor its holdings are or will be subject to a
mortgage or similar lien. In compliance with section 4941 (d)(1)(B) ofthe Code, the
LLC will not receive credit from, or extend credit to, a disqualified person with
respect to any ofits members. In compliance with section 53.4941 (d)-2(f)(1 ) ofthe
regulations, the LLC will not purchase or sell investments in an attempt to
manipulate the price of the investments to the advantage ofa disqualified person.
The rulings requested were given:
1. We have considered the issue whether a contribution by a CRUT to the
LLC in exchange for a membership interest constitutes a sale or exchange of
property for purposes of section 4941 (d)(I)(A) ofthe Code. Ifso, there would be
an act of self-dealing where the ownership interests in the LLC were such as to
constitute the LLC a disqualified person with respect to the CRUT immediately
before the contribution. However, given the taxpayer's representations regarding
the applicable State law principles, we find no sale or exchange ofproperty under
the circumstances.
2. We find that any benefits that the LLC and its disqualified person
members may derive from a CRUTs participation in the LLC funds will be
incidental and tenuous as described in section 53.494I(d)- 2(f)(2) of the
regulations. We note that section 4943 of the Code contemplates co-investment
arrangements between foundations and disqualified persons under specified
circumstances, and in the case of section 4943(d)(3)(B), without ownership
limitations. We also note that, under the facts presented, participation by the
CRUTs will not benefit the disqualified person investors by reducing their
allocable administrative expenses.
3. Under the facts presented and represented, we find the reimbursement of
investment expenses incurred by the LLC to be payment for personal services
reasonable and necessary to carry out exempt purposes (assuming that the charges
are not excessive). The situation is similar to that described in section 53.4941 (d)-
3(c)(2), Example (2) of the regulations.
The key representation was that under applicable state law the contribution by a CRUT to the LLC for a
membership interest would not be a sale or exchange ofproperty.
c. SECTION 408 -- IRAs AND RETIREMENT PLANS
1. New Proposed Regulations Dealing With Minimum Distributions. On January 11,2001, the IRS
issued new proposed regulations under section 40 I(a)(9). REG-I 30477-00; REG-13048 1-00. The proposed regulations
are easier to understand than the previous set but are nonetheless complicated.
a. Lifetime required distributions. Most taxpayers will use one Unifonn Table. The Unifonn
Table will be used in all but one situation; namely, where the spouse is more than 10 years younger than P ("P"). The
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initial division under the Uniform Table for a P who is age 70 is 26 years, and this is recalculated annually -- the plan
need never be exhausted. No beneficiary need be named, nor does the age of the beneficiary, nor the identify of the
beneficiary-(Le. a charity) matter. If the spouse is more than 10 years younger than P the life expectancy tables may
be applied using the age ofP and spouse in the distribution year. Note that the spouse must be the sole beneficiary.
~:What ifspouse ceases to be the sole beneficiary because ofdeath, divorce or beneficiary change? It would make
sense ifP then began using the Uniform Table. It appears that P, who marries a much younger spouse after P's required
beginning date ("RBD"), may then begin using the mortality tables.
b. Post-death distributions - the "applicable distribution period" will be the life expectancy of
the designated beneficiary who actually inherits the benefits when the P dies. The identity of this beneficiary will not
be fmalized until December 31 of the year following the year ofdeath. At P's death, benefits will be distributed over
the beneficiary's life expectancy or, ifthere is no beneficiary, over the remaining fixed term life expectancy ofP based
on P's birthday in the year ofdeath.
Remember that Ps now past their RBD may switch to the Uniform Table. The choice of beneficiaries at the
RBD is no longer significant. Beneficiaries are determined by December 31 of the year following P's death. Thus,
disclaimers may "create" new beneficiaries. Distributions to beneficiaries before that date, take those beneficiaries "out
of the mix", ie, charities. Note: P must still name beneficiaries and you cannot correct the situation where P's estate
is the beneficiary.
c. Distributions Before RBD
One Beneficiary who is P's Spouse: (1) 5 year rule; over spouse's life expectancy
in the year P would have been 70 1/2 (and ifspouse dies before that year, the rules
will be applied as if spouse were the P and died before spouse's RBD).
One Beneficiary, not the Spouse: (1) 5 year rule; or (2) beneficiary's life
expectancy based on beneficiary's age on beneficiary's birthday in the year after
P died.
• Multiple beneficiaries and they have not established separate accounts by
December 31 in the year after P's death and they are all individuals: (1) 5 year rule;
or (2) over the oldest beneficiary's life expectancy based on beneficiary's birthday
in the year after P died.
• One beneficiary, not an individual or more than one beneficiary, one of whom is
not an individual, and separate accounts have not been established by December
31 ofthe year after P died: P is treated as having no designated beneficiary and all
benefits must be distributed under the 5 year rule.
Multiple beneficiaries who have established separate accounts by December 31 of
the year after P's death: The rules above apply to each separate account. This is a
significant liberalization of the prior rules.
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d. Distributions on or after RBD - Beneficiaries must take P's distribution for the year ofdeath,
(and in the year of death), based on the Uniform Table, ifP has not done so. Then:
Surviving spouse is sole beneficiary: Use the spouse's life expectancy in the year
after P's death and based onspouse's age. After spouse's death, benefits are based
on spouse's remaining (fixed) life expectancy. Spouse should roll-over and name
spouse's designated beneficiaries to provide for longer pay-out period.
One beneficiary, not the spouse: use the beneficiary's life expectancy.
• Multiple beneficiaries, all individuals: unless they are able to established separate
accounts, use the life expectancy of the oldest beneficiary.
• One beneficiary, not an individual, or multiple beneficiaries and one is not an
individual: Unless separate accounts are established, P is treated has having no
designated beneficiary and benefits must be paid out over P's life expectancy based
on P's age in year of death.
IfP's account has been divided into separate accounts, the rules, above, are applied to each
separate account.
Trust for sole benefit of spouse - may not roll over unless trust is totally a grantor
trust (under §678) as to the surviving spouse.
Other Trusts as Beneficiaries - the proposed regulation provides:
Q-4. When is the designated beneficiary determined?
A-4. (a) General rule. Except as provided in paragraph (b) and section 1.401(a)(9)-
6, the employee's designated beneficiary will be determined based on the
beneficiaries designated as of the last day of the calendar year following the
calendar year ofthe employee's death. Consequently, except as provided in section
1.401(a)(9)-6, any person who was a beneficiary as of the date of the employee's
death, but is not a beneficiary as of that later date (e.g., because the person
disclaims entitlement to the benefit in favor of another beneficiary or because the
person receives the entire benefit to which the person is entitled before that date),
is not taken into account in determining the employee's designated beneficiary for
purposes ofdetermining the distribution period for required minimum distributions
after the employee's death.
(b) Surviving spouse. As provided in A-5 of section 1.401(a)(9)- 3, in the case in
which the employee's spouse is the designated beneficiary as ofthe date described
in paragraph (a) of this A-5, and the surviving spouse dies after the employee and
before the date on which distributions have begun to the spouse under section
401(a)(9)(B)(iii) and (iv), the rule in section 401(a)(9)(B)(iv)(II) will apply. Thus,
the relevant designated beneficiary for determining the distribution period is the
designated beneficiary of the surviving spouse. Such designated beneficiary will
be determined as ofthe last day ofthe calendar year following the calendar year of
surviving spouse's death. If, as ofsuch last day, there is no designated beneficiary
under the plan with respect to that surviving spouse, distribution must be made in
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accordance with the 5-year rule in section 401(a)(9)(B)(ii) and A-2 of section
1.401 (a)(9)-3.
(c) Multiple beneficiaries. Notwithstanding anything in this A-4 to the contrary, the
rules in A-7 of section 1.401(a)(9)-5 apply if more than one beneficiary is
designated with respect to an employee as of the date on which the designated
beneficiary is to be detennined in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
A-4.
Q-5. If a trust is named as a beneficiary of an employee, will the beneficiaries of
the trust with respect to the trust's interest in the employee's benefit be treated as
having been designated as beneficiaries of the employee under the plan for
purposes ofdetennining the distribution period under section 401 (aX9)?
A-S. (a) Only an individual may be a designated beneficiary for purposes of
determining the distribution period under section 401(a)(9). Consequently, a trust
is not a designated beneficiary even though the trust is named as a beneficiary.
However, ifthe requirements ofparagraph (b) ofthis A-5 are met, the beneficiaries
of the trust will be treated as having been designated as beneficiaries of the
employee under the plan for purposes ofdetermining the distribution period under
section 401(a)(9).
(b) The requirements of this paragraph (b) are met if, during any period during
which required minimum distributions are being determined by treating the
beneficiaries ofthe trust as designated beneficiaries ofthe employee, the following
requirements are met:
(1) The trust is a valid trust under state Jaw, or would be but for the fact that there
is no corpus.
(2) The trust is irrevocable or will, by its terms, become irrevocable upon the death
of the employee.
(3) The beneficiaries of the trust who are beneficiaries with respect to the trust's
interest in the employee'S benefit are identitiable from the trust instrument within
the meaning ofA-I of this section.
(4) The documentation described in A-6 of this section has been provided to the
plan administrator.
(c) In the case ofpayments to a trust having more than one beneficiary, see A-7 of
section 1.401(aX9)-5 for the rules for determining the designated beneficiaty
whose life expectancy will be used to determine the distribution period. If the
beneficiary of the trust named as beneficiary is another trust, the beneficiaries of
the other trust will be treated as having been designated as beneficiaries of the
employee under the plan for purposes ofdetermining the distribution period under
section 401(a)(9)(A)(ii), provided that the requirements ofparagraph (b) ofthis A-
S are satisfied with respect to such other trust in addition to the trust named as
beneficiary.
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Q-6. Ifa trust is named as a beneficiary ofan employee, what documentation must
be provided to the plan administrator?
A-6. (a) Required minimum distributions before death. In order to satisfy the
documentation requirelnent of this A-6 for required minimum distributions under
section40 I(aX9) to commence before the death ofan employee, the employee must
comply with either paragraph (a)(I) or (2) of this A-6:
(1) The employee provides to the plan administrator a copy ofthe trust instrument
and agrees that if the trust instrument is amended at any time in the future, the
employee will, within a reasonable time, provide to the plan administrator a copy
ofeach such amendment.
(2) The employee --
(i) Provides to the plan administrator a list of all of the beneficiaries of the trust
(including contingent and remaindermen beneficiaries with a description of the
conditions on their entitlement);
(ii) Certifies that, to the best of the employee's knowledge, this list is correct and
complete and that the requirements ofparagraphs (bXl), (2), and (3) ofA-5 ofthis
section are satisfied;
(iii) Agrees that, if the trust instrument is amended at any time in the future, the
employee will, within a reasonable time, provide to the plan administrator corrected
certifications to the extent that the amendment changes any information previously
certified; and
(iv) Agrees to provide a copy ofthe trust instrument to the plan administrator upon
demand. .
(b) Required minimum distributions after death. In order to satisfy the
documentation requirementofthis A-6 for required minimum distributions after the
death ofthe employee, by the last day of the calendar year immediately following
the calendar year in which the employee died, the trustee ofthe trust must either--
(1) Provide the plan administrator with a final list of all beneficiaries of the trust
(including contingent and remaindennen beneficiaries with a description of the
conditions on their entitlement) as of the end of the calendar year following the
calendar year of the employee's death; certify that, to the best of the trustee's
knowledge, this list is correct and complete and that the requirements ofparagraph
(b)(I), (2), and (3) ofA-5 ofthis section are satisfied; and agree to provide a copy
of the trust instrument to the plan administrator upon demand; or
(2) Provide the plan administrator with a copy ofthe actual trust document for the
trust that is named as a beneficiary of the employee under the plan as of the
employee's date of death.
One issue that arose under the previous proposed regulations and that persists under these is whether the
presence of a broad special power of appointment means that the trust does not have identifiable beneficiaries and,
consequently, cannot be a "designated beneficiary."
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e. Effective Dates - IRS propose that these regulations become final on January I, 2002. IRA
owners may, however begin using the new rules now. Qualified Plan Ps may not use the new rules until the plan is
amended.
f. Conclusions
1. There is no longer a debate over whether or not to recalculate - all Ps and spouse
now receive the benefits of recalculation, without its drawbacks.
2. Significance ofrequired beginning date is eliminated except for 2 items: (I) must
begin withdrawing by that date; and (2) after P's death, the post death distributions rules are slightly different.
3. Use disclaimers to create younger beneficiaries.
4. No need for separate accounts for charities, because you may make distributions
to older and non-individual (charities) prior to December 31 ofthe year following
P's death.
5. Any beneficiaries, regardless ofwhen P died, should be able to use the new rules
in 2001.
6. Beneficiaries ofP who died in 2000, should be able to use the new rules and make
"corrections" before December 31, 2001.
g. Administrative
IRA providers must now report the end ofyear IRA account values, and also the amount of
the RMD for that year.
2. Oualified Plan Benefits and IRAs Payable to QTIP Trust. The IRS has made Rev. Rul. 89-89
obsolete and replaced it with Rev. Rut. 2000...2, 2000-2 IRB 305 (January 18,2000). The holding of the ruling is:
An executor may elect under § 2056(b)(7) to treat an IRA and a trust as QTIP when
the trustee ofthe trust is the named beneficiaryofthe decedent's IRA, the surviving
spouse can compel the trustee to 'Jlithdraw from the IRA an amount equal to all the
income earned on the IRA assets at least annually and to distribute that amount to
the spouse, and no person has a power to appoint any part of the trust property to
any person other than the spouse.
The ruling is in accordance with Treas. Reg. S 20.2056(b)-5(t)(8) which provides that ifa spouse may demand
all the income ofa trust that will give the spouse the necessary entitlement to all ofthe income to meet the requirements
of section 2056. Provisions in trust documents that require a trustee to demand all the income should be modified.
3. Effect of Facility of Payment Clause on Designated Beneficiary Rules. The IRS determined in
PLR 199912041 that a revocable trust that became irrevocable upon the grantor's death would not qualify as a
designated beneficiaryunder section401(a)(9) for qualified plan benefits because the revocable trustallowed the trustee
to pay amounts needed to pay claims, administration expenses, and taxes to the grantor's estate. The IRS decided that
a facility of payment clause to create the estate as a beneficiary and only individuals, in certain trusts, may be
"designated beneficiaries."
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D. SECTIONS 671-678 -- GRANTOR TRUST RULES
1. Income Tax Consequences of Powers of Withdrawal PLR 199942037 involved a trust with
Crummey powers and a gift ofsubchapter S stock. The IRS ruled that the minor child who is the beneficiary ofthe trust
and who had the power of withdrawal would be treated as the owner of the trust under section 678(a) whether or not
the child withdrew the property or allowed the right to withdraw to lapse.
PLR 200022035 confmns that a person who has a 5 x 5 withdrawal right over a trust will be the owner under
section 678 of an ever increasing fraction of the trust.
2. Grantor Trust Status forGRAT. PLRs 200001013 and 200001015 approved grantor trust status
for GRATs which provided that the retained annuity would first be paid from income, gave the nonadverse trustee the
power to pay additional income to the grantor/annuitant, and the grantor/annuitant would have a general testamentary
power of appointment during the term. The ruling states:
Under the terms ofthe ofTrust, Taxpayer will receive an annuity payable first from
income, and to the extent accumulated income is insufficient, from principal. In
addition, during the Trust term, the trustee (a nonadverse party) will have the sole
discretion to pay the Taxpayer all of the Trust's net income (if there is any
remaining after payment of the annuity). Therefore, under section 677, Taxpayer
will be treated as the owner of the income portion of the Trust during the Trost
term. Additionally, capital gains are accumulated and added to corpus and
Taxpayer has a general testamentary power exercisable only by will to appoint the
accumulated amounts. Therefore, under section 674(a), Taxpayer will be treated
as the owner ofthe corpus portion ofthe Trust during the Trust term. Accordingly,
Taxpayer will be treated as the owner of the Trust for purposes of section 671
during the Trust term.
If the trust had income and capital gains in excess of the annuity the trustee was required to reimburse to
grantor for the excess income tax owed. The ruling is silent about the effect ofthe section 675(4)(c) power which was
described as follows:
Section VILA of the Trust provides that at any time d:.L~ng the Trust term,
Taxpayer is to have the power, exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity (either
personally or by an attorney-in-fact under a power ofattorney expressly referring
to this power), without the consent or approval of any person in any capacity, to
reacquire any property held by the Trust by substituting other property having the
same fair market value (detennined without regard to the nature ofthe assets or the
relative value ofthe asset to any person having an interest in the Trust).
The taxpayer also asked whether the trust would be included in the taxpayer's estate under section 2036 ifthe
grantor survived the trust term. The ruling was favorable.
E. SECTION 1361 - S CORPORATIONS
1. Power to Make Distributions From ESBT. PLR 199930035 proved ESBT status for a trust in
which the trustee could distribute income and principal among the grantor's descendants and could divide the trust
property among separate trusts for the grantor's descendants, per stirpes. Specifically, the IRS determined that the
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trustee's power to create separate trusts would not affect qualification of the single trust as ESBT. The IRS noted that
if the trust property were divided, each separate trust would have to qualify under section 1361(c)(2)(A) and each
beneficiary of the trust would have to be described in section 1361(b)(1).
2. Proposed ESBT Regulations. The IRS issued proposed regulations on December 28,2000. REG-
251701-96. The most important issues covered are which trusts are ESBTs and what is the income tax treatment ofan
ESBT witli both S corporation stock and other assets. The Supplementary Infonnation provides:
1. Beneficiary
The proposed regulations provide guidance as to who is an ESBT beneficiary.
Generally, a beneficiary includes any person who has a present, remainder, or
reversionary interest in the trust other than a remote, contingent interest. If an
ESBT makes distributions to another trust (the distributee trust), the distributee
trust is not treated as a beneficiary ofthe ESBT. However, the beneficiaries ofthe
distributee trust will be counted as beneficiaries ofthe ESBT. Persons whose future
beneficial interest is so remote as to be negligible are not beneficiaries. Generally,
when the probability that a person will receive any distribution from the trust is less
than 5 percent, at a particular time, that person's interest would be so remote as to
be negligible. Finally, the tenn beneficiary does not include a person in whose
favor a power of appointment may be exercised until the power is actually
exercised.
This provision is helpful because most trusts have alternate beneficiaries.
2. Interests Acquired by Purchase
The proposed regulations provide guidance regarding the prohibition on acquiring
an interest in an ESBT by purchase. The proposed regulations provide that the
prohibition applies if any portion of a beneficiary's basis in the beneficiary's
interest is determined under section 1012. Thus, a part-gift, part-sale ofa beneficial
interestwill tenninate the trust's status as an ESBT. Beneficiaries may not purchase
interests in the trust, but the ESBT itselfis allowed to purchase S corporation stock.
3. Grantor Trusts
The proposed regulations provide that a trust, all or a portion ofwhich is treated
as owned by an individual under subpart E, part I, subchapter J, chapter 1 of the
Internal Revenue Code (Code) (a grantor trust), may elect to be an ESBT. The
Treasury Department and the IRS believe that Congress did not intend to preclude
this type of trust, which is a common family estate planning tool, from electing
ESBT status. The proposed regulations provide rules for the treatment ofgrantor
trusts electing ESBT status.
This provision is important because it allows trusts with multiple grantors to qualify as ESBTs.
4. Potential Current Beneficiaries
The proposed regulations provide that the term potential current beneficiary means,
with respect to any period, any person who at any time during such period is
entitled to, or at the discretion of any person may receive, a distribution from the
principal or income ofthe trust. In general, a person who may receive a distribution
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from the ESBT under a currently exercisable power ofappointment is a potential
current beneficiary. In addition, in the case ofan ESBT that is a grantor trust, the
proposed regulations provide that the deemed owner ofthe grantor trust is also to
be treated as a potential current beneficiary.
Under the defmitions set forth in the proposed regulations, a potential current
beneficiary is not necessarily a beneficiary ofthe trust and vice versa. For example,
a person in whose favor property could currently be appointed, but to whom no
such appointment has been made, is a potential current beneficiary, but not a
beneficiary. Conversely, a person who is a non-contingent remainder beneficiary
of a non-grantor trust is a beneficiary, but not a potential current beneficiary.
The proposed regulations provide special rules ifcurrent distributions can be made
to a distributee trust. Ifthe distributee trust does not qualify to be a shareholder of
an S corporation under section 1361(c)(2)(A), then the trust is considered the
potential current beneficiary and thus a shareholder. In that case, the corporation's
S election terminates because the corporation has an ineligible shareholder. For this
purpose, a trust is deemed to qualify to be a shareholder ofan S corporation under
section 1361 (c)(2)(A) ifit would be eligible to make a QSST or ESBT election if
it owned S corporation stock.
If the distributee trust does qualify to be a shareholder ofan S corporation under
section 1361(c)(2)(A), in general, the potential current beneficiaries of the
distributing ESBT will include the potential current beneficiaries ofthe distributee
trust. However, ifthe distributee trust is a fonner grantor trust prior to the owner's
death (that is, a trust described in section 1361(c)(2)(AXii», or is a trust receiving
a distribution ofS stock from a decedent's estate (that is, a trust described in section
136 I(c)(2)(A)(iii», the estate ofthe decedent is treated as the only potential current
beneficiary of the trust In no case will the same person be counted twice whe~
determining the number of S corporation shareholders.
5. ESBT Election
Notice 97-12 (1997-1 C.B. 385) provides the procedures for making the ESBT
election. Under that notice, the ESBT election is required to contain certain
information and representations, and is required to be filed with the service center
where the S corporation files its income tax returns. These proposed regulations,
when finalized, will modify and replace the rules in Notice 97-12.
Under the proposed regulations, the trustee of an ESBT makes a single ESBT
election by filing a statement with the service center where the ESBT files its Form
1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts. This procedure will be more
convenient for taxpayers than the procedures ofNotice 97-12 if the ESBT holds
stock in more than one S corporation. No trust documents are required to be
attached to the election statement.
The proposed regulations provide that if a trust satisfies the ESBT requirements
and makes an ESBT election, the trust will be treated as an ESBT for federal
income tax purposes as ofthe effective date ofthe ESBT election. These effective
dates generally follow the rules of section 1.1361-IG)(6)(iii) for qualified
subchapter S trust (QSST) elections. Protective ESBT elections, which are intended
to become effective only if the trust fails to satisfy the requirements for a trust
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described in section t361(c)(2)(A)(i) through (iv), are prohibited. Unlike a
protective QSST election, a protective ESBT election could result in a change in
the incidence of taxation from the owner of the trust to the trust itself. If a trust
fails to qualify as an eligible S corporation shareholder under section 1361(c)(2),
and consequently the S corporation election is ineffective or tenninated, reliefmay
be available under section 1362(t) for an inadvertent ineffective S corporation
election or an inadvertent S corporation tennination.
6. Conversions of QSSTs and ESBTs
Rev. Proc. 98-23 (1998-1 C.B. 662) provides procedures for the conversion ofa
QSST to an ESBT and an ESBT to a QSST. The proposed regulations, when
fmalized, will modify and replace the procedures ofRev. Proc. 98-23 and provide
rules with respect to these conversions.
The conversion procedure provided in the proposed regulations differs from that
provided in Rev. Proc. 98-23, in that the election must be filed with the service
center where the trust files its income tax return, as well as with the service center
where the S corporation files its income tax return. The election must be filed in
both service centers if the service center for the bust is different from the service
center for the S corporation because QSST elections are filed with the service
center where the S corporation files its income tax return and ESBT elections win
be filed where the trust files its income tax return under the new procedures set
forth in these proposed regulations, when finalized. The IRS and the Treasury
Department specifically request comments on whether the rules for filing QSST
elections similarly should be changed to permit the filing ofa QSST election with
the service center where the trust files its return rather than with the service center
for the S corporation(s).
7. Consent to the S Corporation Election
Notice 97-12 provides that, for pwposes ofthe ESBT's consent to the S corporation
election under section 1362(a), only the trustee needs to consent to the S
corporation election because the ESBT is taxed on the S corporation's income and
the trustee makes the ESBT election. These proposed regulations, when finalized,
will modify and replace the rules in Notice 97-12.
Under the proposed regulations, if the ESBT is also a grantor trust, the deemed
owner must also consent to the S corporation election because such owner will be
taxed on all or a portion of the S corporation's income. If there is more than one
trustee, the trustee or trustees with authority to legally bind the trust must consent
to the S corporation election.
8. ESBT Taxation
The proposed regulations provide that, for federal income tax purposes, an ESBT
consists ofan S portion, a non-S portion, and in some instances a grantor portion.
The items of income, deduction, and credit attributable to any portion ofthe ESBT
treated as owned by a person under the grantor trust rules ofsubpart E, including
S corporation stock and other property (the grantor portion), are taken into account
on that individual's tax return pursuant tQ the normal rules applicable to grantor
trusts. Other items ofincome., deduction, and credit are, pursuant to these proposed
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regulations, attributed to either the S portion, which includes the S corporation
stock, or the non-S portion, which includes all other assets of the trust. The S
portion is subject to tax under the special rules of section 641(c), while the non-S
portion is subject to the normal trust taxation rules of subparts A through 0 of
subchapter J.
The proposed regulations provide that ifan otherwise allowable deduction of the
S portion is attributable to a charitable contribution paid by the S corporation, the
contribution will be deemed to be paid by the S portion pursuant to the terms ofthe
trost's governing instrument within the meaning of section 642(c)(I). The other
requirements of section 642(cXI) must also be met for the contribution to be
deductible by the S portion, and the deduction is limited to the amount ofthe gross
income of the S portion. If a payment is made to a charitable organization by the
ESBT pursuant to the terms of its governing instrument, such payment is
deductible, subject to the provisions of section 642(cXI), to the extent it is paid
from the gross income of the non-S portion of the trust. Thus, if the ESBT
contributes S corporation stock to a charitable organization, no deduction is
allowed under section 642(cXl) because the contribution is not paid out of the
gross income ofthe non-S portion.
The proposed regulations provide guidance regarding the treatment of proceeds
received by an ESBT from the sale of S corporation stock when income from the
sale is reported on the installment method under section 453. The income
recognized with respect to the installment proceeds is taken into account by the S
portion. The interest on the installment obligation is taken into account by the non-
S portion.
The proposed regulations provide that ifa trust holds S corporation stock and is
already an eligible S corporation shareholder and the trust makes an ESBT election
during the trust's taxable year, the electing trust will be treated as a separate
taxpayer for purposes ofallocating S corporation items under section 1377(a)(I).
However, the ESBT election does not result in the prior trust being treated as
tenninating its entire interest in its S corporation stock for purposes of section
1.1377-1(b), unless the prior trust is one described in section 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) or
(iii). Therefore, the S corporation is generally not permitted to make the election
to terminate the taxable year under section 1377(a)(2). The trust will be treated as
a single taxpayer for purposes ofdetennining the taxation ofdistributions from the
trust. Thus, distributions made after the effective date of the ESBT election may
still carry out distributable net income of the trust earned during the taxable year
before the effective date of the ESBT election.
The proposed regulations provide that for purposes of determining whether the
exception to estimated taxes under section 6654(d)(1XB) applies, the trust will not
be considered a different taxpayer as a result of the ESBT election. Therefore, if
the ESBT makes estimated tax payments equal to 100 percent ofthe prior year's tax
liability, no penalties will apply.
The proposed regulations provide that interest expenses paid on loans used to
purchase the S corporation stock must be allocated to the S portion of the ESBT





The proposed regulations provide that generally a trustee must seek the consent of
the Commissioner to revoke its ESBT election by obtaining a private letter ruling.
However, the Commissionerfs consent is granted for revocations that occur on the
conversion ofan ESBT to a QSST under the procedures set forth in the proposed
regulations.
The proposed regulations provide that if an ESBT fails to meet the definitional
requirements ofan ESBT under section 1361(e), the trust's ESBT status terminates
immediately upon such failure to qualify. However, if an ESBT acquires an
ineligible potential current beneficiary, the ESBT has 60 days in which to dispose
ofall ofits S corporation stock to prevent tennination ofthe S corporation election.
If the S corporation stock is not disposed of within the 60-day period, then the S
corporation election will tenninate as of the fIrst day that the ineligible person
became a potential current beneficiary.
Finally, the proposed regulations provide that an ESBT election generally is
terminated ifthe ESBT fails to hold any S corporation stock. However, a trust will
continue to be treated as an ESBT if it is reporting income from the sale of S
corporation stock under the installment method of section 453.
10. Proposed Effective Date
The regulations regarding ESBTs under section 1.641-1(d) through (k), section
1.1361-I(hXIXvi),(hX3Xi)(F),(j)(12),and(m), section 1.1362-6(b)(2Xiv), section
1. I377-1(aX2)(iii) and (c) Example 3 are proposed to apply on and after the date
the final regulations are published in the Federal Register. The IRS and the
Treasury Department have become aware of potentially abusive transactions
involving ESBTs that assume the applicability ofthe rules ofsection 641(c) to the
taxation ofthe grantor portion ofsuch trusts. See Notice 2000-61, 2000-49 I.R.B.
1. Thus, the regulations regarding taxation ofESBTs under section 1.641(c)-l(a),
(b) and (c) are proposed to be applicable for taxable years of ESBTs that end on
and after the proposed regulations are published in the Federal Register.
F. SECTIONS 2031 and 2512 - VALUATION
1. Valuation of Voting Stock of Closely-Held Corporation. The case of the Estate of Richard R.
Simplot v. Commissioner, 112 T.e. No. 13 (1999), is very important. In 1993 Richard Simplot died owning 18 of the
76.445 shares ofthe Class A voting stock, and 3,942.48 ofthe 141,288.584 shares ofthe Class B non-voting stocks of
J.R. Simplot Co., a closely-held corporation best known for being the primary supplier ofpotatoes to McDonalds but
also operating in a variety ofother businesses. At issue was the value of the decedent's stock.
After determining the underlying value ofthe company as a whole, the court calculated the per share value of
the Class A and Class B shares. The court then applied to the Class A shares a 3% premium ofthe value of the whole
company. Finally the court applied a 35% discount for the Class A shares, and a 40% discount for the Class B shares,
based on the lack ofmarketability. That result was a value for a Class A share of$215,539.01 and the value ofa Class
B share of$3,417.05.
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The rationale for the 3% premium for the voting stock was not entirely clear. An important consideration was
the ratio of the number ofClass A shares to the number of Class B shares, which was approximately 1 to 1,848. The
opinion states:
We recognize that on the valuation date the hypothetical buyer of decedent's 18
shares ofclass A voting stock would not have the ability to control the Company's
management and would be subject to the philosophy of the other three class A
shareholders, all of whom were related and had family interests to protect. And
obviously, an investor would pay more for a block ofstock that represents control
than for a block of stock that is only a minority interest in the Company. On the
other hand, here, no one individual had a controlling block of voting stock.
We also recognize that Don, Gay, and Scott [the other voting Shareholders] would
want to maximize their children's interest in the Company and that if a sale or
liquidation of J.R. Simplot Co. occurred or if the Company merged with or into
another, the benefits derived therefrom would probably be distributed not by class
ofstock, but rather on an equal per- share basis, regardless ofclass. In other words,
after having paid for voting privileges, if on or after June 24, 1993, the Company
were merged, sold, or liquidated, the hypothetical buyer would suffer a loss if the
proceeds of the sale, merger, or liquidation were to be distributed among all
shareholders of J.R. Simplot Co. on a pro rata share basis, rather than on a class
basis.
On the other han~ we agree with Mr. Matthews [one of the IRS experts] that
although on the valuation date decedent's class A voting shares constituted a
minority interest in J.R. Simplot Co., it was foreseeable that one day (but NOT ON
the valuation date) the voting characteristics associated with them could have
"swing votet' potential if the hypothetical buyer combined his 18 class A voting
shares with Scott's 22.445 shares or joined with Don and Gay (combined having
36 class A voting shares) to fonn a control group.
Considering and weighing all ofthese factors, we adopt Mr. Matthews· lower range
figure of3 percent ofJ.R. Simplot Co:s equity value as the fair premium for the
voting privileges (NOT voting control) associated with the class A stock of J.R.
Simplot Co. We have adopted Mr. Matthews' 3-percent premium for voting
privileges because we give the greatest weight to the fact that DOD, Gay, and Scott
would be inclined to vote in a manner that would maximize their children's
interests. Thus, we believe the collective premium for the voting privileges ofthe
76.445 shares ofclass A stock ofJ.R. Simplot Co. as ofthe valuation date is $24.9
million (3 percent x $830 million), or $325,724.38 per share.
The court appeared uncomfortable with its decision:
A few fmal words before leaving the valuation issues. We recognize the disparate
ratio of our determined value before consideration of a liquidity discount of the
class A voting stock ($331,595.70 per share) to that ofthe class B nonvoting stock
($5,695.09 per share), that is a ratio ofapproximately 58 to 1. This disparity is the
consequence of the unique capital structure of J.R. Simplot Co. and the skewed
ratio of the number of class A voting shares to the class B nonvoting shares, that
is, approximately 1 to 1,848.
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The decision is unprecedented and can be criticized. In the real world would a buyer pay more unless acquiring
control? The benefit of being a director, for instance, seems ephemeral as an economic matter.
If the Simplot rationale were followed with respect to transfers of general partnership interests, significant
taxable gifts could result. To illustrate, suppose a family limited partnership were formed with 100 general partnership
units and 9,900 limited partnership units and owned $10 million in marketable securities. If a 3% premium were
attributed to the general partnership units then the value of the 100 general partnership units would increase from
$100,000 to $400,000.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the Tax Court on May 14,2001, 87 AFTR2d '2001-923, in a 2-1
decision. The majority opinion was straightforward:
The Tax Court in its opinion accurately stated the law: "The standard is objective,
using a purely hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller .... The hypothetical
persons are not specific individuals or entities." The Commissioner himself in his
brief concedes that it is improper to assume that the buyer would be an outsider.
The Tax Court, however, departed from this standard apparently because it
believed that"the hypothetical sale should not be constructed in a vacuum isolated
from the actual facts that affect value. tt Obviously the facts that determine value
must be considered.
The facts supplied by the Tax Court were imaginary scenarios as to who a
purchaser might be, how long the purchaser would be willing to wait without any
return on his investment, and what combinations the purchaser might be able to
effect with Simplot children or grandchildren and what improvements in
management ofa highly successful company an outsider purchaser might suggest.
"All ofthese factors," i.e., all ofthese imagined facts~ are what the Tax Court based
its 3% premium upon. In violation of the law the Tax Court constructed particular
possible purchasers.
The Tax Court erred further by finding what premium all the Class A shares as a
block would command and then dividing this premium per each Class A share.
Doing so, the Tax Court valued an ass~t not before it -- aU the Class A stock
representing complete control. There was no basis for supposing that whatever
value attached to complete control a proportionate share of that value attached to
each fraction ofthe whole. Under the applicable regulations, the fair market value
of"each unit ofproperty" is to be ascertained; in the case ofshares ofstock, "such
unit of property is generally a share of stock." 26 C.F.R. section 20.2031- 1(b).
The Tax Court committed a third error of law. Even a controlling block ofstock is
not to be valued at a premium for estate tax purposes, unless the Commissioner can
show that a purchaser would be able to use the control "in such a way to assure an
increased economic advantage worth paying a premium for." Ahmanson
Foundation v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 770 (9th Cir. 1981). Here, on
liquidation, all Class B shareholders would fare better than Class A shareholders;
any premium paid for the 18 Class A shares be lost. Class A and B had the right to
the same dividends. What economic benefits attended 18 shares ofClass A stock?
No"seat at the table" was assured by this minority interest; it could not elect a
director. The Commissioner points out that Class A shareholders had formed
businesses that did business with Simplot. If these businesses enjoyed special
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advantages, the Class A shareholders would have been liable for breach of their
fiduciary duty to the Class B shareholders. See Estate of Curry v. United States,
706 F.2d 1424, 1430 (7th Cir. 1983).
Much ofthe Commissioner's argument is devoted to speculation as to what might
happen after the valuation date - the Simplots might fall out with each other, the
purchaser might fmd ways of making Simplot more profitable and persuade the
company to adopt his strategy, the purchaser might be willing to wait fifteen years
to get any return. The speculation is as easily made that the company would go
downhill when its founder, J. R. Simplot, 84 at the valuation date, retired; or that
McDonald's, Simplot's largest customer for its potatoes, would change its supplier;
or that Micron would prove to be an unwise investment. Speculation is easy but not
a proper way to value the transfer at the time of the decedent's death. Olson v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246,259 (1934). In Richard Simplot's hands at the time of
transfer his stock was worth what a willing buyer would have paid for the
economic benefits presently attached to the stock. By this standard, a minority
holding Class A share was worth no more than a Class B share.
The dissent's view was that the purchaser would pay a premium in hopes of reselling the shares to form a
majority block:
The question then becomes whether Scott, who owns 29.35% of the A shares,
would be willing to pay a little less than four million dollars in order to gain voting
control ofa company worth $830 million, or whether Don and Gay, who together
own 47.10% of the A shares, would be willing to pay that amount to gain such
control. I believe the answer is clear. Scott, Don, and Gay would each be extremely
interested in controlling the A shares, because with control of the A shares they
could make decisions - such as issuing dividends or taking the company public --
that would be of economic advantage to them and their descendants given their
substantial ownership interest of the B shares and their descendants' beneficial
ownership ofB shares. Scott, Don, and Gay thelnselves have substantial ownership
ofB shares, and trusts benefitting their descendants have much greater ownership
of B shares. Once the B share interest is taken into account, the disjunction
between voting rights and economic interests disappears with respect to Scott, Don,
and Gay. Given these facts, ourhypothetical buyer, "maneuvering a course between
them," would be able to able to selltS A shares for a substantial amount. In my
view, that amount probably exceeds the $3.9 million valuation reached by the Tax
Court. At the very least, I can find no clear error in the Tax Court's valuation of
$3.9 million.
2. Partnership Interests. The value of a 25% assignee interest in a Texas general partnership that
automatically dissolved upon the decedent's death was entitled to a 5.4% discount for selling expenses in Patricia M.
Adams, et al. v. United States, 83 AFTR2d 199-691 (U.S. N.D. Tx. 1999). The decedent created a general partnership
with her siblings which had a net asset value ofapproximately $33 million at her death which consisted of ranch land,
marketable securities, and mineral interests. At the decedent's death, the partnership dissolved according to Texas law
because the partnership agreement did not provide for it to continue and, also by operation ofTexas law, the decedent's
heirs became assignees of her interest. Texas law allows the remaining partners to either wind up the partnership or
continue it as a new partnership.
A·46
The district court concluded that a hypothetical buyer would choose to receive 25% ofthe partnership's net
assets rather than continuing as an assignee because of the limited rights an assignee has. The estate argued that a
hypothetical buyer would not pay full value for the interest. The court disagreed noting that the existing partners had
a strict fiduciary duty to the assignee while liquidating and valuing the assets to detennine the assignee's share. Thus
the court did not apply a lack ofmarketability or minority interest discount.
The district court also rejected a "portfolio discount" even though the partnership had a mix ofassets because,
again, the purchaser would receive actual assets not a partnership interest. The estate also argued that a hypothetical
buyer would pay less for an interest that has uncertain rights and obJigations or carry the high potential for litigation but
the court did not find any such potential because it found that estate law was very clear.
The district court did conclude that a discount for the cost ofselling the assets wa() appropriate and found the
discount to be 5.4%.
On July 5,2000, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, 96 AFTR2d 'tJ 2000-5090, because the district court
likely misinterpreted Texas law:
This estate tax case presents a single issue: Whether discounts for lack ofcontrol,
lack ofmarketability, and poor portfolio diversity are applicable when appraising
the value of an assignee's fractional interest in a Texas general partnership for
estate tax purposes. The district court correctly identified the relevant interest of
the partnership in question - that ofa partner's assignee, not that ofa full-fledged
partner -- but reached the erroneous legal conclusion that the assignee of a 25
percent partner's interest has a "well-established" right to receive a 25 percent pro
rata share of the partnership's net asset value (UNAVtf) without being reduced by
such discounts. Proceeding on the basis of this erroneous conclusion of law, the
district court held that the assignee's interest would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller for a price equal to such an undiscounted 25 percent
ratable share of the partnership's NAV.
Our "Erie Guess" would likely be that -- under the Texas partnership law, which
is applicable to this case - an assignee's interest in a partnership would be subject
to such discounts; but, more significant to today's inquiry, we are fundy convinced
that it is anything but "well-establis,hed" that a partner's assignee has the right to
receive a 25 percent share ofNAV. We discern a very real possibility that, as a
matter of law, the holder of an assignee interest in the partnership could be stuck
with an unmarketable interest in a partnership that owns a poorly diversified mix
ofassets and over which the assignee has no legal control. Ifthis proved to be the
case, the fair market value of the 25 percent assignee interest would be
substantially less than a straight, ratable 25 percent share ofthe partnership's NAV,
thereby reflecting these undesirable characteristics. More to the point, the legal
uncertainty that obscures the extent, if any, to which an assignee has the right to
provoke liquidation or, alternatively, to force a straight pro rata redemption ofhis
interest, suggests that any effort to exercise such putative rights would be met with
strong resistance from the remaining partners. This legal uncertainty -- which raises
the specter ofcostly litigation in addition to an adverse result - is itselfa factor that
must be taken into account when appraising the fair market value ofan assignee's
interest for estate tax purposes. We therefore reverse the district court's judgment
in favor of the government and remand the case for further proceedings.
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Texas law is substantially similar to most states' partnership law in this respect.
3. Aegreeation ofStock. The holding in Estate ofBonner v. United States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996)
was followed in a case appealable to the Ninth Circuit by the Tax Court in Estate of Harriett R. Mellinger v.
Commissioner, 112 T.C. No.4 (1999). The decedent and her husband originally owned, as community property, 4.9
million shares of Frederick's ofHollywood, Inc. Frederick died fIrSt and left his community property interest of2.46
million shares in a QTIP trust for the benefit of Harriett. The remaining 2.46 million shares were owned by Harriett
in her own revocable trust.
Together the two blocks ofstock represented 55.7% ofthe stock. The estate valued these shares as separate
27.8% interests using a discount of about 30%.
The court valued the interests separately but applied a 25% discount. The court rejected the IRS argument that
the decedent should be treated as the owner ofthe QTIP property for valuation purposes under section 2044. The court
noted that neither decedent had any power of disposition over the assets of the QTIP trust. The Tax Court followed
Estate ofMellinger v. Commissioner, I 12 T.C. 26 (1999) in the Estate ofAmbrosinia Blanche Lopes v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1999-225.
Estate ofEthel S. Nowell v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1999-15, came to the same conclusion as Mellinger
with respect to a partnership interest. ChiefJudge Mary Ann Cohen wrote the opinion in both Nowell and Mellinger.
Also at issue in Nowell was whether the interest in the partnerships passing at the death ofthe decedent should
be valued as an assignee interest or as partnership interest. The Tax Court detennined that the interest should be valued
as an assignee interest because the estate tax is levied on the property interests that were transferred at decedent's death
as determined by applicable state law.
The partnership was created under the Arizona limited partnership act which provided that a limited partner
could not transfer the partner's interest without the consent of the general partner unless the partnership agreement
provided otherwise. Here, the partnership agreement did not provide otherwise. The court noted that whether general
partners will consent is a subjective factor that would not be taken into consideration under the objective standard of
the hypothetical buyer, hypothetical seller analysis, citing Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982),
Estate ofAndrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938 (1982), and Kolom v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 235 (1978), affd. 644
F.2d 1282 (9th. Cir. 1981).
The opinion did not state whether the previous practice of the partnership had been to admit assignees as
limited partners.
In FSA 200119013 the IRS took the position that the Bonner line of cases did not apply to assets held in a
general power of appointment marital trust.
Further, this position is consistent with the recent litigation concluding that
fractional or minority interests in property held in a trust qualifying as qualified
tenninable interest property (QTIP), includible in the decedent's gross estate under
section 2044, is not aggregated for valuation purposes with fractional or minority
interests in property owned outright by the decedent. Estate of Bonner v. United
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States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996); Estate ofMellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C.
4 (1999), acq., 1999-2 C.B. xvi; Estate ofLopes v. Commissioner, TCM 1999-225;
Estate ofNowell v. Commissioner, TCM 1999-225. As discussed below, the nature
of the surviving spousets interest in a marital deduction trust subject to a general
power of appointment and includible in the gross estate under section 2041 is
fundamentally different from the QTIP trust situations previously addressed by the
courts.
The FSA discussed one aspect of Mellinger:
The estate next cites language in the Tax Courtts decision in Estate ofMellinger v.
Commissioner where the court, in reaching the conclusion that assets includible
under section 2044 are not aggregated with assets includible under section 2031,
stated:
Furthermore, at no time did decedent possess, control, or have any power
of disposition over the ... [property] in the QTIP trust. Cf. sees. 2035,
2036, 2041 (requiring inclusion in the gross estate where a decedent had
control over the assets at some time DURING HER LIFE).
Estate ofMellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.e. 35-36 (emphasis added.)
The estate infers that the reference to control "during her life" indicates that the
Tax Court would not view a testamentary general power, which can only be
exercised to dispose of the property at death, as according the decedent sufficient
control over the property to justify aggregation. For several reasons, we do not
agree.
First, we believe the statement, as it applies to testamentary powers, merely
recognizes that in the case ofa testamentary power, the power holder has the power
to dispose of the assets at death but exercises that power during life by executing
the appropriate instrument. Thus, the power holder has lifetime control over the
property in the sense that the power holderts control is exercised during life, and
becomes effective on death. Many courts have characterized testamentary general
powers ofappointment as providing the holder with lifetime control. For example,
in Fidelity- Philadelphia Trust Co., v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108 (1945), the
decedent held a contingent testamentary general power of appointment and the
Court commented that, "[Tlhe ultimate disposition of all the trust property was
suspended during the life of the decedent." See also, Goldstone v. United States,
325 U.S. 687 (1945) (applying the decision in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. to
a decedentts reversionary interest). In Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 102
T.C. 790, 800 (1994), affd, 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996), the Tax Court
characterized the surviving spouse, as the holder ofa testamentary general power
ofappointment, as having "maintained effective control over the disposition ofthe
property in the marital trust until her death. tt 3 Thus, we do not believe the quoted
language can reasonably be viewed as referencing only inter vivos general powers
of appointment.
In Nowell, the decedent had a testamentary special power of appointment:
Finally, the estate argues that in Estate of Nowell the decedent possessed a
testamentary limited power of appointment over the trust assets, and, thus, could
exercise a degree of control over the disposition of the trust assets at death.
Nonetheless, the court did not take this power into account in finding that
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aggregation was not appropriate. We recognize that in some situations, a limited
power of appointment may afford the holder broad powers of disposition.
However, the power holder would not, in any event, be authorized to appoint the
property to his or her estate (or his or her creditors) as is the situation presented
with a general power.
Thus, there is a significant practical difference between the two kinds ofpowers,
and this difference is reflected in the tax treatment accorded the two powers. For
tax purposes, property subject to a limited power is not treated as effectively owned
by the power holder, and is not subject to inclusion in the gross estate. Given the
nature of a limited power, and the fact that a limited power is not recognized for
estate and gift tax purposes as affording the power holder sufficient control to
generate any transfer tax consequences when possessed or exercised, the court in
Estate ofNowell was justified in treating a QTIP trust subject to a limited power
in the same manner as a QTIP trust where the remainder beneficiaries are
designated by the first spouse to die. However, as discussed above, it does not
follow that the same result should obtain in this case where the Decedent possessed
a general power ofappointment over Trust A.
4. Valuation of Construction Company Using Discounted Cash Flow Method. The Tax Court
adopted the discounted cash-flow method to detennine the value of a construction business in May T.-Rakow v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo, 1999-177, finding that a 31% minority discount was appropriate. The taxpayer argued that
future cash flows were too uncertain in the construction business to be a basis for valuation because ofthe risk inherent
in the business -- such as poor estimates, delays, litigation over accidents, defects, non-performance, and cyclical
demands -- but the court rejected that argument because this particular construction company did not suffer
disproportionately from any of those risks. On the other hand, the court rejected the use of an asset base valuation
approach because the construction company was not a holding or an investment company.
The gift involved I,780 shares ofcommon stock out ofa total of$6,340. The taxpayer's original value was
$354.89 per share, and the IRS assessed value was $606.65 per share. The court determined the value to be $413.59
per share.
5. Importance ofReliable Experts and Relevance ofPost-Death Sales. The case ofEstate ofAlice
Friedlander Kaufman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-119, illustrates the importance ofhaving a competent and
credible appraiser. At issue was the value of almost 20% of the stock in a closely-held company, Seminole
Manufacturing Co., a makerofuniforms. The taxpayer contended that the value ofthe shares was $29.77 based on sales
two months after the valuation date of two blocks, one of4.7% and another of 3.25%, sold to other family members.
The court found that those sales were not truly at ann's length because the sellers were not reasonably informed about
•
the facts relating to the stocks' value before they sold.
The estate had engaged an expert as had the IRS. However, the IRS' expert's report used the wrong valuation
date and made other mistakes and thus was held irrelevant other than as a rebuttal to the taxpayer's expert.
The court found that the taxpayer's expert was unpersuasive, and the taxpayer's expert testimony was
unsupported by the record, so that the court gave no weight to the taxpayer's expert and accepted the IRS determination
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of the stock which was $56.50 per share. The case contains a lengthy discussion of the inadequacy of the taxpayer's
expert, ranging from confusion about the expert's assumptions, to mistakes in the interpretation ofvaluation methods.
The case should be reviewed by any expert preparing valuation opinions.
However, on the substance, the Ninth Circuit reversed in James J. Morrissey, et.al. v. Commissioner, 87
AFTR2d ~2001-643 (2001). The Court held that the post-death sales were reliable:
In 1993, A. Max Weitzenhoffer, Jr. (Weitzenhoffer) asked Merrill Lynch to
appraise the value of a minority interest. The Merrill Lynch final report was
delivered to him on July 5, 1994. However, on March 29, 1994 Merrill Lynch
wrote Weitzenhoffer giving its formal opinion that the fair market value of a
minority interest was $29.77 per share.
On the basis of this report Weitzenhoffer advised two shareholders that Merrill
Lynch set the value at $29.70 per share, and each sold to him at this price. Edmund
Hoffman sold him his 10,000 shares on May 12, 1994; Jacquelyne Weitzenhoffer
Branch sold him her 6,960 shares on June 16, 1994. Each seller subsequently
testified before the Tax Court that the price was fair and that the sale had been
under no compulsion.
The Estate filed an estate tax return valuing the stock at $29.77 per share. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the stock at $70.79 per share and
asserted a deficiency based on this amount.
******
No good reason existed to reject the sales by Branch and Hoffman as evidence of
the fair market value of Seminole stock on April 14, 1994. The sales took place
close to the valuation date. The sellers were under no compulsion to sell. There was
no reason for them to doubt Weitzenhcffer's report ofthe Merrill Lynch valuation.
That the final report was delivered only in July did not undercut the weight ofthe
formal opinion letter written in March. The sellers had no obligation to hire another
investment firm to duplicate Merrill Lynch's work.
The Commissioner tries to make something out of the family connections of the
sellers with the buyers. They were not especially close. Hoffman had an uncle
related by marriage to Weitzenhoffer's uncle; there is no English word to name this
relationship. Branch was Weitzenhoffer's fIrSt cousin. Each seller testified that
there was no intention to make a gift to Weitzenhoffer.
The Commissioner notes that Hoffman was a very successful businessman, so that
the Seminole stock may not have meant much to him. People don't get to be very
successful in business by treating valuable property carelessly. To be sure, there
was a seven cents spread between Merrill Lynch's price and Weitzenhoffer's offer;
the resulting difference of $700 and $487.20 were in context de minimis.
The Commissioner also notes that Branch had a misimpression that Seminole still
owned a losing facility that it had, in fact, already sold. Nonetheless Branch was
rightly aware that a substantial loss had occurred due to this facility in 1991 when
no dividends had been paid. Both sellers were aware that dividends had, even in
prosperous years, been meager.
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On the other hand, in William J. Desmond v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1999-76, the court largely accepted
the estate's expert in valuing Deft, Inc. The court looked at two methods to determine value, what is described as the
income method, the discounted cash-flow method, and the market method, comparing the stock to public companies.
The chart shows the calculations ofthe court, following the taxpayer's expert:
Income Market



















Fair Market Value of
Decedent's Interest 3,155,759 + 3,411,565 = 6,567,324
As the chart shows, there was a significant environmental liability potential in the company because it was a
manufacturer ofpaints, and that went into the lack ofmarketability discount when value was determined using the cash- .
flow method. In addition, because the decedent owned a majorityofthe stock thedecedent could liquidate the company,
which was an S corporation, atany time~ Thus the court found that a control premiumshould be added in the discounted
cash flow method. l\ control premium had already been added in the market method when reaching the $10)410,000
value.
With respect to calculating the amount of the lack ofmarketability discount, the court stated:
The following factors favor a high lack ofmarketability discount: (1) There was no
public market for Deft's stock; (2) Deft's profit margins were below the industry
average; (3) all stock in Deft was subject to a restrictive share agreement which
provided that a shareholder could transfer his or her stock to a nonshareholder only
after the sharehoIder offered the shares to the remaining shareholders; (4) given the
size and low profitability ofDeft, a public offering ofthe stock was unlikely in the
future; (5) the size of the interest is so large that it may be hard to fmd potential
buyers in the future who could finance such a purchase; and (6) where not already
considered, Deft has large potential environmental liabilities.
Only one factor favors a low lack ofmarketability discount: Deft had an historical
favorable distribution policy (it distributed most of the company's earnings to its
shareholders through higher-than-market compensation in the past).
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We conclude that a 30-percent lack ofmarketability discount is appropriate for the
Deft stock. Ofthis 30-percent discount, 10 percent is attributable to Deft's potential
environmental liabilities. We shall apply the 30-percent lack of marketability
discount to the unadjusted value we determined under the income method. We
however shall apply only a 20-percent lack of marketability discount to the
unadjusted value we determined under the market method because as discussed
supra, the environmental liabilities have already been included in the unadjusted
value under that method.
6. Discount for Built-in Capital Gains. Last year we saw the Davis case, which, for the first time,
allowed a reduction in fair market value for built-in capital gains based on the theory that a hypothetical willing buyer
would take into consideration and realize capital gains when valuing assets after the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine. How the reduction for built-in gains needs to be calculated is only beginning to be worked out. In Davis the
court considered the reduction as part ofa lack ofmarketability discount.
The Second Circuit held that built-in capital gains must be considered when valuing a C corporation, even if
the corporation has no plan to liquidate. Eisenberg v. Commissioner, ISS F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 1998). The IRS has
acquiesced in the decision. 1999-4 IRB 4. The only asset ofthe corporation was a rental building. The opinion states:
We disagree with the Commissioner's reasoning that the critical point in this case
is that there was no indication a liquidation was imminent or that "a hypothetical
willing buyer would desire to purchase the stock with the view toward liquidating
the corporation or selling the assets, such that the potential tax liability would be
of material and significant concern." Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1046, 1048-49 (1997). The issue is not what a hypothetical willing buyer
plans to do with the property, but what considerations affect the fair market value .
of the property he considers buying. While prior to the TRA any buyer of a
corporation's stock could avoid potential built-in capital gains~ there is simply
no evidence to dispute the fact that a hypothetical willing buyer today would likely
pay le~s for the shares ofa corporation because ofthe buyer's inability to eliminate
the contingent tax liability. See John Gilbert, After the Repeal ofGeneral Utilities:
Business Valuations and Contingent Income Taxes on Appreciated Assets, Mont.
Law, Nov. 1995, at 5 (c:ting a 1994 study that a'la!yzed the i'!1pact ofcontingent
tax liability on a buyer ofa private, closely-held corporation and concluded a large
majority ofbuyers would discount the stock and negotiate a lower purchase price
due to the existence of a contingent tax liability on the corporation's appreciated
property).
******
Further, we believe, contrary to the opinion of the Tax Court, since the General
Utilities doctrine has been revoked by statute, a tax liabilityupon liquidation orsale
for built-in capital gains is not too speculative in this case. Courts previously have
allowed discounts for built-in capital gains if, among other factors, payment oftax
on a capital gain is likely. See, e.g., Obermer v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 29,
34-36 (D. Haw. 1964) (finding expert testimony showed built-in capital gains tax
would necessarily adversely affect value ofstock at issue to willing buyer, and in
allowing discount, contrasted the facts with Estate ofCruiksh~ 9 T.C. 162, a
case relied on by appellee); see generally Clark v. United States, No. 1309, 1309,
1975 WL 610, at *4,5 (E.D.N.C. May)6, 1975) (stating a well-infonned willing
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buyer ofstock in corporation would consider that underlying assets ofcorporation
included inactive investment portfolio that, upon liquidation, would incur
substantial capital gains tax liability).
Although the Tax Court in this case held that "the primary reason for disallowing
a discount for capital gains taxes in this situation is that the tax liability itself is
deemed to be speculative," Eisenberg, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1048, we disagree. We
believe that an adjustment for potential capital gains tax liabilities should be taken
into account in valuing the stock at issue in the closely held C corporation even
though no liquidation or sale of the Corporation or its assets was planned at the
time ofthe gift of the stock. We therefore remand this matter to the Tax Court to
ascertain the gift tax to be paid by the taxpayer consistent with this opinion.
The only guidance given by the court for the way in which the potential capital gains tax should be considered
is provided by footnote 16:
Where there is a relatively sizable number of potential buyers who can avoid or
defer the tax, the fair market value of the shares might well approach the pre-tax
market value ofthe real estate. Potential buyers who could avoid or defer the tax
would compete to purchase the shares, albeit in a market that would include similar
real estate that was not owned by a corporation. However, where the number of
potential buyers who can avoid or defer the tax is small, the fair market value ofthe
shares might be only slightly above the value ofthe real estate net oftaxes. In any
event, all of these circumstances should be determined as a question of valuation
for tax purposes.
More recently, in Estate ofHelen BoltonJameson v. Commis§ioner, T.e. Memo. 1999-43, the court calculated
the discount as the net present value of the capital gains tax liability as the court estimated it would be incurred. The
company at issue was a timber company. ~e estate valued the stock on the basis of income not ~sets but the court
disagreed and accepted the IRS's expert opinion as valuing the assets as a holding company was more appropriate.
As a holding company, the court found that the company would recognize its built-in gain as it cuts timber over
time based on four variables: (1) the rate at which the timber grows, (2) the effects of inflation, (3) capital gains tax
rates, and (4) the discount rate. The court selected variables within the range of figures offered by the various experts
and assumed annual timber growth of 10%, 4% inflation, 34% in capital gains tax rate, and 20% discount rate. The
court assumed 9 years oftimber sales on a sustainable yield basis.
The estate owned virtually all ofthe company stock and the court rejected a 10% Jack ofmarketability discount
in favor ofa 3% lack ofmarketability discount primarily because no expert testimony was offered by the taxpayer on
that subject. The court found that approximately 3% of the company's total assets were completely unmarketable.
The court also rejected the estate's argument that having a small-- 2 or 3 percent minority shareholder -- should
give rise to a nuisance discount.
The IRS had claimed a value of$77.00 per share, the estate $50.94 per share, and the court $71.00 per share.
The Sixth Circuit has reversed and remanded to the Tax Court the case of Estate of Pauline Welch v.
Commissioner, 85 AFTR2d Par. 2000-534, No. 98-2007 (March 1,2000), for a detennination ofthe appropriate built
in gains discount. The opinion gives no guidance on the calculation
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7. Blockage Discount. In general, blockage discounts have been decreasing over many years because
ofthe increased volume. The appropriate blockage discount to apply to 2.2% ofthe common stock ofApplied Power,
Inc. was before the Tax Court in Estate ofDorothy B. Foote v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1999-37. The taxpayer's
expert argued for a 22.5% discount and the IRS' expert for a 2.3% discount.
The court accepted the IRS' expert's opinion. The IRS' expert determined that there were 8 days in 1993, after
the date of.death, where more than 50,000 shares ofApplied Power stock were traded and that the largest decrease on
one ofthose trading days was 2.5% stock all for one of the largest trading volume days there was an increase in value
of 1.5%. In contrast, the taxpayer's expert had concluded the stock could best be disposed of in 7,000 shares per day
increments over a period of40 days.
Of particular interest is the court's discussion of post-death events:
We are mindful that as a general rule only facts known at the valuation date are
considered in detennining the property's value. However, subsequent market
activities may provide helpful comparable sales. See Estate of Newhouse v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193,218 n.15 (1990). Here, we believe the three sales by
the Trust within 3-1/2 months of decedent's death to be relevant and reasonably
proximate to the valuation date. This 3-112-month period was, in our opinion, a
reasonable period of time following the valuation date.
Petitioner failed to show that the market price of the stock on the valuation date
was an inaccurate reflection of the true value of the Trust's block of stock. The
relative size of the block of stock at issue in relation to the amount of Applied
Power stock outstanding, plus the monthly and yearly trading volumes for the stock
of Applied Power, plus the fact that the entire block of stock was sold within an
acceptable period oftime after the valuation date (and on 3 trading days) suggest
that only a minimal blockage discount is warranted. In our opinion, the depressing
effect on the market of the Trust's sale of its stock is not commensurate with the
22.5- percent blockage discount estimate of Mr. Kleeman [taxpayer's expert].
8. Real Estate Corporation. The tax court relied primarily ona discounted cash flow analysis, allowing
for market absorption discounts, to conclude that the fair market value ofthe decedent's one-third interest in a closely-
held corporation involved in real estate development was approximately book value. Estate of Lynn M. Rodgers v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-129.
9. Actuarial Factors. Section 7520 provides that the value ofan annuity, life interest, inter~st for a term
of years, and remainder and reversionary interests, for transfers after April 30, 1989, are to be determined using a
discount rate, rounded to the nearest 2/10ths ofone percent,· equal to 120% ofthe applicable federal mid-term rate in
effect under section 1274(d)(I) for the month in which the transfer occurs. Section 7520(cX3) directed the Secretary
of the Treasury to issue tables not later than December 31, 1989, using the then most recent mortality experience and
to revise the table with respect to mortality experience not less frequently than every 10 years. T.D. 8819, REG-l03851-
99 contains the new tables for the most recent mortality experience available and is effective as of May 1, 1999. The
new mortality tables are referred to as Life Table 90CM. The mortality tables indicate that for the most part individuals
are living longer, except in the very oldest ages where life expectancies have actually declined since the 1980 tables.
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10. Comparison With Public Companies. In Estate of Brookshire v. Commissioner, 76 T.e.M. 659
(1998) the Tax Court accepted the taxpayer's expert valuation ofBrookshire Grocery Company, comparing it to certain
public companies. The court allowed a 40% discount for lack of marketability.
Valuation of two private held telephone companies was at issue in Barnes v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. 881
(1998). The Tax Court largely accepted the opinion ofthe taxpayer's expert who compared the privately held companies
that issue in the case to 10 local or regional publicly traded telephone companies with respect to price earnings ratios,
dividends, price compared with cash flow, etc. The IRS argued that actual dividend payments were irrelevant and that
only dividend paying capacity should be considered but the court disagreed finding that 6 ofthe 10 guideline companies
paid out greater dividends than the privately-held companies. The court noted that the donees of the non-voting stock
at issue had no right to participate in any decision related to the company and thus could not force the companies to pay
dividends.
The court rejected the argument oftaxpayer's expert in one regard, holding that no premium should be allowed
in calculating the discount rate used to capitalize "the companies to sort earnings. The court held that the taxpayer's
expert did not show that the companies were riskier than other comparably sized companies, primarily because all
telephone companies are highly regulated.
The Tax Court also allowed substantial discounts of40% of lack ofmarketability for one ofthe companies and
45% for the other company. The court noted that the donor's family has controlled the companies for more than half
a century and intend to keep control. Interestingly, the court pointed to the fact that a voting trust had been created, and
life insurance has been purchased, as part ofan estate plan, as indicating the intent to maintain the companies in the
family. The court also noted that there had been no outside sales of the companies.
The court also allowed an additional discount for the non-voting stock, even though the voting stock was a
.minority interest of 3.66% based on the testimony of the taxpayer's expert.
11 Valuation ofS Corporation Shares. Walter L. Gross, Jr., et UK., et at. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
1999-254, involved the value of S corporation shares. The court did not allow the taxpayer to reduce the assumed cash-
flow of the S corporation as if it were a C corporation. That is, the Court rejected "tax-affecting" the earnings.
Arguably this is contrary to the training and audit handbooks of the IRS itself. The court also allowed a 25%
marketability discount.
12 BankStock. At issue in Estate ofJames Waldo Hendrickson v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo 1999-278,
was the valuation of stock in a closely-held bank in a small Indiana town. The opinion is a useful review of the
application of appraisal factors generally. In particular, however, two fmdings are interesting.
The decedent owned 1499 shares, of3000, which is 49.97%. One child owned 85 shares and the decedent's
ex-wife owned 610 shares. There were 29 other shareholders, each with at least 3 shares. The court found that the
decedent's shares should be valued as a control block.
The court applied a 30% lack of marketability discount as well.
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13. Blockage and Fractional Interest Discounts for Real Property. In Estate ofEileen K. Brocato v
Commissioner, TC Memo 1999-424, the court allowed an 11% blockage discount and a 20% fractional interest discount,
largely accepting the taxpayer's expert, for 8 apartment complexes of between 12 and 45 units each.
In Estate ofWilliam Busch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-3 (2000), the court allowed a 10% fractional
interest discount for a 50% interest in real estate the highest and best use ofwhich was residential. The court rejected
the taxpayer's expert's claim ofa 40% discount fmding that discount to be based on studies ofpartnerships and REITS.
The court gave no justification for 10% but did note that it would be "more than adequate to accommodate reasonable
costs of partition" on the facts of the case.
Pending in the Tax Court is Estate ofEileen Kerr Stevens v. Commissioner, No. 22643-97, in which the IRS,
on brief, cites its expert in ceding between a 10% and 20% discount for fractional interests in commercially leased real
estate. The brief states that the costs of partition are one factor the expert relied on.
14. Majority ofOperating Company. In Estate ofBeatrice Ellen Jones Dunn v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2000-12, the court valued a 62.96% interest in a heavy equipment rental business. The court applied a 5%
discount for built-in capital gains, without useful discussion, and a 15% discount for lack of marketabilitY, agreed to
by the experts for the taxpayer and IRS. Under Texas Jaw a shareholder cannot compel liquidation of a corporation
without 66.67% of the vote. The IRS conceded a discount of 7.5% for lack ofa super-majority.
15. Closely-Held Company With an ESOP. In Estate of Sam Homer Mannaduke v. Commissioner,
T.C.Memo. 1999-342, the decedent died owning 22% of Hastings Books, Music & Video, Inc., a retailer. The
decedent's family owned 57% and an ESOP owned 21%. By general agreement, the value ofthe whole company was
$100,000,000 on the date ofdeath. Within a year ofdeath there were a number oftransactions involving small blocks
of stock that used a value of$47 per shares, about a 20% discount.
Judge Swift detennined that a discount below $47 per share was warranted, and valued the stock at $41.51 per
shares~ a 30% discount.
16. Tax Court Values Decedent's Stock in Two Nonpublicly Traded Corporations. The value of
one-third of a fann corporation and 12% of a family owned bank were at issue in Estate of Helen J. Smith v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-368. The case was mostly a taxpayer victory because Judge Gale was more persuaded
by the taxpayer's experts. One point is especially instructive. In valuing the farm corporation the court accepted an
expert's opinion that the valuation would be based 70% on assets and 30% on earnings.
17. Value of Partnership with Pre-2703 Options. Estate of Fred O. Godley v. Commissioner, T.C.
memo 2000-242 involved the valuation of five 50% interests in housing partnerships owned by a decedent who died
in May, 1990. The estate valued the interests at $10,000 each because the decedent's son, Fred, Jr., could purchase
the interests at that price. The Tax Court disregarded the options:
It is well settled that an option agreement may fix the value of a business interest
for Federal estate tax purposes if the following conditions are met: (i) The price
must be fixed and detenninabie under the agreement; (ii) the agreement must be
binding on the parties both during life and after death; and (iii) the agreement must
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have a bona fide business purpose and must not be a substitute for a testamentary
disposition. See Estate of Bischoffv. Commissioner, 69 T.e. 32,39 (1977); see
also sec. 20.2031-2(h), Estate Tax Regs. Respondent does not dispute that
petitioner meets the fIrSt two conditions but challenges whether the option
provision had a bona fide business purpose and whether it was a substitute for
testamentary disposition. According to petitioner, the optionprovision was inserted
in each of the partnership agreements for the purpose of allowing Fred Jr. to
maintain controlofthe businesses without the possibilityofinterference from other
family members. The maintenance of family ownership and control constitutes a
bona fide business purpose. See Estate ofBischoffv. Commissioner, supra at 39-
40. However, even if we find that the option had a bona fide business purpose, it
will be disregarded if it served as a device to pass decedent's interest to the natural
objects of his bounty and to convey that interest for less than full and adequate
consideration. See Bommer Revocable Trust v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1997-
380; Estate of Lauder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-736; see also sec.
20.2031-2(h), Estate Tax Regs. We find that the option provision in each of the
partnership agreements represents a testamentary device to convey decedent's
interest to his son for less than full and adequate consideration, and therefore we
disregard it in determining the value of those interests.
Petitioner argues that the options were not a testamentary device because they were
exchanged for full and adequate consideration. Petitioner claims that the options
were granted in exchange for allowing decedent to participate as a 45- or 50-
percent partner in the partnerships without a substantial contribution, either ofcash
or in kind, and that, therefore, decedent's agreement to concede to Fred Jr. all future
appreciation exceeding $10,000 was the product of a bona fide, arm's-length
transaction.. That is, Fred Jr. testified at trial, and petitioner argues on brief, that
Fred Jr.'s contribution to the partnerships substantially outweighed decedent's;
namely, that Fred Jr. had the original idea ofseeking HUD contracts; that Fred Jr.
mastered the HUD bureaucracy and regulations encountered in the undertaking;
and that, as managing partner, Fred Jr. did the lion's share of the work in
developing and managing the housing projects, whereas decedent served merely as
a "soundingboard". Thus, petitioner's argument goes, decedent's agreement to give
the options to Fred Jr. - in which decedent effectively gave up any future
appreciation in the value ofhis interests exceeding the $10,000 option price and
settled for a share of each partnership's current operating income -- was arm's
length and bona fide, given the vastly unequal contributions of father and son.
When both parties to the agreement are members of the same family and
circumstances indicate that testamentary considerations influenced the creation of
the option agreement, we do not assume that the price as stated in the agreement
was a fair one.. See Bommer Revocable Trust v. Commissioner, supra; Estate of
Lauder v. Commissioner, supra. We first "note that the fIXed price of the option,
without any adjustment mechanism to reflect changing conditions, invites close
scrutiny. If decedent and Fred Jr. really engaged in an annes-length transaction in
which it was decided that Fred Jr..'s greater contribution required decedent to give
an option, we believe the price of the option would have included an adjustment
mechanism to account for future appreciation. See Bommer Revocable Trust v.
Commissioner, supra. The fact that the price was set at $1 0,000, combined with the
fact that the agreement was between a father and son, strongly suggests that there
was no arm's-length bargain for the option price, but rather that the option was a
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testamentary device designed to pass decedent's interest for less than adequate
consideration.
Moreover, the foregoing picture of the partners' relative contributions is based
almost entirely on Fred Jr. 's self-serving testimony at trial. In contrast to Fred Jr. 's
efforts to portray the options in the instant proceeding as the product ofan ann's-
length bargain, in their sworn testimony in the equitable distribution proceedings,
Fred Jr. and decedent both characterized the options as "gifts", suggesting that both
thought it was decedent who was giving something of value to Fred Jr., not the
other way around. We note also that decedent's second wife provided detailed,
credible testimony concerningdecedent's frequent trips (on which sheaccompanied
him) to inspect each partnership property and attend to problems thereby
discovered; that decedent had an entire career's worth of experience in the
c9nstruction business; and that Fred Jr.'s brother testified credibly that when
decedent entered into a business venture, he was almost always in charge -- all of
which tend to rebut Fred Jr.'s characterization of decedent's role in the enterprise
as minimal.
On balance, we believe the evidence that the options were a substitute for a
testamentary device outweighs any evidence of their bona fide business purpose.
In an unusual circumstance, we have the sworn testimony ofthe grantor-decedent
himself as to the options' essentially testamental)' purpose, as well as the sworn
testimony of the grantee to the same effect, albeit a grantee who now testifies in
changed circumstances that the options had a bona fide business purpose.
Presumably in the equitable distribution case between Fred, Jr., the son, and his fJISt wife, it was beneficial
for the options to have been gifts.
18. Use ofCapital Asset Pricing Model. The Tax Court will not accept an expert's use ofthis method
unless a company is going public. In Estate of Emily F.Klauss v. Commissioner, T.C.Memo. 2000t"'191, the court
stated:
Fuller [IRS expert] calculated his discount rate using the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM). In contract, Johnson [taxpayer expert] used a discount rate based on the
build-up method. We believe that Fuller should not have used the CAPM in this
case. Green Light should not be valued by using theCAPM method because
Johnson and Fuller agreed that it had little possibility ofgoing public. See Estate
of Maggos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-120; Estate of Hendrickson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-278; Furman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1998-157.
19. Burden of Proof. The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court in Estate of Paul Mitchell v.
Commissioner, 87 AFTR2d Par. 2001-881 (9th Cir. 2001), fmding that the testimony ofthe Internal Revenue Service's
own expert at trial about the value ofstock ofJPMS (a closely-held corporation) in the Estate was sufficient to overcome
the presumption of correctness for IRS determinations. The opinion states:
According to the Notice, the Commissioner concluded the value ofthe JPMS stock
at the time ofPaul Mitchell's death was $105 million. The Estate had reported the
value at $28.5 million in its tax return. Due to the $76.5 million difference in value,
the Commissioner asserted that the Estate owed an additional $45,117,089 in estate
taxes, not including a total of $8,543,643 in penalties. At trial, Martin Hanan, a
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witness for the Commissioner, valued the stock at $81 million -- $34 million less
than the Commissioner's original valuation. Furthermore, a letter written by the
Commissioner's appraiser, AIBE Valuation, dated March 18, 1993, indicates that
AIBE Valuation originally appraised Mitchell's interest at $85 million as a minority
interest, but increased it to $105 million, at the request of the IRS, to reflect the
Estate's interest as a controlling interest. We find that Hanan's testimony and the
AIBE letter support the conclusion that the Commissioner's assessment was
arbitrary and excessive. United States v. Stonehill, 702 F.2d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that "where the assessment has separable items, ... error which
demonstrates a pattern ofarbitrariness or carelessness will destroy the presumption
for the entire assessment"); Cohen, 266 F.2d at 11 (holding that when the taxpayer
has shown the determination to be arbitraryand excessive, the burden ofpersuasion
shifts to the Commissioner to prove the correct amount of tax owed and the
presumption as to the correctness ofthe Commissioner's detennination is outofthe
case); see also Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507,513-15 (1935).
We conclude that the Tax Court erred in denying the Estate's Motion to Shift the
Burden of Persuasion. Consistent with Cohen, because the Commissioner's
detennination was demonstrated, by its own experts, to be invalid, the
Commissioner - and not the Estate -- had the "burden of proving whether any
deficiency exists and if so the amount. " Cohen, 266 F.2d at II. The Tax Court
treated the case as one where the burden of proof made no difference; it did not
find that one party failed to carry its burden, but proceeded with its own valuation,
"weighing the evidence and choosing from among conflicting inferences and
conclusions those which it considers most reasonable." Tax Court Order, Docket
No. 21805-93 (July 8, 1998) (citing Comm'r v. Scottish Am. Inv. Co., 323 U.S.
119, 123-24 (1944». However, in responding to the petitioner's second motion for
reconsideration, the Tax Court erroneously stated that valuation was a matter of
approximation and judgment "on which the PETITIONER has the burden of
proof." (emphasis added). Because the burden of proving the evaluation of the
Estate and the commensurate deficiency shifted to the Commissioner, it was error
not to put the Commissioner to its proof.
The case was remanded to the Tax Court for a determination ofvalue.
20. Tax Court Recommends Settlement. In John E. WaiL et.ux. v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo 2001-75,
the taxpayers valued stock on gift tax returns at $221 per share and the IRS claimed $260 per share. During the
litigation both sets of experts became more extreme. Judge Beghe upheld the $260 per share value and suggested the
parties should have settled.
21. Discounts, Closely-Held Stock. In Donald J. Jarid~ 181 TeM 1100 (2001) the donor's expert
applied a 65.77% discount to minority interest gifts to each of four children in a holding company that owned almost
all of a small Nebraska bank. The court applied a 40% discount. The IRS had argued for 20%. the court did not use
the quantitative marketability discount model set forth byZ. Christopher Mercer in Quantifying Marketability Discounts
(1997).
22. Discounts, Real Estate. In Estate ofAugusta Porter Forbes, 81 TCM 1399 (2001), the court accepted
the 30% discount propounded by the estate's expert. The opinion discusses the issue as follows:
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Petitioner presented testimony of two expert witnesses: Mr. James F. Lawton
(Lawton) and Mr. Glen A. Hultquist (Hultquist).
Lawton detennined that a fractional interest valuation discount is appropriate
becalJSe the QTIP trust's undivided interests were minority interests and because
the .market for such interests would be restricted taking into consideration the
limited pool ofpotential buyers, the likely difficulty ofsecuring fmancing, and the
likely costs ofpartitioning the two separate parcels. Lawton was unable to locate
comparable sales, but he detennined that in the market in which the subject
property is located, real estate brokers had applied fractional interests of10 percent
to 30 percent in liquidating partnerships. Based on this information, and taking into
consideration the specific characteristics of the subject property, possible intra-
family conflicts, and other factors adversely affecting the marketability ofthe two
undivided interests in the subject property, Lawton concluded that a valuation
discount of 30 percent is appropriate.
Hultquist, petitioner's other expert, concluded that the fair market value ofthe two
undivided interests in the subject property as of decedent's date of death was
$720,000, based on the correlated present value ofnet annual income streams that
he projected from hypothetical partitions or forced sales of the subject property
undervarious scenarios. Hultquist assumed that the QTIP trust's undivided interests
included the value ofpecan orchards but not the value ofany timber. Because this
assumption is contrary to our previous determination that the QTIP trust's
undivided interests included no beneficial interest in the pecan orchards, his
$720,000 estimate ofdiscounted fair market value is of little utility.
Because Hultquist's $720,000 estimate of the discounted fair market value is
approximately 36 percent less than what Hultquist assumed to be the undiscounted
fair market value ofthe undivided interests in the subject property (again assuming
that pecan orchards but not timber are included), petitioner argues that a 36 percent
discount rate is appropriate. We disagree. We are unconvinced that a discount rate
extrapolated from onesetofindicated values, under assumptions inapplicablehere,
would correspond to the discount rate extrapolated from a different set ofindicated
values ifthe underlying assumptions were altered. Moreover, even disregarding his
faulty assumptions, Hultquist's present value computations are inadequately
explained andjustified, particularly in regard to the manner in which he derived. the
projected revenues from his hypothetical partitions or forced sales and the manner
in which he derived his chosen 14 percent equity yield for purposes ofhis present
value computations.
Respondent's expert, Mr. Richard Parks (Parks), purported to use a comparable
sales approach to determine an appropriate valuation discount for a 42-percent
undivided interest in the subject property. Parks indicated that because he was
unable to locate minority interest sales in the market where the subject property is
located, he had identified three other "appropriate examples" involving: (1) A 1989
sale ofan office building in Binningham, Alabama; (2) a 1961 sale of a 128-acre
vacant tract in Jefferson County, Alabama; and (3) a 1981 sale ofa 1,600-acre tract
known as Bell Plantation (location not specifically identified but apparently
somewhere outside of Georgia). These three "comparables" suggested discounts
ranging from 25 percent to 64 percent. With little explanation, Parks concludes that
based on these examples and "other market oriented research completed by this
A - 61
appraiser" (not otherwise described by Parks), the appropriate discount rate is 18
percent.
We are unpersuaded that the "examples" on which Parks bases his comparable
sales analysis actually represent comparable sales. Even if they did, we find no
adequate justification for his selection ofan I8-percent discount rate - a rate that
is well below the smallest discount indicated by Parks' own "comparables".
Consequently, we do not rely on Parks' report. See Rule I43(t)(I).
We are unsatisfied that any of the parties' experts have adequately justified their
recommended discount rates - a shortcoming that might be attributable in part to
a lack ofavailable empirical data. Given that the parties agree that some valuation
discount is appropriate, however, and lacking any firm basis on which we might
independently derive one, we accept Lawton's recommended 30- percent valuation
discount as being the most reasonablyjustified ofthe opinions presented to us. This
is the same discount rate that petitioner used in reporting the value ofthe undivided
interests for Federal estate tax purposes.
G. SECTION 2032 - ALTERNATE VALUATION AND SECTION 2032A - SPECIAL USE
VALUATION
1. Protective Election ofAlternate Valuation. A protective election under section 2032 was allowed
by TAM 9846002. The estate wanted to use the alternate valuation date only if the surviving spouse agreed to an
elective share, which she did after the estate tax return was filed. In Estate of Mapes v. Commissioner, 99 T.e. 511
(1992), the Tax Court allowed a protective election that was conditional on section 2032A treatment not being allowed
by the IRS.
There are other situations in which a protective election could be desirable. Forexample, suppose certain assets
that have decreased in value may be includable in the gross estate (e.g. because of what could be a power of
appointment), but the value of the other assets in the estate has increased.
In PLR 199942025 the estate made a protective election under section 2032 which would become effective
only if the dat~ ofdeath vulue ofthe decedent's gross estate, and the estate tax and generation skipping tax, is higher
than the value ofthe gross estate determined under section 2032 using the appropriate alternate valuation date. The facts
were that the estate included a large block ofpublicly traded stock all ofwhich was disposed ofwithin the six months
after the decedent's death. The estate intended to take a blockage discount which would reduce the value as ofthe date
of death, but which might be disallowed by the IRS on audit.
2. Minority Interest. A minority interest discount may be taken for assets that then qualify for special
use valuation. The IRS has acquiesced in Estate ofClara K. Hooverv. Commissioner, 69 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 1995).
The assets there were a minority interest in a partnership for which a 30% discount was claimed.
3. Use ofComparables. [n Estate ofLewis S. Thompson, III v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-325
Tax et. Dkt. No. 14929-96, the Tax Court held that taxpayer's expert did not meet the regulatory requirements for a
valid section 2032A election:
Section 20.2032A-4(b)(2), Estate Tax Regs., describes the documentation required
from the executor in order to value property under section 2032A(e)(7)(A). The
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regulation states that "The executor must identify to the Internal Revenue Service
actual comparable property for all specially valued property and cash rentals from
that property" for each ofthe 5 calendar years preceding the year ofthe decedent's
death. Sec. 20.2032A-4(b)(2)(i) and (iv), Estate Tax Regs.
The detennination ofwhether property is comparable is a factual one and is made
according to "generally accepted real property valuation rules". Sec.
20.2032A-4(d), Estate Tax Regs. Factors to be considered in such a determination
include, but are not limited to, whether the property is situated in the same locality
as the specially valued property; whether the property is segmented or unified;
whether the property is subject to flooding; and, in the case of timberlands, the
comparability of the timber to the timber located on the property to be specially
valued. Sec. 20.2032A-4(d), Estate Tax Regs.
Frazer [taxpayer's expert] utilized 8 timberland properties as comparables in his
report. The report identified the lessor and lessee, the location ofthe property, the
initial year ofthe lease, and the cash consideration paid for each ofthe 8 properties
used as comparables. The report also listed the "Adjusted Net Lease Income!Acre"
for the 8 properties and the "Average" thereof ($15). The report indicated no
adjustments to any ofthe 8 properties used as comparables based on the factors set
forth in section 20.2032A-4(d), Estate Tax Regs.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the report is completely unreliable as
to whether any ofthe 8 properties were indeed comparable to the subject property.
The putative comparables ranged in size from 44 acres to 34,365 acres, yet no
adjustment to any of them was made for size even though the substantially
disparate sizes ofthe properties would appear to have some significance in tenns
ofeconomies ofscale. Frazer also did not make any adjustments for location, land
quality, or timber type!maturity in his report. Moreover, no description of the
properties was contained in the report, from which Frazer appears implausibly to
be inferring that they were sufficiently similar so as to warrant none of the above
adjustments.
We are also not convinced that the special use valuation ofthe subject property was
based on actual cash rents of the putative comparables as is called for under the
regulations. Section 20.2032A-4(b)(2)(iii), Estate Tax Regs., provides that
"appraisals orother statements regarding rental value as well as area-wide averages
of rentals * * * may not be used under section 2032A(e)(7) because they are not
true measures of the ACTUAL CASH RENTAL VALUE OF COMPARABLE
PROPERTY in the same locality as the specially valued property." (Emphasis
added.)
Although in effect for the 5 years preceding decedent's death in 1992, the 8
timberland leases were entered into over the 27- year period from 1957 through
1984. For those leases which did not contain rent escalation clauses, Frazerclaimed
to have applied the "Producer Price Index" (PPI) to the consideration stated therein
in an effort to calculate the market rental value of those properties for the 5-year
period preceding decedent's death. The result was tenned the "Adjusted Net Lease
Income/Acre" in his report.
In Estate of Carolyn J. Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 2000-133, the court reached a different conclusion
from that of Thompson.
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In Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1998- 325, we concluded
that the taxpayer had failed to identify comparable real properties and cash rentals
within the meaning of section 2032A(e)(7), where the expert's adjusted net lease
income per acre figures were more akin to an appraisal, which is expressly
prohibited by section 20.2032A-4(b)(2)(iii), Estate Tax Regs., rather than an
accurate calculation ofactual cash rents.
In Estate of Thompson we concluded that the expert's report was completely
unreliable as to whether any of eight properties were indeed comparable to the
subject property for the following reasons. First, the alleged comparable properties
ranged in size from 44 acres to 34,365 acres, compared to the subject property of
2,929 acres. In addition, the expert made no adjustments due to differences in
location, land quality, or timber type/maturity. Moreover, no description of the
properties was contained in the expert's report.
In decedent's estate here, five out of seven tracts share nine out of the nine
applicable features set forth in section 20.2032-4(d), Estate Tax Regs. For
decedent's estate, the range in size ofcomparables is much tighter: comparables of
261 to 1,665.28 acres (for subject properties ranging from 65-1670 acres).
Furthermore, Dr. Haney excluded potential comparables because ofdifferences in
locatio~ land quality, and timber type/maturity. Dr. Haney excluded the potential
comparable in Fayette County because of location; he excluded a Pickens County
tract with somewhat different slope and soil. Further, Dr. Haney proposed a 10-
percent reduction to four ofthe subject properties, because ofthe superior quality
oftimber on the five leased tracts. As noted previously, however, such a reduction
is inappropriate as appraisals are not true measures ofthe actual cash rental value
ofcomparable property. Moreover, petitioner provided detailed descriptions ofthe
subject properties and the leased properties in the original estate tax return; more
detailed descriptions of the leased properties are provided in the leases and Dr.
Haney's reports. .
The eight leases in Estate of Thompson were entered into over a 27-year period,
some with no rent escalation clause. For those leases with no rent escalation clause,
the expert claimed to have applied the "Producer Price Index" (PPI) in an effort to
calculate the market rental value of those properties for the 5- year period
preceding decedent's death. Petitioner requested that we take judicial notice of
Report 807, Escalation and Producer Price Indexes: A Guide for Contracting
Parties issued by the u.s. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics in
September 1991 for the purpose of establishing that the PPI can be applied to
contract rents to calculate accurately fair market rents for future years in the
absence ofescalation clauses, as the expert claimed to have done. We detennined
in Estate of Thompson that:
Report 807 does not support the proposition that market rents for the
relevant period can be accurately calculated from contract rents entered
into several decades beforehand via the application of the PPI for
purposes of section 2032A(e)(7)(A) for those leases which do not
themselves contain rent escalation clauses. Rather, Report 807 provides
guidance to contracting parties with respect to the use ofprice adjustment
clauses at the time the contract is entered into. * * *
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In Estate of Thompson the average gross cash rental for the 5 years preceding the
decedent's death was determined by the expert on the basis of his "personal
knowledge * * * what I thought would be the indicated market rent for what I knew
about the whole business, and that's it. It Furthermore, the expert testified that he
validated his estimate of the cash rental rate for the timberland by reference to the
prevailing rate for cropland during the relevant period, of which there was no
evidence.
In decedent's estate here, the special use valuation ofthe five estate tracts is based
exclusively on actual cash rents from the five leased tracts for the 5 years preceding
decedent's death. All five leases for the five leased tracts contain rent escalation
clauses; as escalated, the leases constituted the prevailing rents during the statutory
period on that type ofland. Both the actual rents and State and local property taxes
were explained and are fully substantiated with original source data. There is no
adjustment to rents because petitioner used only actual current rents during the
statutory period.
Respondent also asserts that the five estate tracts and the five leased tracts are not
comparable in any manner in regard to the rental values. Respondent contends that
the regulations require that "generally accepted real property valuation rules" be
applied to determine comparabilityofthe property. Sec. 20.2032A-4(d), Estate Tax
Regs. Respondent asserts that the maximum period allowed under real estate
valuation rules is 5 years prior to the valuation date. On brief: respondent states this
argument as follows:
Leases that establish the applicable rents are leases that would have been
negotiated and entered into during the five-year period. Leases that were
negotiated more than five years prior to the date ofdeath do not accurately
reflect the economic conditions at the date ofdeath and the current rental
values of comparable lands. Comparability must be based on numerous
factors, no one ofwhich is determinative. See sec. 20.2032A-4(d), Estate
Tax Regs. All factors generally considered in real estate valuation are to
be considered in determining comparability under section 2032A. See ide
However, respondent seeks to exclude the comparable land on the basis
of one factor and one factor only (the age of the leases - which is not
even one ofthe factors enumerated in the regulations).
Neither the statute nor the regulations support respondent's position in that respect.
In this case, the parties stipulated that the typical timber lease in effect in western
Alabama between 1987 and 1991 was entered into in the 1950's, 1960's, and early
1970's and was a long-term timber lease. Respondent's argument would exclude
every lease executed before August 19, 1987, which would effectively operate to
prevent estates in Alabama from using section 2032A(e)(7) to value timberland
since the typical timber lease in effect in western Alabama between 1987 and 1991
was entered into in the 1950's, 1960's, and early 1970's.
Respondent has submitted an original and two rebuttal reports from his expert,
Richard Maloy. Mr. Maloy contends that, "Comparable leases must have been
negotiated under recent (5-year period ofanalysis) dates to ensure comparability
ofeconomic conditions. II Mr. Maloy is simply parroting respondent's primary legal
argument that would inject an arbitrary requirement for application of section
2032A(e)(7) -- that is, as a matter of law no lease can be considered unless it was
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executed within 5 years of the date ofdeath. We have stated before, in Alumax v.
Commissioner, 109 T.C. 133, 171 (1997): "We shall disregard any opinion of an
expert that constitutes nothing more than that expert's legal opinion or conclusion
about a particular matter."
Mr. Maloy further states the following: "Lease comparability under section
2032A(e)(7) would require recent leases, foreseeable within the 5-year average.
This is relatively easy in row crop valuation, but generally eliminates the use ofthis
section in timber land valuation."
Two consecutive paragraphs establish that the protection afforded fanns by section
2032A was intended to apply to timberland. Section 2032A(e)(7) sets forth the
"Method of valuing fanns." Section 2032A(eX4) and (5) leaves no doubt that
timber operations are included under section 2032A(eX7) and (8). Furthennore,
factor (7) under section 20.2032A4(d), Estate Tax Regs., obviously contemplates
that rented timberland may be comparable property.
As stipulated, the leases represented the typical timber leases in effect in western
Alabama during the 5-year statutory period. Moreover, the inflation-adjusted rents
paid under these leases constituted the prevailing rents in effect during the statutory
period. All ofthe leases on the five leased tracts have escalation clauses. Moreover,
in contrast to the fatal ''judgment call" as to the annual rents in Estate ofThompson
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-325, the parties have stipulated the precise,
actual annual gross rents for the statutory period.
Consequently, with their escalation clauses, the stipulated rents constitute the
prevailing rents actually paid on comparable land in western Alabama under the
typical/standard lease in effect during the statutory period. Once the unleased and
the leased land are detennined to be comparable (as we have found), section
2032A(e)(7) permits petitioner to use for valuation purposes the average annual
gross cash rents for the 5 calendar years preceding decedent's death.
4. Grant ofDevelopment Easement is a Disposition. In Estate ofJames C. Gibbs, Sr. v. United States,
82 AFTR2d -U 98-5557 (3rd Cir. 1998) the court held that granting a development easement to the state ofNew Jersey
was a disposition ofqualified fann property that triggered recapture ofestate tax under section 2032A(c)(l). The court's
rationale was that the heir benefitted from the property's "highest and best use" through the grant of the easement.
Stated differently, the court viewed the land as a bundle oftwo rights - the land's agricultural use, plus non-agricultural
development rights. In order to obtain special use valuation the estate had to warrant that only agricultural use would
be made during the 10-year recapture. By granting the easement the owner benefitted from the development value of
the land.
5. Time to Make Election. In Estate ofEddy v. Commissioner, 115 T.e. No. 10 (2000) the estate tax
return was filed more than 18 months after it was due. Section 2032(d) provides that the election must be made not later
than one year after the due date, including extensions, of the estate tax return. Thus, the election was denied.
H. SECTIONS 2035-2038 - RETAINED INTERESTS
I. Requirement that Trustees Pay Grantor's Income Taxes. PLR 199922062 dealt with an
interesting issue. A grantor intended to create a foreign trust that would be a grantor trust for income tax p~rposes. The
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trust would require the trustee to pay, on behalf of the grantor, to the IRS or to a state revenue authority, income or
principal to satisfy the grantor's income tax liability attributable to the trust. The issue presented in the ruling was
whether such requirement constituted a retained interest under section 2036. The Service concluded that such direction
would not be a retained interest; however, ifthe trustee were required to make distributions to reimburse to grantor for
any tax liabilities not attributable to the trust the grantor would have retained section 2036 power. The ruling
did not state why the payments would not be made to the grantor directly, but presumably the ruling would have been
the same had the payments been so made. The payment provision itself was a direction to the trustee to distribute an
amount by which the personal income tax liability of the grantor exceeded what the grantor's personal income tax
liability would be if he were not the owner ofany portion of the trust.
2. Sale ofRemainder Interest. Section 2702 does not apply to residences. Where a client has a long
life expectancy the sale ofremainder interest in a residence may be more attractive than a qualified personal residence
trust. This transaction will be effective, however, only ifsection 2036 does not apply to the sale ofa remainder interest.
In Estate ofCTIil I. Magnin, 184F.3d 1074 (9th. Cir. 1999) the court followed D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner,
101 F.3d 309 (3rd. Cir. 1996) and Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 7489 (5th Cir. 1997) to hold that the term
"adequate and full consideration" under section 2036(a) refers only to the amount of the remainder interest of the
transferred property. The Service's position was that in order for adequate and full consideration to be present the sale
must be for the value of the entire property rather than just the value of the remainder interest. The policy arguments
supporting the court's decision were that the purpose ofsection 2036(a) is to prevent depletion ofa decedent's estate
and the true fair market value ofa remainder interest must track the value ofa life interest in order to be consistent under
the Internal Revenue Code.
The Circuit Court remanded the case to the Tax Court for detennination from the value of the consideration
in the case. The Tax Court held that the decedent (Cyril) did not receive adequate and full consideration for the
remainder interest he agreed to transfer at death to his children pursuant to a 1951 agreement. That agreement required
Joseph Magnin, Cyril's father, to give shares in two companies to Cyril which gave him control, and obligated Cyril
to transfer the shares to his children at death. The opinion states:
Before analyzing the positions of each party, we note the facts that: (1) Cyril had
a higher percentage of voting control in JM than Joseph prior to the 1951
Agreement, and Cyril's total shares were worth more outright under either party's
valuation standards; (2) Cyril received only a life estate in one-half of Joseph's
shares, although he obtained voting control ofall ofJoseph's shares; (3) Cyril was
required to transfer his shares to his children on his death and could not dispose of
the shares during his lifetime for his own personal gain; and (4) under the 1951
Agreement, Joseph agreed to will his shares to Cyril's children and those shares,
coupled with the shares Cyril was required to leave to his children under the 1951
Agreement, represented voting control of1M.
Respondent employed a fair market value approach and determined the value ofthe
interests transferred and received by Cyril under a hypothetical willing buyer and
willing seller standard. Fair market value for Federal estate and gift tax purposes
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is defined as "the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to
sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." United States v.
Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546,551 (1973); Snyderv. Commissioner, 93 T.e. 529, 539
(1989); sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs; sec. 25.2512-1, Gift Tax Regs. The
standard is objective; it uses a hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller. See
Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1251- 1252 (9th Cir. 1982); Estate of
Newhouse v. Commissioner, supra at 218. The willing buyer and willing seller are
presumed to be dedicated to achieving the maximum economic advantage, and the
views ofeach hypothetical person must be taken into account. See Estate ofBright
v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1005-1006 (5th Cir. 1981); Kolom v.
Commissioner, 644 F.2d 1282, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981), affg. 71 T.C. 235 (1978);
Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, supra at 218; Estate of Kaufman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-119. The individual characteristics of the
hypothetical buyer and seller are not necessarily the same as the individual
characteristics of the actual buyer or actual seller. See Estate of Simplot v.
Commissioner, supra at 152. However, "the hypothetical sale should not be
constructed in a vacuum isolated from the actual facts that affect the value of the
stock". Estate ofAndrews v. Commissioner, supra at 956.
In valuing the interests transferred and received by Cyril, the estate assumes that
the hypothetical buyer is a person in the same position as Cyril. The estate then
applies a control premium to Joseph's minority block of shares because they will
allow the hypothetical buyer in the same position as Cyril to obtain majority voting
control of JM. This is not the proper application of the willing buyer and willing
seller standard as set forth in the estate and gift tax regulatory provisions and as
interpreted by case law because the willing buyer cannot be the actual buyer, he
must be a hypothetical person. See Propstra v. United States, supra at 1251- 1252;
Estate of Bright v. United States, supra at 1005-1006; Furman v. Commissioner,
T.e. Memo. 1998-157. The willing buyer and willing seller standard renders
irrelevant the actual buyer and actual seller; however, the other stockholders are not
irrelevant under the standard. See Estate ofBright v. United States, supra at 1007.
The estate relies on Estate ofWinkler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-231, in
arguing that Joseph's shares have nswing vote characteristics" because when
combined with the shares ofa hypothetical shareholder in the positionofCyril, that
person would have majority voting control. The estate's reliance on Estate of
Winkler v. Commissioner, supra, is misplaced. In that case, there were three
shareholders with stock interests of 50 percent, 40 percent, and 10 percent,
respectively. The main issue for decision was whether a minority discount applied
for estate tax purposes of valuing the 10-percent interest. We held that the 10-
percent interestpossessed"swing vote characteristics" becausea hypothetical buyer
would be able to combine with one of the two remaining shareholders to either
effect or block control of the company. We based our analysis on a hypothetical
buyer, not one holding either the 40- percent or 50-percent interest. We concluded
that the no minority discount should apply to the 10-percent interest. The instant
case is distinguishable from Estate of Winkler v. Commissioner, supra. Cyril held
33.73 percent and Joseph held 28.26 percent ofthe voting stock ofJM; collectively
their shares represented 61.99 percent of the voting power. The evidence in the
record does not establish the share ownership ofthe remainder ofthe stock ofJM.
It has not been established that a hypothetical buyer would be able to combine with
another shareholder to effectuate control; 32 thus, Joseph's stock has not been
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demonstrated to have the "swing vote characteristics" described in Estate of
Winkler v. Commissioner, supra. 33
1. VALUE OF CONSIDERATION RECEIVED BY CYRIL
No calculations were presented by the estate as to the values of the interests if a
hypothetical buyer would not gain control as a result of the transfer by Joseph.
Accordingly, the estate has failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the
values it assigns to the interests at issue are reliable and accurate under the willing
buyer and willing seller standard set forth in the estate and gift tax regulatory
provisions.
Although it claims to have used the hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller
standard, in reality, the estate applied an actual buyer and actual seller standard
because it based its valuation on parties in identical positions as Joseph and Cyril.
It chose to look at the actual transaction and the logical inference that Cyril would
have paid more for Joseph's minority-interest-voting rights because they would give
Cyril voting control when added to his existing minority-interest-voting rights. In
applying such a standard, the estate detennined that the value ofthe consideration
received by Cyril was approximately $58,000, of which approximately $44,000
consisted ofcontrol value received by Cyril.
The estate argues that a control premium must be applied in this circumstance
because an actual, bargained-for transaction occurred in which Cyril obtained
control ofJM. But even ifwe were to accept the estate's argument, its application
of its own "actual buyer-seller" test is flawed. First, the control premium and
control value analysis, even ifappropriate, were incorrectly applied. Mr. Browning
applied the control value to the combined to~l ofCyril's share ownership after the
1951 Agreement. Thus, Mr. Browning took into account shares already owned by
Cyril in valuing control. IfMr. Browning had applied his control value analysis to
the percentage of shares owned only by Joseph, 28.26 percent, and not the
combined percentage ofthe shares ofJoseph and Cyril, 61.99 percent, the value of
the consideration received by Cyril would have been approximately $29,000 using
Mr. Browning's valuation methodology. 34 Also, Mr. Browning's support for the 40-
percent control premium is derived from studies ofcontrol premiums in the 1980's,
and he did not establish that such a reference was reliable for purposes of a
transaction occurring in 1951.
The estate also failed to address the issue of control in considering what Cyril
transferred in exchange for Joseph's shares. Cyril bound himself to transfer a
remainder interest in his shares to his children, and those shares, when combined
with the shares transferred at death byJoseph to Cyril's children, constituted voting
control of JM. The estate's expert agreed at trial that he might have been
inconsistent in his approach. The estate did not consider the fact that Joseph
bargained for and received from Cyril the right to dispose of control of JM after
Cyril's death. Joseph was enswing that his grandchildren received control of JM
upon Cyril's death. Ifa control premium applies for purposes ofvaluing what Cyril
received from Joseph, then it follows, in the facts of this case, that a control
premium should also apply when valuing the interest Cyril transferred to, or at the
direction of, Joseph. 'The application of a control element on both sides of the
transaction would significantly increase the value of the remainder interest
transferred by Cyril because a control element would attach to the remainder
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interest in Cyril's shares. The number ofshares transferred by Cyril was larger than
the number ofshares received by Cyril, the full fee-simple interest in the stock was
transferred by Cyril at his death, and Cyril's life estate factor in Joseph's shares and
the remainder factor in the stock he transferred at death were approximately equal.
The estate presented no revised calculations or other evidence establishing that the
value transferred by Cyril, when adjusted for this control element, was less than the
consideration received from Joseph. The estate has failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that the values it assigns to the interests at issue are reliable
and accurate under an actual buyer and actual seller standard.
The valuation methodology of Mr. Browning was questionable in other areas as
well. In determining the values of JM common stock and Specialty common and
preferred stocks, Mr. Browning applied a lack of marketability and liquidity
discount and a minority interest discount on a combined basis, instead of
individuaHy. For example, Mr. Browning added together the 35-percent
marketability and liquidity discount and the 25-percent minority discount to get a
combined discount of60 percent, which he then applied to the values before him.
As we noted earlier, discounts for marketability and minority interest are separate
and distinct, and this fact must be taken into account when such discounts are
applied in order to avoid distorting the valuation. While expert reports and the
courts sometimes apply combined discount rates to detennine the value of stock,
this is a questionable procedure to use if specific rates are determined for each
discount and then added together to reach the combined rate. See Pratt, et a!.,
Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal ofClosely Held Companies 314
(3d ed. 1996). In order to ensure accuracy, the minority interest discount should be
applied first and then the marketability and liquidity discount should be applied to
this figure. 35 Had this been done, the discounts would have yielded a combined
discount rate of 51.25 percent. 36 Mr. Browning also applied a minority discount
to the values based on his market comparable analysis, although he agreed at tri~l
that traditional appraisers believe that the market approach yields a valuation on a
minority basis because the market approach is based on trading done by minority
stockholders. Mr. Browning testified that he applied a minority discount in this
situation because ifhe did not then his market approach generally yielded a value
higher than the value determined under his DCF approach. We do not find Mr.
Browning's explanation for applying a minority discount in this situation to be
satisfactory because it is not based on valuation standards, but rather on the fact
that he is adjusting his valuation simply to yield a result closer to that produced
under his DCF approach.
*.* •••
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit emphasized that, on remand, a
determination of "adequate and full consideration" requires a fmding that the
exchanged interests are of tttapproximately equal valuettt • Estate of Magnin v.
Commissioner, 184 F.3d at 1081 (quoting Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 440
F.2d 896, 900 (3d Cir. 1968), revg. 51 T.C. 269 (1971)). This Court has not
interpreted the "adequate and full consideration't requirement as necessitating a
dollar-for-dollar matching of consideration paid with the value of the transferred
property. Estate of Carli v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 649, 661 (1985); Estate of
O'Nan v. Commissioner, 47 T.e. 648, 663 (1967). Cyril transferred a remainder
interest in exchange for a life estate. The value of the remainder interest Cyril
transferred was between $90,000 and $110,000. The value of the life estate Cyril
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received was $43,878. In the instant case, the approximately 2-to-1 disparity
between the remainder interest transferred by Cyril and the consideration received
by Cyril does not support a finding that the two interests were of "approximately
equal value". Therefore, we hold that Cyril did not receive "adequate and full
consideration" for the remainder interest he transferred to his children. The estate
is entitled to an offset of$43,878 under section 2043 for the partial consideration
received by Cyril.
3.. Stock Transferred to Partnership is Includable in Gross Estate. TAM 199938005 is very
important in the family limited partnership context. At issue was whether closely-held stock owned by a partnership
which the decedent could vote as general partner in the partnership would be included in the decedent's gross estate
under section 2036(b). The IRS described the transaction as follows:
Decedent and his brother each owned a 50 percent interest in Corporation
represented by W voting and X nonvoting shares ofcommon stock. In Year I, in
conjunction with the renegotiation ofCorporation's revolving credit agreement with
Bank, Bank required the shareholders to devise a plan of management and
ownership succession.
On Date I in Year I, Decedent and his brother carried out the following
transaction. Each transferred 55 percent ofhis stock to a family limited partnership
(Partnership) (Y shares ofvoting and Z shares ofnonvoting common) in exchange
for 10 general partnership units, 1,000 Class A limited partnership units, 100 Class
B limited partnership units, and 100 Class C limited partnership units. Also on Date
I, Decedent transferred 50 Class B units to Child I, 50 Class B units to Child 2, 50
Class C units to Child 3, 50 Class C units to Child 4, and his remaining partnership
units and stock to a revocable trust of whi~h he was trustee (Trust). Under the
terms ofTrust, at his death, Trust assets passed to his four children.
In a letter dated one month before Date 1, the estate planning attorney for Decedent
and his brother states that he has enclosed a draft of a new fIrSt Article to the
partnership agreement ofPartnership and a ttdraft ofa gift trust that could be used
to receive the B and C units that are intended to be given to the children at this
time. tt The letter suggests that Decedent and his hrother could create identical
separate trusts or joint trusts with the end result being a single trust for each child
to hold the child's B or C units.
Article 8.3 ofthe partnership agreement authorized the general partners to vote the
shares of Corporation as follows:
Prior to the death of the survivor of [Decedent] and [hisbrother], the
General Partners will have complete discretionregarding the votingofany
Controlled Corporation's shares;provided, however, that if the General
Partners cannot agreeabout how the shares of [Corporation] should be
voted on anyissue, then each General Partner shall vote a number of
thePartnership's shares bearing the same proportion to the totalshares
owned by the Partnership that the number of GeneralPartnership Units
held by that Partner bears to the total numberofGeneral Partnership Units
outstanding.
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At his death on Date 2, Trust held Decedent's 10 general partnership units, his
1,000 Class A limited partnership units, and 22.5 percent of the outstanding stock
in Corporation. On the federal estate tax return, the estate included in Decedent's
gross estate, the date of death value of the 22.5 percent stock interest in
Corporation and of the 10 general partnership units and 1,000 Class A limited
partnership units.
The IRS concluded:
In this case, in view ofthe ownership ofthe Corporation stock by Partnership and
Trust, and the decedent's right to vote the stock, Corporation was a controlled
corporation for purposes ofsection 2036(bX2) with respect to Decedent, between
the date of transfer to Partnership and Decedent's date ofdeath.
Further, the transfer of Decedent's Y shares of voting stock to Partnership is
properly viewed as a transfer ofthe stock, for purposes ofsection 2036(b), for less
than adequate consideration. That is, Decedent, in substance, transferred the stock
to Partnership in exchange for 10 general partnership units and 1000 Class A
limited partnership units. The 100 Class B and 100 Class C units passed to
Decedent's children, pursuant to an integrated plan, at the moment Partnership was
fonned. Thus, these units cannot properly be viewed as received by Decedent in
exchange for the transfer of his stock to Partnership. Because Decedent did not
receive all of the consideration for his transfer of stock to Partnership, Decedent
transferred the stock for less than adequate consideration for purposes of section
2036(b). In addition, it is doubtful that the transfer to the family owned partnership
designed to produce an estate freeze could be characterized as a "bona fide" sale.
As a general partner, Decedent retained the right to vote the Y shares. In this
regard, the statutory language expressly states that the statute applies where the
decedent retains "either directly, or indirectly" the right to vote the stock. The
legislative history indicates that the statute applies regardless of the capacity in
which the decedent exercises the voting rights. The statute applies where the stock
is voted by the decedent indirectly through a fiducial)', and accordingly, would
necessarily apply where the decedent holds the voting rights directly, as a fiduciary.
Accordingly, Decedent's retention of the right to vote Corporation stock in his
capacity as a general partner constitutes the retention of the right to vote the
transferred stock for purposes of section 2036(b).
The Service rejected the argument that because the decedent could only vote the stock in conjunction with the
other general partner, section 2036(b) would not apply. In part that was because each general partner could vote a
proportionate number of shares according to the provisions of the partnership agreement. In addition, the IRS
specifically stated that "under section 2036(b), the retained right to vote transferred stock constitutes the retained
enjoyment of the stock, and the legislative history indicates that the statute applies regardless ofthe capacity in which
a decedent exercises the voting rights. Thus, we believe the statute applies even if the voting powers only exercisable
by decedent in conjunction with another."
The proposed regulations under section 2036 agree with the ruling with respect to the ability vote the stock only
in conjunction with someone else. Prop. Reg. § 20.2036-2(c). A transfer of non-voting stock by gift will not be
included in a decedent's gross estate merely because the decedent retains voting stock. Prop. Reg. § 20.2036-2(a).
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The provisions of2036 must be examined whenever voting stock is to be given by means ofa partnership over
which the donor retains control.
4. Retained Interest in Residence. Clients often want to make gifts of interests in a residence while
continuing to live in the residence. The issue arose in Estate of Rebecca A. Wineman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2000-193. The opinion states:
The frrst issue for decision is whether decedent retained a life interest in the partial
interests in her homestead property that she gave to her children. Respondent
increased decedent's gross estate by the value ofa life estate in the aggregate 24-
percent interest of her homestead property (parcel 3) that decedent gave to her
children. Respondent asserts that the value ofthat interest is properly includable
in decedent's gross estate pursuant to section 2036(a) because she retained a life
estate in that interest. Petitioner does not dispute respondent's valuation of the
purported life estate but contends that decedent retained no such interest in her
homestead property. Petitioner bears the burden ofproof. See Rule 142(a); Welch
v. HeJvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
In support of its contention that decedent retained no life estate in the children's
partial interests, petitioner points out that decedent used much less than 76 percent
of parcel 3 and the main house. Petitioner also points to Dean's [one of the
decedent's children] testimony to the effect that no agreement existed, implied or
otherwise, for decedent to retain the possession and enjoyment of the partial
interests at the time she transferred those interests to her children. Respondent
argues that Dean's testimony is self-serving and contrary to the objective facts and
circumstances. Although Dean's testimony was clearly self-serving, we disagree
with the assertion that the testimony was contrary to the objective facts and
circumstances, and we ultimately agree with petitioner that decedent did not retain
a life estate includable in her gross estate under section 2036.
A decedent's reservation ofa life interest need not be provided for expressly in the
. instrument oftransfer or enforceable under local law to be includable under section
2036. See Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 29 T.e. 1179 (1958), affd. 265
F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959)...t\n implied agreement !\t the tirn~ of transfer for the
decedent to continue possession or enjoyment ofthe property is sufficient and may
be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the transfer. See Guynn v.
United States, 437 F.2d 1148, 1150 (4th Cir. 1971). In determining whether an
implied agreement existed, "all facts and circumstances surrounding the transfer
and subsequent use of the property must be considered." Estate of Rapelje v.
Commissioner, 73 T.e. 82,86 (1979); sec. 20.2036-1(a), Estate Tax Regs.
Decedent gave her children, collectively, a 24-percent interest in parcel 3. Parcel
3 consisted ofjust over 10 acres and had two houses, two large barns, a small barn,
a granary, a fann shop, cattle scales and corrals, two garages, and a small orchard.
Pursuant to its leases of decedent's properties, Coastal Ranches stored hay in the
barns, used the corrals and fann shop, and kept vehicles in a garage and one ofthe
big barns. Decedent occupied the larger house, although Dean kept his desk and
bookkeeping papers in one of the bedrooms and used it as an office. Another
bedroom was used primarily by Marian when she visited from Montana. Coastal
Ranches used an office in the main house. Dean resided in the smaller house on the
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homestead property. Other than the main house, decedent's personal use ofparcel
3 was limited to the garden and small orchard next to the main house.
Decedent's limited personal use of the property does not prove the absence of an
implied agreement. In fact, the record is silent as to whether decedent could
designate who might enjoy the property. See sec. 2036(aX2); see also United States
v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 145 (1972) (possession and enjoyment are synonymous
with substantial present economic benefit). The fact that decedent personally
usedless than all ofthe property does not demonstrate that she did not possess and
enjoy the entire property.
In contrast, where a decedent continues exclusive possession and continues to pay
taxes and other property expenses after the transfer and the owner of record title
neither charges rent nor takes possession of the property, these facts are highly
indicative of an implied agreement. See Guynn v. United States, supra at 1150;
Estate of Rapelje v. Commissioner, supra at 87. Here, however, decedent shared
the property with Dean and his wife and rented the property at a below-market rent
(discussed in more detail infra sec. II) to Coastal Ranches. Pursuant to its leases,
Coastal Ranches paid the taxes and other property expenses associated with parcel
3. These facts do not of themselves prove the absence ofan implied agreement.
On balance, the objective facts convince us that an implied agreement giving
decedent continuing possession and enjoymentofthe entire homestead propertydid
not exist. Unlike the authority that has been cited in respondent's brief, this case
involves a transfer of less than a fee simple interest in property. The majority
owner's continued use and possession of real property following transfer of a
minority interest is not unusual. Cf. Gutchess v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 554, 557
(1966) (where a husband transferred his entire interest in a homestead property to
his wife, who then allowed him to live in the house without charge, the donor's
continued use and enjoyment is a natural use which does not diminish the wife's
enjoyment and possession). In this case~ decedent's continued use and possession
of parcel 3, of which she owned a controlling interest, is natural in light of the
children's minority ownership. It is not surprising that the children did not seek to
partition the property, since they also used the property regularly and they had only
a minority interest in the property.
In addition to the objective facts, our decision rests heavily on Dean's testimony
that there was no understanding between .decedent and her children. While his
testimony was clearly self- serving, Dean's testimony was straightforward,
unequivocal, and credible. Respondent's counsel chose not to cross-examine him
on this point. Because we credit his testimony, we hold that petitioner has carried
its burden of proving that there was no implied agreement. Cf. Hendry v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 861, 872 (1974).
In general, it remains prudent to avoid gifts and sales ofpartial interests in residences.
I. SECTION 2040 - JOINT INTERESTS
No Developments.
J. SECTIONS 2041 AND 2514 - GENERAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
1. Power ofAppointment Among Descendants. PLR 199938024 solved a significant drafting problem
for a taxpayer. A decedent's son was given the power to appoint by Will among the "Grantor's issue and the spouses
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ofsuch issue." The issue before the Service was whether the son had a general power of appointment. The Service
determined that because the power was testamentary, the son could not appoint to the son or the son's creditors during
the son's life and the son's estate and the creditors of the son's estate were not within the class of permissible
appointees. Some states mandate the same result under applicable state law (e.g., Maryland). On the other hand, a
broader power, might be a general power even iftestamentary. See e.g. Dickinson v. Wilmington I'rust Co., 734 A.2d
605 (Del. Chao 1999) (A testamentary power to appoint to "such person or persons" as the power holder designated
would be general).
A similar issue arose in TAM 200014002:
In the instant case, Decedent was a Iife income beneficiary and a co-trustee ofthe
trust created under Item Seven of Spouse's will. The will directed the trustees to
pay to Decedent all of the trust income for her comfort and support and for the
comfort, education, and support ofthe children ofSpouse and Decedent. The will
further provided that should the income payable to Decedent be insufficient for her
comfort and support and for the comfort, education, and support ofthe children of
Spouse and Decedent, the trustees were authorized to encroach upon the trust
corpus in such amounts as they deemed necessary, in their discretion.
However, as was the case in Rev. Rut. 54-153, under Mo. Ann. Stat. section
456.540.4, at the time ofher death, Decedent, as both beneficiary and co-trustee,
was prohibited from exercising her trustee powers to make discretionary
distributions oftrust principal to herself. Consequently, under Missouri law, as co-
trustee and life beneficiary, Decedent held no power to invade trust principal for
her own benefit. Thus, as provided in Rev. Rut. 54-153, Decedent was prohibited
by the Missouri statute from participating in decisions to distribute trust corpus to
herself. Accordingly, because Decedent did not have a power to appoint corpus to
herself, or for her benefit, (whether or not limited by an ascertainable standard) no
part ofthe value ofthe trust created under Spouse's will is includible in Decedent's
gross estate under section 2041.
K. SECTIONS 83, 2042 AND 7872 - LIFE INSURANCE
1. Interim Guidance on Split-Dollar Life Insurance. TAM 960400 I stated that ifth~ cash sWTend~r
value of a policy exceeded the premiums paid by the employer, section 83 would cause the excess to be treated as
income. Following much consternation, nothing else was heard from the IRS for five years on this issue until IRS
Notice 2001-1 O. The Notice itselfis unclear and arguably internally inconsistent; nonetheless, the IRS has.made it clear
that guidance is coming that will likely reduce the aggressive planning opportunities that have been seen previously.
First, the Notice reviews existing authority:
II. BACKGROUND
Rev. Rut. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11, and Rev. Rut. 66-110, 1966-1 C.B. 12,
addressed the Federal income tax treatment of split- dollar arrangements under
which an employer and employee join in the purchase ofa life insurance contract
on the life of the employee subject to a contractual allocation of policy benefits
between the employer and employee. The rulings described two contractual forms:
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(1) the endorsement method, under which the employer is fonnally designated as
the owner of the contract, and the employer endorses the contract to specify the
portion ofthe proceeds payable to the employeets beneficiary; and (2) the collateral
assignment method, under which the employee is fonnally designated as the owner
ofthe contract, the employer's premium.payments are characterized as loans from
the employer to the employee, and the employer's interest in the proceeds of the
contract is designated as collateral security for its loans.
These rulings conclude that all economic benefits conferred on an employee under
such an arrangement, excluding economic benefits attributable to the employee's
own premium payments, constitute gross income to the employee. See also
Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S.
177 (1945). Under the rationale ofthese rulings, the determination ofan employee's
gross income is unaffected by whether the endorsement method or the collateral
assignment method is used.
Under the specific split-dollar arrangement addressed in Rev. Rut. 64-328, all
amounts credited to the cash surrender value ofthe life insurance contract inured
to the benefit of the employer. Thus, the only economic benefit inuring to the
employee was the value ofthe insurance protection attributable to the portion ofthe
contract's death benefit payable to the employee's beneficiary. Rev. Rul. 64-328
holds that, in such a case, the employee's gross income in any year includes the
value ofthe life insurance protection provided to the employee in that year, less any
amount actually paid by the employee.
Rev. Rut. 66-110 amplified Rev. Rut. 64-328 by holding that the value of any
economic benefits in addition to current insurance protection that are provided to
an employee under a split- dollar arrangement are also includible in the employee's
gross income. More specifically, Rev. Rul. 66-110 held that an employee has
additional gross income equal to the amount of any policyholder dividendS
distributed to the employee or applied to provide additional insurance for the
exclusive benefit ofthe employee. Thus, where the employer has no interest in the
dividend applied to provide paid-up additional insurance, the taxable economic
benefit is the dividend itself, not the value of the insurance protection resulting
from the dividend.
Rev. Rul. 64-328 and Rev. Rut. 66-110 each addressed a situation in which the
employer possessed all beneficial interest in the cash surrender value of the life
insurance contract (exclusive of any separate cash surrender value of paid-up
additions attributable to dividends I), and the employee was entitled only to certain
other economic benefits generated by the employer's investment in the contract,
specifically, current insurance protection or dividends. Consistent with that, Rev.
Rut. 64-328 revoked Rev. Rut. 55-713, 1955-2 C.B. 23, which had treated a split-
dollar arrangement similar to that addressed in Rev. Rut. 64-328 as a secured loan
from the employer to the employee. In rejecting the loan characterization, Rev. Rul.
64-328 stated that the substance of the split-dollar arrangement differed from that
ofa loan because the employee was not expected to make repayment except out of
the cash surrender value or proceeds of the life insurance contract. But see.
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983)("we read [Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947)] to have approved the Commissioner's decision
to treat a nonrecourse loan in this context as a true loan.").
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Rev. Rul. 64-328 held that the table of one-year premium rates set forth in Rev.
Rut 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228, commonly referred to as the "P.S. 58" rates, may be
used to determine the value ofthe current life insurance protection provided to an
employee under a split-dollar arrangement. Rev. Rul. 66-110 amplified Rev. Rut.
64-328 in this respect by holding that the insurer's published premium rates for
one-year term insurance may be used to measure the value ofthe current insurance
protection if those rates are lower than the P.S. 58 rates and available to all
standard risks. Rev. Rut. 67-154, 1967-1 C.B. 11, modified Rev. Rut. 66-110 by
holding that an insurer's published term rates must be available for initial issue
insurance (as distinguished from rates for dividend options) in order to be
substituted for the P.S. 58 rates set forth in Rev. Rul. 55-747.
Similarly, the IRS has ruled that the economic benefit inuring to a third-party donee
under an employer-employee split- dollar arrangement or to a shareholder under a
corporation- shareholder split-dollar arrangement is to be determined under the
principles and valuation methods set forth in Rev. Rut. 64-328, as amplified by
Rev. Rul. 66-110. See Rev. Rul. 78-420, 1978-2 C.B. 67; Rev. Rul. 79-50, 1979-1
C.B. 138. Also, the same premium rate alternatives may be relied upon to measure
the value of current life insurance protection provided to an employee under a
qualified retirement plan. See Rev. RuI. 55-747, supra.
III. NEED FOR UPDATED GUIDANCE
A. EQUITY SPLIT-DOLLAR
None of the published rulings relating to split-dollar life insurance has directly
addressed the fonns ofequity split- dollar arrangements that have been widely used
in recent years. In contrast with the split-dollararrangements described in Rev. Rul.
64-328 and Rev. Rut. 66-110, an employee's economic interest in a life insurance
contract purchased under an equity split-dollar arrangement includes an agreed
upon portion ofthe cash surrender value. Under the most common form ofequity
split-dollar arrangement, the employer's interest in the cash surrender value ofthe
contract is limited to the aggregate amount of its premium payments, exclusive of
any earnings component. In such cases, the employee derives the entire economic
benefit of any positive return on the employer:s invesunent in the life insurance
contract.
Under such an equity split-dollar arrangement, the employee derives a valuable
economic benefit from the employer's premium payments beyond the current life
insurance protection addressed in Rev. Rul. 64-328. As held in Rev. Rut. 66-110,
an employee who receives economic benefits beyond the value of current life
insurance protection is taxable on the value ofthose additional benefits. Therefore,
under the general principles followed in Rev. Rut 64-328 and Rev. Rul. 66-110,
it is necessary to account for the employee's rights in the cash surrender value
under an equity split- dollar arrangement in a manner consistent with the substance
of the parties' contractual positions.
Under section 83, which was enacted in 1969 and generally governs the income tax
treatment ofproperty transferred in connection with the perfonnance of services,
a life insurance contract is considered.to be property to the extent of its cash
surrender value. See section 1.83-3(e) of the Income Tax Regulations. Therefore,
if the substance of an equity split-dollar arrangement involves the transfer of a
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beneficial interest in the cash surrender value ofa life insurance contract from an
employer to an employee, that economic benefit is properly includible in the
employee's gross income under section 83. For purposes of section 83, a split-
dollar arrangement could, depending on the facts, involve a series of property
transfers or a single transfer of property.
However, whetheran equity split-dollararrangement involvesa transferofproperty
within the meaning ofsection 83 depends on the substance ofthe arrangement. See
section 1.83-3(a) ofthe regulations. Ifthe employee is the beneficial owner ofthe
life insurance contract from the inception of the arrangement, there is no transfer
ofproperty under section 83. For example, assuming there is a reasonable and bona
fide expectation that the employer will receive repayment of its share of the
premiums at a fixed or determinable future date, then the arrangement may in
certain circumstances be properly treated as an acquisition of a life insurance
contract by the employee with the proceeds of a loan or series of loans from the
employer to the employee secured by the life insurance contract, rather than as an
arrangement whereby the employer acquires ownership of the life insurance
contract and provides economic benefits to the employee thereunder.
Section 7872 of the Code, which was enacted in 1984, sets forth rules for
determining the tax treatment ofcertain direct and indirect below-market loans. In
general, section 7872 recharacterizes a below-market loan (a loan in which the
interest rate charged is less than the applicable Federal rate, or "AFRtt ) as an ann's-
length transaction in which the lender makes a loan to the borrower at the AFR,
coupled with a payment or payments to the borrower sufficient to fund all or part
of the interest that the borrower is treated as paying on that loan. The amount,
timing, and characterization of the imputed payments to the borrower under a
below-market Joan depend on the relationship between the borrower and the lender
and whether the loan is characterized as a demand loan or a term loan. In the case
of a compensation-related below-market loan within the meaning of section
7872(c)(1)(B), the imputed payments to the borrower are treated as compensation
income.
The legislative history of section 7872 states that the tenn "loan" is to be
interpreted broadly for purposes of section 7872, potentially encompassing "any
transfer ofmoney that provides the transferor with a right to repayment. It H.R. Rep.
98-861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1018 (1984). Treasury and the IRS believe that
Congress generally intended that section 7872 would govern the detennination of
compensation income resulting from an arrangement the substance ofwhich is a
loan from an employer to an employee, and that there was no congressional intent
to makesection 7872 inapplicable to split-dollar arrangements ifsuch arrangements
are, in substance, loans.
The Notice then states:
IV. INTERIM GUIDANCE
A. CHARACTERIZATION OF SPLIT-DOLLAR ARRANGEMENTS
In light ofthe rationale set forth in Rev. Rul. 64-328 and the fact that no published
guidance has addressed the potential applicability of section 7872 to split-dollar
arrangements, Treasury and the IRS recognize that taxpayers have not generally
treated employer payments under equity split-dollar arrangements as loans, and that
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the below-market loan rules of section 7872 have not generally been applied to
impute compensation income to employees from such arrangements. It is also
recognized that, without further guidance, it may be difficult for taxpayers to
determine whether an employer's payments under a split-dollar arrangement are
properly characterized as loans for Federal tax purposes or whether the employer
should instead be treated as having acquired a beneficial ownership interest in the
life insurance contract through its premium payments and having provided
economic benefits to the employee thereunder. Accordingly, pendingconsideration
of public comments and the publication of further guidance, the characterization
and income tax treatment of equity and other split-dollar arrangements will
generally be detennined under the following guidelines:
1. The IRS will generally accept the parties' characterization of the
employer's payments under a split-dollar arrangement, provided that (i) such
characterization is not clearly inconsistent with the substance ofthe arrangement,
(ii) such characterization has been consistently followed by the parties from the
inception of the arrangement, and (iii) the parties fully account for all economic
benefits conferred on the employee in a Iilanner consistent with that
characterization.
2. The IRS will pennit an employer's payments under a split- dollar
arrangement to be characterized as loans for tax purposes, provided that all ofthe
conditions set forth in paragraph 1 are satisfied. In such cases, the tax
consequences of the payments treated as loans will be detennined under section
7872, the employee will not have additional compensation income for the value of
the insurance protection provided under the life insurance contract, and the cash
surrender value ofthe contractwiU not represent property that has been transferred
to the employee for purposes of section 83. However, the employee ordinarily
would have additional gross income ifthe employer's advances were not repaid in
accordance with the tenns ofthe arrangement. Moreover, the employee could have
gross income under section 72 for distributions actually received under the life
insurance contract.
3. In any case in which an employer's payments under a split- dollar
arrangement have not been consistently treated as i08ilS in accordance \vith
paragraph 1, the parties will be treated as having adopted a non-loan
characterization ofthe arrangement, and the parties must fully account for all ofthe
economic benefits that the employee derives from the arrangement in a manner
consistent with that characterization and with Rev. Rul. 64-328, Rev. Rul. 66-110,
and the general tax principles upon which those rulings are based. In general, this
means that (i) the employer will be treated as having acquired beneficial ownership
of the life insurance contract through its share of the premium payments, (ii) the
employee will have compensation income under section 61 equal to the value ofthe
life insurance protection provided to the employee each year that the arrangement
remains in effect, reduced by any payments made by the employee for such life
insurance protection, (iii) the employee will have compensation income under
section 61 equal to any dividends or similar distributions made to the employee
under the life insurance contract (including any dividends described in Rev. Rul.
66-110 applied to provide additional policy benefits), and (iv) the employee will
have compensation income under section 83(a) to the extent that the employee
acquires a substantially vested interest in the cash surrender value of the life
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insurance contract, reduced under section 83(a)(2) by any consideration paid by the
employee for such interest in the cash surrender value.
4. Pending the publication of further guidance, the IRS will not treat an
employer as having made a transfer of a portion of the cash surrender value of a
life insurance contract to an employee for purposes ofsection 83 solely because the
interest or other earnings credited to the cash surrender value ofthe contract cause
the cash surrender value to exceed the portion thereofpayable to the employer on
termination of the split-dollar arrangement. If future guidance provides that such
earnings increments are to be treated as transfers of property for purposes of
section 83, it will apply prospectively.
5. In any case in which the employer's payments under a split- dollar
arrangement have not been consistently treated as loans, then for so long as the
arrangement remains in effect, the IRS will treat the employee as continuing to
have gross income under section 61 for any current life insurance protection
provided to the employee under the arrangement, except to the extent allocable to
premium payments made by the employee (or included in the employee's gross
income under paragraph 6) or to any portion of the cash surrender value of the
contract that has been treated as a substantially vested transfer of property to the
employee under section 83. When such an allocation is required, the IRS will
accept a pro rata or other reasonable method for determining that portion of the
death benefit allocable to cash surrender value beneficially owned by the employer
and that portion allocable to cash surrender value transferred to or purchased by the
employee.
6. If an employer makes a premium or other payment for the benefit of an
employee under a split-dollar arrangement, and the employer neither acquires a
beneficial ownership interest in the life insurance contract through such payment
nor has a reasonable expectation of receiving repayment of that amount through
policy proceeds orotherwise, such paymentwill be treated as compensation income
to the employee under section 61. See Reg. section 1.61- 2(d)(2)(ii)(a); Frost v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 89 (1969).
In sum, therefore, any pa)ment made by an employer under a spHt-dollar
arrangement must be accounted for as a loan (see paragraph 2), as an investment
in the contract for the employer's own account (see paragraph 3), or as a payment
of compensation (see paragraph 6).
Essentially, the IRS wants the value to the employee to be accounted for, either as income, under section 83,
or as a loan under section 7872. The Notice does not discuss private (or intra-family) split-dollar; arguably, the same
policy arguments apply except that perhaps the choice is between a gift and a loan.
The most complicated aspect of the Notice deals with section 83. The Notices states:
However, whether an equity split-dollararrangement involves a transfer ofproperty
within the meaning ofsection 83 depends on the substance ofthe arrangement. See
section 1.83-3(a) of the regulations. Ifthe employee is the beneficial owner ofthe
life insurance contractfrom the inception ofthe arrangement, there is no transfer
ofproperty undersection 83. For example, assuming there is a reasonable and bona
fide expectation that the employer will receive repayment of its share of the
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premiums at a fixed or determinable future date, then the arrangement may in
certain circumstances be properly treated as an acquisition of a life insurance
contract by the employee with the proceeds of a loan or series of loans from the
employer to the employee secured by the life insurance contract, rather than as an
arrangement whereby the employer acquires ownership of the life insurance
contract and provides economic benefits to the employee thereunder.
The highlighted sentence is an important planning point.
Another important question unaddressed by the Notice is its application to existing split-dollar arrangements.
The life insurance industry has argued vigorously for grandfathering. Would grandfathering protect new premium
payments or only existing cash values?
The Notice also abolishes the use of the P.S. 58 Tables:
B. Revised Standards for Valuing Current Life Insurance Protection
Pending the consideration of comments and publication of further guidance, the
following interim guidance is provided on the valuation of current life insurance
protection:
I. Rev. Rut. 55-747 is hereby revoked, and the IRS will no longer treat or
accept the P.S. 58 rates set forth therein as a proper measure ofthe value ofcurrent
life insurance protection for Federal tax purposes. Nonetheless, for taxable years
ending on or before December 31,200 I, taxpayers may continue to use the P.S. 58
rates set forth in Rev. Rul. 55-747 for purposes ofdetermining the value ofcurrent
life insurance protection provided to an employee under a split-dollar arrangement
or a qualified retirement plan.
2. Taxpayers may use the premium rate table set forth at the end of this
notice, captioned as Table 200 I, to determine the value of current life insUrance
protection on a single life provided under a split-dollar arrangement or qualified
retirement plan for taxable years ending after the date of issuance of this notice.
Table 200 I is based on the mortality experience reflected in the table of unifonn
premiums promulgated under section 79(c) of the Code (see section 1.79-3(dX2)
of the regulations), with extensions for ages below 25 and above 70, and the
elimination of the five-year age brackets. 3 With the revocation of Rev. Rut 55-
747, the rates set forth in Table 2001 are provided as an interim substitute for the
P.S. 58 rates that taXpayers may rely upon pending further consideration ofhow the
value of current life insurance protection should be detennined for these Federal
tax purposes in the future. The premium rates set forth in Table 200 I are materially
lower than the P.S. 58 rates at all ages.
3. Taxpayers may continue to determine the value ofcurrent life insurance
protection by using the insurer's lower published premium rates that are available
to all standard risks for initial issue one- year term insurance as set forth in Rev.
Rul. 66-110, subject to the following additional limitations. First, for periods after
December 31,2003, the IRS will not consider an insurer's published premium rates
to be available to all standard risks who apply for term insurance unless (i) the
insurer generally makes the availability ofsuch rates known to persons who apply
for term insurance coverage from the. insurer, (ii) the insurer regularly sells tenn
insurance at such rates to individuals who apply for term insurance coverage
through the insurer's nonnal distribution channels, and (iii) the insurer does not
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more commonly sell term insurance at higher premium rates to individuals that the
insurer classifies as standard risks under the defmition of standard risk most
commonly used by that insurer for the issuance of tenn insurance. Second, with
respect to a life insurance contract (or individual certificate) issued after March 1,
2001, no assurance is provided that such published premium rates may be used to
determine the value of life insurance protection for periods after the later of
December 31,2003, or December 31 ofthe year in which further guidance relating
to the valuation ofcurrent life insurance protection is published.
L. SECTION 2053 and 2054 - DEBTS AND ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES
1. Deduction for An Uncertain Amount. In Estate ofMcMonis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-
82, the court determined that where a decedent took an estate tax deduction for income taxes which were owed, and
subsequent developments produced an income tax refund, the estate tax deduction must also be reduced. In April 1990,
Donn McMorris died and a few months later Evelyn McMorris received a partial distribution of certain closely-held
stock from his estate which was redeemed in September, 1990. Evelyn McMorris died in March, 1991 and a deduction
was taken on her estate tax return for a significant income tax. A significant part ofthe income was gain resulting from
the redemption ofstock because it was redeemed at considerably more than the value placed on it in Donn McMorris'
estate. Subsequently, the Donn McMorris estate and the IRS reached a settlement which increased the value ofthe stock
in his estate, which in turn increased the basis ofEvelyn McMorris in the stock and eliminated the income. Whereupon,
she filed a claim for an income tax refund.
The issue was whether the original estate tax deduction in the Evelyn McMorris estate should be adjusted. The
court determined that it should be because:
a claim that is valid and enforceable at the date ofa decedent's death must remain
enforceable in order for the estate to' deduct the claim. Technical claims that
disappear in the light of subsequent circumstances should not be allowed. Thus,
postdeath events must be taken into consideration in determining the enforceability
of a claim that a creditor fails to make and preserve within the time allowed by
local law.
The court distinguished Estate ofSachs v. Commissioner, 88 T.e. 769 (1987), rev'd, 856 F.2d I 158 (8th Cir.
1988), which dealt with a post-death, retroactive, change in the tax laws.
The case was appealed and the question before the Tenth Circuit in Estate ofEvelvn M. McMorris, 87 AFTR2d
Par. 2001-668 (2001), was whether the section 2053 deduction in Evelyn's estate should be reduced. The Tax Court
said yes. The opinion relies on Ithaca Trust:
Neither section 2053(a)(3) nor the tax regulations clearly indicate whether events
that occur after a decedent's death are relevant in calculating a deduction for a
claim against the estate. The statute is silent on this issue. The regulations, on the
other hand, contain language which arguably supports the positions ofboth parties.
For instance, one regulation cited by the estate provides: "The amounts that may
be deducted as claims against a decedent's estate are such only as represent
personal obligations ofthe decedent existing at the time ofhis death." Treas. Reg.
section 20.2053-4. But, another regulation relied upon by the Commissioner
permits estates to deduct a decedent's tax liabilities as a claim against the estate
even if the exact amount is not known, as long as the deduction "is ascertainable
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with reasonable certainty, and will be paid." Treas. Reg. section 20.2053-1(b)(3).
In light of these apparent inconsistencies, the most we can discern "from these
Regulations is that the situation we now face is not expressly contemplated." Estate
of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 1999).
We therefore begin our analysis with the leading case on this issue, Ithaca Trust
Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929). In Ithaca Trust, the decedent left the
residue ofhis estate to his wife for life, with the remainder to certain charities. To
ascertain the amount ofthe charitable deduction for estate tax purposes, the wife's
residual was calculated with a mortality table and subtracted from the principal of
the estate. However, the wife died much sooner than expected. The question for the
Court was whether the value of the estate's deduction should be calculated
according to the wife's life expectancy as of the date of the testator's death or by
applying the wife's actual date ofdeath. In a unanimous opinion, the Court adopted
a date-of-death valuation rule: "The estate so far as may be is settled as ofthe date
of the testator's death." Id. at 155. The Court acknowledged that "[t]he first
impression is that it is absurd to resort to statistical probabilities when you know
the fact," but it stated that "the value of the thing to be taxed must be estimated as
ofthe time when the act is done," i.e., the passing ofthe decedent's estate at death.
Id. The Court therefore concluded by stating that, as "[t]empting as it is to correct
uncertain probabilities by the now certain fact, we are ofopinion that it cannot be
done." Id.
Several courts have relied on the date-of-death valuation rule announced in Ithaca
Trust to hold that events occurring after a.decedent's death are irrelevant in valuing
an estate's deduction under section 2053(a)(3). See Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at
520-26 (allowing estate to deduct date-of-death value of claim against it even
though estate later settled for lesser amount); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d
1248, 1253-56 (9th eire 1982) (same); Estate of Van Home v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.
728, 732-39 ( 1982) (same), affd, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983); Greene v. United
States, 447 F. SUPPa 885,892-95 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (declining to consider creditor's
failure to comply with statute of limitations for filing claim after decedent's death
in allowing estate's deduction for claim); Russell v. United States, 260 F. SUppa
493,499-500 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (same); Winer v. United States, 153 F. SUPPa 941,
943-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (same). to While most ofthese courts acknowledged that
Ithaca Trust involved a different section of the federal estate tax statute, i.e.,
charitable bequest deductions under the precursor to 26 U.S.C. section 2055, they
interpreted the opinion as announcing a broad principle that the value ofa taxable
estate should be detennined as closely as possible to the date of the decedent's
death.
Other courts, however, have refused to extend the principle ofIthaca Trust beyond
charitable bequest deductions, holding that postmortem events may properly be
considered in calculating the value of a claim against the estate deduction. See
Estate of Sachs v. Comm'r, 856 F.2d 1158, 1160-63 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that
Commissioner could rely on retroactive ta?C forgiveness legislation enacted four
years after decedent's death in disallowing estate deduction for paying those taxes);
Comm'r v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372,373-75 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that
decedent's estate could not deduct full date-of-death value of spousal support
obligations because ex-wife re-married before estate filed return); Jacobs, 34 F.2d
at 235-36 (holding that husband's estate could not deduct amount ofclaim against
it arising from antenuptial agreement as a result of wife's waiver of claim after
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husband's death); Estate of Kyle v. Comm'r, 94 T.e. 829, 848-51 (1990)
(disallowing estate's deduction for date-of-death value of litigation claim against
it because case was resolved in estate's favor six years after decedent's death);
Estate ofHagmann v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 465,466-69 (1973) (refusing to allow estate
to deduct valid claims against it because creditors never filed those claims after
decedent's death), affd per curiam, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974). 11 Although these
courts have offered a variety of reasons why Ithaca Trust should be limited to
charitable bequests, three recurring themes emerge.
One explanation for not extending Ithaca Trust to claims against the estate is that
the congressional purpose underlying that deduction is different from that of
deductions for charitable bequests. According to this rationale, the date-of-death
valuation rule does not apply to section 2053(aX3) because the purpose of that
deduction is to appraise the decedent's actual net worth at death, while the purpose
of section 2055 is to encourage charitable bequests by ensuring that if a testator
makes a charitable gift in a prescribed fonn, a deduction will be allowed in a
specified amount. See, e.g., Sachs, 856 F.2d at I 162 (ltthere is no legislative
interest behind the section 2053(a)(3) deduction in encouraging claims against the
estate in the same way that date-of-death valuation encourages charitable
bequeststt).
Another justification for not applying Ithaca Trust to section 2053(a)(3) is based
on the other deductions in the section. This approach places heavy reliance on the
fact that section 2053(a) allows a deduction not only for claims against the estate
but also for funeral and estate administration expenses.. Under this view, since these
expenses are calculated after death, Congress must also have intended that claims
against the estate be ascertained by post- mortem events. See, e.g., Jacobs, 34 F.2d
at 236 ("funeral expenses, administration expenses, and claims against the estate,
under this paragraph, were intended by Congress to be determined in the course of
an orderly administration of the estatett) •
•••••
Sound policy reasons support our adoption ofthe date-of- death valuation principle
for section 2053(a)(3) deductions. Specifically, this principle provides a bright line
rule which alleviates the uncertainty and delay in estate administration which may
result if events occurring months or even years after a decedent's death could be
considered in valuing a claim against the estate. See Appel1ant's Opening Br. at 22
("This uncertainty would make estate administrators -- who are personally liable
for the estate tax - more reluctant to satisfy estate obligations and distribute estate
assets. tt); Robert C. Jones, Note, Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate
and Events Subsequent to Date ofDeath, 22 U.e.L.A.. L. Rev. 654, 680 (1975) ("A
large part of the delay involved in the probate of estates is attributable to a fmal
detennination oftax liabilities.... [A]Ilowing postmortem events occurring during
the administration of the estate to govern, contributes to probate delay. tt). Our
hoIding resolves these problerns by bringingmore certainty to estate administration,
an ideal which has long been promoted by judge and commentator alike. See
Shively, 276 F.2d at 376 (Moore, J., dissenting) (ttIn the field of estate tax law it
is particularly important that there be as much certainty as possible.ttl; Jones, Estate
and Income Tax, supra, at 681 C'the current approach to timing the valuation of
claims must be made more certain and consistent").
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IRS has non-acquiesced in Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'g, 108 T.C.
412 (1997), cited above in McMorris, and distinguished. The conflict in the circuits may require a Supreme Court
resolution. The IRS notice states:
Decedent died on November 16, 1990. At her death, Exxon had a claim against the
estate that was being adjudicated in a United States District Court. In FebruaI)'
199I, the court ruled in favor ofExxon and referred the case to a Special Master
to determine the amount of the liability. In April 1991, Exxon presented to the
estate its $2,482,719 damages calculation. The executors deducted that amount on
the estate tax return, which was filed in July 1991. On February 10, 1992, the estate
settled the claim for $681,840 and paid this amount on or about March 10, 1992.
The Commissioner determined that the estate was only entitled to a deduction for
the amount actually paid, and the estate filed a petition in the United States Tax
Court.
The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determination that the claim against the
estate should be limited to the amount actually paid. The Tax Court held that,
"[w]here a claim is disputed, contingent, or uncertain as of the date of the
decedent's death, the estate is not entitled to a deduction until the claim is resolved
and it is determined what amount, if any, will be paid. It is this latter amount that
is allowed as a deduction." 108 T.C. at 419.
The United States Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit reverse~ holding that the
amount deductible was the fair market value of the claim on the date of death,
rather than the amount paid to settle the claim as argued by the government, or the
full amount of the claim as argued by the estate. The Fifth Circuit relied on the
decision in Ithaca Trust v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929). In that case,
the Supreme Court concluded that a post-death event (the premature death oft~e
life tenant of a charitable remainder trust) should not be taken into account in
detennining the amount of the charitable deduction allowable under the
predecessor to section 2055. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court
to 9.etermine the value ofthe claim at the date ofdeath with the instruction that the
court was "neither to admit nor consider evidence ofpost-death occurrences when
determining the date-of-death value of Exxon's claim." 198 F.3d at 526.
******
We disagree with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and conclusion. Because the section
2055 deduction involves different concerns, we do not believe that Ithaca Trust
precludes consideration ofpost-death events in determining the amount deductible
under section 2053 for claims against the estate. The Fifth Circuit's reliance on
Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, (9th eir. 1982), and Estate ofVan Home
v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), affg, 78 T.C. 728, 734 (1982),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984) was also misplaced. Propstra and Van Horne
involved claims that were certain and enforceable at death, and in both cases, the
Ninth Circuit limited its holding to "certain and enforceable" claims, noting that
"[t]he law is clear that post-death events are relevant when computing the
deduction to be taken for disputed or contingent claims." Propstra, 680 F.2d at
1253.
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Every court, except the Fifth Circuit, that has addressed the section 2053(a)(3)
issue where the claim is contested, contingent, or unenforceable on the date of
death, has considered post-death events in detennining the allowable deduction.
Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874 (1st eir. 1963), affg sub nom., Taylor v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 371 (1962); Estate ofJacobs v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d233
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929); Estate ofCourtney v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 317 (1974); Estate ofCafaro v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-348. See
also Estate of Van Home, 720 F.2d 1114 and Propstra, 680 F.2d 1248. But cf.,
Commissioner v. Strauss, 77 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1935).
2. Deduction for Interest. Section 2053(c)(1)(B) provides that for decedents dying after December 31,
1997, no deduction is allowable for any interest payable under section 6601 on any unpaid portion ofthe federal estate
tax for the period during which an extension oftime for payment is in effect under section 6166. What ifan estate does
not elect section 6166 but merely arranges for a loan to pay the estate tax? Is that interest deductible?
Revenue Ruling 84-75, 1984-1 C.B. 193, states that if a loan is reasonably and necessarily incurred in
administering the estate (e.g., to avoid a forced sale of estate assets) then the interest is deductible as an expense of
administration under section 2053(a)(2). However, ifthe amount ofinterest the estate might pay is uncertain, because,
for example, the estate's obligation to make payments could be accelerated either through pre-payment or through
default, the ruling concludes that the interest is deductible by the estate only after it accrues and any future estimated
accrual is not deductible. This presents a significant problem with loans that last for longer than the applicable statute
of limitations.
PLR 199903038 considered an estate in which the estate proposed to borrow, with appropriate court approval
as required by applicable state law, from a bank. The loan would provide for an annual payment of both interest and
principal over a specified tenn ofyears not to exceed seven at a fIXed rate of interest. The note would also provide that
neither principal nor interest could be prepaid and that in the event ofdefault the entire interest that would have been
paid under the full term ofthe note would be accelerated. Stated differently, the loan was designed to set forth a strictly
ascertainable amount cf interest that ~¥ouldbe paid. PLR 200020011 approved a commercial loan to pay interest owed
under section 6166 was reasonable and necessary under section 2053(a)(2). The estate represented as follows:
The represented facts are as follows: Decedent died on Date 1. Decedent's niece
(Niece), also Decedent's conservator, is the principal beneficiary of Decedent's
estate. Decedent's estate was initially administered by Bank. After the filing ofthe
Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return on Fonn 706 and prior to
the issuance ofthe closing letter dated Date 2, Bank resigned and Niece succeeded
Bank as the personal representative of Decedent's estate.
Decedent's federal estate tax return reported a gross estate ofa. Of the total gross
estate, b represented the value of real estate, including a closely-held business
interest in the fonn of a commercial shopping center. The shopping center was
valued for federal estate tax purposes at c and thus comprised approximately w
percent ofthe value ofDecedent's gross estate. This percentage ofbusiness assets
met the percentage requirements for purposes ofthe election under section 6166.
Decedent's estate elected under section 6166(a), therefore, to defer payment ofthe
federal estate tax attributable to the value of the shopping center and to pay the
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estate tax in installments together with annual payments of interest on the unpaid
portion of the federal estate tax liability during the deferral period. To date, the
estate has made the required payments.
It has been represented that Niece, the personal representative and principal
beneficiary ofDecedent's estate, received approximately x percent of Decedent's
estate. It has been further represented that Niece holds a y percent direct interest
in the commercial shopping center and, as well, currently operates the shopping
center. The remaining z percent is held in a trust for the benefit ofNiece's daughter.
Decedent's estate represents that it has had difficulty obtaining operational lines of
credit because ofthe federal tax lien resulting from the election under section 6166
and that the future payments required under section 6166 would cause a strain on
the cash flow of the commercial shopping center. Decedent's estate further
represents that the majority ofother gross estate assets have been liquidated to pay
estate taxes. Accordingly, Decedent's estate has detennined that it is in the best
interests of the closely-held business to obtain a commercial loan for the purpose
ofpaying offthe deferred estate taxes in full. To date, such a loan has been secured
and the deferred estate taxes have been paid in full.
It has been represented that a loan has been secured and the deferred estate taxes
have been paid in full. Inasmuch as the applicable loan documents contain a
prepayment option, however, it has been further represented that the loan
documents will be amended to provide that the loan may not be prepaid, and upon
default all interest that would have been owed throughout the loan term must be
paid in full at the time ofdefault. Decedent's estate represents that itwill not deduct
the interest attributable to the loan as an administration expense until the loan
documents have been amended to remove any possibility ofprepayment.
The IRS detennined that the interest was deductible prior to payment relying on Estate of Graegin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-477, which dealt with a similar situation except that the lender was the decedent's
closely-held corporation. The IRS noted that whether the expense was necessarily incurred was a factual detennination.
As such it was not part of the ruling.
Suppose an estate includes only limited partnership interests. The Executor requests that the general partner
distribute funds to the estate for payment of tax. The partnership declines to do so but is willing to make a loan to the
estate. Ifthat loan is structured properly the interest should be deductible. Such would be desirable because ofa spread
between income tax rates and estate tax rates.
3. Environmental Claims. In Estate ofRobert L. Snyder v. United States, 84 AFTR2d Par. 99-5255,
the decedent owned contaminated property in this revocable trust at death. The estate, after considerable negotiation,
settled with the EPA for $750,000 and wanted to deduct that amount under section 2053. The IRS originally denied
a deduction because the claim was speculative but after it become fixed, because ofthe settlement, raised the argument
that no deduction in excess of the probate estate could be taken. The court gave the argument short shrift:
The tenn "property subject to claims," as used in section 2053(c)(2), does not make
a distinction between a probate versus a non-probate asset. Rather, it expressly
provides that "the term 'property subject to claims' means property INCLUDABLE
in the gross estate of the decedent WI-IICH,or the avails of which, would BEAR
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THE BURDEN OF THE PAYMENT OF SUCH DEDUCTIONS in the final
adjustment and settlement of the estate ...." 26 U.S.C. section 2053(c)(2)
(emphasis added). The Revocable Trust's assets are subject to and bear the burden
ofthe payment ofthe EPA claims under Ohio law. Thus, the plain language ofthe
statute dictates that the Revocable Trust's assets fall within the defmition of
"property subject to claims."
The government argues that "in the fmal adjustment and settlement ofthe estate"
means "in the probate estate." Thus precluding plaintifffrom deducting the EPA
settlement from the Revocable Trust. It states that the "property subject to claims"
must be within the jwisdiction of a state probate court, surrogate court, orphans'
court, or other court which exercises jurisdiction over the fmal adjustment and
settlement of a decedent's estate. We find this interpretation overly narrow.
The government cites a third circuit case, Wilson v. United States, 372 F.2d 232
(3rd eire 1963) to support this proposition. However, under the Pennsylvania law
applicable in Wilson, no part of the spendthrift trust in question could have been
seized for the payment of the debts ofthe deceased. In the instant case, the value
of the trust has been reduced by the EPA liability.
M. SECTIONS 2056, 2056A AND 2519- MARITAL DEDUCTION
1. Coordination With Tax Payment Clause. The Eighth Circuit has reversed the District Court in
Patterson, et at v. United States, 83 A.F.T.R.2d 99-2476 (8th Cir. 1999). The estate poured into a revocable trust. The
decedent's Will directed the executor to pay from the residue all death taxes but also provided that ifthere were a trust
inexistence at the decedent's death, any part of the deathtaxes could be paid from the trust assets in the trustee's
discretion. The trust provided that 10% ofthe trust assets, unreduced by any death taxes, were to be set aside in a QTIP
trost.
The IRS claimed that 10% ofthe probate assets which the estate had qualified for the marital deduction were
not in fact eligible for the marital deduction because they would not have existed i(~he trustee had not paid the estate
taxes. Stated differently, the IRS contention was that the wording of the tax payment clauses was not sufficient to
protect the marital deduction with respect to the estate assets. The Ninth Circuit rejected that position, holding, in
essence, that ifthe assets actually pass to the QTIP trust that is sufficient, relying on Estate ofSpencer v. Commissioner,
43 F.3d 226 (6th eire 1995); Estate of Robertson v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1994); Estate ofCtayton v.
Commissioner, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992).
The case underscores the importance ofcoordinated tax clauses when a Will and a revocable trust are involved.
The facts in Richard Salyer, et at. v. United States, 84 AFTR2d Par. 99-5477, No. 98-6243 (November 4,
1999), decided by the Sixth Circuit on appeal from the Eastern District ofKentucky, were interesting. Life insurance
was paid to an irrevocable trust that did not qualify for the marital deduction, but which was included in the gross estate
ofthe decedent because it was transferred to the trust withinJ years ofthe decedent's death. The decedent's revocable
trust contained the following funding clause:
3.0 l.a. Share Number One shall be an amount equal to the maximum value ofgross
estate which when subjected to the federal Estate Tax will result in no tax liability
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for the year in which Donor's death occurs. The maximum value ofthe total gross
estate which will not result in a federal Estate Tax may be determined by reference
to IRC Section 20 I0, which provides the amount ofthe unified credit, and to IRC
Section 6018, which describes the maximum gross estate which may exist before
a federal Estate Tax return is required to be filed. This amount is also known as the
"Exemption Equivalent" and currently.~uals$600,000.00. The amountso set apart
shall be a pecuniary amount and shall not participate in any appreciation or
depreciation in the value of Donor's estate during the administration thereof. To
the extent other property is available, this share shall not be reduced by the
payment of debts, taxes and administrative expenses applicable to and payable
from, or by, Donor's estate.
3.01.b. Share Number Two shall be an amount equal to the remaining assets of
Donor's estate, which may also be referred to as the rest residue and remainder of
the assets in the hands ofmy Executorffrustee. However, this subsection shall not
be applicable to any property which passes to or becomes a part ofShare Number
Three pursuant to a disclaimer or renunciation.
3.0 I.e. Share Number Three shall be those assets for which a proper disclaimer or
renunciation has been executed pursuant to Kentucky law and/or the Internal
Revenue Code.
The court agreed with the IRS that the insurance plus the exemption equivalent was taxable. The planning
point is clear: have the insurance paid to a marital trust if it is included in the estate.
2. QTIP Reeulations: Effect ofEstate Expenses. Proposed regulations on the effectofadministration
expenses on the marital deduction were issued, REG-l 14663-97(December 15, 1998), and fmal regulations were issued
in T.D. 8846 (December 2, 1999). The regulations distinguish between estate transmission expenses which will reduce
the marital deduction, and estate management expenses which will not reduce the marital deduction. For drafting
purposes, the marital deduction/exemption equivalent formula clause should be revised to take into consideration estate
management expenses that are not taken as income tax deductions. The final regulations are substantially like the
proposed regulations with one notable exception:
Many ofthe comments concerned the special rule ofsection 20.2056(b)-4(eX2Xii)
of the proposed regulations. Under the special rule, the value of the deductible
property interest is not increased as a result ofthe decrease in the federal estate tax
liability that is attributable to the deduction of estate management expenses as
expenses ofadministration under section 2053 on the federal estate tax return. A
similar rule would have applied for purposes ofthe estate tax charitable deduction.
Several of these commentators argued that the special rule is inconsistent with
sections 2056(a) and 2055(c), because the value of the property passing to the
surviving spouse or charity should be reduced only by the estate taxes actually paid.
Thus, an estate should be permitted the full benefit of deducting management
expenses on the federal estate tax return, including an increase to the marital or
charitable deduction based on the resultant decrease in tax payable from the marital
or charitable share.
Conversely, other commentators asserted that the special rule does not confonn
with section 2056(b)(9). Section 205(i(b)(9) provides that nothing in section 2056
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or any other estate tax provision shall allow the value ofany interest in property to
be deducted for federal estate tax purposes more than once with respect to the same
decedent. These commentators pointed out that ifestate management expenses paid
from the marital or charitable share are deducted on the federal estate tax return,
and no reduction is made to the alJowable amount of the marital or charitable
deduction, then the same property interest is deducted twice in violation ofsection
2056(b)(9).
After considering these comments, the Treaswy and the IRS have eliminated the
special rule of the proposed regulations. The final regulations provide that estate
management expenses attributable to, and payable from, the property interest
passing to the surviving spouse or charity do not reduce the value ofthe property
interest. However, pursuant to section 2056(b)(9), the allowable amount of the
marital or charitable deduction is reduced by the amount of these management
expenses if they are deducted on the Federal estate tax return.
The regulations provide as follows:
(d) Effect of administration expenses -- (I) Defmitions - (i) Management
expenses. Estate management expenses are expenses that are incurred in
connection with the investment of estate assets or with their preservation or
maintenance during a reasonable period of administration. Examples of these
expenses could include investment advisory fees, stock brokerage commissions,
custodial fees, and interest.
(ii) Transmission expenses. Estate transmission expenses are expenses that would
not have been incurred but for the decedent's death and the consequent necessity
ofcollecting the decedent's assets, paying the decedent's debts and death taxes, and
distributing the decedent's property to those who are entitled to receive it. Estate
transmission expenses include anyadministration expense that is not a management
expense. Examples of these expenses could include executor commissions and
attorney fees (except to the extent of commissions or fees specifically related to
investment, preservation, and maintenance of the assets), probate fees, expenses
incurred in construction proceedings and defending against will contests, and
appraisal fees.
(iii) Marital share. The marital share is the property or interest in property that
passed from the decedent for which a deduction is allowable under section 2056(a).
The marital share includes the income produced by the property or interest in
property during the period ofadministration if the income, under the tenns of the
governing instrument or applicable local law, is payable to the surviving spouse or
is to be added to the principal ofthe property interest passing to, or for the benefit
of, the surviving spouse.
(2) Effect of transmission expenses. For purposes of determining the marital
deduction, the value of the marital share shall be reduced by the amount of the
estate transmission expenses paid from the marital share.
(3) Effect ofmanagement expenses attributable to the marital share. For purposes
of determining the marital deduction, the value of the marital share shall not be
reduced by the amount ofthe estate management expenses attributable to and paid
from the marital share. Pursuant to section 2056(b)(9), however, the amount ofthe
allowable marital deduction shall be reduced by the amount of any such
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management expenses that are deducted under section 2053 on the decedent's
Federal estate tax return.
(4) Effect of management expenses not attributable to the marital share. For
purposes ofdetennining the marital deduction, the value ofthe marital share shall
be reduced by the amount ofthe estate management expenses paid from the marital
share but attributable to a property interest not included in the marital share.
(5) Examples. The following examples illustrate the application of this paragraph
(d):
Example I. The decedent dies after 2006 having made no lifetime gifts. The
decedent makes a bequest of shares of ABC Corporation stock to the decedent's
child. The bequest provides that the child is to receive the income from the shares
from the date of the decedent's death. The value of the bequeathed shares on the
decedent's date of death is $3,000,000. The residue of the estate is bequeathed to
a trust for which the executor properly makes an election under section 2056(b)(7)
to treat as qualified tenninable interest property. The value of the residue on the
decedent's date of death, before the payment of administration expenses and
Federal and State estate taxes, is $6,000,000. Under applicable local law, the
executor has the discretion to pay administration expenses from the income or
principal of the residuary estate. All estate taxes are to be paid from the residue.
The State estate tax equals the State death tax credit available under section 20 II.
During the period ofadministration, the estate incurs estate transmission expenses
of $400,000, which the executor charges to the residue. For purposes of
detennining the marital deduction, the value of the residue is reduced by the
Federal and State estate taxes and by the estate transmission expenses. If the
transmission expenses are deducted on the Federal estate tax return, the marital
deduction is $3,500,000 ($6,000,000 minus $400,000 transmission expenses and
minus $2,100,000 Federal and State estate taxes). Ifthe transmission expenses are
deducted on the estate's Federal income tax return rather than on the estate tax
return, the marital deduction is $3,011,] II ($6,000,000 minus $400,000
transmission expenses and minus $2,588,889 Federal and State estate taxes).
Example 2. The facts are the same as in Example I, except that, instead of
incurring estate transmission expenses, the estate incurs estate management
expenses of $400,000 in connection with the residue property passing for the
benefit of the spouse. The executor charges these management expenses to the
residue. In detennining the value of the residue passing to the spouse for marital
deduction purposes, a reduction is made for Federal and State estate taxes payable
from the residue but no reduction is made for the estate management expenses. If
the management expenses are deducted on the estate's income tax return, the net
value of the property passing to the spouse is $3,900,000 ($6,000,000 minus
$2,100,000 Federal and State estate taxes). A marital deduction is claimed for that
amount, and the taxable estate is $5,100,000.
Example 3. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that the estate
management expenses of$400,000 are incurred in connection with the bequest of
ABC Corporation stock to the decedent's child. The executor charges these
management expenses to the residue. For purposes of determining the marital
deduction, the value ofthe residue is reduced by the Federal and State estate taxes
and by the management expenses. The management expenses reduce the value of
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the residue because they are charged to the property passing to the spouse even
though they were incurred with respect to stock passing to the child. If the
management expenses are deducted on the estate's Federal income tax return, the
marital deduction is $3,0 II, III ($6,000,000 minus $400,000 management
expenses and minus S2,588,889 Federal and State estate taxes). Ifthe management
expenses are deducted on the estate's Federal estate tax return, rather than on the
estate's Federal income tax return, the marital deduction is $3,500,000 ($6,000,000
minus $400,000 management expenses and minus $2,100,000 in Federal and State
estate taxes).
Example 4. The decedent, who dies in 2000, has a gross estate of $3,000,000.
Included in the gross estate are proceeds ofS150,000 from a policy insuring the
decedent's life and payable to the decedent's child as beneficiary. The applicable
credit amount against the tax was fully consumed by the decedent's lifetime gifts.
Applicable State law requires the child to pay any estate taxes attributable to the
life insurance policy. Pursuant to the decedent's will, the rest of the decedent's
estate passes outright to the surviving spouse. During the period ofadministration,
the estate incurs estate management expenses of $150,000 in connection with the
property passing to the spouse. The value of the property passing to the spouse is
$2,850,000 ($3,000,000 less the insurance proceeds of $150,000 passing to the
child). For purposes of determining the marital deduction, if the management
expenses are deducted on the estate's income tax return, the marital deduction is
$2,850,000 ($3,000,000 less $150,000) and there isa resulting taxable estate of
$150,000 ($3,000,000 less a marital deduction ofS2,850,000). Suppose, instead,
the management expenses ofSI50,OOO are deducted on the estate's estate tax return
under section 2053 as expenses of administration. In such a situation, claiming a
marital deduction of $2,850,000 would be taking a deduction for the same
$150,000 in property under both sections 2053 and 2056 and would shield from
estate taxes the $150,000 in insurance proceeds passing to the decedent's child.
Therefore, in accordance with section 2056(b)(9), the marital deduction is limited
to $2,700,000, and the resulting taxable estate is $150,000.
Example 5. The decedent dies after 2006 having made no lifetime gifts. The value
of the decedent's residuary estate on the decedent's date of death is $3,000,000,
before the payment ofadministration expenses and Federai and State estate taxes.
The decedent's will provides a fonnula for dividing the decedent's residuary estate
between two trusts to reduce the estate's Federal estate taxes to zero. Under the
formula, one trust, for the benefit ofthe decedent's child, is to be funded with that
amount ofproperty equal in value to so much ofthe applicable exclusion amount
under section 2010 that would reduce the estate's Federal estate tax to zero. The
other trust, for the benefit of the surviving spouse, satisfies the requirements of
section 2056(b)(7) and is to be funded with the remaining property in the estate.
The State estate tax equals the State death tax credit available under section 2011.
During the period of administration, the estate incurs transmission expenses of
$200,000.. The transmission expenses ofS200,000 reduce the value ofthe residue
to $2,800,000. If the transmission expenses are deducted on the Federal estate tax
return, then the fonnula divides the residue so that the value ofthe property passing
to the child's trust is $1,000,000 and the value ofthe property passing to the marital
trust is $1,800,000. The allowable marital deduction is $1,800,000. The applicable
exclusion amount shields from Feder~1 estate tax the entire $1,000,000 passing to
the child's trust so that the amount of Federal and State estate taxes is zero.
Alternatively, if the transmission expenses are deducted on the estate's Federal
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income tax return, the formula divides the residue so that the value ofthe property
passing to the child's trust is $800,000 and the value ofthe property passing to the
marital trust is $2,000,000. The allowable marital deduction remains $1,800,000.
The applicable exclusion amount shields from Federal estate tax the entire
$800,000 passing to the child's trust and $200,000 ofthe $2,000,000 passing to the
marital trust so that the amount of Federal and State estate taxes remains zero.
Example 6. The facts are the same as in Example 5, except that the decedent's will
provides that the child's trust is to be funded with that amount ofproperty equal in
value to the applicable exclusion amount under section 2010 allowable to the
decedent's estate. The residue of the estate, after the payment of any debts,
expenses, and Federal and State estate taxes, is to pass to the marital trust. The
applicable exclusion amount in this case is $1,000,000, so the value ofthe property
passing to the child's trust is $1,000,000. After deducting the $200,000 of
transmission expenses, the residue ofthe estate is $1,800,000 less any estate taxes.
If the transmission expenses are deducted on the Federal estate tax return, the
allowable marital deduction is $1,800,000, the taxable estate is zero, and the
Federal and State estate taxes are zero. Alternatively, if the transmission expenses
are deducted on the estate's Federal income tax return, the net value ofthe property
passing to the spouse is $1,657,874 ($1,800,000 minus $142,106 estate taxes). A
marital deduction is claimed for that amount, the taxable estate is $1,342, 106, and
the Federal and State estate taxes total $142,106.
Example 7. The decedent, who dies in 2000, makes an outright pecuniaI)' bequest
of$3,000,000 to the decedent's surviving spouse, and the residue ofthe estate, after
the payment ofall debts, expenses, and Federal and State estate taxes, passes to the
decedent's child. Under the terms of the applicable local law, a beneficiary of a
pecuniary bequest is not entitled to any income on the bequest. During the period
of administration, the estate pays estate transmission expenses from the income
earned by the property that will be distributed to the surviving spouse m
satisfaction of the pecuniary bequest. The income earned on this property is not
part ofthe marital share. Therefore, the allowable marital deduction is $3,000,000,
unreduced by the amount of the estate transmission expenses.
The effective date is for decedents dying after December 3, 1999.
The most important planning point is that a residuary marital clause allows the estate to benefit from the
regulations.
3. Savings Clause. The IRS determined in 19993200I that a general marital deduction savings clause
"trumped" a provision cutting off distributions to the surviving spouse if such distributions would make the spouse
ineligible for government benefits. The Service noted that a savings clause is not decisive but is helpful in ascertaining
a decedent's intent. Here, the spouses's rights were described as follows:
My Trustees shall pay the entire net income therefrom to my wife [Spouse] for so
long as she lives, in quarter annual or more frequent intervals as my Trustees
determine in their absolute discretion. In addition, my Trustees may pay to or apply
for the benefit ofmy wife, for so long as she lives, so much (even to the extent of
the whole) of the principal of this trust as my Trustees shall deem advisable, in
their sole and absolute discretion. Hov/ever, any authorization, direction, or other
provision contained in this trust which would prevent my wife from being eligible
for or result in the loss of government benefits or assistance shall be void to the
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extent that such authorization, direction or other provision would have such
adverse result. I intend that the trust assets be used to supplement, not supplant,
impair or diminish, any benefits or assistance ofany federal, state, county, city, or
other governmental entity for which my wife may otherwise be eligible or which
my wife may be receiving.
4. Minority Interest Passinc to Spouse. Problems arise when a decedent owns a majority interest in
a closely-held business at death but a minority interest passes to the surviving spouse. Such were the facts in Estate of
Frank M. DiSanto, et at. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-421. The decedent owned 53.5% ofMorgariton Dyeing
& Finishing Corp. The decedent's wife disclaimed a portion ofthe stock with the result that she received a minority
interest. The court found that a share was worth $23.50 per share as a majority interest and $13.00 per share as a
minority interest. The opinion states:
Petitioners contend that we must base the marital deduction on the value of Mr.
DiSanto's controlling interest in MD&F stock. We disagree. An estate may deduct
"an amount equal to the value of* * * property which passes or has passed from
the decedent to his surviving spouse". Sec. 2056(a). The value of the marital
deduction for a devised interest in stock of a closely held corporation equals the
value of the interest that passes to the surviving spouse. See sec. 2056(b)(4); sec.
20.2056(b)-4(a), Estate Tax Regs.; Estate ofChenoweth v. Commissioner, 88 T.C.
1577, 1588- 1589 (1987). Thus, the marital deduction for Mr. DiSanto's estate is
based on the value of the interest that passed from Mr. DiSanto's estate to Mrs.
DiSanto.
Mrs. DiSanto's disclaimer reduced the value ofher interest in Mr. DiSanto's estate,
and reduced the amount ofthe marital deduction for Mr. DiSanto's estate. See sec.
2518(a). We have decided that the fair market value ofeach share ofMD&F stock
that Mrs. DiSanto was entitled to receive from Mr. DiSanto's estate after she made
the disclaimer was $13 per share when she died. See paragraph B-3, above. Mr.
DiSanto's estate may claim a marital deduction based on that per share stock value.
Petitioners contend that we should disregard Mrs. DiSanto's disclaimer in deciding
!A'1e amount of the marital deduction for Mr. DiS1JI1fo's estate just as we disregard
postdeath fluctuations in the values of assets in estates in deciding marital
deduction amounts. We disagree. Petitioners cite Rev. Rut. 90-3, 1990-1 C.B. 174.
In Rev. Rut. 90-3, 1990-1 C.B. 174, respondent ruled that the value ofa residuary
bequest to a surviving spouse does.not change even if the value of estate assets
fluctuates after the decedent dies. Mrs. DiSanto's disclaimer ofSl,325,OOO worth
of Mr. DiSanto's MD&F stock is not a postdeath fluctuation in the value of his
stock. Thus, Rev. Rut. 90-3, 1990-1 C.B. 174, does not apply here.
Petitioners contend that, if a surviving spouse executes a disclaimer, the marital
deduction is merely reduced by the disclaimed amount, citing Estate of Nix v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-109. We disagree. In Estate ofNix, we held that
the disclaimer reduced the surviving spouse's interest in the decedent's estate bythe
value ofdisclaimed property. Unlike the facts in Estate ofNix, here the qualified
disclaimer reduces Mrs. DiSanto's interest in Mr. DiSanto's stock in MD&F from
a controlling interest to a minority interest.
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Petitioners cite Estate ofJameson v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1999-43, for the
proposition that respondent may not use one value for including the MD&F stock
in Mr. DiSanto's estate and a lower value for calculating the marital deduction. We
disagree. The decedent in Estate ofJameson bequeathed an amount to his children
and the residu8lY to his wife. We held that his estate may not use a lower per share
value ofclosely held stock to increase the number ofshares to compute the bequest
to his children and a higher per share value of the same stock to compute the
marital deduction. Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner, supra, is distinguishable
because the decedent's wife did not disclaim part ofher interest as Mrs. DiSanto
did here.
The disclaimer was apparently entered into because Mrs. DiSanto was in ill health and it was thought desirable
for her to be in a minority position. The opinion does not discuss the application ofthe tax clause. Where should the
estate tax due on the gap between the estate value and the marital deduction value fall? In general, state law may
"protect" a marital bequest from paying tax if the bequest generates no tax but such is not the case here. If it is not
protected, the marital deduction would be reduced further.
s. Nonqualified Disclaimer of QTIP Income Interest. PLR 200022031 involves interesting facts.
Spouse died leaving assets in a QTIP trust with remainder in part to a private foundation and in part to-charitable
remainder trusts, one for each ofthree children. Taxpayer -- the surviving spouse - proposed to execute a nonqualified
disclaimer ofhis interest in the QTIP trust, with any gift tax being paid by the recipients of the disclaimed property as
provided in section 2207A. The ruling states:
In the present case, because Taxpayer's disclaimer is not a qualified disclaimer
under section 2518, Taxpayer's relinquishment of the income interest is a gift by
Taxpayer of the value of that interest under section 2S II. Under section 2502(c),
the payment ofthe tax is the liability ofthe Taxpayer. However, a condition ofthe
Taxpayer's transfer is the agreement that the gift tax will be paid by the trustees of
the Trust. Consequently, under section 2512(b), the value ofthe gift ofTaxpayer's
income interest·is measured by the fair market value ofthe income interest minus
the amount ofgift tax to be paid.
In addition, Taxpayer's relinquishment of his income interest constitutes a
disposition of Taxpayer's income interest under section 2519. The amount of the
gift made by the Taxpayer under section 2519 will be the value of the corpus of
Trust less the value of Taxpayer's qualifying income interest, reduced by the
amount of the gift tax paid by the person receiving the property under section
2207A.
6. Disclaimers Save Marital Deduction. In Estate of Hemy Lassiter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2000-324, the decedent's Will created the following marital trust:
(b) Said Trustee shall hold and manage said property and shall use such part
of the income and/or principal thereofas it may deem necessary to provide for the
support in reasonable comfort of my wife, and to provide for the support and
education ofmy children and the descendants ofany deceased child ofmine. After
any child has finished his education, or in normal course should have completed
his education, the Trustee shall not be required to make any payment for the
support ofsuch child or his descendants unless in the judgment ofthe Trustee there
is ample property to support my wife and educate my children or such child is
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unable to support himself. To the extent practicable, however, I desire my Trustee
in making encroachment for the benefit of my wife to encroach first on the trust
created for my wife in Item IV hereof before encroaching on this trust; but this
request shall not apply to the extent it would be necessary to sell property which
in the opinion ofthe Trustee should not be sold in order to encroach first on such
trust.
(c) My said wife shall have the power at any time and from time to time by
instrument in writing signed by her and delivered to the Trustee, to direct the
Trustee to tum over any part of the property in this trust to or among such ofmy
descendants, or spouses of such descendants, and in such manner, in trust or
otherwise, as my said wife may in such instrument direct or appoint, provided that
she shall have no power to appoint said property to herself, to her estate, to her
creditors or to the creditors of her estate.
(d) On the death of my said wife, the property then remaining in this trust
shall be distributed to or among such of my descendants, and in such manner, in
trust or otherwise as my said wife may by her Last Will and Testament direct or
appoint,provided that she shall have no power to appoint said property to herself,
to her creditors, to her estate or to the creditors of her estate.
(e) Should my said wife fail to exercise her power ofappointment as to all of
the property in this trust, or should she predecease me, then on my death or on the
death ofmy said wife, whichever last occurs, the property ofthis trust as to which
she fails to exercise such power of appointment shall be divided into as many
separate and equal shares as I have children then living and deceased children with
descendants then living.
All descendants disclaimed including unboms leaving the wife as the only beneficiary. She disclaimed her
power ofappointment and her power as tnlstee to distribute to the descendants. With respect to the guardian ad litem's
authority to disclaim, and to the wife's authority as trustee, the opinion states:
In addition, we decline respondent's invitation to question the validity of these
disclaimers on the grounds that those executed by the guardian ad litem failed to
protect the best interests of the beneficiaries. Toe renunciations endeavor to
preserve in excess of$14 million in a trust naming Mr. Lassiter's descendants as
the ultimate remainder beneficiaries. Given this potential for future benefit, we are
unwilling to find a violation offiduciary duties. For similar reasons, we are equally
unwilling to construe Mrs. Lassiter's actions in attempting to obtain the increased
deduction as a violation ofher fiduciary duties as administrator and trustee. On the
record before us, we lack any basis upon which to evaluate or second-guess the
Probate Court's acceptance of the actions by the fiduciaries.
Hence, we are satisfied that Mr. Lassiter's descendants effectively disclaimed their
right to receive trust income during Mrs. Lassiter's life, and thereby cut off the
trustee's discretionary power to make such distributions for their support and
education.
The court next looked to a Georgia statute to determine that the wife would receive all the income annually:




(a) The duties contained in this chapter are applicableexcept as
otherwise provided in the trust instrument, and are inaddition to and not
in limitation ofthe common law duties ofthe trustee, except to the extent
inconsistent therewith.
••••••
(c) The trustee shall distribute all net income derivedfrom the trust
at least annually.
Our inquiry thus becomes whether the 1970 will "otherwise providers]" within the
meaning of the statute. Unfortunately, research has revealed no opinions from
courts located within the State of Georgia which address subsection (c) of Ga.
Code Ann. section 53-12-190 and its relationship to subsection (a). However, this
statute is the successor to Ga. Code Ann. sections 108-445 and 108-446 (Code
1933), which were construed by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
ofGeorgia in Friedman v. United States, supra. These predecessor laws read:
Where the trust instrument is silent as to the time of distribution of
income and the frequency thereof, all trustees ofall trusts subject to the
laws of this State, whether heretofore or hereafter established, shall
distribute all net income derived from the property comprising such trust
at least annually, on a calendar or fiscal year basis. [Ga. Code Ann. sec.
108-445.]
In the case of any trust now in existence or hereafter created where the trust
instrument expressly directs or permits net income to be distributed less frequently
than annually, the express provisions of such instrument shall govern the time
andmanner ofmaking distributions of income. [Ga. Code Ann. sec. 108-446.]
••••••
Friedman v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 4~4 (1973), reflects that the statutes from
which Ga. Code Ann. section 53-12-190 sprang were enacted for the purpose of
establishing a default rule by which spousal trusts were able to qualify for the
marital deduction absent an unmistakable expression of intent to the contrary. At
the same time, no evidence suggests that the Georgia legislature has since sought
to weaken this rule and thereby make it easier for a trust to fall short ofdeductible
status. The above-quoted sections addressed in Friedman v. United States, supra,
were subsequently recodified verbatim in all material respects as subsections (b)
and (c) ofOa. Code Ann. section 53-13-53 (Code 1981). The provisions existed
in such form until the comprehensive revision and complete recodification of
Georgia trust law which took effect on July 1, 1991, and which enacted Ga. Code
Ann. section 53-12-190. An article explaining the new act by the individual who
served as Reporter to the Trost Law Revision Committee which drafted the
measure indicates that no substantive change was intended. See Emanuel, "The
Georgia Trust Act", 28 Ga. St. B.J. 95, 97 (1991). Citing former Ga. Code Ann.
section 53-13-53, the article states: "The Act • * • carries forward the Georgia
statute directing the trustee to distribute net income at least annually in O.e.G.A.
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section 53- I2-190(c)." Id. at 97 & 0.40. In contrast, the article highlights and
expounds upon alterations in prior law. See ide
Here then is the situation with which we are faced in deciding whether Georgia
courts would require annual distribution on the facts before us. In tenns ofthe legal
context, we are presented with a State statute that, in connection with its
interpretive history, clearly demonstrates a bias on the part ofGeorgia lawmakers
toward enabling trusts to qualify for the marital deduction. Moreover, from c a
practical standpoint, we address a situation where any accumulation ofincome by
the trustee under an ascertainable standard theory would be pointless.
The descendants have disclaimed their right to all income earned by the trust during
Mrs. Lassiter's lifetime. Under the State disclaimer law, they are deemed to have
predeceased Mrs. Lassiter as to these sums. The amounts thus can neither be
distributed to them while Mrs. Lassiter is living nor be added to the remainder
interest they will take after her death. The surviving spouse, or her estate, is the
only possible beneficiary ofthis income. The disclaimers have therefore rendered
meaningless any discretion on the part of the trustee to accumulate income.
On balance, we believe that where a standard for distribution has so been vitiated
of any potential for protecting the interests of any other beneficiary, a Georgia
court would deem the subject trust instrument to have been rendered silent as to
timing and frequency of payment, such that the default rule of Ga. Code Ann.
section 53-12-190(c) would require not less than annual payment ofall income to
the surviving spouse. We so conclude here.
7. Joint Revocable Trust. In a very interesting ruling, PLR 20010102, the Service has detennined that
a joint revocable trust works to achieve a double basis step-up. The facts were:
The facts and representations submitted are summarized as follows: Grantor A and
Grantor B, who are husband and wife, propose to create a joint trust ("Trustff).
Grantor A will be the initial trustee of Trust. The Grantors will fund Trost with
assets that they own as tenants bythe entireties having a value ofapproximately $x.
Under the terms of Trust, during the joint lives of the Grantors, the trustee may
apply income and principal ofTrust as the trustee deems advisable for the comfort,
support, maintenance, health and general welfare ofthe Grantors. The trustee may
also pay additional sums to either or both of the Grantors or to a third person for
the benefit ofeither or both Grantors as Grantor A directs, or ifbe is not capable
of this decision, then as Grantor B directs. While both Grantors are living, either
one may terminate Trust by written notice to the other Grantor. If Trust is
tenninated, the trustee will deliver the trust property to the Grantors in both their
names as tenants in common. Either Grantor may also amend the trust while both
grantors are living by delivering to the other Grantor the amendment in writing at
least 90 days before the effective date of the amendment.
Upon the death of the first Grantor to die, he or she possesses a testamentary
general power ofappointment, exercisable alone and in all events, to appoint part
or all ofthe assets ofTrust, free oftrust, to such deceased Grantor's estate or to or
for the benefit ofone or more persons or entities, in such proportions, outright, in
trust, or otherwise as the deceased Grantor may direct in his or her wilL
A·98
If the first Grantor to die fails to fully exercise his or her testamentary general
power of appointment, and providing the surviving Grantor survives the first
Grantor to die by at least six months, an amount of Trust property sufficient to
equal the largest amount that can pass free of federal estate tax by reason of the
unified credit, is to be transferred to an irrevocable Credit Shelter Trust. Any
amount in excess of the amount needed to fully fund the Credit Shelter Trust that
has not been appointed by the deceased Grantor will pass outright to the surviving
Grantor.
The rulings were:
RULING # 1. Grantor A and Grantor B propose to transfer property held as tenants
by the entireties to Trust. The Grantors will each retain the power to tenninate
Trust by written notice to the other Grantor. IfTrust is terminated, the trustee will
deliver the trust property to the Grantors in both their names as tenants in common.
We conclude that the initial contribution of assets to Trust as proposed will not
constitute acompleted gift by either Grantor under section 25.2511-2(c), since each
will retain the right, exercisable unilaterally, to revoke their respective transfer, and
revest title in themselves.
RULING #2. Ifeither Grantor exercises the right to tenninate Trust, each Grantor
will receive an undivided 50% interest in the· remaining balance of the Trust
corpus, as a tenant in common. Therefore, distributions ofTrust property to either
Grantor during their joint lives will constitute a gift by the other Grantor to the
extent of50% ofthe value ofTrust assets distributed. The gift will qualify for the
gift tax marital deduction under section 2523.
RULING #3 AND #4. Upon the death of the first Grantor to die, he or she will
possess a testamentary power exercisable alone and in all events, to appoint part
or all of the assets of the Trust, free of trust, to such deceased Grantor's estate or
to or for the benefit of one or more persons or entities, in such proportions,
outright, in trust, or otherwise as the deceased Grantor may direct in his or her will.
We conclude that, on the death of the first Grantor to die, the portion ofthe Trust
property attributable to the property the deceased Grantor transferred to Trust will
be includible in the deceased Grantor's gross estate under section 2036. The
balance of the property attributable to the property the surviving Grantor
contributed to Trust will be includible in the deceased Grantor's gross estate under
section 2041.
Further, on the death ofthe first deceasing Grantor, the surviving Grantor is treated
as relinquishing his or her dominion and control over the surviving Grantor's one-
half interest in Trust. Accordingly, on the death ofthe fIrSt deceasing Grantor, the
surviving Grantor will make a completed.gift under section 2501 ofthe surviving
Grantor's entire interest in Trust. This gift will qualify for the marital deduction
under section 2523.
In addition, section 1014(e) will apply to any Trust property includible in the
deceased Grantor's gross estate that is attributable to the surviving Grantor's
contribution to Trust and that is acquired by the surviving Grantor, either directly
or indirectly, pursuant to the deceased Grantor's exercise, or failure to exercise, the
general power ofappointment. See, H.R. Rept. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (July
24, 1981).
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RULINGS #5 AND #6. As discussed above, the surviving Grantor is treated as
making a completed gift of his or her interest in Trust on the death of the fIrst
deceasing Grantor. Also, as discussed above, a portion of the Trust property will
be subject to inclusion in the deceased Grantor's gross estate under section 2038,
and a portion will be subject to inclusion under section 2041. Accordingly, to the
extent the Credit Shelter Trust is funded, property passing to the trust is treated as
passing from the deceased Grantor, and not from the surviving Grantor.
The fIrSt ruling is the crucial one - that there was no gift when the trust was funded.
8. Division of Trust for Section 2519 Purposes. PLR 200116006 detennined that where a spouse
renounced the income interest in a part ofa QTIP trust that had been divided, the spouse would not be treated as having
disposed ofan income interest under section 2519 in the other part ofthe trust. Where section 2519 does apply the IRS
ruling position is that the gift tax is calculated on a net gift basis. See, e.g., 200022031.
N. SECTIONS 2501 TO 2524 - GIFTS
1. Gift Tax Disclosure Regulations. REG. 106177-98 set forth proposed regulations relating to the
gift tax statute of limitations which became final regulations in T.D. 8845 (December 2, 1999). The regulations add
a new paragraph (t) to section 301 .6501(c)-I. Ifa gift is not adequately disclosed on a timely filed gift tax return, then
gift tax may be assessed at any time. With respect to the finality issue, the explanation to the regulations states:
Under the proposed regulations, ifa transfer is adequately disclosed on the gift tax
return, and the period for assessment of gift tax has expired, then the IRS is
foreclosed from adjusting the value ofthe gift under section 2504(c) (for purposes
ofdetennining the current gift tax liability) and under section 200 I(f) (for purposes
of detennining the estate tax liability). However, the IRS is not precluded from
makL~g adjustments involving legal issues, even if the gift was adequately
disclosed. This position was based on longstanding regulations applying section
2504(c) and relevant case law.
Comments suggested that this rule is contrary to Congressional int~nt in enacting
section 2001(f) and amending section 2504(c) to provide a greater degree of
fmality with respect to the gift and estate ta,"{ statutory scheme. In response to these
comments, the final regulations preclude adjustments with respect to all issues
related to a gift once the gift tax statute of limitations expires with respect to that
gift.
Adequate disclosure is described by (f)(2) as follows:
Adequate disclosure of transfers of property reported as gifts. A transfer will be
adequately disclosed on the return only if it is reported in a manner adequate to
apprise the Internal Revenue Service ofthe nature ofthe gift and the basis for the
value so reported. Transfers reported on the gift tax return as transfers ofproperty
by gift will be considered adequately disclosed under this paragraph (f)(2) if the
return (or a statement attached to the return) provides the following information--
(i) A description ofthe transferred property and any consideration received by the
transferor;
(ii) The identity of, and relationship between, the transferor and each transferee;
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(iii) If the property is transferred in trust, the trust's tax identification number and
a brief description of the tenns of the trust, or in lieu of a brief description of the
trust tenns, a copy ofthe trust instrument;
(iv) Except as provided in section 301.650 I-I (f)(3), a detailed description of the
method used to detennine the fair market value ofproperty transferred, including
any financial data (for example, balance sheets, etc. with explanations of any
adjustments) that were utilized in detennining the value of the interest, any
restrictions on the transferred property that were considered in detennining the fair
market value ofthe property, and a description ofany discounts, such as discounts
for blockage, minority or fractional interests, and lack ofmarketability, claimed in
valuing the property. In the case ofa transfer ofan interest that is actively traded
on an established exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange, the American
Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ National Market, or a regional exchange in which
quotations are published on a daily basis, including recognized foreign exchanges,
recitation of the exchange where the interest is listed, the CUSIP number of the
security, and the mean between the highest and lowest quoted selling prices on the
applicable valuation date will satisfy all of the requirements of this paragraph
(f)(2)(iv). In the case of the transfer of an interest in an entity (for example, a
corporation or partnership) that is not actively traded, a description must be
provided ofany discount claimed in valuing the interests in the entity or any assets
owned by such entity. In addition, ifthe value ofthe entity or ofthe interests in the
entity is properly determined based on the net value ofthe assets held by the entity,
a statement must be provided regarding the fair mfirket value of 100 percent ofthe
entity (determined without regard to any discounts in valuing the entity or any
assets owned by the entity), the pro rata portion ofthe entity subject to the transfer,
and the fair market value ofthe transferred interest as reported on the return. If 100
percent ofthe value ofthe entity is not disclosed, the taxpayer bears the burden of
demonstrating that the fair market value of the entity is properly determined by a
method other than a method based on the net value ofthe assets held by the entitY.
If the entity that is the subject of the transfer owns an interest in another non-
actively traded entity (either directly or through ownership of an entity), the
information required in this paragraph (t)(2)(iv) must be provided for each entity
if the information is relevant and material in detennining the value ofthe interest;
and
(v) A statement describing any position taken that is contrary to any proposed,
temporary or final Treasury regulations or revenue rulings published at the time of
the transfer (see section 601.601(d)(2) of this chapter).
Appraisals will satisfy these roles in certain circumstances:
Submission of appraisals in lieu of the infonnation required under paragraph
(f)(2)(iv) of this section. The requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(iv) oftbis section
will be satisfied if the donor submits an appraisal of the transferred property that
meets the following requirements --
(i) The appraisal is prepared by an appraiser who satisfies all of the following
requirements:
(A) The appraiser is an individual who holds himselfor herselfout to the public as
an appraiser or perfonns appraisals on a regular basis.
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(B) Because of the appraiser's qualifications, as described in the appraisal that
details the appraiserts background, experience, education, and membership, ifany,
in professional appraisal associations, the appraiser is qualified to make appraisals
of the type of property being valued.
(C) The appraiser is not the donor or the donee ofthe property or a member of the
family of the donor or donee, as defined insection 2032A(e)(2), or any person
employed by the donor, the donee, or a member ofthe family ofeither; and
(ii) The appraisal contains all of the following:
(A) The date of the transfer, the date on which the transferred property was
appraised, and the purpose of the appraisal.
(B) A description ofthe property.
(C) A description of the appraisal process employed.
(D) A description of the assumptions, hypothetical conditions, and any limiting
conditions and restrictions on the transferred property that affect the analyses,
opinions, and conclusions.
(E) The infonnation considered in detennining the appraised value, including in the
case of an ownership interest in a business, all financial data that was used in
determining the value of the interest that is sufficiently detailed so that another
person can replicate the process and arrive at the appraised value.
(F) The appraisal procedures followed, and the reasoning that supports the
analyses, opinions, and c,?nclusions.
(G) The valuation method utilized, the rationale for the valuation method, and the
procedure used in detennining the fair market value ofthe asset transferred.
(H) The specific basis for the valuation, such. as specific comparable sales or
transactions, sales ofsimilar interests, asset- based approaches, merger-acquisition
transactions, etc.
Transactions that are non-gifts were handled in the following way, after much criticism of the proposed
regulations:
Under the proposed regulations, a completed transfer that did not constitute a gift
would be considered adequately disclosed ifthe taxpayer submitted the infonnation
required for adequate disclosure and an explanation describing why the transfer
was not subject to the gift tax. One commentator suggested that the adequate
disclosure requirement should be waived ifthe taxpayer reasonably, in good faith,
believes the transfer is not a gift (for example, a salary payment made to a child
employed in a family business). Another commentator noted that the standard for
adequate disclosure is higher for a ttnon-gift.. than it is for a gift transaction since,
in the non-gift situation, the donor must provide all the infonnation required by the
regulation and a statement why the transaction is not a gift. Another comment
requested more guidance for reporting non- gift business transactions. In response
to the comments, the final regulations limit the information required in a non-gift
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situation. In addition, the final regulations provide that completed transfers to
members of the transferor's family (as defined in section 2032A(e)(2» in the
ordinary course of operating a business are deemed to be adequately disclosed,
even if not reported on a gift tax return, if the item is properly reported· by all
parties for income tax purposes. For example, in the case ofa salary payment made
to a child of the donor employed in the donor's business, the transaction will be
treated as adequately disclosed for gift tax purposes if the salary payment is
properly reported by the business and the child on their income tax returns. This
exception only applies to transactions conducted in the ordinarycourseofoperating
a business. It does not apply, for example, in the case of a sale of property
(including a business) by a parent to a child.
Another major issue that arose in response to the proposed regulations was the effective date ofthe regulations.
The explanation states:
One comment requested clarification of the effective date of section 6501(c)(9),
as amended. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 provides that the amendments to
section 650 I (c)(9) (commencing the running ofthe period oflimitations only ifthe
gift is adequately disclosed) apply to gifts made in calendar years ending after
August 5, 1997 (that is, all gifts made in calendar year 1997 and thereafter).
However, the underlying legislative history indicates that the amendment to section
6501(c)(9) applies "to gifts made in calendar years after the date of enactment
[August 5, 1997]". H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 220, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 408 (1997).
Notwithstanding this statement in the legislative history, the statutory language is
clear that the section as amended applies to all gifts made during the 1997 calendar
year, and thereafter. In the fmal regulations, the statutory effective date language
is restated in a manner that makes it clear that section 6501(cX9) as amended
applies to all gifts made after December 31, 1996.
Another comment suggested clarification of the application of the adequate
disclosure rules and the interaction between sections 2504(c) and 650 I(c)(9) with
respect to gifts made between January 1, 1997, and August 6, 1997, since section
2504(c) as amended applies only to gifts made after August 5, 1997~ but section
6501(c)(9) as amended applies to all gifts made in 1997. In response to this
comment, ~9) exemple has been added under section 25.2504-2(c) involving a
situation where a gift is made prior to August 6, 1997, that is not adequately
disclosed on the return filed for 1997. The example clarifies that the period for
assessment with respect to the pre-August§, 1997 gift does not commence to run
because the gift is not adequately disclosed. Accordingly, a gift tax may be
assessed with respect to the gift at any time~ and notwithstanding the effective date
for section 2504(c), that 1997 gift can be adjusted as a part ofprior taxable gifts in
determining subsequent gift tax liability. Further, the 1997 gift can be adjusted as
part of taxable gifts under section 2001 in determining estate tax liability.
Finally, in response to another comment, an example has been added illustrating
the application of the effective date rules in a similar fact pattern, where the gifts
are made in a calendar year prior to 1997. The example illustrates that the IRS may
not revalue the gifts, for purposes of determining prior taxable gifts for gift tax
purposes, ifa gift tax was paid and assessed with respect to the calendar year, and
the period for assessment has expired. Since the gifts were made prior to 1997, the
rules ofsection 2504(c) and section 6501 prior to amendment apply. However, the
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IRS may adjust the gifts for purposes of determining adjusted taxable gifts for
estate tax purposes.
2. No Annual Exclusion for Gifts to Corporation. The U. S. District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana concluded in Estate of Stinson v. United States, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-6944 (N.D. Ind. 1998), that a donor's
forgiveness ofcorporate debt did not qualify as an annual exclusion gift to the corporation's shareholders because the
gifts were not present interests. The court stated that "it is the shareholder's inability to use, possess, or enjoy any of
the corporation's assets, including the gift, without joint actions by the directors that renders their interest in the gift to
the corporation's 'future interests.'" The Seventh Circuit affinned, at 85 AFTR2d -U 2000-690. Revenue Ruling 71-443,
1971-2 C.B. 337, sets forth the same position relying on Chanin v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 840,393 F.2d 972 (1968)(a
gift from one closely held corporation made to another closely held corporation would be a future interest gift to the
shareholders of the recipient corporation).
3. Prepaid Tuition Payments. In TAM 199941013 the National Office dealt with whether prepaid
tuition payments by a decedent on behalfoftwo grandchildren to an educational institution would be qualified transfers
under section 2503(e). The transfers were made beginning in 1994 and continuing through 1996 and were i.ntended to
fund tuition through the year 2004. The ruling notes that the payments were not subject to refund and would be forfeited
ifthe decedent's grandchildren ceased to attend the school and thus·the payments could only be described as being made
directly to an educational organization to be used exclusively for the payment as specified tuition costs for designated
individuals. By contrast, Example 2 of Treas. Reg. §25.2503-6(c) determined that the unlimited exclusion under
§2503(e) would not apply where a donor transferred assets to a trust which required the trustee to use the trust funds
to pay tuition expenses for the donor's grandchildren. The transfers must be to the educational institution itself.
4. Stock Options. PLR 199927002 provides as follows:
In the present case, Taxpayer proposes to transfer options that he received as an
employee ofCompany, to one or more ofhis children, or to a trust for the benefit
ofone or more ofhis children. The exercise ofthe options will not be conditioned
on continued future employment of 'faxpayer at the time of transfer. The
transferees may exercise the options and purchase the stock at their discretion after
the price appreciation thresholds have been met.
After the transfers to the individuals or the trust, Taxpayer will retain no interest
or reversion in the options or the stock upon exercise and has no right to alter,
amend, or revoke the transfer ofthe options or stock. In addition, Taxpayer holds
no general power of appointment over the options or the stock.
Based on the infonnation submitted, we rule as follows:
I. The transfer of the stock options to the transferee will not cause the
recognition of taxable income or gain to Taxpayer
2. If the transferee subsequently exercises the stock options, Taxpayer
(or, if Taxpayer is not then living, Taxpayer's estate) will be deemed to
receive taxable compensation under section 83 ofthe Code, and Company
will receive a corresponding deduction under section 162 of the Code.
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3. If the transferee exercises the stock options, the transferee's basis in
the stock so acquired will be its fair market value on the date ofexercise
which consists of the consideration paid by the transferee and income
taxed to Taxpayer (or Taxpayer's estate) under section 83 of the Code.
4. Taxpayer's transfers ofhis Plan A options and Plan B options to one
or more of his children or to a trust for the benefit of one or more ofhis
children will constitute completed gifts on the date of transfer for
purposes ofsection 2511 ofthe Code, provided that under the tenns ofthe
trust, Taxpayer will not retain any power that would render the gift
incomplete.
5. he proposed transfers of the stock options granted under Plan A and
Plan B from Taxpayer to one or more ofhis children, or to a trust for the
benefit ofone or more ofhis children will not be subject to sections 2701
and 2703 of the Code.
6. After the transfer of the options by Taxpayer to one or more of his
children, or to a trust for the benefit ofone or more ofhis children, neither
the options nor the shares obtained upon the exercise of the options will
be includable in Taxpayer's gross estate.
PLR 199952012 deaJtwith the transfer ofvested stock options. Rev. Rut. 98-21, 1998-18 IRB 7, provides that
a complete gift cannot be made ofoptions that are conditioned on the performance offuture services. The ruling states:
Because the option cannot be exercised if A fails to perfonn the services, Rev.
Rul. 98-21 provides that, before Aperfonns the services, the rights that A
possesses in the stock option have not acquired the character of enforceable
property rights susceptible of transfer for federal gift tax purposes. A can make a
gift of the stock option to B, one ofA's children, for federal gift tax purposes only
after A has completed the additional required services because only upon
completion ofthe services does the right to exercise the option become binding and
enforceable. In the event the option were to become exercisable in stages, each
portion of the option that becomes exercisable at a different time is treated as a
separate option fer the purpcseofapplying this analysis. Rev. Rut. 98-21 concludes
that the transfer of a nonstatutory stock option by A, the optionee, to B, a family
member, for no consideration is a completed gift under section 2511 on the later
of (i) the date of the transfer or (ii) the time when the donee's right to exercise the
option is no longer conditioned on the perfonnance of services by the transferor.
The ruling distinguished these, vested, options:
In the present case, Taxpayer, an employee ofCompany, holds options to purchase
Company common stock under both Plan A and Plan B. Taxpayer is under age fifty
and has been employed by Company for less than thirteen years. At the time ofthis
ruling, the options received under Plan A met all of the price appreciation
thresholds required by Plan A; however, only a portion of the options received
under Plan A satisfied the holding period requirements for vesting. Further, at the
time of this ruling, the options received under Plan B had not met all of the price
appreciation thresholds required by Plan B, and only a portion of the option
received under Plan B satisfied the holding period requirements for vesting..
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Although all of the stock price appreciation requirements for the option issued to
Taxpayer under Plan A have been met, the option owned by Taxpayer under Plan
A is not completely vested. Further, the option owned by Taxpayer under Plan B
has not met all of the stock appreciation thresholds, nor is the option owned by
Taxpayer under Plan B completely vested. Taxpayer proposes to transfer only the
portions of the options granted under Plan A and Plan B that are both vested and
exercisable. After the proposed transfers, Taxpayer will have no power or right to
determine when the transferred portion of the option is exercised. Because
Taxpayer proposes to transfer only portions ofthe Plan A and Plan B options that
are vested and exercisable, we conclude that his proposed transfers ofthe portions
ofhis Plan A and Plan B options that are vested and exercisable to one or more of
his children or to a trust for the benefit of one or more of his children will
constitute completed gifts on the date of transfer for purposes of section 2511,
provided that under the terms ofthe trust, Taxpayer will not retain any power that
would render the gifts incomplete.
The relevance ofthe "price appreciation requirements" being met or unrnet is unclear. The issue was not part
of Rev. Rul. 98-21.
Section 83 governs the income taxation of the options:
Section 83(a) of the Code provides that if, in connection with the performance of
services; property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom the
services are perfonned, the excess of (1) the fair market value of the property
(determined without regard to any restriction other than a restriction which by its
terms will never lapse) at the frrst time the rights ofthe person having a beneficial
interest in the property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier, over (2) the amount, if any, paid for the
property, will be included in the gross income of the person who performed the
services in the first taxable year in which the rights of the person having the
beneficial interest in the property are transferable or are not subject to a substantiai
risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable.
Under section 83(e)(3) ofthe Code, section 83 does not apply to the transfer ofan
option without a readily ascertainable fair market value.
Pursuant to section 83(h) of the Code, t'lere is allowed a deduction under seciion
162 ofthe Code, to the person for whom were performedthe services in connection
with which the property was transferred, an amount equal to the amount included
under section 83 in the gross income ofthe person who performed the services. The
deduction will be allowed for the taxable year of such person in which or with
which ends the taxable year in which such amount is included in the gross income
ofthe person who perfonned the services. Section 1.83-6(a)(3) ofthe Income Tax
Regulations provides an exception to the rule of section 83(h) concerning what
taxable year the service recipient is allowed the deduction. There, it is provided
that, ifproperty is substantially vested upon transfer, the deduction will be allowed
in accordance with the service recipient's method of accounting.
Section 1.83-7(a) of the regulations provides, in part, that if there is granted to an
employee or independent contractor (or beneficiary thereot) in connection with the
performance of services, an option to which section 421 (relating generally to
certain qualified and other options) does not apply, section 83(a) shall apply to the
grant if the option has a readily ascertainable fair market value at the time the
option is granted. Ifsection 83(a) does not apply to the grant ofthe option because
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it does not have a readily ascertainable fai~ market value at the time of the grant,
section 83 will apply at the time the option is exercised or otherwise disposed of,
even though the fair market value of the option may have become readily
ascertainable before such time. If the option is exercised, section 83(a) applies to
the transfer ofproperty pursuant to the exercise, and the employee or independent
contractor realizes compensation upon the transfer at the time and in the amount
detennined under section 83(a). Ifthe option is sold or otherwise disposed of in an
ann's length transaction, section 83(a) applies to the transfer of money or other
property received in the same manner as section 83 would apply to the transfer of
property pursuant to the exercise of an option. See section 1.83-7(b) of the
regulations for the tests to be applied in determining whether an option has a
readily ascertainable fair market value.
Section 1.83-4(b) of the regulations provides in part that, if property to which
section 83 applies is acquired by any person (including a person who acquires such
property in a subsequent transfer which is not at arm's length), while such property
is still substantially nonvested, such person's basis in the property should reflect
any amount paid for the property and any amount includible in the gross income of
the person who performed the services.
Here, Section 83 will not apply until the options are exercised. The ruling holds:
I. The transfer ofthe stock options to the transferee will not cause the recognition
of taxable income or gain to Taxpayer.
2. If the transferee subsequently exercises the stock options, Taxpayer (or, if
Taxpayer is not then living, Taxpayer's estate) will be deemed to receive taxable
compensation under section 83 of the Code, and Company will receive a
corresponding deduction under section 162 ofthe Code.
3. Ifthe transferee exercises the stock options, the transferee's basis in the stock so
acquired will be its fair market value on the date ofexercise which consists ofthe
consideration paid by the transferee and income taxed to Taxpayer (or
Taxpayer'sestate) under section 83 of the Code.
The Service also determined that sections 2701 and 2703 would not apply to the options and the decedent
would have no retained interests.
5. Reciprocal Gifts and Indirect Transfers. Gifts by siblings to their own children and their nieces
and nephews were collapsed by the Tax Court in Larry L. Sather, et al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-309. The
court found that the inclusion ofa childless sibling in the scheme did not save it from the reciprocal trust doctrine. The
court stated:
Section 2501(a) imposes a tax "on the transfer of property by gift", and section
2511(a) provides that "the tax imposed by section 2501 shall apply * * * whether
the gift is direct or indirect". Section 2503(b) excludes from the defmition of
"taxable gifts" the frrst $10,000 of gifts to any person during the year. The
simultaneous, circuitous transfers of identical property to the various nieces and
nephews constitute gifts by the transferors to their own children. See, e.g., Furst v.
Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1962-221. Petitioners' attempt to manufacture
exclusions under a taxing statute that reaches both direct and indirect gifts is
unavailing.
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We are led to the inescapable conclusion that the form in which the transfers were
cast, i.e., gifts to the nieces and nephews, had· no purpose aside from the tax
benefits petitioners sought by way of inflating their exclusion amounts. The
substance and purpose ofthe series oftransfers was for each married couple to give
to their own children their Sathers stock. After the transfers, each child was left in
the same economic position as he or she would have been in had the parents given
the stock directly to him or her. Each niece and nephew received an identical
amount ofstock from his or her aunts and uncles and was left in the same economic
position in relation to the others. This was not a coincidence but rather was the
result ofa plan among the donors to give gifts to their own children in a fonn that
would avoid taxes. We hold the number ofexclusions under section 2503 is limited
by the number ofchildren in each petitioner's family.
Our conclusion is supported by the doctrine of economic substance as embodied
in the reciprocal trust doctrine. In United States v. Estate ofGrace, 395 U.S. 316
(1969), the decedent created a trust for the benefit ofhis wife and, at the same time,
his wife created a trust ofequal value for his benefit. The trusts had identical tenns
granting the other spouse a life estate with the remainder to their children. The
Supreme Court applied the reciprocal trust doctrine which requires that where two
settlors simultaneously create trusts with the same provisions and with similar
property for the benefit ofeach other, each settlor will be considered the creator of
the trust that is in fonn created by the other. See ide The Supreme Court clarified
that subjective intent ofthe settlors is irrelevant and held the doctrine applies ifthe
two trusts: (I) Are interrelated, and (2) leave the settlors in approximately the same
economic position as they would have been in had they created trusts naming
themselves as beneficiaries. See id.; Estate ofBischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.e.
32 (1977).
This Court and other courts have applied the principles of the reciprocal trust
doctrine to gift tax cases under facts similar to those ofthis case, see, e.g., Schultz
v. United States, 493 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1974); Furst v. Commissioner, supra, and
we apply those principles herein. The gifts to the nieces and nephews are
interrelated. They are identical in type and amount and were executed at the same
time. Indeed, the gifts were all part ofa plan designed and carried out by petitioners
as a group. It is clear that the purpose of the plan was for each married couple to
benefit their own children. It is also clear that the gifts in trust left each beneficiary
(the nieces and nephews), to the extent of mutual value, in the same position as
they would have been in had their parents given the property directly to them. In
relation to one another, the nieces and nephews all were left in the same economic
position. The fact that petitioners routed the gifts to their own children through
their nieces and nephews is immaterial, and we ignore that routing for tax purposes.
We sustain respondent's detenninations of gift tax for 1993 relating to Lany,
Kathy, John, and Sandra. For the same reasons, we also agree with respondent that
Kathy, Sandra, and Diane are each entitled to only three exclusion amounts under
section 2503 on their respective gift tax returns for 1992.
Petitioners argue that the entire series of transactions should be respected for tax
purposes because Rodney gave property on the same dates in 1992 and 1993, and
he received nothing in return. Petitioners argue that application of the step-
transaction doctrine mandates this result. That doctrine requires that interrelatedyet
formally distinct steps in an integrated transaction may not be considered
independently ofthe overall transaction. See Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726,
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738 (1989). When the step-transaction doctrine is applied, separate steps of a
transaction are collapsed into one taxable event if the steps ofthe series are really
prearranged parts ofa single transaction. See id.; Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.e.
1415, 1429 (1987). As we understand it, petitioners' argument is that all transfers
by Larry, Kathy, John, Sandra, Duane, Diane, and Rodney, in each year, were
really separate steps of a single transaction. Therefore, petitioners argue, the
transaction must be viewed and taxed as a "whole", and Rodney's participation
destroys the reciprocal nature ofthe entire transaction because he received nothing
in return for his gifts.
To the extent petitioners suggest that Rodney's unilateral gift giving somehow
validates the entire transaction and destroys the reciprocal nature of the gifts, we
disagree. Rodney is a separate taxpayer whose gifts have not been challenged. That
his gifts may have passed scrutiny does not dictate the result as to the other
taxpayers. Rodney's participation in the gift giving in no way lends economic
reality to the form in which the other donors structured the transfers, and his
participation does not immunize the questioned transfers from application of the
doctrine ofeconomic substance or the reciprocal trust doctrine.
A similar case is Estate of Robert V. Schuler, et aI., v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-392. There two
-
brothers owned two companies and made gifts to their, and each other's, children and other descendants in order,
ostensibly, to transfer one business to each brother's family. The court described the plan:
Decedent had heart disease, had undergone heart bypass surgery, and had suffered
seven heart attacks, most ofthem before the transfers at issue. Decedent had seven
children, his brother has six children, and many of both men's children have
children. In discussions with their insurance agent, Dave Middaugh (Mr.
Middaugh), decedent and his brother made it clear that they wanted their families
to succeed them in the businesses, and that they wanted decedent's family to control
Sigco and George's family to control Minn-Kota. .
After many discussions, decedent, his brother, and Mr. Middaugh devised a three-
step plan to transfer divided ownership of Sigma and Minn-Kota to each other's
family and to use section 2503(b) to save estate taxes.
The fIrSt step to transfer the Sigco stock was for decedent and his wife to make
joint gifts of Sigco stock equal to $20,000 of value to their children and
grandchildren during December 1994 and January 1995. The second step was for
George and his wife to duplicate the first step; that is, to make joint transfers of
Sigco stock equal in value to $20,000 to each of decedent's children and
grandchildren. The third step in their scheme was for certain ofdecedent's children
to transfer the shares that they had received to four of their siblings, including to
Jay and his children.
The first step to transfer the Minn-Kota stock was for George and his wife to make
joint gifts of Minn-Kota stock valued at $20,000 to each of their children and
grandchildren in December 1994 and January 1995. The second step was for
decedent and his wife to duplicate the first step; that is, to transfer in each year
$20,000 of Minn-Kota stock to George and his wife and their children. The third
step was for certain ofGeorge's children and their spouses to transfer the stock in
amounts equal in value to $10,000 to Jody and his wife, Holly, and to their
children, George M. Schuler IV (George IV) and William.
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The court concluded:
The facts of the instant case prove conclusively that the transfers at issue were
reciprocal; that is, decedent's transfers to his brother's family were made in
exchange for George's transfers to decedent's family members.
The parties stipulated that the brothers' motivations in making the transfers
included the desire to separate ownership ofSigco and Minn-Kota between the two
families and to minimize estate taxes. Clearly, as both decedent and his brother
owned stock ofboth corporations, separationofownership by exchanging the stock
through transfers to each other's family members at least implies reciprocity. The
estate asserts, however, that the business purpose for exchanging the stock excepts
these transactions from the reciprocal transaction doctrine. We disagree.
The estate contends that the business purpose was to divide the companies and
place Jay in control ofSigco and Jody in control ofMinn-Kota. Separation of the
families' ownership ofSigco and Minn-Kota, insofar as it was accomplished, was
not the main purpose oCthe transfers. Before the transfers, decedent's family owned
75 percent of Sigco; after the transfers, it owned almost 80 percent. Thus, the
transfers resulted in little ofthe Sigco ownership shifting from George's family to
decedent's family. Moreover, the estate's contention is proved false by the facts that
decedent transferred shares of Sigco in 1994 and 1995 to George's son Jody, and
other members ofGeorge's family, and George transferred more than 1,600 Minn-
Kota shares to decedent's son, Jay, after decedent's death.
Finally, before the transfers at issue, decedent owned 25 percent of the Sigco
shares outstanding and Jay owned 50 percent; collectively, a 75-percent majority.
Therefore, the transfers at issue were not necessary for Jay to acquire control of
Sigco. Both before and after the transfers, Jodyowned 100 percent of the Minn-
Kota voting stock and, therefore, controlled Minn-Kota; acquiring control ofMinn~
Kota for Jody was not the purpose of the transfers.
A business purpose, if any, was not the primary motivation for making the
reciprocal transfers at issue. It is an inescapable conclusion that decedent and his
brother mad~ the circuitous transfers for the primary purpose of increasing the
number of exclusions under section 2503(b) that otherwise would have been
available to them.
In Estate ofMarie A. Bies, et af. v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 2000-338~ the decedent made gifts offuneral
home stock (MBI) to her sons and daughters-in-law. The latter immediately tra.~sferred their shares to th~irhusbands.
This was arranged by Mr. Grayson, the decedent's attorney. The opinion states:
Beginning in 1985, and each year until her death, decedent transferred shares of
MBI stock to Albert, Gayle, Gregory, and Loretta. Beginning in 1991, and each
year until her death, decedent transferred shares of MBI stock to James and his
wife Cheryl. Each transfer was to an individual, and each transfer was the number
of shares or fraction ofa share calculated by Mr. Grayson to be equal in value to
$10,000.
The procedure was the same for each of the 27 transfers at issue: Mr. Grayson
would prepare the certificates to transfer MBI shares to Albert, Gayle, Gregory,
and Loretta, and at the same time, he would prepare the certificates for the shares
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transferred from Gayle to Albert, and from Loretta to Gregory. After Mr. Grayson
had prepared all transfer documents, he would deliver them to the funeral home for
endorsement. Albert, as president of MBI, endorsed all the certificates before
delivery to the donees, including the shares that would be issued to Albert and
Gregory once Gayle and Loretta endorsed the certificates for transfer. Gayle and
Loretta transferred the shares received from decedent to their husbands upon
receipt. Mr. Grayson would retrieve the documents after they were signed, and the
transfers were then recorded in the corporate stock ledger. After their marriage, the
transfers ofshares from decedent to James and Cheryl, and from Cheryl to James,
were made according to this same procedure.
The court held:
As a general rule, we will respect the form ofa transaction. We will not apply the
substance over form principles unless the circumstances so warrant. See Gregory
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Estate ofJalkut v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 675,
686 (1991 ). Courts have applied the substance over form principles in gift tax cases
to determine the real donee and value ofthe property transferred. See, e.g., Heyen
v. United States, 945 F.2d 359, 363 (lOth Cir. 1991); Estate of Cidulka v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-149. In these cases, the indirect transfers ofthe
property to the intended donees were the result of a prearranged plan. See, e.g.,
Heyen v. United States, supra at 361 (donor transferred stock to"29 straws who
either did not know they were receiving stock or believed that they were
participating in stock transfers or had agreed before receiving the stock to its
retransfer, 27 ofwhom then retransferredthe stock to the donor's intended donees);
Estate of Cidulka v. Commissioner, supra (father's 14 transfers of stock to
daughter-in- law, who, on the same day, transferred the stock to her husband,
provided 'finference'· of an "understanding" between father and daughter-in-law
that her shares would be merely a pass-through of shares to her husband).
Section 2511 (a) requires consideration ofwhether decedentmade indirect transfers~
Accordingly, we must decide whether Gayle, Loretta, and Cheryl were merely
intennediate recipients ofdecedent's indirect transfers ofstock to Albert, Gregory,
and James, respectively~or were the intended beneficiaries ofdecedent·s bounty.
See Heyen v. United States, supra at 362; Estate of Cidulka v. Commissioner,
supra.
We consider the objective facts ofthe transfers and the circumstances under which
they were made evidence ofdecedent·s actual intent in making the stock transfers.
See United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.8. 316, 323 (1969); Heyen v. United
States, supra at 362-363; sec. 25.2511-1(g)(1), Gift Tax Regs. The evidence shows
that the simultaneous transfers were all part of a prearranged single transaction.
It is clear that decedent arranged to give annually to each recipient the number of
MBI shares that would avoid imposition of the gift tax. This fact, by itself, is not
evidence ofan ulterior purpose in making the stock transfers to Gayle, Loretta, and
Cheryl. See Gregory v. Helvering, supra at 469 (tiThe legal right of a taxpayer to
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid
them, by means which the law pennits, cannot be doubted."). However, it is also
clear from the record that Gayle, Loretta, 'and Cheryl had preexisting agreements
to transfer the shares to their husbands. Mr. Grayson testified that he knew before
decedent made the gifts that the wives had agreed to transfer the shares to their
husbands. Moreover, decedent was treasurer ofMBI and a member of its board of
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directors; therefore, it cannot be denied that she knew Gayle, Loretta, and Cheryl
made immediate transfers ofthe shares to Albert, Gregory, and James, respectively.
Decedent executed her will in 1989. lhe will provided for the bequest ofthe MBI
stock that decedent held at death to her sons, or to the survivor of them. Thus, in
the event either ofher sons had predeceased decedent, decedent did not intend for
the surviving spouse of the deceased son to take any shares. This provision is
evidence of decedent's intentions regarding ownership or MBI stock by her
daughters-in-law.
Furthermore, decedent made no inter vivos or testamentary transfers ofMBI stock
to either Joanne orBarb~because neither daughter was committed to the funeral
home business. However, decedent made transfers ofstock to Gayle even though
she knew that Gayle did not want to be in the funeral home business. This is strong
evidence that the stock transfers to the daughters-in-law actually were indirect
transfers to her sons.
6. Use of Unified Credit. TAM 199930002 deals with simple, but interesting, facts:
Taxpayer died on Date. During Taxpayer's lifetime, Taxpayer made gifts in Year
2 ofAmount 1 that were reported on a timely filed gift tax return. No gift tax was
due after application ofthe unified credit under section 2505. The transfers in Year
2 utilized almost the entire amount ofthe unified credit available to Taxpayer. The
statute of limitations for assessment of tax on the Year 2 gifts has expired. During
the course ofthe estate tax examination, it was discovered that in Year 1, Taxpayer
entered into a transaction with his children pursuant to which Taxpayer purportedly
sold real estate valued at Amount 2 to his children for adequate consideration in
money or money's worth. No gift tax return was filed reporting the transaction in
Year 1. It is contended that this transaction is properly characterized as a gift
subject to gift tax in Year 1. See, Estate ofMaxwell v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 59'
(2d Cir. 1993); Rev. Rut. 77-299, 1977-2 C.B. 343. Taxpayer has not agreed with
this characterization.
The Service detennined:
In the instant case, under the statutory scheme, Taxpayer is not entitled to a total
unified credit for lifetime transfers in excess of the amount provided by section
2505. Provided it is detennined, either by a court or as a result ofthe administrative
process, that the Year 1 transaction constituted a gift subject to gift tax in Year 1,
Taxpayer was obligated to report the gift and to utilize the unified credit in Year
1. By claiming the unified credit with respect to the Year 2 gifts, Taxpayer
represented that Taxpayer had not made any prior gifts and that Taxpayer still had
his entire unified credit available. The Service relied on this representation in
allowing the use ofthe unified credit for the Year 2 gifts, with respect to which the
statue of limitations has now expired. In allowing the application of the unified
credit in Year 2, the Commissioner was not provided with any facts or information
by Taxpayer that would disclose the Year 1 transaction. The Commissioner may
rely on the correctness of a return or report by Taxpayer that is given to the
Commissioner under penalty ofperjury. Assuming that it is determined, by a court
or otherwise, that Taxpayer made a gift in Year I, the determination would
constitute a contrary representation regarding the Year 2 transaction. Taxpayer is
precluded from contradicting the previous representation and it is not necessary
that there be a finding of intentional misrepresentation by Taxpayer. Accordingly,
Taxpayer would be estopped from now arguing that Taxpayer has available the
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entire unified credit allowable for application against the Year 1 gift tax liability.
Any other result would conflict with the clear statutory intent of section 2505(a),
limiting to $192,800~ the total available unified credit that can be claimed with
respect to lifetime transfers.
7. Gift of Estate Income. The failure to require payment of income may be a gift. In Estate ofOna E.
Hendrickson v. Commissioner., T.C. Memo. 1999-357, the estate ofthe decedent's deceased husband received about
$2 million in investment income from the period 1979 to 1993 ofwhich the decedent, Ona Hendrickson, was entitled
to approximately $913,000. The decedent never took the income. The Estate argued that the income was used to
maintain the farm, but the Tax Court determined that the needs ofthe fann did not exceed approximately $239,000 and
the decedent's spouse's share ofthat expense would have been not more than $120,000. That result was a significant
gift by the decedent's spouse.
8. Excess Trustee Fees as Gifts. In TAM 200014004 the IRS assumed that trustee fees paid in a QTIP
trust to a widow's children were excessive under sections 162 and212. The issue was whether the fees were, therefore,
gifts from the widow to the children. The TAM states:
In Estate ofHendrickson v. Commissioner, TCM 1999-357, the surviving spouse
was bequeathed a substantial portion of the decedent's estate. The estate was
subject to a prolonged period ofadministration during which the court determined
the spouse was entitled to receive approximately $913,000 in estate income.
However, most of this income was diverted to, or expended for the benefit of the
other beneficiaries of the estate (the spouse's children.) The court held that the
spouse's conduct as personal representative of the estate and her acquiescence in
the expenditure ofestate income that she was otherwise entitled to receive for the
benefit of her children, constituted a gift for gift tax purposes.
In the present case, we believe that.the fees, to the extent they were excessive,
constitute gifts by Spouse to C and D. The trustees' fees were paid by agreement
of Spouse, to her two children, the natural objects of her bounty. There is no
evidence ofany arm's length bargaining regarding the setting ofthe fees, and little
evidence ofa goed faith effort to determine the appropriate fee amount, at least on
an ongoing basis. The income tax examiner has determined that there is a
substantial disparity between the fees paid and that which would constitute a
reasonable fee. Thus, there is no indication that the setting ofthe trustees' fees and
the subsequent payment should be viewed as a transaction in the ordinary course
ofbusiness. Spouse is the income beneficiary ofTrust B. As was the case in Estate
of Hendrickson, cited above, Spouse's agreement to, and acquiescence in, the
payment ofexcessive fees effectively diverted to her children trust income she was
otherwise entitled to receive. We believe the facts (including the substantial
disparity between a reasonable fee and the fees actuaJly paid) support the
conclusion that the excessive fees were intended by all the parties involved to
facilitate Spouse's estate plan by transferring assets that would otherwisebe subject
to estate tax in Spouse's gross estate to Spouse's children without the payment of
transfer tax.
9. Redemption for Less Than Fair Market Value Creates a Gift. The Estate orMan' D. Maggos
v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 2000-129, can be read very simply: ifa shareholder allows his or her stock to be redeemed
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for Jess than fair market value then the shareholder has made a gift to the other shareholders. But the facts are much
more interesting.
The decedent owned 56.7% of Pepsi-Cola Alton Bottling, Inc. ("PCAB") which, in 1987, she allowed to be
redeemed for a $3,000,000 note, interest only for 10 years at 8%. As a result the decedent's son, Nikita, owned all of
the company. The opinion described the transaction:
Decedent was represented by independent and experienced counsel in the
transaction. The redemption transaction was designed to be an "estate freeze". The
purpose ofan estate freeze, to minimize estate taxes, was explained to decedent by
her counsel before the redemption. The redemption price of $3 million was
determined in part because Nikita Maggos' attorney believed they could support
such a valuation for gift tax purposes. In part, the price was detennined by the
amount Nikita Maggos thought he could afford. Decedent and Nikita Maggos did
not negotiate the redemption price. Neither Nikita Maggos nor decedent sought a
formal valuation of the company prior to the redemption. However, in January
1987, Nikita Maggos' accountants wrote to Robert T. Shircliff& Associates, Inc.
(Shircliff & Associates), requesting that Shircliff & Associates review the draft
financial results ofPCAB to October 31, 1986, so that they could advise Nikita on
the value ofPCAB. The purpose ofobtaining the valuation was for estate planning.
Shircliff& Associates were in the business ofConsulting with Pepsi bottlers and
acting as business brokers in the purchase and sale of Pepsi bottling franchises.
Shircliff& Associates prepared a preliminary valuation ofPCAB's business based
in part on a complete valuation of the business that Shircliff & Associates had
conducted in 1983 and on the recent draft financial infonnation that had been
provided. Shircliff & Associates fonned the view that the business as a whole
could be sold for between $9,764,144 and $13,169,366.
Things changed, as they often do in families:
In 1994, after receiving advice from her daughter, Catherine Adkins, decedent
ceased her association with Robert Hite, her attorney ofmany years, and retained
new counsel.
Subsequent to retaining ne\\' ccu!lsel on ~1ey 31, ! 994, decedent disinherited her
son, Nikita Maggos. Based on advice from new counsel, on August 23, 1994,
decedent commenced suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii
against Nikita Maggos and PCAB (Civil No. 94-00649ACK) (the District Court
litigation). On August 17, 1995, decedent commenced suit in the Circuit Court of
the First Circuit ofHawaii against Helm, Huber, Ring, Helm & Co., Bezman, and
Katten Muchin & Zavis (Civ. No. 95-2973-08). The circuit court litigation was
removed to the Federal District Court in Hawaii (Civil No. 95-00784 SPK) and was
ultimately consolidated with the District Court litigation. In the District Court
litigation, decedent sought both damages and the rescission of the redemption
transaction based on a number of claims asserted against Nikita Maggos and
PCAB, including common law fraud, breach offiduciary duty (against Nikita in his
capacity as a fiduciary being the president and a director of PCAB and the
decedent's son), and breach ofthe Illinois Business Corporation Act. Decedent also
asserted similar claims, as well as professional malpractice claims, against Helm,
Huber, Ring, Helm & Co. (her fonner accountants)~Bezman, and Katten Muchin
& Zavis (Nikita's, and PCAB's attorneys)
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Petitioner's attorneys requested Coopers & Lybrand to detennine the fair market
value ofa 100-percent and a 56.7-percent interest in peAB. Coopers and Lybrand
prepared an expert report for the District Court litigation in support ofpetitioner's
contention that decedent had been defrauded by Nikita Maggos. Coopers &
Lybrand concluded that on May 1, 1987, a 100-percent interest in peAB was worth
between $14 million and $18 million and a 56.7-percent interest was worth
between $7,144,200 and $9,185,400. That study detenninedthat the appropriate
"marketability discount" that should be applied to the value of a 56.7-percent
interest was 10 percent. Petitioner filed the Coopers & Lybrand report in the
District Court litigation on or about December 10, 1996, in support ofdecedent's
assertion that her interest in PCAB was worth substantially in excess ofwhat she
received in the May I, 1987, redemption. The District Court litigation was settled
out ofcourt in early 1998.
Nikita paid $1,400,000 plus real estate of unstated value to his mother's estate.
The taxpayer's estate argued first ~hat she did not really own the redeemed stock (it had been held in a trust)
but the court summarily rejected that argument because she had filed the civil action. The taxpayer next argued she was
defrauded, also rejected by the court:
In May 1987, decedent and her son, Nikita Maggos, entered into a transaction
designed to minimize estate taxes and achieve decedent's testamentary goals. Both
decedent and Nikita Maggos were represented by independent and qualified
attorneys in the transaction. Nikita·was represented by Mr. Bezman. Decedent's
attorney at the time ofthe redemption transaction was Robert Hite. We found Mr.
Hite to be a credible, truthful, and disinterested witness. Mr. Hite testified that the
purpose of the transaction was an "estate freeze", a legitimate estate planning
technique to move an appreciating asset out of decedent's estate. He further
testi tied that Nikita Maggos' attorney, Victor Brezman, had plannedthe transaction.
Mr. Hite did not question the redemption. price that decedent and her son, Nikita
Maggos, had agreed upon because it satisfied decedent's testamentary plan. Mr.
Hite testified that decedent "had promised to leave him [Nikita Maggos] the shares
when she died." The conclusion that the redemption transaction was part of an
estate plan is corroborated by the fact that as part of the redemption transaction
plan, Nikita Maggos' a.lld peAR's attorneys contacted decedenfs attorney and
recommended that decedent should be convinced to make a gift to decedent's
daughter in 1987 so that the statute oflimitations for assessing gift tax would start
to run. We find that decedent and her son entered into the redemption transaction
to fulfill decedent's estate planning goals and for no other reasons. Decedent was
not concerned with and did not negotiate or authorize her attorney to negotiate for
the fair market value ofher interest in PCAB. The price received was the price that
satisfied decedent's needs while she was alive, was the greatest amount her son
believed he could pay, and was the lowest price Nikita's lawyers thought could be
defended for gift tax purposes. So long as the transaction could be defended for
Federal gift tax purposes, the fair market value of the PCAB shares that were
redeemed was not of material concern to decedent.
We further find that decedent, after having received competent independent legal
advice, gave a fully informed consent to the redemption transaction as an estate
planning technique. On the record before us, given the intended nature of the
redemption transaction, we can find no credible evidence that would support a
finding that decedent was defrauded ofher interest in PCAB or that there was any
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breach of fiducial)' duty by Nikita Maggos which was owed to decedent, thus
entitling decedent to rescind the transaction. We therefore reject petitioner's
"incomplete gift argument", and for the same reasons, we also reject petitioner's
"bad business bargain" or "unilateral mistake" arguments.
10. Gifts by Attorney-in-Fact. The Tax Court has held that under Oregon law gifts may be made by an
attorney-in-fact under a general powerofattorney. Estate ofSuzanneC. Pruitt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-287.
The court first concluded that the power could be broadly construed then looked to the facts and circumstances
in the case. Many states have no conclusive law on this issue. Pruitt, therefore, may serve as a road-map as such. The
opinion states:
The parties agree that the three powers of attorney at issue in this case did not
expressly authorize Ms. Thompson to make gifts. The parties do not agree,
however, whether the power to make gifts can be inferred from the language ofthe
powers of attorney and the circumstances surrounding their execution. Applying
Oregon law, we examine the language of the powers ofattorney and the facts and
circumstances surrounding decedent's execution of the powers of attorney to
determine whether the power to make gifts must be inferred in order to give effect
to decedent's intent. Our goal is to ascertain whether decedent had the intent to
confer gift-giving power upon Ms. Thompson.
The March 12, 1992, No.2 power, which was" prepared by decedent's lawyer,
appointed Ms. Thompson as decedent's "agent and attorney in fact" with power and
authority to "Convey, sell, mortgage, pledge, consign, lease and in any other
manner deal in and with my property, both real and personal." (Emphasis added.)
The March 12, 1992, No.2 power, also authorized Ms. Thompson "to execute and
acknowledge any and all instruments necessary or proper to carty out the foregoing
powe~, hereby releasing aJl third persons from responsibility for the acts and
omissions ofmy attorney." .
The December 22, 1987, power and the March 12, 1992, No.1 power were
prepared on preprinted standard power of attorney forms published by the same
company and used identical language in most respects. They appointed Ms.
Thompson as decedent's "true and lawful attorney" to exercise certain powers "for
me and in my name, place and stead and for my use and benefit". Among those
powers was the power to "lease, let, grant, bargain, sell, contract to sell, convey,
exchange, remise, release and dispose or' any of decedent's "real or personal
property • • • for any price or sum and upon such terms and conditions as to my
said attorney may seem proper". The powers ofattorney also contained a general
grant, giving Ms. Thompson "full power and authority freely to do and perfonn
every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the
premises, as fully to all intents and purposes, as I might or could do ifpersonally
present".
Our review ofthe March 12, 1992, No.2 power in particular leads us to conclude
that the grantofpower authorizing decedent's attorney-io-fact to transferdecedent's
real or personal property was sufficiently broad to encompass the power to make
gifts. See sec. 2512(b) ("Where property is transferred for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which the
value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a
gift"). Ms. Thompson was authorized by the terms of the March 12, 1992, No.2
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power not only to sell, mortgage, and pledge decedent's property, but also to
convey decedent's property. "Convey" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 30 I
(5th ed. 1979) as follows:
To transfer or deliver to another. To pass or transmit the title to property
from one to another. To transfer property or the title to property by deed,
bill of sale, or instrument under seal. • • •
The authority to convey without any qualification of that authority is
broad enough to pennit property conveyances for no consideration. Even
ifthe word "convey" is interpreted to mean transfer for consideration, the
March 12, 1992, No.2 power broadly authorized Ms. Thompson to deal
with decedent's property "in any other manner" and was not necessarily
restricted to transactions for consideration.
In other cases where the applicable State law required us to ascertain the decedent's
intent in interpreting a generally worded power of attorney, we have applied a
similar analysis. For example, in Estate ofBronston v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo.
1988-510, we examined a power ofattorney which granted the attorney-in-fact the
authority to convey property without restriction to determine ifthe power to make
gifts could be inferred under New Jersey law. The powerofattorney did not restrict
conveyances to those for consideration and contained a broad grant ofauthority to
the attorney-in-fact to do whatever the principal could do if personally present.
After distinguishing several decisions interpreting powers of attorney decided
under New Jersey law, we concluded that the specific language in the power of
attorney, which authorized the attorney-in-fact to convey property without any
apparent restriction, "could authorize gifts in appropriate circumstances.·' Id. We
examined the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the power of
attorney and the making of the gifts, noting that the decedent "historically gave
gifts to her children" and had expressed her intention to give them gifts in the year
the disputed gifts were made, and we concluded that the attorney-in-fact "acted on
behalfofdecedent, continuing her usual affairs." Id. Based upon our review ofthe
language of the power of attorney and the evidence of the decedent's intent, we
held that the power ofattorney authorized gifts. See id.; see also Estate ofNeff v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-186 (applying Oklahoma law, we concludedthat
Oklahoma had not adopted a flat prohibition against attorneys-in-fact making gifts
to themselves or to third parties absent express written authorization, and that the
durable power of attorney at issue included the implied authority to make
irrevocable gifts during the principal's lifetime).
Because the powers of attorney in this case contain language broad enough to
include the power to make gifts and, therefore, could be interpreted to authorize
Ms. Thompson to make the 1993 and 1994 gifts, we now must examine the facts
and circumstances surrounding the execution ofthe powers ofattorney to ascertain
whether decedent intended to confer gift-giving power and, ifso, whether the gifts
in question were "within the spirit of the power conferred upon" Ms. Thompson.
Wade v. Northup, 140 P. at 458; see also Brown v. Laird, 291 P. at 354.
Petitioner offered the following evidence of decedent's intent: A substantial and
consistent pattern ofannual gifting extending overa period of 13 years prior to the
gifts made by Ms. Thompson; a February 26, 1987, handwritten letter from
decedent to her children; decedent's awareness ofthe potential tax liabilities ofher
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estate; the testimony of decedent's daughter, Ms. Thompson, and decedent's
attorney, Mr. Walker; and decedent's last will and testament. We review this
evidence for what it shows, if anything, about decedent's intent regarding the
interpretation of the powers of attorney in this case.
Beginning in 1980 and continuing annually through 1992, decedent made gifts to
the natural objects of her bounty. Decedent gave her daughters annual gifts in
amounts that increased over time. In 1987, decedent expanded her gifting program
to include her sons- in-law and her grandchildren. When decedent executed the first
ofher three powers ofattorney in 1987, the gifting program was well established
and steadily growing, and she already had made her annual gifts for 1987. The
powerofattorney was executed in connection with estate planning by decedent and
her husband which was designed to minimize, to the fullest extent possible, the
estate and gift tax liability of their estates and to maximize the assets passing to
their family. After the execution of the December 22, 1987, power, decedent
continued to make annual gifts ofher property, periodically increasing the amount
of the gifts and the number of donees. In February 1992, decedent again made
substantial gifts to her daughters, their husbands, and her grandchildren. We
believe this pattern of making annual gifts covering a period of 13 years
demonstrates, and is consistent with, decedent's intention to make annual gifts of
her property until her death in order to take full advantage ofthe annual per-donee
gift tax exclusion, thereby reducing the amount ofestate tax her estate would owe
upon her death.
Decedent's intention to make annual gifts to her children in order to minimize her
estate tax liability is demonstrated further by her February 26, 1987, Jetter to her
children in which she stated: ttit is better, to give to you now, instead offrom a will.
Then most of it would be consumed by old Uncle Sam, who is always hungry. We
want you to enjoy it." Decedent's intention, shown by annual gifts beginning in
1980 and stated clearly in her 1987 letter to her daughters, was to minimize the
potential tax liabilities ofher estate by giving annual gifts to her family.
The testimony of decedent's daughter also reinforces petitioner's argument that
decedent intended to grant the power to make gifts to her attorney-in-fact Ms.
Thompson testified that she discussed the "gifting program" on numerous
occasions with her parents, who were concerned about the size oftheir estates. Ms.
Thompson also testified that when decedent delivered the powers of attorney to
her, decedent never indicated that Ms. Thompson was prohibited from taking
certain acts and decedent gave no specific instructions to Ms. Thompson. Since
decedent was told by her attorney, Mr~ Walker, that such powers of attorney
authorized fv1s. Thompson to do whatever decedent could do with her own
property, and since each of the powers of attorney contained a general grant of
power that would appear to a nonlawyer to be· consistent with Mr. Walker's
statement to decedent, we do not find it surprising that decedent did not discuss
specifically with Ms. Thompson whether Ms. Thompson had the power to continue
the annual gifts to decedent's family.
The testimony of decedent's attorney, Mr. Walker, lends support to petitioner's
argument. Mr. Walker testified that, when the December 22, 1987, power was
executed, "my words were to her that 'this will allow your daughter to do anything
that you can do.'" With respect to the March 12, 1992, powers, Mr. Walker
testified: "The intent was that the agent under [the power] could do anything that
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[decedent] could do." Mr. Walker further testified that when he presented the
March 12, 1992, powers to decedent for execution, he recalled "using the words
'this will allow your daughter to do anything that you can do.'" When Mr. Walker
was asked on cross- examination whether decedent ever told him whether she
specifically wanted to include the power to make gifts in the powers ofattorney,
Mr. Walker responded: "I think it might have been the other way around. I said that
'this will allow your daughter to do anything that you could do', and we specifically
talked about the gifting." The record amply demonstrates that decedent relied upon
Mr. Walker's advice and acted upon it. Decedent understood from conversations
she had had with Mr. Walker that lifetime gifts were an important estate planning
tool and that her powers of attorney authorized her daughter to do anything
decedent could do. It is reasonable, therefore, for us to conclude on this record that
decedent intended the powers ofattorney to include the power to make gifts.
Finally, a review ofdecedent's will confirms that the 1993 and 1994 gifts were to
the same individuals who would have inherited the properties under the terms of
decedent's will. In her will, decedent bequeathed all her real and personal property
to her three daughters ifshe was not survived by her husband (decedent's husband
died in November 1993).
******
Without an explicit ruling by the Supreme Court ofOregon or a statute enacted by
its legislature, we cannot decide this case based on a bright-line rule that an agent
lacks authority to make gifts ofthe principal's property unless the agent is expressly
given that power in the power ofattorney. We must rely instead upon Oregon law
which requires us to consider both "the strict letter" and "the spirit of the power"
conferred upon the agent. Wade v. Northup, 140 P. 451, 458 (Or. 1914). We
recognize the potential for "self-dealing" that exists when an agent acting pursuant
to a durable power of attorney has the power to make gifts, especially after the
principal becomes incapacitated, and we agree that we must be wary when asked
to infer from a power ofattorney a power to make gifts when the attorney-in-fact
has made the gifts in question to herself and to individuals related to her. See
Wilkinson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-336. Acknowledging, as we must,
that a decision inferring a power to make gifts from the general language of a
durable power ofattorney must be made with great caution, we nevertheless must
decide this case based on the best information available to us and our careful
review of applicable State law. After carefully reviewing Oregon law and
examining the decisions of the Supreme Court of Oregon, this Court, and other
courts for guidance, we are convinced that a decision to infer the power to make
gifts from the general language ofa durable power ofattorney is warranted in this
case because (1) there is no case law or. statute in .the controlling jurisdiction
prohibiting an inferred power to make gifts, (2) the controlling jurisdiction
considers the principal's intention in interpreting the power of attorney, (3) there
is a substantial pattern ofgifting by the principal preceding the gifts made by the
attorney-in-fact, (4) the gifts made by the attorney-in-fact are consistent with the
principal's prior gifting, (5) the gifts do not deplete the principal's assets to the
principal's detriment, and (6) it is clear there has been no fraud or abuse by the
agent.
In Estate ofSwanson v. United States, 46 Fed. Ct. 388 (2000), the court looked to a specific California statutes
and accumulated case law to conclude the opposite. Washington has a similar statute. In Estate ofFloy M. Christensen,
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et al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-368, the decedent's estate attempted to get around the fact that the decedent's
attorneys-in-fact did not have the power to make gifts by arguing that they could write checks to various donees from
a joint bank account.
11. Relation-Back Doesn't Apply to Non-Charitable Gifts. In Robert Rosano v. United States, 87
AFTR2d Par. 2001-766 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit affinned the district court and held that the relation-back
doctrine does not apply to non-charitable gifts:
Other courts have refused to apply the doctrine when the decedent died prior to
payment ofanon-charitable gift. McCarthy v. United States, 806 F.2d 129, 131-33
(7th Cir. 1986); Newman v. Commissioner, III T.C. 81 (1998). In McCarthy, the
court offered two reasons for its refusal to extend the doctrine of relation-back.
First, a rationale for applying the doctrine in the charitable context was not present
in the non-charitable context. Checks delivered by the decedent to a charity but not
paid until after the decedent's death, if included in the estate, would generate a
deduction for the estate. This deduction would result in a "wash" for estate tax
purposes, meaning that the estate would obtain the benefit of the charitable
deduction whether or not the doctrine ofrelation- back was applied. For practical
purposes, it makes more sense to consider the checks as outside the estate. "No
such practical consideration extends to noncharitable gifts. No offsetting deduction
exists for gifts made to noncharitable donees." McCarthy, 806 F.2d at 132. Second,
the court thought that extending the doctrine would allow for improper tax
avoidance: "By issuing acheck to a noncharitable donee with the understanding
that it not be cashed until after his death, a decedent may effectively bequest up to
$10,000 per donee, thus avoiding the estate tax consequences normally attending
such transactions." Id. Accord Metzger, 38 F.3d at 122.
We agree with the policy concerns expressed by the McCarthy and Metzger courts.
Thus, we will not apply the doctrine where gifts are made to a non-charitable donee
and the donor died prior to the date of payment. We express no opinion as to
whether we would apply the doctrine where there is a non-charitable donee and the
donor is alive on the date ofpayment
o. SECTION 2518 - DISCLAIMEP..s
1. Reasonable Time. In PLR 199934011 the Service allowed a disclaimer in an unusual situation.
Father created a trust for the benefit ofson, son's descendants, and son's wife. Son died and son's wife became aware
ofher interest and wanted to disclaim it. The ruling states
As discussed above, section 25.2511-1(c)(2) governs the effectiveness of a
disclaimer with respect to an interest created in a "taxable transfer" prior to 1977.
In the instant case, under the tenns ofTrust, Taxpayer was a contingent beneficiary
of Trust, in the event she survived Son. Under Jewett and Ordway, the ''taxable
transfer" creating Taxpayer's interest in Trust occurred on Date 3, when Decedent
died. Therefore, section 25.2511-1 (c)(2) applied in determining the effectiveness
of Taxpayer's disclaimer for federal transfer tax purposes.
As discussed above, under section 25.2511-1 (c)(2), the disclaimer will not be
subject to the gift tax if it is made within a reasonable time after the disclaimant
obtains knowledge of the transfer creating the interest. The question of what
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constitutes a reasonable time is dependent on federal, rather than state, criteria and
is generally dependent on the facts and circumstances presented.
We note that a disclaimer made within nine months ofthe disclaimant learning of
the existence of the transfer creating the interest would generally satisfy the
reasonable time requirement ofthe regulations, in the absence of facts indicating
a contrary result is warranted. Accordingly~ Taxpayer's disclaimer within nine
months of learning of the existence of Trust would be timely for purposes of
section 25.2511-1(c)(2). We express or implyno opinion as to when Taxpayer first
obtained the requisite knowledge of the transfer creating the interest.
Presumably there would have been a different result for a post 1976 power.
P. SECTIONS 2601-2654 - GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX
1. Final Regulations Discuss Modification to Grandfathered Trusts. On December 20, 2000, the
IRS issued final regulations dealing with trust modifications that will not affect a trust's exempt status for GST
purposes. T.D.8912. They differ significantly from the proposed regulations.
The explanation states:
1. The Regulatory Approach
In general, under the effective date rules accompanying the GST statutory
provisions, a trust that was irrevocable on September 25, 1985, is not subject to the
GST tax provisions, unless a GST transfer is made out ofcorpus added to the trust
after that date. Section 1433(b)(2)(A) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA),
Public Law 99-514 (100 Stat. 2085,2731), 1986-3 (Vol. l)C.B. 1,634. Such trusts
are hereinafter referred to as exempt trusts for GST tax purposes. The proposed
regulations provide a number of safe harbors with respect to changes that can be
made to the tenns ofan exempt trust that will not result in the loss ofexempt status.
Commentators argued that the approach set forth in the proposed regulations is
inconsistent with the statutory effective date provisions. They contend that, under
the TRA, with the exception of additions to principal~ modifications or other
actions with respect to a trust should not affect the trust's exempt status. Rather"
any change should have GST tax consequences only ifthe change subjects the trust
principal to a current gift tax. In that case, the individual making the gift will be
treated, to the extent ofthe gift, as the transferor ofthe trust for GST tax purposes
and the trust, to the extent of the gift, will be subject to the GST tax regime.
This approach was not adopted. The statutory effective date provision protects
generation-skipping trusts that were irrevocable before the GST tax was enacted
and presumably could not be changed to avoid the imposition of the tax. The
Treasury Department and the IRS believe that the approach adopted in the
regulations is consistent with Congressional intent to protect these trusts and that
most of the modifications that will not affect the exempt status of a trust will be
covered by the safe harbors in the fmal regulations.
2. Trustee Discretionary Actions
Under the proposed regulations, where there is a distribution oftrust principal from
an exempt trust to a new trust, the new trust will be an exempt trust if the terms of
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the governing instrument ofthe old trust authorize the trustee to make distributions
to the new trust without the consent or approval ofany beneficiary or court and the
tenns ofthe new trust do not extend the time for vesting ofany beneficial interest
in the trust beyond the applicable perpetuities period.
In response to comments, the final regulations clarify that the retention ofproperty
in a continuing trust, as well as the distribution ofproperty to a new trust, will not
cause loss of exempt status, assuming the requirements of the regulations are
satisfied.
In response to comments, the fmal regulations provide that distribution to a new
trust or retention in a continuing trust will not cause the loss ofexempt status, even
if the governing instrument does not specifically authorize the action, if state law,
at the time the exempt trust became irrevocable, pennitted such distribution or
retention in a continuing trust.
One comment suggested that the final regulations provide that a discretionary
distribution that otherwise satisfies the regulatory requirements should not cause
the trust to lose exempt status if the trustee, although not required to do so, seeks
approval ofa court or the trust beneficiaries before taking action. This change was
deemed unnecessary. An action that satisfies the requirements of the regulations
will not cause loss ofexempt status even if, for whatever reason, the trustee seeks
a court's or a beneficiary's approval of such action.
Comments suggested that the period for measuring the appropriate perpetuities
period for the new trust should be the date the original trust became irrevocable
under local law. The comments noted that the perpetuities period is properly
measured from the date the trust becomes irrevocable, which is not always the date
the trust was created (the date referenced in the proposed regulations). The
regulations have been revised accordingly. .
3. Settlements and Judicial Constructions
Under the proposed regulations, a court-approved settlement ofa bona fide issue
regarding the administration of the trust or the construction of tenns of the trust
will not cause the trust to lose exempt status ifthe settlement is the product ofarm's
length negotiations, and the settlement is within the range ofreasonable outcomes
under the governing instrument and applicable state law. A judicial construction
ofa governing instrument resolving an ambiguity in the terms ofthe instrument or
correcting a scrivener's error will not cause loss of·exempt status if the judicial
action involves a bona fide issue, and the construction is consistent with applicable
state law that would be applied by the highest court of the state.
One comment suggested that the standard applicable for recognition ofsettlement
agreements should also apply for court decrees, such that one standard would
govern both actions. Thus, the commentator suggested that a settlement agreement
or court decree should be binding on the Service (and not cause loss of exempt
status) if the result is within the range of reasonable outcomes and the agreement
or court decision is the product ofadversarial pr':lCeedings. The suggestion was not
adopted. The standard applied in the regulations for court decrees was enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967),
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and has been continuously and repeatedly applied by the IRS and the courts. The
adoption ofa different standard at this time is not appropriate.
Another comment addressing the rule for settlements stated that the requirement
that the settlement fall within the range of reasonable outcomes under the
governing instrument and state law could be read to deny protection to a settlement
that reaches a result that a court could not reach. However, the purpose ofthis rule
is not to restrict safe harbor protection to only those settlements that reach the result
a court could reach ifthe issue was litigated. Rather, the rule is intended to afford
the parties a greater degree of latitude to settle a case than would be available ifa
court had to decide the issue. Thus, a settlement "within the range of reasonable
outcomes" would include a compromise that reflects the parties' assessmentoftheir
relative rights and the strengths and weaknesses oftheir respective positions. The
settlement need not (and it is anticipated that in most cases it would not) resolve the
issue in the same manner as a court decision on the merits. Language has been
added to the fmal regulations emphasizing this point. On the other hand, as
illustrated in the preamble to the proposed regulations, a settlement that, for
example, creates beneficial interests that did not exist under a reasonable
interpretation of the instrument will not satisfy the regulations.
One comment suggested that the scope of the judicial construction rule should be
expanded to cover not only ambiguities and scrivener's error, but any request for
court instructions orany similarproceedings such as requests to modernize the trust
instrument, or adapt the instrument to unforeseen changed circumstances. This
suggestion was not adopted. The Treasury Department and the IRS believe that
these and similar actions are properly addressed under the safe-harbor "shift in
beneficial interest" rule provided in the regulations, and a separate category to
address these items is not needed.
4. Other Changes
Under the proposed regulations, a modification that does not satisfy the regulatory
rules for trustee distributions, settlements, and constructions will not cause a trust
to lose exempt status, if the modification does not shift a beneficial interest in the
trust to any beneficiary who occupies a lower generation (as defmed in section
2651) than the person or persons who held the beneficial interest prior to the
modification, and the modification does not extend the time for vesting of any
beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the original trust.
Comments suggested that the regulations should provide additional guidance on
when a modification shifts a beneficial interest in a trust. In response to these
comments, the final regulations provide that a modification to an exempt trust will
result in a shift in beneficial interest to a lower generation beneficiary if the
modification can result in an increase in a GST transfer or create a new GST
transfer. To determine whether a modification of an irrevocable trust will shift a
beneficial interest in a trust to a beneficiary who occupies a lower generation, the
effect of the instrument on the date of the modification is measured against the
effect of the instrument in existence immediately before the modification. If the
effect of the modification cannot be immediately determined, it is deemed to shift
a beneficial interest in the trust to a beneficiary who occupies a lower generation
(as defined in section 2651) than the person or persons who held the beneficial
interest prior to the modification.
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In conjunction with this change, the final regulations remove Example 7 contained
in section 26.260 I-I (b)(2)(vii)(B). This example had illustrated the transition rule
contained in section 26.260 I-I (b)(2) for generation-skipping transfers under wills
or revocable trusts executed before October 22, 1986. Under this rule, the GST tax
does not apply to transfers made under a will or revocable trust executed before
October 22,··1986, if the decedent dies before January I, 1987, and the instrument
is not amended after October 21, 1986, in any respect that results in the creation of,
or increase in the amount of, a generation-skipping transfer. In Example 7, trust
income is to be distributed equally, for life, to A, B, and C who are skip persons
assigned to the same generation. The trust is amended to increase A's share ofthe
income. The example concludes that the trust is subject to GST tax because the
amendment increases the amount of the generation-skipping transfers to be made
to A. The amendment to the trust, however, does not increase the amount of a
generation-skippingtransfer when viewed in the aggregate. The amendment merely
shifts an interest from one beneficiary to another beneficiary assigned to the same
generation. Example 7 in section 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(E) considers a substantially
similar fact pattern involving a trust that is irrevocable on or before September 25,
1985, and concludes that the modification will not result in an increase in a
generation-skipping transfer.
The standard contained in section 26.260 I-I(b)(2) (relating to wills and revocable
trusts executed before October 22, 1986) is similar to the standard contained in
section 26.2602- 1(b)(4)(i)(D)(relating to a modification to a trust that was
irrevocable on September 25, 1985). The Treasury Department and the IRS believe
that the two provisions should be applied in a consistent manner. Therefore,
Example 7 in section 26.2601-1(b)(2)(vii)(B) has been eliminated.
In response to comments, the final regulations specify that changes that are
administrative in nature (such as a change in the number oftrustees) will not caus~
the trust to lose its exempt status. An example has been added illustrating this
point.
Several comments indicated that many states have adopted, or are considering
adopting, section 104 of the Revised Vnifonn Principal and Income Act. Vnif.
Principal and Income Act section 104, 7B V.L.A. 141 (1997) (Act). The Aetallows
a trustee to adjust between principal and income to the extent necessary to produce
an equitable result, if the trustee invests and manages trust assets pursuant to the
state's prudent investor statute and the trustee is unable to administer the trust fairly
and reasonably under the general statutory rules governing the allocation ofincome
and principal. In addition, the comments noted that some state legislatures are
contemplating revising their state principal and income act to define trust income
as a unitrust amount (a fixed percentage ofthe trust principal determined annually).
The comments suggested that the regulations provide additional safe harbors to the
effect that the administration ofan exempttrust pursuant to a state statute adopting
the Act, or the conversion ofan income interest to a unitrust interest pursuant to a
court order or a state statute redefining trust income, would not cause the trust to
lose exempt status.
A guidance project considering the tax consequences ofthese state law changes in
a broader context is currently under consideration. Accordingly, these regulations
do not specifically address this issue. However, two examples have been added to
the regulations illustrating circumstances under which a trust will not lose exempt
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status where an income interest is converted to an interest that pays the greater of
trust income or a unitrust amount~ and a trust is modified to allow allocation of
capital gain to income.
In response to a comment~ the facts presented in section 26.2601-I(b)(4)(i)(E)
Example 5, have been changed to clarify that after the trusts are partitioned, if
either beneficiary should die without descendants surviving, the principal oftheir
partitioned trust will pass to the other partitioned trust.
5. Effective Dates and Other Matters
Comments requested clarification regarding the status of exempt trusts that were
modified or subject to other actions (for example, judicial constructions or
settlements) prior to the effective date of these regulations, December 20, 2000.
The IRS will not challenge the exempt status ofa trust that was, prior to December
20~ 2000, subject to any trustee action,judicial construction, settlement agreement,
modification, or other action, if the action satisfies the requirements of the
regulations.
Finally, with respect to the deletion of section 26.2601- 1(b)(2)(vii)(B) Example
7, discussed above, the IRS will not follow that example when applying the rule in
section 26.260 1-1 (b)(2).
Certain key areas are illustrated by example.
a. Change in trust situs. Example 4 provides:
Example 4. Change in trust situs. In 1980, Grantor, who was domiciled in State X,
executed an irrevocable trust for the benefit of Grantorfs issue, naming a State X
bank as trustee. Under the terms ofthe trust, the trust is totenninate, in all events,
no later than 21 years after the death of the last to die of certain designated
individuals living at the time the trustwas executed. The provisions ofthe trust do
not specify that any particular state law is to govern the administration and
construction of the trust. In State X, the common law rule against perpetuities
applies to trusts. In 2002, a State Y bank is named as sole trustee. The effect of
changing trustees is that the situs cfthe trust changes to State Y, and the laws of
State Y govern the administration and construction of the trust. State Y law
contains no rule against perpetuities. In this case, however, in view ofthe terms of
the trust instrument, the trust will terminate at the same time before and after the
change in situs. Accordingly, the change in situs does not shift any beneficial
interest in the trust to a beneficiary who occupies a lower generation (as defined in
section 2651) than the person or persons who held the beneficial interest prior to
the transfer. Furthennore, the change in situs does not extend the time for vesting
ofany beneficial interest in the trust beyond that provided for in the original trust.
Therefore, the trust will not be subject to the provisions of chapter 13 of the
Internal Revenue Code. If, in this example, as a result ofthe change in situs, State
Y law governed such that the time for vesting was extended beyond the period
prescribed under the terms of the original trust instrument, the trust would not
retain exempt status.
What ifthe change in situs enabled the trust to be administered in a way that benefitted a lower generation by,
for instance, allowing less to be distributed to higher generations?
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In PLR 199922044 the trust provided that the situs of the trust would be deemed to be at the principal office
of the corporate trustee and the trust was to be governed by the laws ofthe state of the situs and to be administered in
accordance with the laws ofthe state ofthe situs. The ruling concluded that the primary beneficiary ofthe trust had the
power to replace the corporate trustee according to the governing instrument and thus that the change in situs and
applicable law occurred pursuant to the terms ofthe governing instrument. Thus "the proposed modifications do not
confer additional powers or beneficial interest upon any current or new trustee or upon any of the trust beneficiaries.
Moreover, these modifications will not create any additional generation-skipping transfers or increase the amount of
any generation-skipping transfers."
b. Change to unitrust distribution. Two examples, 8 and 9, deal with this, in a generally favorable way:
Example 8. Conversion of income interest into unitrust interest. In 1980, Grantor
established an irrevocable trust under the terms of which trust income is payable
to A for life and, upon A's death, the remainder is to pass to A's issue, per stirpes.
In 2002, the appropriate local court approves a modification to the trust that
converts A's income interest into the right to receive the greater of the entire
income of the trust or a fixed percentage of the trust assets valued annually
(unitrust interest) to be paid each year to A for life. The modification does not
result in a shift in beneficial interest to a beneficiary who occupies a lower
generation (as defined in section 2651) than the person or persons who held the
beneficial interest prior to the modification. In this case, the modification can only
operate to increase the amount distributable to A and decrease the amount
distributable to A's issue. In addition, the modification does not extend the time for
vesting ofany beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the
original trust. Therefore, the trust will not be subject to the provisions of chapter
13 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Example 9. Allocation of capital gain to income. In 1980, Grantor established an
irrevocable trust under the terms of which trust income is payable to Grantor's
child, A, for life, and upon A's death, the remainder is to pass to the A's issue, per
stirpes. Under applicable state law, unless the governing instrument provides
otlternrise, C2pirel gain is a!located to principal. In 2002, the trust is modified to
allow the trustee to allocate capital gain to the income. The modification does not
shift any beneficial interest in the trust to a beneficimy who occupies a lower
generation (as defined in section 2651 )$an the person or persons who held the
beneficial interest prior to the modification. In this case, the modification can only
have the effect of increasing the amount distributable to A, and decreasing the
amount distributable to A's issue. In addition~ the modification does not extend the
time for vesting of any beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided
for in the original trust. Therefore, the trust will not be subject to the provisions of
chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Would the result be different in Example 8 if the conversion had been to a pure unitrust?
c. Effect of state statutes. Example 2 is slightly different from the regulation. The regulation states:
(4) Retention of trust's exempt status in the case of modifications, etc. -- (i)
In general. This paragraph (b)(4) provides rules for detennining when a
modification, judicial construction, settlement agreement, or trustee action with
respect to a trust that is exempt from the generation-skipping transfer tax under
paragraph (b)(l), (2),. or (3) of this section (hereinafter referred to as an exempt
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trust) will not cause the trust to lose its exempt status. The rules contained in this
paragraph (b)(4) are applicable only for purposes of detennining whether an
exempt trust retains its exempt status for generation-skipping transfer tax purposes.
The rules do not apply in determining, for example, whether the transaction results
in a gift subject to gift~ or may cause the trust to be included in the gross estate
of a beneficiary, or may result in the realization of capital gain for purposes of
section 1001.
(A) Discretionary powers. The distribution of trust principal from
an exempt trust to a new trust or retention of trust principal in a continuing trust
will not cause the new or continuing trust to be subject to the provisions ofchapter
13, if-
(I) Either--
(i) The tenns of the governing instrument of the
exempt trust authorize distributions to the new trust or the retention of trust
principal in a continuing trust, without the consent or approval ofany beneficiary
or court; or
(ii) at the time the exempttrust became irrevocabIe,
state law authorized distributions to the new trust or retention of principal in the
continuing trust, without the consent or approval of any beneficiary or court; and
(2) The tenns of the governing instrument of the new or
continuing trust do not extend the time for vesting ofany beneficial interest in the
trust in a manner that may postpone or suspend the vesting, absolute ownership, or
power ofalienation ofan interest in property for a period, measured from the date
the original trust became irrevocable, extending beyond any life in being at the date
the original trust became irrevocable plus a period of21 years, plus ifnecessarY,
a reasonable period ofgestation. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(4)(i)(A), the
exercise of a trustee's distributive power that validly postpones or suspends the
vesting, absolute ownership, or power of alienation of an interest in property for
a term ofyears that will not exceed 90 years (measured from the date the original
trust became irrevocable) will not be considered an exercise that postpones or
suspends vesting, absolute ownership, or the power of alienation beyond the
perpetuities period. Ifa distributive power is exercised by creating another power,
it is deemed to be exercised to whatever extent the second power may be exercised.
The -example provides:
ExampIe 2. Trustee's powerto distribute principal pursuant to state statute. In 1980,
Grantor established an irrevocable trust (Trust) for the benefit ofGrantor's child,
A, A's spouse, and A's issue. At the time Trust was established, A had two
children, B and C. A corporate fiduciary was designated as trustee. Under the terms
of Trust, the trustee has the discretion to distribute all or part of the trust income
or principal to one or more ofthe group consisting ofA, A's spouse or A's issue.
Trust will terminate on the death of A, at which time, the trust principal will be
distributed to A's issue, per stirpes. Under a state statute enacted after 1980 that is
applicable to Trust, a trustee who has the absolute discretion under the terms of a
testamentary instrument or irrevocable inter vivos trust agreement to invade the
principal of a trust for the benefit of the income beneficiaries of the trust, may
exercise the discretion by appointing so much or all of the principal of the trust in
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favor of a trustee of a trust under an instrument other than that under which the
power to invade is created, or under the same instrument. The trustee may take the
action either with consent ofall the persons interested in the trust but without prior
court approval, or with court approval, upon notice to all of the parties. The
exercise of the discretion, however, must not reduce any fixed income interest of
any income beneficiary ofthe trust and must be in favor ofthe beneficiaries ofthe
trust. Under state law prior to the enactment ofthe state statute, the trustee did not
have the authority to make distributions in trust. In 2002, the trustee distributes
one-half ofTrust's principal to a new trust that provides for the payment of trust
income to A for life and further provides that, at A's death, one-half of the trust
remainder will pass to B or B's issue and one- halfofthe trust will pass to C or C's
issue. Because the state statute was enacted after Trust was created and requires the
consent of all of the parties, the transaction constitutes a modification of Trust.
However, the modification does not shift any beneficial interest in Trust to a
beneficiary or beneficiaries who occupy a lower generation than the person or
persons who held the beneficial interest prior to the modification. In addition, the
modification does not extend the time for vesting ofany beneficial interest in Trust
beyond the period provided for in the original trust. The new trust will tenninate
at the same date provided under Trust. Therefore, neither Trust nor the new trust
will be subject to the provisions ofchapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code.
2. Effective Date Rule. The Eighth Circuit has issued a very important opinion in John M. Simpson,
et at. v. United States, 84 AFTR2d Par. 99-5089. The facts were simple. Grover Simpson died in 1966 and creates a
general power ofappointment marital trust. Mary dies in 1993 having exercised the power ofappointment in favor of
her grandchildren. Does the GST apply to the assets passing to the grandchildren?
The court has no trouble answering the questions - the GST does not apply:
The parties discuss at some length what the purpose of the special effective-date
provision could have been. The effective date of September 25, 1985, is the date
on which the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation issued a
summaryofproposals for a revision ofthe then-existing GSTtax. (The tax had first
been enacted, in a different form, in 1976.) The premise of such provisions, in
general, is that taxpayers, at least those with a lot at stake, follow closely proposals
pending in Congress to amend the tax laws. Once the taxpayer has notice of a
proposal, it is fair to subject him or her to the tax, even when the tax may be
enacted some months oreven years later. (Congress has power, within broad limits,
to make taxing statutes retroactive, but it frequently chooses not to exercise this
power.) So the provision was obviously intended to protect taxpayers who had,
before September 25, 1985, taken certain irrevocable action in reliance upon the
state ofthe tax law existing at the time ofthe action. What is the relevant action in
the present case? The government argues that the relevant action was the exercise
of the power of appointment by Mrs. Bryan, an exercise which became effective
only upon her death, approximately eight years after September 25, 1985. The
taxpayer argues, to the contrary, that the relevant action is the date ofthe creation
ofthe trust, which occurred when Mr. Simpson died in 1966. When Mr. Simpson
created the trust, there was no GST tax, and he thus had no reason to anticipate that
his wife's exercise ofher general testamentary power ofappointment would trigger
any kind of a tax over and above the ordinary estate tax consequent upon her
possession of a general power, see 26 U.S.C. section 2041.
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Which side is right about the purpose of the statute? The issue is easily resolved,
we think, by consulting the most important evidence of a statute's purpose -- that
is, its words. Recall the relevant clause: "any generation-skipping transfer under a
trust which was irrevocable on September 25, 1985." The government wants us to
read the words, in effect, as though "which" modified "transfer." This is not a
meaning that the words will bear. The antecedent of "which" is "trust," not
"transfer.tt The relevant action which has to take place before September 25, 1985,
is the creation of the trust, or rather its becoming irrevocable, not the occurrence
of the generation-skipping transfer. We see no escape from the logic of this
reasoning. In the present case, the trust became irrevocable before September 25,
1985. The transfer was made possible by the trust. The transfer was "under" the
trust. The fact that the transfer occurred after September25, 1985, and, indeed, that
Mrs. Bryan, the transferor, could have avoided the GST tax by giving the property
to someone other than her grandchildren, is not relevant. The point is that when the
trust was created and became irrevocable Mrs. Bryan was given the authority,
under the law as it then existed, to exercise her general power ofappointment in
favor of anyone at all, and to do so without subjecting the transfer to a GST tax,
such a tax then being far in the future. This is the sort ofreliance that the effective-
date provision protects.
The IRS thought the issue had been addressed previously in E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v.
Commissioner, 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996). The facts there, as recited by the Simpson court were:
In that case, the original settlor, E. Nonnan Peterson, died in 1974. His will created
a trust for the benefit of his wife, Eleanor Peterson. Mrs. Peterson was given a
general testamentary power of appointment over the corpus of the trust. If the
power was not exercis~ the corpus was to be set aside for the Petersons'
grandchildren. Mrs. Peterson died in 1987. Because she had a general power of
appointment, the remaining value ofthe trust was then included in her gross estate
under 26 U.S.C. section 2041. But in her will, Mrs. Peterson specifically stated that
she was not exercising the power, except to the extent necessary to pay the estate
tax attributable to the inclusion of the trust property in her estate. The power
therefore lapsed, and the property remaining in the trust after payment ofthe estate
taxes was transferred to the grandchildren.
The court distinguished Peterson:
The distinction between Peterson and the present case is obvious. Here, when the
power was exercised, it was exercised with respect to the entire remaining corpus.
There was no portion of the trust remaining after the exercise. Nor did the power
lapse to any extent. There is therefore no way to argue, and the government in fact
does not argue, that the transfer at issue here is subject to the GST tax because it
was made out ofcorpus added to the trust after September 25, 1985. Nor is there
any regulation, temporary or permanent, that applies to the particular sort of
transfer made here - a transfer of the entire corpus of the trust remaining at the
time ofthe exercise ofthe power. We have no quarrel with the holding ofPeterson,
but we cannot agree with the government that it compels or even supports the result
contended for in the present case.
Clearly the court was puzzled over why there was any dispute at all:
The entire concept ofwritten law, indeed ofall verbal communication, depends on
the idea that words have SOME meaning. It is true that the ingenuity oflawyers can
usually scrape up some tag end of ambiguity on '1Nhich to hang a policy hat. But
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judges are obliged, unless there is a substantial uncertainty as to the meaning ofthe
words of a statute, to apply the statute as written, unless the words are simply
nonsense, or self-contradictory, or something ofthat kind. This is not such a case.
The words ofSection 1433(b)(2)(A) are clear, at least to us, and we see no reason
not to apply them. The words make it clear that Congress intended to protect the
reliance ofcreators of trusts on the law as it existed at the time the tnJsts became
irrevocable. That Congress could, consistently with the Constitution and with
fairness, have selected another effective-date regime is not relevant. We hold that
the transfer at issue in this case took place undera trust which was irrevocable on
September 25, 1985. The GST tax therefore does not apply.
The final regulations attempt to reverse the result in Simpson. As stated in the Supplementary Infonnation to
the proposed regulations:
In Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1999), the decedent exercised
a testamentary general power ofappointment granted under a marital trust that was
created in 1966. Pursuant to the decedent's exercise of the general power of
appointment, the property passedto hergrandchildren who were skip persons under
section 2612. The court concluded that the transfer to the grandchildren was
exempt from the GST tax under section 1433(bX2XA) of the TRA, because the
transfer was "under a trust" that was irrevocable on September 25, 1985.
The facts in Simpson are similar to those presented in Peterson Marital Trust v.
Commissioner, 78 F.3d 795 (2nd Cir. 1996). In Peterson, the decedent had a
testamentary general powerto appoint property in a pre-September25, 1985 marital
trust created under herhusband's will. Rather than appointing the property outright,
the taxpayer allowed the power to lapse and the property passed to her husband's
grandchildren, who were skip persons under section 2612. The court concluded
that the transfer was subject to the GST tax. The court noted that the effective date
provisions in section 1433(b)(2) of the TRA were "designed ... to protect those
taxpayers who, on the basis ofpre-existing rules, made arrangements from which
they could not reasonably escape and which, in retrospect, had become singularly
undesirable." Peterson Marital Trust, at 801 (footnote omitted). The court
concluded that there was no basis to apply the protection provided in section
1433(b)(2) to the marital trust because the arrangement could have been changed
to avoid the GST tax through the exercise of the decedent's general power of
appointment.
Treaswy and the IRS believe that there is no substantive difference between the
situation in Simpson where property passed pursuant to the exercise ofa general
power of appointment and the situation in Peterson Marital Trust where property
passed pursuant to a lapse ofa general power ofappointment. An individual who
has a general power ofappointment has the equivalent ofoutright ownership in the
property. Estate ofKruz v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 44, 50-51, 59-60 (1993). The
value of the property subject to the general power is includible in the power
holder's gross estate at death under section 2041(a). In eithercase, the powerholder
can avoid the consequences ofthe GST tax by appointing the property to nonskip
persons. Therefore, as the court noted in Peterson Marital Trust, there is no basis
for exempting such dispositions from the GST tax under the TRA effective date
provisions.
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Accordingly, the proposed regulations clarify that the transferofpropertypursuant
to the exercise, release, or lapse of a general power of appointment created in a
pre-September 25, 1985 trust is not a transfer under the trust, but rather is a transfer
by the power holder occurring when the exercise, release, or lapse of the power
becomes effective, for purposes ofsection 1433(bX2)(A) of the TRA.
The IRS is correct that there is no substantive difference between the facts ofSimoson and Petersen. However,
the Eighth Circuit in Simpson appeared to be interpreting the statute, not the regulations, in its holding despite the
language distinguishing Petersen and referring to the regulation. It should be more difficult for the IRS 'to reverse a
Circuit Court interpretation of the statute itself.
In Robert A. Bachler, et at. v. United States, (N.D.Cal. 2000), the court was persuaded
by Peterson not Simpson. The opinion states:
Peterson does not directly control the analysis ofthis case, because the facts ofthat
case were different. Peterson dealt with the situation covered by 26 C.F.R. section
26.2601- l(b)(I)(v)(A), where a portion ofa trust remains in the trust after the
exercise, release, or lapse of a power of appointment. Here, because no part of
Trust A was left in the trust after Decedent's exercise of her general power of
appointment, the exercise did not constitute a constructiveaddition under26 C.F.R.
section 26.2601- I (bXl)(v)(A). Nonetheless, the Court is persuaded by that court's
reasoning regarding the purpose of the grandfather clause.
The justification for the grandfather clause is evidenced in the text of the clause
itself. Section 1433(b)(2)(A) is one ofthree grandfatheringprovisions for the GST
tax. Subsection (b)(2)(B) allows extra time for individuals to refonn an existing
will before the newGST tax would apply to them. Subsection (bX2XC) provides
that the grandfather clause will apply to the wills ofindividuals subject to a mental
disability who are unable to change their wills after the effective date of the new
GST tax. Taken as a whole, the three subsections indicate Congress' intent to
protect individuals who are unable to escape from their existing plans, not an intent
to exempt certain trusts in perpetuity.
Plaintiffargues that the Court should fo!lo\v Simpson. While the facts ofthe jtL~tant
case are almost identical to those in Simpson, the Court finds Simpson
unpersuasive. Simpson analyzed the phrase "under a tIllst," and justified the
application of the grandfather clause to a transfer pursuant to a general power of
appointment as follows:
Was the transfer made by Mrs. Simpson "under" this trust? We do not see
how an affrrmative answer can be avoided. The powerofappointment that
made the transfer possible was created by the trust. Language has to mean
something, and the argument that this particular transfer was not "under"
trust A is simply untenable.
Id. at 814. As discussed above, an affirmative answer to the Simpson court's
question can be avoided by recognizing that the phrase "under a trust" is
ambiguous, and looking to the purposes of the grandfather clause.
Plaintiff claims that "under a trust" is a term of art, and includes decisions and
transfers not specified in the trust instrument itself. Plaintiff cites no case law or
statutory authority in support ofthis contention. "Under a trust" is nowhere defmed
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in the tax code, and must be given a meaning informed by its context. The context
indicates that the grandfather clause of TRA 1986, section 1433(b)(2)(A) was
meant to protect donors from a change in the law that they could not avoid. Thus,
a transfer "under a trust," within the meaning ofthe grandfather clause, is a transfer
that is required by the tenns ofan irrevocable trust. Grandfather clauses typically
serve such a purpose. See Tataranowicz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268,277 (D.C. Cir.
1992); Serel v. United States, 684 F.2d 597,599 (8th Cir. 1982).
Here, it was not inevitable that Trust A would be subject to the GST tax. Settlor's
will provided that upon a lapse of Decedent's general power of appointment, the
assets ofthe trust would pass to his children, a transfer that would not have resulted
in the imposition oftbe GST tax. Decedent, like the decedent in Peterson, had the
power to appoint the assets in Trust A to whomever she chose. Decedent could
have appointed all ofTrost A to her children, thus avoiding the GST tax entirely.
As the court noted in Peterson, "[t]here is no reason to 'grandfather' such a mutable
arrangement, and Congress has given no indication that it wished to do so."
Accordingly, the Court holds that TRA 1986, section 1433(b)(2)(A) does not apply
to Decedent's transfer to her grandchildren. The GST tax does apply and Plaintiff
is not entitled to a refund of it.
3. Substantial Compliance in Allocating GST Exemption. The IRS seems generally wilting to rule
that donors have substantially complied with the GST exemption allocation requirements even ifno notice ofallocation
is actually filed. See PLRs 200027009 and 200040013 for example.
4. Transfer ofCLAT Remainder Does Not Shift Transferor. In an as yet unpublished PLR (dated
November 14, 2000) the question was whether the transfer ofa remainder interest in a CLAT by a child of the CLAT
to the child's children would cause the child to become the transferor. Such a result would be desirable because the
interest ofthe child would be zero, or close to i~ upon the transfer. The ruling point out that CLATs have great potential
for abuse of the generation skipping tax rules. Thus:
Congress remedied this situation by the enactment of§2642(e). Under this special
rule for charitable lead annuity trusts, the numeratorofthe applicable fraction is the
adjusted GST exempticn and the denominator is lite value of all property in the
trust immediately after tennination of the charitable lead interest. The adjusted
GST exemption is the GST exemption allocated to the trust increased by the
interest rate used in detennining the charitable deduction for federal gift or estate
tax purposes for the actual period of the charitable lead annuity.
In light of § 2642(e), all generation-skipping transfers made with respect to a
charitable lead annuity trust will be subject to the GST tax if no GST exemption
is allocated to the trust. Even ifGST exemption is allocated to a trust, there is no
way to guarantee that it will be sufficient to ensure that the trust is exempt from
GSTtax.
The series of transactions proposed in the ruling request have the effect of
circumventing the rules of § 2642(e) using the same type of leveraging that
prompted Congress to enact § 2642(e). The trustees propose to designate Child A
as the beneficiary ofone-sixth ofthe remainder interest in Trust. Child A will then
assign Child A's one-sixth remainder interest to Child A's children in a transaction
that is subject to gift tax.
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Based on the above, we conclude that for GST tax purposes, and consistent with
the purpose of § 2642(e), there will be two transferors with respect to the trust
assets in Trust as of the date of the assignment. Child A will be considered the
transferor with respect to the portion ofthe trust assets equal to the present value
of the one-sixth remainder interest on the date of the gift. The Decedent will
remain the transferor with respect to the balance of the Trust.
Apparently concerned that the basis of the ruling might be too narrow, the Service goes on to state:
We also note that under the facts presented in the ruling request, the fonn of the
transaction might be disregarded and the series of transactions viewed as the
designation bythe Trustee ofChild A's children as remainder beneficiaries. Under
this analysis, Decedent would be treated as the transferor ofthe entire Trust estate
for GST tax purposes. See Estate ofBles v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 200-388;
Estate of Cidulka v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-149; Griffm v. United
States, 42 F.Supp.2d 700 (W.O. Tex. 1998).
separated from the creation of the CLAT by a year so there was a gift? What about a GRAT?
5. Rule Against Perpetuities. A number ofstates have repealed their rule against perpetuities. Among
them are Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin. The Florida statute imposes a 360 year statute. The purpose ofthe limit, rather than simple
repeal, is to avoid the so-called Delaware Tax Trap.,
Q. SECTIONS 2701-2704 - SPECIAL VALUATION RULES
1. Application to Family Limited Partnerships. In Blaine P. Kerr, et ux. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C.
No. 30 (1999), the Tax Court considered the application ofthe statute to the transfer ofinterests in a family partnership
to GRATs, KFLP was created under the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act (TRLPA). The court described the
taxpayer's position:
Petitioners contend that section 2704(b) does not apply to the KFLP interests that
they transferred to the GRAT's trustees because those interests were merely
assignee interests under State law. TRLPA section 7.02(a)(2) provides that an
assignment of a partnership interest does not dissolve a li.mited partnership or
entitle the assignee to become or exercise the rights or powers ofa partner. TRLPA
section 7.02(aX3) and (4) provides that an assignee is allocated the income, gain,
loss, deduction, or credit to which the assignor was entitled, and, until the assignee
becomes a partner, the assignor continuesto be a partner and to have the power to
exercise any rights or powers ofa partner. TRLPA section 7.04(a) provides that an
assignee ofa partnership interest may become a limited partner ifand to the extent
that the partnership agreement provides for such a transition or on the consent of
all partners. Relying on the definition of an applicable restriction contained in
section 25.2704-2(b), Gift Tax Regs., petitioners maintain that an assignee's
inability to force KFLP to liquidate under the KFLP partnership agreement imposes
no greater restriction than those imposed upon assignees under TRLPA.
Petitioners' contention that the partnership interests they transferred to the ORA1"s
trustees were assignee interests as opposed to limited partnership interests is based
on a strict construction ofthe KFLP partnership agreement. In particular, although
petitioners made the transfers to themselves asGRATs trustees, petitioners
nonetheless maintain that their children, as KFLP general partners, had to consent
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to the admission ofthe GRATs trustees as limited partners pursuant to section 3.06
of the KFLP partnership agreement.
The taxpayer's argument was rejected because the court found that the interests transferred were limited
partnership interests not assignee interests. The opinion states:
Read as a whole, the language used in the "Assignment of Partnership
Interest" establishes that petitioners transferred limited partnership
interests to themselves as the ORATs trustees. Although the documents
refer to the ORAT's trustees as assignees, the description ofthe assigned
interests contained in Schedule I clearly states that the assignees will hold
class B limited partnership interests in KFLP. Equally important, the
"Assignment ofPartnership Interest" states that petitioners had obtained
all necessary consents to effect the conveyance. Because the ORATs
trustees qualified as permitted assignees within the meaning of section
8.03 of the partnership agreement, and petitioners were not required to
obtain any consents to transfer an assignee interest to a permitted
assignee, the inclusion of the statement that all necessary consents had
been obtained also indicates that petitioners were transferring limited
partnership interests to the ORAT's trustees. Further, the statement that all
necessary consents had been obtained contradicts the testimony of the
Kerr children that petitioners never requested that they consent to the
transfers to the ORAT's trustees.
C. OBJECTIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The objective economic realities. underlying the transfers to the ORAT's
trustees do not support petitioners' position that the transferred interests
should be considered assignee interests. First, and perhaps most
importantly, there were no significant ... differences under the KFLP
partnership agreement between the rights cf limited partners and
assignees. Petitioners were vested with managerial responsibilities for
KFLP; neither limited partners nor assignees had any managerial rights.
In addition, limited partners and assignees enjoyed equivalent rights to
information concerning the partnership's business affairs) and they shared
the same interests in the partnership's distributable cash. Finally, while
limited partners were pennitted to put or sell their interests to the
partnership under section 9.02 of the partnership agreement, assignees
were given a substantially equivalent right to offer their interests to the
partnership under sections 8.04 and 8.21 of the partnership agreement.
The only relevant difference between the rights of limited partners and
assignees relates to a limited partner's right to vote on major decisions --
a right not extended to assignees. However, given the rare and
extraordinary nature of the matters qualifying as a major decision, such
as the filing ofa bankruptcy petition or approving an act in contravention
ofthe partnership agreement, we do not consider a limited partner's right
to vote on such matters to be significant for purposes of deciding the
question presented.
We further note that petitioners retained the right to vote the limited
partnership interests and petitioners and the Kerr children had the ability
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to convert the purported assignee interests to full limited partnership
interests or liquidate the partnership at will. To characterize the interests
that petitioners transferred to the GRA1"s trustees as assignee interests
ignores the objective economic reality that there was no meaningful
difference between the transfer of an assignee interest as opposed to a
limited partnership interest.
D. TAX MOTIVATION
The record shows that Eastland structured petitioners' transfers to the
GRAT's trustees primarily to avoid the special valuation rules set forth in
section 2704(b). Eastland's writings on the subject of family limited
partnerships disclose his belief that the transfer of an assignee interest
from one family member to another would serve to circumvent section
2704(b). Accepting petitioner's testimony that he did not considerwhether
he was transferring a limited partnership interest as opposed to an
assignee interest to his GRA1"s, it appears that Eastland made a conscious
decision not to raise the subject with his clients.
Consistent with the foregoing, we conclude that petitioners transferred
limited partnership interests to the ORATs trustees in substance as in
form.
Having decided that partnership interests were transferred the court detennined that section 2704 did not apply:
Section 2704(bX2XA) broadly defines an applicable restriction as "any restriction
which effectively limits the ability ofthe corporation or partnership to liquidate".
However, section 2704(b)(3)(B) excepts from the definition of an applicable
restriction "any restriction on liquidation imposed, or required to be imposed, by
any Federal or State law".
In what we view as an expansion of the exception contained in section
2704(b)(3)(B), the Secretary promulgated section 25.2704- 2(b), Gift Tax Regs.,
which states in pertinent part: "An applicable restriction is a limitation on the
ability to liquidate the entity (in whole or in part) that is more restrictive than the
limitations that would apply under the State law generally applicabie to the entity
in the absence ofthe restriction. tt Thus~the question arises whether the partnership
agreements involved herein impose greater restrictions on the liquidation ofKFLP
and KILP than the limitations that generally would apply to the partnerships under
State law.
Section 10.01 of the partnership agreements states in pertinent part that the
partnerships shall dissolve and liquidate upon the earlier ofDecember 31,2043, or
by agreement ofall the partners. Petitioners direct our attention to TRLPA section
8.01, which provides that a Texas limited partnership shall be dissolved on the
earlier of: (1) The occurrence of events specified in the partnership agreement to
cause dissolution; (2) the written consent of all partners to dissolution; (3) the
withdrawal of a general partner; or (4) entry of a decree ofjudicial dissolution.
TRLPA section ~.04 provides that, following the dissolution of a limited
partnership, the partnership's affairs shall be wound up (including the liquidation
of partnership assets) as soon as reasonably practicable.
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On the basis ofa comparison of section 10.0 I of the partnership agreements and
TRLPA section 8.01, we conclude that section 10.01 ofthe partnership agreements
does not contain restrictions on liquidation that constitute applicable restrictions
within the meaning of section 2704(b). We reach this conclusion because Texas
law provides for the dissolution and liquidation ofa limited partnership pursuant
to the occurrence of events specified in the partnership agreement or upon the
written consent ofall the partners, and the restrictions contained in section 10.01
of the partnership agreements are no more restrictive than the limitations that
generally would apply to the partnerships under Texas law. Consequently, these
provisions are excepted from the definition ofan applicable restriction pursuant to
section 2704(b)(3)(B) and section 25.2704-2(b), Gift Tax Regs.
Kerr was cited favorably in Estate ofMorton B. Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-202, which held
that section 2704(b) did not apply to a California limited partnership.
The Federal District Court for San Antonio has upheld a death-bed family limited partnership involving very
difficult facts for the taxpayer, including that the general partner, a corporation, was not actually formed until after the
decedent's death and no assets were titled in the name of the partnership as of the decedent's death. Elsie J. Church
v. United States, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-804 (W.O. Tex., 2000). The Court rejected the application ofsections 2703 and
2704, and held that the fonnation of the general partner and funding of the partnership were ministerial.
In Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.e. (2000), the Courtdisregarded a death-bed partnership
because, the Court found, the decedent had retained, by implied agreement, use of the partnership units he had given
away. The Court determined that the fonn of the partnership was not respected by the parties. In particular, he
continued to live rent-free in a house owned by the partnership and opened no partnership bank accounts.
In three cases between October 26 and November 30, 2000, the Tax Court clarified the rules it sees as
applicable to family limited partnerships. The three decisions, each en banc, were J.C. Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115
T.e. No. 30 (2000); Ina F. Knight v. Commissioner, et vir v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. No. 36 (2000); and Estate of
Albert Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. No. 35 (2000). The opinions should be read in their entirety. Three general
conclusions follow from all the opinions. First, the most effective attack appears that it might be substance over form,
including the step-transaction doctrine. Second, where the Tax Court can fmd an "understanding" that a partnership
will continue for the benefit ofa decedent it will be sympathetic to a section 2036 argument. Third, case must be given
to avoid a gift on fonnation.
Shepherd involved the transfer of timberland subject to a lease to a partnership owned 50% by the taxpayer
(father) and 25% by each oftwo sons, followed several weeks later by a gift ofbank stock to the same partnership. At
issue was whether the gifts were to be valued as gifts ofproperty to one entity - the partnership, or gifts to two people --
the sons, or gifts ofpartnership interests. The majority opinion valued the gifts as ifthey were made to the sons, rather
than as gifts of partnership units:
2. DID PETITIONER MAKE DIRECT GIFTS TO HIS SONS?
Petitioner deeded the leased land and bank stock to the partnership. Whatever
interests his sons acquired in this property they obtain~dby virtue oftheir status as
A - 136
partners in the partnership. Clearly, then, contraryto one ofrespondent's alternative
arguments, petitioner did not make direct gifts of these properties to his sons. Cf.
LeFrak v. Commissioner, supra (transfer by donor-father of buildings to himself
and his children as tenants in common, "d.b.a." (doing business as) one ofvarious
partnerships fonned later the same day to hold the particular building conveyed,
represented direct gifts to the children of the father's interest in the buildings).
3. DID PETITIONER MAKE INDIRECT GIFTS TO HIS SONS?
A gift may be direct or indirect. See sec. 25.2511-1(a), Gift Tax Regs. The
regulations provide the following example of a transfer that results in an indirect
taxable gift, assuming that the transfer is not made for adequate and full
consideration: "A transfer of property by B to a corporation generally represents
gifts by B to the other individual shareholders of the corporation to the extent of
their proportionate interests in the corporation." Sec. 25.2511- 1(h)(I), Gift Tax
Regs.
Application of this general rule is well established in case law. For instance, in
Kincaid v. United States, 682 F.2d at 1225, the taxpayer transferred her ranch to
a newly fonned corporation in which she and her two sons owned all the voting
stock. In exchange for the ranch, the taxpayer received additional shares of the
corporation's stock. The stock was determined to be less valuable than the ranch.
The court concluded that the difference between what she gave and what she got
represented a gift to the shareholders. Noting that the taxpayer could not make a
gift to herself, the court held that she made a gift to each ofher sons ofone-third
of the total gift amount. See also Heringer v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 149, 151
(9th Cir. 1956) (transfers of farm lands to a family corporation of which donors
were 40-percent owners represented gifts to other shareholders of60 percent ofthe
fair market value ofthe farm lands), modifying and remanding 21 T.e. 607 (1954);
CTUW Georgia Ketteman Hollingsworth v. Commissioner, 86 T.e. 91 (1986)
(mother's transfer to closely held corporation ofproperty in exchange for note of
lesser value represented gifts to the other five shareholders of five-sixths the
difference in values ofthe property transferred and the note the mother received);
Estate of Hitchon v. Commissioner, 45 T.e. 96 (1965) (father's transfer of stock
to a family corporation tor no consideration constiwted gift by famer of one-
quarter interest to each of three shareholder-sons); Estate of Bosca v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-251 (father's transfer to a family corporation of
voting common stock in exchange for nonvoting common stock represented gifts
to each ofhis two shareholder-sons of50 percent ofthe difference in the values of
the stock the father transferred and ofthe stock he received); cf. Chanin v. United
States, 183 Ct. CI. 745, 393 F.2d 972 (1968) (two brothers' transfers of stock in
their wholly owned corporation to the subsidiary of another family corporation
constituted gifts to the other shareholders ofthe family corporation, reduced by the
portion attributable to the brothers' own ownership interests in the family
corporation).
Likewise, a transfer to a partnership for less than full and adequate consideration
may represent an indirect gift to the other partners. See Gross v. Commissioner, 7
T.e. 837 (1946) (taxpayer's and spouse's transfer of business assets into a newly
formed partnership among themselves, their daughter, and son-in-law resulted in
taxable gifts to the daughter and son-in-law). Obviously, not every capital
contribution to a partnership results in a gift to the other partners, particularly
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where the contributing partner's capital account is increased by the amount ofhis
contribution, thus entitling him to recoup the same amount upon liquidation ofthe
partnership. In the instant case, however, petitioner's contributions of the leased
land and bank stock were allocated to his and his sons' capital accounts according
to their respective partnership shares. Under the partnership agreement, each .son
was entitled to receive distribution of any part of his capital account with prior
consent ofthe other partners (i.e., his father and brother), and was entitled to sell
his partnership interest after granting his father and brother the fIrSt option to
purchase his interest at fair market value. Upon dissolution ofthe partnership, each
son was entitled to receive payment of the balance in his capital account.
In these circumstances, we conclude and hold that petitioner's transfers to the
partnership represent indirect gifts to each of his sons, John and William, of
undivided 25-percent interests in the leased land and in the bank stock. In reaching
this conclusion, we have effectively aggregated petitioner's two separate, same-day
transfers to the partnership of undivided 50-percent interests in the leased land to
reflect the economic substance ofpetitioner's conveyance to the partnership ofhis
entire interest in the leased land. We have not, however, aggregated the separate,
indirect gifts to his sons, John and William. See Estate ofBosca v. Commissioner,
T.e. Memo. 1998-251 (for purposes of the gift tax., each separate gift must be
valued separately), and cases cited therein; cf. Estate of Bright v. United States,
658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting family attribution in valuing stock for estate
tax purposes).
Judge Ruwe and 2 judges would have held that the gift was to the partnership:
I agree with the majority opinion except for its allowance ofa 15- percent
valuation discount with respect to what the majority descnoes as ..indirect
gifts [by petitioner] to each of his sons, John and William, of undivided
25-percent interests in the leased land". Majority Ope p. 22. In my opinion,
no such discount is appropriate because undivided interests in the leased
land were never transferred to petitioner's sons. The transfer in question
was a transfer of petitioner's entire interest in the leased land to the
partnership. This transfer was to a partnership in which petitioner held a
50-percent interest. Except for enhancing the value of petitioner's 50-
percent partnership interest, he received no other consideration for the
transfer.
Section 2512(b) provides:
SEC. 2512. Valuation of Gifts.
(b) Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which the
value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be
deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing the amount of gifts
made during the calendar year.
The Supreme Court has described previous versions ofthe gift tax statutes (section
501 imposing the tax on gifts and section 503 which is virtually identical to present
section 2512(b)) in the following terms:
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Sections 501 and 503 are not disparate provisions. Congress directed
them to the same purpose, and they should not be separated in application.
Had Congress taxed "gifts" simpliciter, it would be appropriate to assume
that the tenn was used in its colloquial sense, and a search for "donative
intent" would be indicated. But Congress intended to use the tenn "gifts"
in its broadest and most comprehensive sense. H. Rep. No. 708, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess., p.27; S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., p.39; cf.
Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176; Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S.
184. Congress chose not to require an ascertainment ofwhat too often is
an elusive state ofmind. For purposes ofthe gift tax it not only dispensed
with the test of "donative intent." It fonnulated a much more workable
external test, that where "property is transferred for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth," the excess in such
money value "shall, for the purpose of the tax imposed by this title, be
deemed a gift... t, And Treasury Regulations have emphasized that
common law considerations were not embodied in the gift tax.
[Commissionerv. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945); fn. ref. omitted.]
The SupremeCourtdescribed the objectiveofthese statutory provisions as follows:
The section taxing as gifts transfers that. are not made for "adequate and
full [money] consideration" aims to reach those transfers which are
withdrawn from the donor's estate. * * * [Id. at 307.]
Under the applicable statutory provisions, it is unnecessary to consider the value
of what petitioner's sons received in order to detennine the value of the property
that was transferred. Indeed, the regulations provide that it is not even necessary
to identify the donee. The regulations provide that the gift tax is the primary and
personal liability ofthe donor, that the gift is to be measured by the value of the
property passing from the donor, and that the tax applies regardless ofthe fact that
the identity of the donee may not be presently known or ascertainable. See sec.
25.2511- 2(a), Gift Tax Regs.
The majority correctly states the formula for valuing transfers ofproperty:
If property is transferred for less than adequate and full consideration,
then the excess of the value of the· property transferred over the
consideration received is generally deemed a gift. See sec. 2512(b). The
gift is measured by the value of the property passing from the donor,
rather than by the property received by the donee or upon the measure of
enrichment to the donee. See sec. 25.2511-2(a), Gift Tax Regs. [Majority
Ope pp. 11-12.]
This is exactly the fonnula used in the cases on which the majority relies
for the propositi~n that a gift was made. See Kincaid v. United States, 682
F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982); Heringerv. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1956); Ketteman Trust v. Commissioner, 86 T.e. 91 (1986). In each
ofthese cases, property was transferred to a corporation for less than full
consideration. All or part of the stock of the transferee corporations was
owned by persons other than the transferor. In each case, the value ofthe
gift was found to be the fair market value of the property transferred to
the corporation, minus any consideration received by the transferor. None
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of these cases allowed a discount based upon a hypothetical assumption
that fractionalized interests in the transferred property were given to the
individual shareholders ofthe transferee corporations. Unfortunately, the
majority does not follow its own formula, as quoted above, or the above-
cited cases.
Presumably Judge Ruwe would have reduced the value ofthe gift for the father's 50% interest; whether that
reduction would be discounted is not discussed directly but the answer would appear to be no.
Judge Beghe would have applied an estate depletion theory:
With all the woofmg these days about using family partnerships to generate big
discounts, the majority opinion· provides salutary reminders that the ttgift is
measured by the value of the property passing from the donor, rather than by the
property received by the donee or upon the measure ofenrichment of the donee",
majority Ope pp. 11-12, and that "How petitioner's transfers of the leased land and
bank stock may have enhanced the sons' partnership interests is immaterial, for the
gift tax is imposed on the value of what the donor transfers, not what the donee
receives", majority Ope p. 16 (citing section25.2511-2(a), Gift Tax Regs., Robinette
v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 186 (1943), and other cases therein); see also sec.
25.2512-8, Gift Tax Regs.
This is the ttestate depletion tt theory ofthe gift tax, given its most cogent expression
bytheSupremeCourtinCommissionerv. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303,307-308 (1945):
The section taxing as gifts transfers that are not made for "adequate and
full [money] consideration" aims to reach those transfers that are
withdrawn from the donor's estate. To allow detriment to the donee to
satisfy the requirement of"adequate and full consideration" would violate
the purpose of the statute and open wide the door for evasion of the gift
tax. See 2 Paul, supra [Federal Estate and Gift Taxation (1942)] at 1114:
The logic and the sense of the estate depletion theory require that a donor's
simultaneous or contemporaneous gifts to or for the objects of his bounty be
unitized for the purpose of valuing the transfers under section 2511(a). After all,
the gift tax was enacted to protect the estate tax, and the two taxes are to be
construed in pari materia. See Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 313 (1945). The estate
and gift taxes are different from an inheritance tax, which focuses on what the
individual donee-beneficiaries receive; the estate and gift taxes are taxes whose
base is measured by the value of what passes from the transferor.
I would hold, contrary to the majority and the approach of Estate of Bosea v.
Commissioner7 T.e. Memo. 1998-251, that the gross value of what petitioner
transferred in the case at hand is to be measured by including the value ofhis entire
interest in the leased land. I would then value the net gifts by subtracting from the
gross value so arrived at the value, at the end of the figurative day, of the
partnership interest that petitioner received back and retained, sec. 2512(b), not 50
percent of the value of the leased land that he transferred to the partnership.
In Knight a majority of the Tax Court explicitly rejected the IRS argument that the fonn of the partnership
should be disregarded. Judge Beghe dissented as in Shepherd. The facts were:
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On December 6, 1994, petitioner opened an investment account at Broadway
National Bank in the name of petitioners' family limited partnership, the Herbert
D. Knight limited partnership (created on December28, 1994, as described below),
and transferred Treaswy notes to it. On December 12, 1994, petitioners opened a
checking account for their partnership at Broadway National Bank and transferred
$10,000 to it from their personal account. On December 15, 1994, petitioners
transferred $558,939.43 worth ofa USAA municipal bond fund from theirpersonal
investment account to the partnership.
On December 28, 1994, the following occurred:
a. Petitioners signed documents which created the partnership, consisting of
100 units of ownership. The steps followed in the creation of the partnership
satisfied all requirements under Texas law to create a limited partnership.
b. Petitioners conveyed the ranch and the real property at 6219 Dilbeck and
14827 Chancey to the partnership.
c. Petitioners createdthe Knight Management Trust (managementtrust). The
steps followed in the creation of the management trust satisfied all requirements
under Texas law to create a trust. The management trust was the partnership's
general partner.
d. Petitioners each transferred a one-half unit of the partnership to the
management trust. That unit is the only asset held by the management trust.
Petitioners eayh owned a 49.5-percent interest in· the partnership as limited
partners.
e. Petitioners created trusts for Mary Knight and Douglas Knight (the
children's trusts). The documents petitioners executed were sufficient under TexaS
law to create the children's trusts. Douglas Knight and Mary Knight were each the
beneficiary and trustee of the children's trust bearing their name.
f. Petitioners each signed codicils to their wills in which they changed the
bequests to their children to bequests to the children·s trusts.
g. Petitioners each transferred a 22.3-percent interest in the partnership to
each ofthe children's trusts. After those transfers, petitioners each retained a 4.9-
percent interest in the partnership as limited partners.
The opinion states:
Respondent contends that the partnership lacks economic substance and fails to
qualify as a partnership under Federal law. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson,
337 U.S. 733, 740 (1949); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286 (1946);
Merryman v. Commissioner, 873 F.2d 879, 882-883 (5th Cir. 1989), affg. T.e.
Memo. 1988-72. Petitioners contend that their rights and legal relationships and
those of their children changed significantly when petitioners formed the
partnership, transferred assets to it, and transferred interests in the partnership to
their children's trusts, and that we must recognize the partnership for Federal gift
tax valuation purposes. We agree with petitioners.
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State law determines the nature ofproperty rights, and Federal law detennines the
appropriate tax treatment of those rights. See United States v. National Bank of
Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985); United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677,683
(1983); Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509,513 (1960). The parties stipulated
that the steps followed in the creation ofthe partnership satisfied all requirements
under Texas law, and that the partnership has been a limited partnership under
Texas law since it was created. Thus, the transferred interests are interests in a
partnership under Texas law. Petitioners have burdened the partnership with
restrictions that apparently are valid and enforceable under Texas law. The amount
of tax for Federal estate and gift tax purposes is based on the fair market value of
the property transferred. See sees. 2502, 2503. The fair market value ofproperty
is "the price at which such property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell, and both
having reasonable knowledge ofrelevant facts." See sec. 20.2031-1 (b}, Estate Tax
Regs.; sec. 25.2512-1, Gift Tax Regs. We apply the willing buyer, willing seller
test to value the interests in the partnership that petitioners transferred under Texas
law. We do not disregard the partnership because we have no reason to conclude
from this record that a hypothetical buyer or seller would disregard it.
Respondent relies on severa) income tax economicsubstance cases. See, e.g., Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583- 584 (1978); Knetsch v. United
States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960); ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner,
201 F.3d 505, 511-516 (D.C. Cir. 2000), affg. T.C. Memo. 1998-305; ACM
Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231,248 (3d Cir. 1998), affg. in part and
revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1997-115; Menyman v. Commissioner, supra; Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254, 278 (1999). We disagree that
those cases require that we disregard the partnership here because the issue here is
what is the value of the gift. See sees. 2501,2503; sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax
Regs.; sec. 25.2512- I, Gift Tax Regs.
Respondent points out that in several transfer tax cases we and other courts have
valued a transfer based on its substance instead of its form. See, e.g., Heyen v.
United States, 945 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1991); Schultz v. United States, 493
F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1974); Estate ofMurphy v.Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1990-
472; Griffin v. United States, 42 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (W.O. Tex. 1998). Our
holding is in accord with those cases because we believe the form ofthe transaction
here (the creation of the partnership) would be taken into account by a willing
buyer; thus the substance and fonn of the transaction are not at odds for gift tax
valuation purposes. Respondent agrees that petitioners created and operated a
partnership as required under Texas law and gave interests in that partnership to
their children's trusts. Those rights are apparently enforceable under Texas law.
The good news were the legal holdings. On the other hand the Tax Court allowed only a 15% discount:
D. PETITIONERS' CONTENTION THAT A PORTFOLIO DISCOUNT AND
MINORITY AND LACK OF MARKETABILITY DISCOUNTS TOTALING 44
PERCENT APPLY
Petitioners' expert, Robert K. Conklin (Conklin), estimatedthat, ifwe recognize the
partnership for Federal tax purposes, a IO-percent portfolio discount and discounts
of 10 percent for minority interest and 30 percent for lack ofmarketability apply,
for an aggregate discount of44 percent.
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1. PORTFOLIO DISCOUNT
Conklin concluded that a IO-percent portfolio discount applies based on the
assumption that it is unlikely that a buyer could be found who would want to buy
all of the Knight family partnership's assets. He provided no evidence to support
that assumption, see Rule 143(t)(1); Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.e. 386, 401
(1987), affd. 868 F.2d 851 (6th eir. 1989); Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-220.
To estimate the amount ofthe portfolio discount, Conklin relied on a report stating
that conglomerate public companies tend to sell at a discount of about 10 to 15
percent from their breakup value. However, the Knight family partnership is not a
conglomerate public company.
Conklin cites Shannon Pratt's definition of a portfolio discount in estimating the
portfolio discount to apply to the assets of the partnership. A portfolio discount
applies to a company that owns two or more operations or assets, the combination
of which would not be particularly attractive to a buyer. See Estate of Piper v.
Commissioner, 72 T.e. 1062, 1082 (1979). The partnership held real estate and
marketable securities. Conklin gave no convincing reason why the partnership's
mix ofassets would be unattractive to a buyer. We apply no portfolio discount to
the assets of the partnership.
2. LACK OF CONTROL AND MARKETABILITY DISCOUNTS
Conklin concluded that a lack of control discount applies. He speculated that,
because the partnership invested a large part of its assets in bonds, and investors
in the bond fund could not influence investment policy, the partnership "could be
similar to a closed-end bond fund". He estimated that a lack ofcontrol discount of
I0 percent applies by evaluating the difference between the trading value and the
net asset values on October21, 1994, of 10 publicly traded closed-end bond funds.
The 10 funds that Conklin chose are not comparable to the Knight family
partnership. We fmd unconvincing his use ofdata from noncomparable entities to
increase the discount. However, on this record, we believe some discount is
appropriate based on an analogy to a closed-end fund.
Conklin cited seven studies of sales of restricted stocks from 1969 to 1984 to
support his estimate that a 30-percent discount for lack ofmarketability applies. He
used a table summarizing initial public offerings of common stock from 1985 to
1993. However, he did not show that the companies in the studies or the table were
comparable to the partnership, or explain how he used this data to estimate the
discount for lack ofmarketability. See Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d432, 434-
435 (7th Cir. 1964), affg. T.e. Memo. 1963-244; Rose v. Commissioner, supra;
Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734-735 (1985). He also listed seven reasons
why a discount for lack ofmarketability applie~, but he did not explain how those
reasons affect the amount of the discount for lack ofmarketability.
3. CONKLIN'S FACTUAL ASSUMPTIONS
Conklin listed 19 purported business reasons for which he said the partnership was
formed. Petitioners claimed to have had only 5 of those 19 reasons. Conklin also
said: "The compensation and reimbursement paid to the general partner reduce the
A·143
income available to limited partners or assignees. It His statement is inapplicable
because the general partner received no compensation and incurred no expenses.
We have rejected expert opinion based on conclusions which are unexplained or
contrary to the evidence. See Rose v. Commissioner, supra; Compaq Computer
Corp. v. Commissioner, supra. An expert fails to assist the trier of fact ifhe or she
assumes the position of advocate. See Estate of Halas v. Commissioner, 94 T.C.
570, 577 (1990); Laureys v. Commissioner, 92 T.e. 101, 122-129 (1989).
Conklin's erroneous factual assumptions cast doubton his objectivity.
4. CONCLUSION
The parties stipulated that the net asset value ofthe partnership was $2,081,323 on
December 28, 1994. Each petitioner gave each trust a 22.3-percent interest in the
partnership; 44.6 percent of$2,081,323 is $928,270.
We conclude that Conklin was acting as an advocate and that his testimony was not
objective. However, despite the flaws in petitioners' expert's testimony, we believe
that some discount is proper, in part to take into account material in the record
relating to closed-end bond funds. We hold that tile fair market value ofan interest
in the Knight family partnership is the pro rata net asset value of the partnership
less a discount totaling 15 percent for minority interest and lack ofmarketability.
Thus, on December 28, 1994, each petitioner made taxable gifts of$789,030 (44.6
percent of$2,081,323, reduced by 15 percent).
The court also commented on an attempt to cap the amount ofthe gifts:
c. WHETHER THE VALUE OF PETITIONERS' FOUR GIFTS IS
LIMITED TO $300,000 EACH
The transfer document through which petitioners made the gifts at issue states that
each petitioner transferred to each of their children's trusts the number of limited
partnership units which equals $300,000 in value. Petitioners contend that this bars
respondent .. from. asserting that the value of each partnership interest exceeds
$300,000.
Respondent contends that the transfer document makes a fonnula gift that is void
as against public policy. Respondent relies on Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d
824 (4th Cir. 1944), and Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.e. 78, 109-116 (1986). In
Procter, the transfer document provided that, ifa court decided a value that would
cause a part ofthe transfer to be taxable, that part ofthe transfer would revert to the
donor. The u.s. Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit described this provision
as a condition subsequent, and held that it was void as against public policy. See
Commissioner v. Procter, supra at 827.
We need not decide whether Procter and Ward control here because we disregard
the stated $300,000 gift value for other reasons. First, petitioners reported on their
gift tax returns that they each gave two 22.3-percent interests in the partnership.
Contrary to the transfer document, they did not report that they had given
partnership interests worth $300,000. We believe this shows their disregard for the
transfer document, and that they intended to give 22.3-percent interests in the
partnership. .
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Second, even though petitioners contend that respondent is limited to the $300,000
amount, Le., that the gifts were for $300,000 and thus cannot be worth more than
$300,000, petitioners contend that the gifts are each worth less than $300,000. In
fact, petitioners offered expert testimony to show that each gift was worth only
$263,165. We fmd petitioners' contentions to be at best inconsistent. We treat
petitioners' contention and offer of evidence that the gifts were worth less than
$300,000 as opening the door to our consideration of respondent's argument that
the gifts were worth more than $300,000.
Clearly the court was not sympathetic to the taxpayer but it did not squarely confront this issue.
In Strangi the decedent's attorney-in-fact fonned the partnership two month's before the decedent's death. The
decedent retained a 99% limited interest and a 47% interest in the 1% corporate general partner. The decedent's
children paid for the other shares in the general partner. Over 75% of the partnerships' assets were marketable
securities.
The Tax Court first determined that the "business purposes" for the partnership were bogus but that the
partnership would be respected anyway:
We must decide whether the existence of SFLP [Strangi Family Limited
Partnership] will be recognized for Federal estate tax purposes. Respondent argues
that, under the business purpose and economic substance doctrines, SFLP should
be disregarded in valuing the assets in decedent's estate. Petitioner contends that
the business purpose and economic substance doctrines do not apply to transfer tax
cases and that SFLP had economic substance and business purpose.
Taxpayers are generally free to structure transactions as they please, even if
motivated by tax-avoidance considerations. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465,469 (1935); Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d494, 497 (7th eire 1988), affg.
Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.e. 1087 (1986). However, the tax effects of a
particular transaction are determined by the substance ofthe transaction rather than
by its form. In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583..584 (1978), the
Supreme Court stated that "a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic
substance * * * compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, * * *
imbued with tax-independent considerations, and * • • not shaped soleiy by tax
avoidance features" should be respected for tax purposes. "[T]ransaetions which
have no economic purpose or substance other than the avoidance oftaxes will be
disregarded." Gregory v. Helvering, supra at 469-470; see also Merryman v.
Commissioner, 873 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1989), affg. T.e. Memo. 1988-72.
Family partnerships must be closely scrutinized by the courts because the family
relationship "so readily lends itself to paper arrangements having little or no
relationship to reality." Kuney v. Frank, 308 F.2d 719, 720 (9th Cir. 1962); accord
Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554, 561 (1992); Harwood v. Commissioner, 82
T.C. 239, 258 (1984), affd. without published opinion 786 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir.
1986); Estate of Kelley v. Commissioner, 63 T.e. 321, 325 (1974); Estate of
Tiffany v. Commissioner, 47 T.e. 491,499 (1967); see also Helveringv. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331,336-337 (1940). Family partnerships have long been recognized
where there is a bona fide business carried on after the partnership is fonned. See,
e.g., Drew v. Commissioner, 12 T.e. 5, 12-13 (1949). Mere suspicion and
speculation about a decedent's estate planning and.testamentary objectives are not
sufficient to disregard an agreement in the absence ofpersuasive evidence that the
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agreement is not susceptible of enforcement or would not be enforced by parties
to the agreement. Cf. Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 92 T.e. 312,335 (1989).
The estate contends that there were "clear and compelling" nontax motives for
creating SFLP, including the provision ofa flexible and efficient means by which
to manage and protect decedent's assets. Specifically, the estate argues that its
business purposes for fonning SFLP were (1) to reduce executor and attorney's
fees payable at the death ofdecedent, (2) to insulate decedent from an anticipated
tort claim and the estate from a will contest (by creating another layer through
which creditors must go to reach assets conveyed to the partnership), and (3) to
provide a joint investment vehicle for management ofdecedent's assets. We agree
with respondent that there are reasons to be skeptical about the nontax motives for
forming SFLP.
******
We also do not believe that a "joint investment vehicle" was the purpose of the
partnership. Mr. Gulig [the attorney-in-fact] took over control ofdecedent's affairs
in September 1993, under the 1988 power ofattorney, and Mr. Gulig continued to
manage decedent's assets through his management responsibilities in Stranco.
Petitioner concedes, in disputing respondent's alternative claim ofgift tax liability,
that "directly or indirectly, the Decedent ended up with 99.47% ofthe Partnership,
having put in essentially 99.47% of the capital."
The formation and subsequent control of SFLP were orchestrated by Mr. Gulig
without regard to '~ointenterprise". He fonned the partnership and the corporation
and then invited Mrs. Gulig's siblings, funded by her, to invest in the corporation.
The Strangi children shared in managing the assets only after and to the extent that
the Merrill Lynch account was fragmented in accordance with their respective
beneficial interests. .
The nature ofthe assets that were contributed to SFLP supports the conclusion that
management ofthose assets was not the purpose ofSFLP. There were no operating
business assets contributed to SFLP. Decedent transferred cash, securities, life
insurance policies, annuities, real estate, and partnership interests to SFLP. The
cash and securities approximated 75 percent ofthe value ofthe assets transferred.
No active business was conducted by SFLP following its formation.
******
SFLP was validly fonned under State law. The formalities were followed, and the
proverbial "its were dotted" and Itt's were crossed". The partnership, as a legal
matter, changed the relationships between decedent and his heirs and decedent and
actual and potential creditors. Regardless ofsubjective intentions, the partnership
had sufficient substance to be recognized for tax purposes. Its existence would not
be disregarded by potential purchasers of decedent's assets, and we do not
disregard it in this case.
The court then rejected the applicability of section 2703:
Respondent next argues that the term "property" in section 2703(a)(2)
means the underlying assets in the partnership and that the partnership
form is the restriction that must be disregarded. Unfortunately for
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respondent's position, neither the language ofthe statute nor the language
ofthe regulation supports respondent's interpretation. Absent application
of some other provision, the property included in decedent's estate is the
limited partnership interest and decedent's interest in Stranco.
In Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), the Court dealt with a similar issue
with respect to interpretation of section 2704(b). Sections 2703 and 2704 were
enacted as part ofchapter 14, I.R.C., in 1990. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388. However, as we indicated in Kerr
v. Commissioner, supra at470-471, and as respondent acknowledges in the portion
ofhis briefquoted above, the new statute was intended to be a targeted substitute
for the complexity, breadth, and vagueness ofprior section 2036(c); and Congress
"wanted to value property interests more accurately when they were transferred,
insteadofincludingpreviously transferred property in the transferor's grossestate."
Treating the partnership assets, rather than decedent's interest in the partnership,
as the "property" to which section 2703(a) applies in this case would raise anew the
difficulties that Congress sought to avoid by repealing section 2036(c) and
replacing it with chapter 14. We conclude that Congress did not intend, by the
enactment ofsection 2703, to treat partnership assets as if they were assets ofthe
estate where the legal interest owned by the decedent at the time of death was a
limited partnership orcorporate interest. See also EstateofChurch v. United States,
85 AFTR 2d 2000-804, 2000-1 USTC par. 60,369 (W.O. Tex. 2000). Thus, we
need not address whether the partnership agreement satisfies the safe harbor
provisions ofsection 2703(b). Respondent did notargue separately that the Stranco
shareholders' agreement should be disregarded for lack ofeconomic substance or
under section 2703(a).
More interesting is the court's discussion ofthe gift on formation argument. The court rejects the argument:
Respondent detennined in the statutory notice and argues in the alternative that, if
the partnership is recognized for estate tax purposes, decedent made a gift when he
transferred property to the partnership and received in return a limited partnership
interest of lesser value. Using the value reported by petitioner on the estate tax
return, if decedent gave up property worth in excess of$10 million and received
back a limited partnership interest worth approximately $6.5 million, he appears to
have made a gift equal to the loss in value. (Petitioner now claims a greater
discount, as discussed below.) In analogous circumstances involving a transfer to
a corporation, the CourtofAppeals in Kincaid v. United States, 682 F.2d 1220 (5th
Cir. 1982), held that there was a taxable gift and awarded summaryjudgment to the
Government The CourtofAppeals rejected the discounts claimed bythe taxpayer,
stating that no business person "would have enter~ into this transaction, * * *
[thus] the 'moving impulse for the * * * transaction was a desire to pass the family
fortune on to others"'. Id. at 1225 (quoting Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184,
187-188 (1943)).The Court 0 f Appeals in Kincaid concluded that, while there may
have been business reasons for the taxpayer to transfer land to a family corporation
in exchange for stock, "there was no business purpose, only a donative one, for
Mrs. Kincaid to accept less value in return than she gave up." Id. at 1226.
In this case, the estate claims that the assets were transferred to SFLP for the
business purposes discussed above. Following the fonnation ofSFLP, decedent
owned a 99-percent limited partnership interest in SFLP and 47 percent of the
corporate general partner, Stranco. Even asS\U11ing arguendo that decedent1s
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asserted business purposes were real, we do not believe that decedent would give
up over $3 million in value to achieve those business purposes.
Nonetheless, in this case, because we do not believe that decedent gave up control
over the assets, his beneficial interest in them exceeded 99 percent, and his
contribution was allocated to his own capital account, the instinctive reaction that
there was a gift at the inception ofthe partnership does not lead to a detennination
ofgift tax liability. In a situation such as that in Kincaid, where other shareholders
or partners have a significant interest in an entity that is enhanced as a result of a
transfer to the entity, or in a situation such as Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115 T.C.
_, _ (2000) (slip. op. at 21), where contributions of a taxpayer are allocated to
the capital accounts of other partners, there is a gift. However, in view of
decedent's continuing interest in SFLP and the reflection ofthe contributions in his
own capital account, he did not transfer more than a minuscule proportion of the
value that would be "losttl on the conveyance of his assets to the partnership in
exchange for a partnership interest. See Kincaid v. United States, supra at 1224.
Realistically, in this case, the disparity between the value ofthe assets in the hands
of decedent and the alleged value of his partnership interest reflects on the
credibility ofthe claimed discount applicable to the partnership interest. It does not
reflect a taxable gift.
Clearly the court thought another theory should be asserted, but was not -- section 2036:
The actual control exercised by Mr. Gulig, combined with the 99-percent limited
partnership interest in SFLP and the 47- percent interest in Stranco, suggest the
possibility of including the property transferred to the partnership in decedent's
estate under section 2036. See, e.g., Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
144 (2000). Section 2036 is not an issue in this case, however, because respondent
asserted it only in a proposed amendment to answer tendered shortly before trial.
Respondent's motion to amend the answer was denied because it was untimely.
Applying the economic substance doctrine in this case on the basis of decedent's
continuing control would be equivalent to applying section 2036(a) and including
the transferred assets in decedent's estate. As discussed below, absent application
of section 2036, Congress has adopted an alternative approach to perceived
valuation abuses.
The IRS expert allowed a 31% discount which the court, reluctantly, accepted:
Both petitioner's expert: and respondent's expert determined that a 25-percent lack
of marketability discount was appropriate. Only respondent's expert, however,
considered decedent's ownership ofStranco·stock. We agree with respondent that
the relationship between the limited partnership interest and the interest in Stranco
cannot be disregarded. The entities were created as a unit and operated as a unit
and were functionally inseparable.
In valuing decedent's 99-percent limited partnership interest on the date ofdeath,
respondent's expert applied an 8- percent minority interest discount and a 25-
percent marketability discount, to reach a combined (rounded) discount of 31
percent. Respondent's expert valued decedent's 47-percent interest in Stranco by
applying a 5-percent minority interest discount and a 15-percentmarketability
discount, to reach a combined (rounded) discount of 19 percent. Petitioner's expert
applied a 25-percent minority interest discount and a 25-percent marketability
discount, resulting in an effective total discount of43.75 percent to the partnership.
He did not value petitioner's interest in Stranco because he believed that the
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relationship was irrelevant. In our view, his result is unreasonable and must be
rejected.
Respondent's expert selected the lower minority interest discount after considering
the effective control of the limited partnership interest and the interest in Stranco
and considering the detailed provisions of the partnership agreement and the
shareholders' agreement. He examined closed-end funds, manyofwhich are traded
on major exchanges, and detennined the range ofdiscounts from net asset value for
those funds. He selected a discount toward the lower end ofthe range. His analysis
was well documented and persuasive. As respondent notes, nonnally a control
premium would apply to an interest having effective control ofan entity.
Petitioner argues that consideration of the stock interest in Stranco in valuing the
limited partnership interest is erroneous because the shareholders' agreement
granted the corporation and the other shareholders the right to purchase a selling
shareholder's stock. While the shareholders' agreement may be a factor to be
considered in detennining fair market value, it does not persuade us that a
hypothetical seller would not market the interest in the limited partnership and the
interest in the corporation as a unit or that a transaction would actually take place
in which only the partnership interest or the stock interest was transferred.· Under
the circumstances, the shareholders' agreement is merely a factor to be taken into
account but not to be given conclusive weight. Cf. Estate ofHall v. Commissioner, ,
92 T.C. 312, 335 (1989); Estate of Lauder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-
527.
In view of our rejection of respondent's belated att~mpt to raise section 2036 and
respondent's request that we disregard the partnership agreement altogether, we are
constrained to accept the evidence concerning discounts applicable to decedent's
interest in the partnership and in Stranco as of the date of death. We believe tha~
the result ofrespondent's expert's discounts may still be overgenerous to petitioner,
but that result is the one that we must reach under the evidence and under the
applicable statutes.
Again, there were concurrences and dissents, in line with Shepherd and Knight. Judge Ruwe makes the point
that a 31% discount ought to mean a gift on formation based on the majority opinion:
This case involves an attempt by a dying man (or his attorney) to transfer property
to a partnership in consideration for a 99-percent partnership interest that would be
valued at substantially less than the value of the assets transferred to the
partnership, while at the same time assuring that 100 percent of the value of the
transferred assets would be passed to decedent's beneficiaries. Assuming, as the
majority has found, that decedent's partnership·interest was worth less than the
property he transferred, section 2512(b) should be applied. Pursuant to that section
the excess ofthe value ofthe property decedent transferred to the partnership over
the value ofthe consideration he received is "deemed a gift" subject to the gift tax.
By failing to apply section 2512(b) in this case, the majority thwarts the purpose
of section 2512(b) which the Supreme Court described as "the evident desire of
Congress to hit all the protean arrangements which the wit ofman can devise that
are not business transactions". Commissioner v. Wemyss, supra at 306.
The majority's allowance ofa 3 I-percent discount is in stark contrast to its rejection
of respondent's gift argument on the ground that decedent did not give up control
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of the assets when he transferred them to the partnership. See majority Ope p. 21.
While the basis for fmding that decedent did not give up control ofthe assets is not
fully explained, it appears not to be based on the literal terms of the partnership
agreement which gave control to Stranco, the corporate general partner. Decedent
owned only 47 percent of the Stranco stock. Since the majority also rejects
respondent's economic substance argument, the only other conceivable basis for
concluding that decedent retained control over the assets that he contributed to the
partnership is that the partnership arrangement was a factual sham. Ifthat were the
case, the partnership arrangement itselfwould be "mere windowdressing" masking
the true facts and the tenns ofthe partnership arrangement should be disregarded.
In an analogous situation the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disregarded
the written tenns ofa transfer document as fraudulent. See Heyen v. United States,
945 F.2d 359 (lOth Cir. 1991).
Judge Beghe would have applied substance over form to negate the benefit of the transaction:
I support the use of substance over fonn analysis to decide whether a transaction
qualifies for the tax-law defined status its form suggests. A formally correct
transaction without a business purpose may not be a "reorganization", and a title
holder of property without an economic interest may not be the tax "owner".
However, I share the majority's concerns about using substance over form analysis
to alter the conclusion about a real-world fact, sqch as the fair market value of
property, which the law tells us is the price at which the property actually could be
sold.
Although my approach to the case at hand employs a step- transaction analysis,
which is a variant of substance over form, I do not use that analysis to conclude
anything about fair market value. Instead, I use it to identify the property whose
transfer is subject to tax. Step-transaction analysis has often been used in transfer
tax cases to identify the transferor or the property transferred.
The step-transaction doctrine is a judicially created concept that treats a series of
formally separate "steps" as a single transaction if those steps are "in substance
integrated, interdependent and focused toward a particular end result. It Penrod v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 (1987). The most far-reaching version of the
step-transaction doctrine, the end-result test, applies if it appears that a series of
formally separate steps are really prearranged parts ofa single transaction that are
intended from the outset to reach the ultimate result..See Penrod v. Commissioner,
88 T.C. at 1429, 1430 (citing Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315
U.S. 179 (1942); South Bay Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1965);
Morgan Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1941); Heintz
v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 132 (1955); Ericsson Screw Machine Prods. Co., v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. 757 (1950); King Enters., Inc. v. United States~ 189 Ct. Cl.
466,475,418 F.2d 511, 516 (1969». The end- result test is flexible and grounds
tax consequences on what actually happened, not on formalisms chosen by the
participants. See Penrod v. Commissioner, supra.
The sole purpose of the transactions orchestrated by Mr. and Mrs. Gulig was to
reduce Federal transfer taxes by depressjpg the value ofMr. Strangi's assets as they
passed through his gross estate, to his children, via the partnership. The
arrangement merely operated to convey. the assets to the same individuals who
would have received the assets in any event under Mr. Strangi's will. Nothing of
substance was intended to change as a result of the transactions and, indeed, the
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transactions did nothing to affect Mr. Strangi's or his children's interests in the
underlying assets except to evidence an effort to reduce Federal transfer taxes. The
control exercised by Mr. Strangi and his children over the assets did not change at
all as a result of the transactions. For instance, shortly after Mr. Strangi's death
SFLP made substantial distributions to the children, the Merrill Lynch account was
divided into 4 separate accounts to allow each child to control his or her
proportionate share of SFLP assets, and distributions were made to the estate to
enable it to pay death taxes and post a bond. Mr. Strangi's testamentary objectives
are further evidenced by his practical incompetency and failing health at formation
and funding of SFLP and Stranco and the short time between the partnership
transactions and Mr. Strangi's death.
The estate asserts that property with a stated value of$9,876,929, in the form of
cash and securities, when funneled through the partnership, took on a reduced
value of $6,560,730. It is inconceivabJethat Mr. Strangi would have accepted, if
dealing at arm's length, a partnership interest purportedly worth only two- thirds of
the value ofthe assets he transferred. This is especially the case given Mr. Strangi's
age and health, because it would have been impossible for him ever to recoup this
immediate loss.
It is also inconceivable that Mr. Strangi (or his representatives) would transfer the
bulk ofhis liquid assets to a partnership, in exchange for a limited interest (plus a
minority interest in the corporate general partner) that would tenninate his control
over the assets and their income streams, if the other partners had not been family
members. See Estate ofTrenchard v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1995-121; there
the Court found "incredible" the assertion of the executrix that the decedent's
transfer of property to a family corporation in exchange for stock was in the
ordinary course ofbusiness. It is clearthat the sole purpose ofSFLP was to depress
the value of Mr. Strangi's assets artificially for a brief time as the assets passed
through his estate to his children. See Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1990-472, in which this Court denied dec«lent's estate a minority discount
on a 49.65-percent stock interest because the prior inter vivos transfer of a 1.76-
percent interest did "not appreciably affect decec;lent's beneficial interest except to
reduce Federal transfer taxes." Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, supra, 60
T.e.M. (CCH) 645, 661, 1990 T.e.M. (RIA) par. 90,472, at 90-2261.
Thus, under the end-result test, the fonnally separate steps ofthe transaction (the
creation and funding ofthe partnership within 2 months ofMr. Strangi's death, the
substantial outright distributions to the estate and to the children, and the carving
up of the Merrill Lynch account) that were employed to achieve Mr. Strangi's
testamentary objectives should be collapsed and viewed as a single integrated
transaction: the transfer at Mr. Strangi's death of the underlying assets.
In many cases courts have collapsed multistep transactions or recast them to
identify the parties (usually the donor or donee) or the property to be valued for
transfer tax purposes. See, e.g., Estate ofBies v. Commissioner, T.C. M~mo. 2000-
338 (identifying transferors for purposes ofgift tax annual exclusions); Estate of
Cidulka v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1996-149 (donor's gift of minority stock
interests to shareholders followed by a redemption of donor's remaining shares
treated as single transfer of a controlling interest); Estate of Murphy v.
Commissioner, supra(decedent's inter vivos transferofa minority interest followed
by a testamentary transfer ofher remaining shares treated as an integrated plan to
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transfer control to decedent's children); Griffin v. United States, 42 F. Supp. 2d 700
(W.O. Tex. 1998) (transfer of 45 percent of donor's stock to donor's spouse
followed by a transfer by spouse and donor of all their stock to a trust for the
benefit of their child treated as one gift by donor of the entire block).
Most recently, the Tax Court has issued Estate ofW. W. Jones, II v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. No. II (2001).
The opinion is favorable to the taxpayer. The Court summarized its holding:
D [W.W. Jones, II] formed a family limited partnership (JBLP) with his son and
transferred assets including real property, to IBLP in exchange for a 95.5389-
percent limited partnership interest. D also formed a family limited partnership
(AVLP) with his four daughters and transferred real property to AVLP in exchange
for an 88. I 78-percent limited partnership interest. D's son contributed real property
in exchange for general and limited
partnership interests in JBLP, and the daughters contributed real property in
exchange for general and limited partnership
interests in AVLP. All of the contributions were properly reflected in the capital
accounts of the contributing partners. Immediately after fonnation of the
partnerships, 0 transferred by gift an 83.08-percent limited partnership interest in
JBLPto
his son and a 16.915-percent limited partnership interest in AVLP to each of his
daughters.
HELD: The transfers of property to the partnerships were not taxable gifts. See
Estate ofStrangi v. Commissioner, t 15 T.C. 478 (2000).
HELD, FURTHER, sec. 2704(b), I.R.e., does not apply to this transaction. See
Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449 (1999).
HELD, FURTHER, the value ofD's gift to his son was 83.08-percent ofthe value
ofthe underlying assets ofJBLP, reduced by a lack-of-marketability (8%) discount.
The value of D's gift to each of his daughters was 16.915 percent of the value of
the underlying assets ofAVLP, reduced by secondary market (40%) and
lack-of-marketability (8%) discounts.
HELD, FURTHER, the gifts of limited partnership interests are not subject to
additionallack-of-marketability discounts forbuilt-in capital gains. Estate ofDavis
v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 530 (1998), distinguished.
2. - Use ofNotes in GRATs. The IRS has confirmed its regulatory position that notes may not be used
to make annuity payments from a GRAT. REG-I08287-98 (proposed regulations); T.D. 8899 (September 5, 2000)(fmal
regulations). The explanation to the proposed regulations stated:
Accordingly, these proposed regulations amend the regulations under section 2702
to provide that issuance ofa note, other debt instrument, option or similar financial
arrangement does not constitute payment for purposes ofsection 2702. A retained
interest that can be satisfied with such instruments is not a qualified annuity interest
or a qualified unitrust interest. In examining all of these transactions, the Service
will apply the step transaction doctrine where more than one step is used to achieve
similar results. In addition, a retained interest is not a qualified interest under
section 2702, unless the trust instrument expressly prohibits the use ofnotes, other
debt instruments, options or similar fmanciaI arrangements that effectively delay
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receipt by the grantor of the annual payment necessary to satisfy the annuity or
unitrust interest amount. Under these provisions, in order to satisfy the annuity or
unitrust payment obligation under section 2702(b), the annuity or unitrust payment
must be made with either cash or other assets held by the trust.
The proposed regulations provide a transition rule for trusts created before
September20, 1999. Ifa trust created before September20, 1999, does not prohibit
a trustee from issuing a note, other debt instrument, optionor other similar
financial arrangement in satisfaction ofthe annuity or unitrust payment obligation,
the interest will be treated as a qualified interest under section 2702(b) ifnotes, etc.
are not used after September 20, 1999, to satisfy the obligation and any note or
notes or other debt instruments issued on or prior to September20, 1999, to satisfy
the annual payment obligation are paid in full by December 31, 1999, and any
option or similar financial arrangement is tenninated by December 31, 1999, such
that the grantor actually receives cash or other trust assets in satisfaction of the
payment obligation. For purposes of this section, an option will be considered
tenninated if the grantor is paid the greater of the required annuity or unitrust
payment plus interest computed under section 7520 ofthe Code, or the fair market
value of the option.
The Supplementary Infonnation to the final regulations states:
Under the proposed reg\flations, the use ofa note, other debt instrument, option, or
similar financial arrangement does not constitute a payment of the annuity or
unitrust amount to the grantor as required by section 2702. Further, the proposed
regulations provide that a retained interest is not a qualified interest under section
2702, unless the trust instrument expressly prohibits the use of notes, other debt
instruments, options, or similar financial arrangements.
Commentators suggested that the regulations should permit the use of short-te~
notes or notes that bear interest at the section 7520 rate. This suggestion was not
adopted. A note issued by the trust, regardless of the tenn or the interest rate,
effectively defers the required payment. Thus, the issuance of a note is not the
current payment ofthe annuity or unitrust amount not less frequently than annually
as required by the statute. Under these provisions, in order to satisfy the annuity or
unitrust payment obligation under section 2702(b), the annuity or unitrust amount
must be paid with either cash or other assets held by the trust.
Commentators also questioned whether the prohibition on the use ofnotes to make
the annuity or unitrust payment applies if the tnJstee borrows the required funds
from an unrelated party. The Treasury Department and the IRS acknowledge that
a trustee may borrow from an unrelated party to make the payment. However, the
step transaction doctrine will be applied where a series of transactions is used to
achieve a result that is inconsistent with the regulations. For example, suppose that
the trustee borrows cash from a bank to make the required annuity payment and
then borrows cash from the grantor to repay the bank. Similarly, suppose the
grantor requests that a bank make a loan to the trust, but as a prerequisite for
making the loan, the bank requires the grantor to deposit with the bank an amount
equal to the loan. There is no sub~tantive difference between these series of
transactions and the situation in which a trustee issues a note for the annuity
amount directly to the grantor. The final regulations have added the words "directly
or indirectly" to clarify this point.
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In response to a comment, the final regulations clarify that a trust instrument
provision expressly prohibiting the use of notes to satisfy the annual payments is
not required for trusts established before September 20, 1999. However, as
provided in the regulations, a retained interest in a trust established before
September20, 1999, Will not be treated as a qualified interest ifnotes are used after
September 20, 1999, to satisfy the payment obligati.pD, or any notes issued to
satisfy the annual payment obligation on or prior to·September 20, 1999, are not
paid in full by December 31, 1999.
Proration of First Year's Payment
In response to comments, the regulations clarify the roles covering the period on
which the annual payment must be based and the proration of the annuity or
unitrust amount in the case ofshort periods. The final regulations make it clear that
the annuity or unitrust amount need not be payable based on the taxable year ofthe
trust. Rather, the annuity or unitrust amount may be payable annually or more
frequently, (for example, monthly, quarterly, or semi- annually) based on the
anniversary date ofthe creation of the trust. Thus, a trust providing for an annuity
interest created on May 1st need not require that the trustee make payments based
on the taxable year ofthe trust. Instead, the entire annual payment may be made by
April 30th of each succeeding year of the trust term. If payment is based on the
anniversary date of the trust, proration of the annuity or unitrust amount will be
required only ifthe last period during which such amount is payable to the grantor
is a short period. On the other hand, ifpayment is based on the taxable year of the
trust, proration is required for each short taxable year of the trust during the
grantor's term.
The provision allowing payments on the anniversary date will be difficult or impossible to meet in almost every
circumstance.
Borrowing can have negative income tax consequences. In TAMs 200010010, 2000100 II, and 200011005,
the Service considered GRATs which borrowed money from another trust to pay the annuity. The remainder
beneficiaries of both the ORAT (Trust 2) and the lender trust (Trust 3) were the annuitant's nephews. The TAMs
conclude that when the ORAT's status as a grantor trust tenninated the annuitant/grantor recognized gain. The Service
states:
Section 1.1001-2(a) of the Income Tax Regulations provides that the amount
realized from a sale or other disposition of property includes the amount of
liabilities from which the transferor is discharged as a result of the sale or
disposition.
Section 1.loo1-2(a)(3) states that "In the case ofa liability incurred by reason of
the acquisition of the property, this section does not apply to the extent that such
liability was not taken into account in detennining the transferor's basis for such
property."
In Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184, an individual, A created an irrevocable trust,
T, and funded T with 100 shares ofstock in Corporation Z in 1980. A's basis in the
shares was $20x. On December 27, 1981, when the fair market value of the
Corporation Z shares was $40x, W, as trustee, transferred the 100 shares to A in
exchange for A's unsecured pr9missory note with a face amount of$40x, bearing
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an adequate rate of interest. On January 20, 1984, A sold the 100 shares to an
unrelated party for $50x. The Revenue Ruling concludes that A's acquisition ofthe
entire corpus of T in exchange for an unsecured note was, in substance, the
economic equivalent of borrowing trust corpus, and therefore A is treated as the
owner of the trust under section 675(3), and is considered to be the owner of tile
trust assets for federal income tax purposes. Furthennore, the ruling concludes that
the transfer oftrust assets to A was not a sale for federal income tax purposes and
A did not acquire a cost basis in those assets.
Under section 1.1001-2(c) Ex. 5, C, an individual creates T, a grantor trust. C is
treated as the owner ofthe entire trust. T purchases an interest in P, a partnership.
C, as the owner of T, deducts the distributive share of partnership losses
attributable to the partnership interest held by T. When C renounces the powers
that initially resulted in T being classified as a grantor trust, T ceases to be a
grantor trust and C is no longer considered to be the owner ofthe trust. Since prior
to the renunciation, C was the owner of the entire trust, C was considered the
owner of all the trust property for federal income tax purposes and C was
considered to be the partner in P during the time T was a grantor trust. When T no
longer qualified as a grantor trust, with the result that C was no longer considered
to be the owner of the trust and trust property, C is considered to have transferred
ownership of the interest in P to T, now a separate taxable entity. At that time CIS
share ofP's liabilities is $11,000. On the transfer, CIS shareofpartnership liabilities
is considered as money received.
Similarly, in the present case, X has created a grantor trust and is treated as the
owner of the entire trust and the owner ofall the trust property. Thus, although X
has nominally transferred a shares of Company stock to Trust 2, X remains the
owner ofthe trust property for federal income tax purposes. Therefore, when Trust
2 terminates and transfers a shares ofCompany stock to the remainder trusts for C
and D, X is considered to have disposed of the Company stock to the remainder
trusts, along with the associated liability assumed by the remainder trusts, and XIS
amount realized includes the amount of liabilities from which X is discharged as
a result of the disposition.
X argues that this case is distinguishable from Example 5 in 1.IOOI-2(c) because,
in that example, T purchased an interest in P and C deducted the distributive share
ofpartnership losses attributable to the partnership interest held by T, while, in the
present case X did not deduct losses attributable to debt incurred by Trust 2.
Therefore, X argues that X should not be considered the owner of all the trust
property for federal income tax purposes, and X should not be considered to have
transferred ownership ofthe stock, subject to the liability, to the remainder trusts.
X argues that instead, Trust 2 should be treated as the owner ofthe stock, and Trust
2 should be treated as the transferor of the stock, subject to the liability, to the
remainder trusts. In addition, X argues that the debt is incurred by reason ofTrust
2's acquisition of the stock, and since under Rev. Rut. 85-13, the amount of the
debt did not increase Trust 2's basis in the stock, the liability should not be included
in Trust 2's amount realized under section 1.1001-2(a)(3).
However, although X did not deduct losses attributable to debt incurred by Trust
2, X received an annuity payment from Trust 2 that was not includible in XiS
income, and thus, X benefitted from the debt incurred by Trust 2. Therefore, we
conclude that the present case is not distinguishable from Example 5 of section
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1.1001-2(c). Because X was considered the owner ofthe stock for federal income
tax purposes, the exception in section 1.1001-2(a)(3) does not apply to the present
case. X, not Trust 2, is the transferor of the stock on termination ofTrust 2 and X
did not incur the indebtedness in order to acquire the stock within the meaning of
section 1.1001-2(a)(3).
In addition, X argues that the language ofsection I.I001-2(a)(3) does not require
that the debt be incurred by reason ofthe transferor's acquisition of the property,
but merely be incurred by reason ofany acquisition ofthe property. Therefore, X
states that regardless of whether X or Trust 2 is treated as the transferor of the
stock to the remainder trusts, the amount ofthe liability should not be included in
X's amount realized because the debt was incurred by reason of Trust 2's
acquisition ofCompany stock. Section 1.1001-2(a)(3) states that "In the case ofa
liability incurred by reason ofthe acquisition ofthe property, this section does not
apply to the extent that such liability was not taken into account in detennining the
transferor's basis for such property." We believe this language can only be
reasonably read to refer to the transferor's acquisition of the property. We believe
this case is substantially identical to Example 5 in section 1.1001-2(c).
3. Valuing Annuity Interest in GRAT. Two Tax Court cases have clarified what are, and are not,
qualified interests for purposes ofsection 2702. In William A. Cook, et ux. v. Commissioner, 115 T.e. No.2 (2000),
the Tax Court held that a spousal interest that took effect after the grantor's death was not a qualified interest. The
opinion states:
Respondent agrees that each grantor's retained annuity to the extent it is for a tenn
ofyears or the grantor's earlier death constitutes a qualified interest. Respondent,
however, challenges the provision ofeach trust which continues the annuity for the
spou~e, if the spouse survives the grantor, for the remaining tenn of the trust or
until the spouse's earlier death.
We agree with respondent that as to each trust, the interest retained in favor ofthe
grantor's spouse, whether viewed as an independent interest or as an expansion of
the grantor's interest, is not qualified. and therefore must be valued at zero. Thus,
v,'e reject petitioners'contention that they are entitloo to value each grantor's
retained interest as an annuity based on two lives.
We frrst consider the nature ofthe spousal interests themselves. In the trusts before
us, the spousal interests are contingent upon surviving the grantor, so they may
never take effect. We, however, do not believe section 2702 pennits a transferor
to reduce the value of a remainder interest by the simple expedient ofassigning a
value to a retained interest which may, in fact, never take effect.
As indicated above, the regulations provide that "The governing instrument must
fix the tenn of the annuity or unitrust interest." Sec. 25.2702-3(d)(3), Gift Tax
Regs. We construe this language to require that the tenn be fIXed and ascertainable
at the creation of the trust. The regulations contain two examples which illustrate
this requirement, as follows:
EXAMPLE 5. A transfers property to an irrevocable trust, retaining the
right to receive 5 percent ofthe net fair market value ofthe trust property,
valued annually, for 10 years. If A dies within the IO-year tenn~ the
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the retained annuity will extend beyond the life ofthe tenn holder; i.e., the grantor.
Section 25.2702-3(d)(3), Gift Tax Regs., precludes this result.
The Tax Court followed its decision in Cook in Patricia A. Schott et vir v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 2001-
110.
On the other hand, the Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion, has agreed that payments to a decedent's estate are
qualified interests. Audrey J. Walton v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. No. 41 (2000). There were two ORATs involved:
According to the provisions ofeach GRAT, petitioner was to receive an annuity
amount equal to 49.35 percent ofthe initial trust value for the first 12-month period
of the trust term and 59.22 percent of such initial value for the second 12-month
period ofthe trust teon. In the event that petitioner's death intervened, the annuity
amounts were to be paid to her estate. The sums were payable on December 31 of
each taxable year but could be paid up through the date by which the Federal
income tax return for the trust was required to be filed. The payments were to be
made from income and, to the extent income was not sufficient, from principal.
Any excess income was to be added to principal.
Upon completion of the 2-year trust term, the remaining balance was to be
distributed to the designated remainder beneficiary.
The opinion describes the issue as follows:
Respondent contends that in establishing each ORAT, petitioner created three
separate and distinct interests: (I) The annuity payable to her during her lifetime,
(2) the "contingent" interest of her estate to receive the annuity payments in the
event ofher death prior to expiration ofthe 2-year trust term, and (3) the remainder
interest granted to her daughter. Ofthese three, it is respondent's position that only
the first interest, but not the second, constitutes a,qualified retained interest within
the meaning of section 2702 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Respondent particularly relies upon section 25.2702-3(e), Example (5), Gift Tax
Regs. (hereinafter Example 5), as a valid interpretation of the statute and as
governing the issues involved in this case.
Hence, according to respondent, only the value of an annuity payable for the
shorter of2 years or the period ending upon petitioner's death may be subtracted
from the fair market value ofthe stock in calculating the value ofthe taxable gift
made by reason ofpetitioner's establishment of the GRAT's.
******
Conversely, petitioner maintains that for valuation purposes under section 2702,
each ORAT is properly characterized as creating only two separate interests: (I)
A retained annuity payable for a fixed tenn of2 years, and (2) a remainder interest
in favor ofher daughter. Petitioner further asserts that the fonner, in its entirety, is
a qualified interest within the meaning ofthe statute. Accordingly, it is petitioner's
position that the retained interest to be subtracted in computing the amount ofthe
taxable gift occasioned by each GRATis to be valued as a simple 2-year tenn
annuity, without regard to any mortality factor.
The IRS relied on Example 5 for its position; the taxpayer argued that Example 5 was an invalid interpretation
of section 2702.
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Overturning a regulation is hard. The court described the standard of review in this way:
The regulations at issue here are interpretative regulations promulgated under the
general authority vested in the Secretary by section 7805(a). Hence, while entitled
to considerable weight, they are accorded less deference than would be legislative
regulations issued under a specific grant ofauthority to address a matter raised by
the pertinent statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984) (Chevron); United States v. Vogel
Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982). A legislative regulation is to be upheld
unless "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contraly to the statute'" Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra at 843-844.
With respect to interpretative regulations, the appropriate standard is whether the
provision '''implement[s] the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner....
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., supra at 24 (quoting United States v. Correll,
389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967». In applying this test, we look to the following two-part
analysis enunciated by the Supreme Court:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has ~irectlyspoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent ofCongress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent ofCongress. If, however, the court detennines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence ofan administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. [Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., supra at 842-843; fo. refs. omitted.]
A challenged regulation is not considered such a pennissible4 construction or
reasonable interpretation unless it hannonizes both with the statutory language and
with the statute's origin and purpose. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,
supra at 25-26; National Muftler Dealers Association v. United States, 440 U.S.
472,477 (1979) (National Muffler).
We pause to note that before the Chevron standard ofreview was enunciated by the
Supreme Court, the traditional standard was simply "whether the regulation
hannonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose", as
prescribed by the Supreme Court in National Muffler Dealers Association v.
United States, supra at 477. As we have observed in a previous case, the opinion
of the Supreme Court in Chevron failed to cite National Muffler and may have
established a different fonnutation ofthe standard ofreview. See Central Pa. Save
Association v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 384, 390-~91 (1995). In the case before us,
we conclude that it is unnecessary to parse the semantics ofthe two tests to discern
any substantive difference between them, because the result here would be the
same under either.
The IRS argument was that an annuity paid to an estate is essentially a contingent reversion, which is not a
qualified interest.
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Respondent alleges that Congress sought to curb the then- current practice of
bifurcating trusts into numerous interests and selectively retaining interests based
on mortality, such as reversions. Respondent points out the common estate
planning device ofcreating a trust, with a tenn short enough that the grantor's risk
ofdying during the term would be minimal, in which the grantor retained both an
income interest and a contingent reversion in the trust corpus to take effect in the
event ofhis or her death during the tenn. The value ofthe gift to the remaindennen
would then be calculated by subtracting actuarial amounts for each of these
interests, despite the negligible chance that the reversion would become operative.
Respondent then goes on to frame the annuities payable to petitioner's estate as no
different in substance from such reversions. Respondent's position is that both
represent separate rights to receive property contingent upon the grantor's death
during the trust term. Because contingent rights, not fixed or ascertainable at the
creation of the trust, do not fall within any ofthe three forms defined as qualified
in section 2702(b), respondent maintains that both are properly valued at zero. On
this basis, respondent argues that Example 5 is consistent not only with the purpose
of section 2702 but also with other regulations which deal with post- death
interests, particularly section 25.2702-3(e), Example (1), Gift Tax Regs.
Respondent further contends that Congress' reference to a trust consisting only of
a fixed-term annuity and a noncontingent remainder was describing a situation
different from that of petitioner here. Respondent avers that the scenario
contemplated by the lawmakers was one in which the donor transferred the lead
annuity to an entity with perpetual life and retained a noncontingent remainder.
According to respondent, only in that context is it possible for a donor to create
strictly an annuity for a term ofyears and a noncontingent remainder. Hence, it is
only that kind of situation which respondent claims is sanctioned by the mention
ofan annuity "for a specified term ofyears" in section 25.2702-3(d)(3), Gift Tax
Regs., with the result that there exists no ipconsistency between Example 5 and
such regulatory section.
The court rejected the IRS argument:
With respect to the text itself, the short answer is that an annuity for a specified
tenn of years is consistent with the section 2702(b) defmition of a qualified
interest; a contingent reversion is not.
As regards policy, permitting reduction to gift value for reversionary interests was
resulting in arbitrary and abusive elimination ofvalue which was intended to, and
typically did, pass to the donee. Donors were subtracting the full actuarial value of
a reversionary interest in the trust corpus and were not merely treating their
retained interests as an annuity for a fixed term ofyears. Although we acknowledge
that, in the case of a reversion, at least the equivalent of the tenn annuity's value
would be payable to the grantor or the grantor's estate in all events, Congress was
entitled to require that interests be cast:in one of three specified fonns to receive
the favorable treatment afforded qualified interests. Accordingly, the
Commissioner is equallyjustified in assigning a zero value to reversionary interests
outside the scope ofthe statutory definition and refusing to consider whether such
interests can have the practical effect ofa different fonn of interest not chosen by
the grantor. See sec. 25.2702-3(e), Example (1), Gift Tax Regs.
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In contrast, there exists no rationale for refusing to take into account for valuation
purposes a retained interest of which both the form and the effect are consistent
with the statute. We further observe that respondent's attempts to equate the estate's
rights here with other contingent, post-death interests are premised on the
bifurcation of the estate's interest from that ofpetitioner. Yet, given the historical
unity between an individual and his or her estate, we believe such separation is
unwarranted where the trust is drafted in the form ofa specified interest retained
by the grantor, with the estate designated only as the alternate payee ofthat precise
interest. This is the result that would obtain if the governing instrument were
simply silent as to the disposition ofthe annuity in the event ofthe grantor's death
during the trust term. Additionally, any other construction would effectively
eliminate the qualified term-of-years annuity, a result not contemplated by
Congress.
Moreover, we note in this connection that the Commissioner has defined
noncontingent for purposes of determining a qualified remainder interest as
follows: "an interest is non-contingent only if it is payable to the beneficiary or the
beneficiary's estate in all events. It Sec. 25.2702-3(f)( 1Xiii), Gift Tax Regs. We are
satisfied that this principle is equally applicable in the circumstances at bar. For
similar reasons, we decline respondent's invitation to treat tenn annuities payable
to a grantor or the grantor's estate as having two separate "holders" for purposes of
the regulatory requirement of section 25.2702-3(b)(1)(i), Gift Tax Regs., that the
annuity amount "be payable to (or for the benefit ot) the holder of the annuity
interest for each taxable year of the term. tI
Lastly, we observe that the legislative history indicates section 2702 was to draw
upon the rules for valuing split-interest gifts to charity under section 664. Section
664 deals with charitable remainder annuity trusts and unitrusts for which a tax
deduction is available. Yet under this statute, respondent apparently acknowledges
that an annuity payable for a term ofyears to an individual or the individual's estate
is valued as a fixed-term interest. Section 1.664-2(c), Income Tax Regs., provides
that the present value of an annuity is to be computed in accordance with
regulations promulgated under section 2031. Such regulations, in turn; contain the
following example: .
EXAMPLE 4. ANNUITY PAYABLE FOR A TERM OF YEARS.
The decedent, or the decedent's estate, was entitled to receive an annuity
of $10,000 a year payable in equal quarterly installments at the end of
each quarter throughout a term certain. At the time of the decedent's
death, the section 7520 rate was 9.8 percent. A quarterly payment hadjust
been made prior to the decedent's death and payments were to continue
for 5 more years. Under Table B in section 20.2031-7(d)(6) for the
interest rate of9.8 percent, the factor for the present value ofa remainder
interest due after a tenn of5 years is .626597. Converting the factor to an
annuity factor, as described in paragraph (d)(2XivXA) ofthis section, the
factor for the present value ofan annuity for a tenn of 5 years is 3.8102.
The adjustmentfactor from Table K in section 20.2031-7(d)(6) at an
interest rate of9.8 percent for quarterly annuity payments made at the end
of the period is 1.0360. The present value of the annuity is, therefore,
$39,473.67 ($10,000 x 3.8102 x 1.0360).
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[Sec. 20.2031-7T(d)(5), Example (4), Temporary Estate Tax Regs.,64
Fed. Reg. 23214 (April 30, 1999); see also pre-1999 sec.20.2031-7(d)(5),
Example (4), Estate Tax Regs.]
It strikes us as incongruous that respondent is willing to recognize the full value of
a tenn annuity, whether payable to a taxpayer or to the taxpayer's estate, when to
do so will reduce the amount of a charitable deduction, but refutes this approach
when it will decrease the amount ofa taxable gift.
4. Commutation of GRIT. TAM 199935003 determined that the commutation ofa grantor retained
income trust would not remove assets from the grantor's estate. The GRIT was created in 1988 and the trustee could
commute the GRIT by giving the grantor and the remaindennan their respective actuarial interests. The commutation
at issue was as follows:
On Date 1, in 1995, the decedent was admitted to the hospital. The Decedent had
been diagnosed with terminal cancer.
Eight days later, on Date 2, the trustee wrote the three remaindermen and informed
the remaindennen that if Decedent died during the ten-year trust tenn, then the
entire value of the trust would be included in Decedent's gross estate. The letter
further stated that, by commuting the Decedent's interest, and, thus avoiding
inclusion ofthe entire trust corpus in the gross estate, a significant amount ofestate
tax could be saved. The letter then requested the beneficiaries' recommendation
regarding commutation. The three remaindennen recommended commutation.
Eleven days later on Date 3, the trust was valued at $6,159,479.05. The trustee
distributed $2,247,981.95 to a separate account for the Decedent. The balance of
the trust, $3,911,497.20, was distributed to the three remainder beneficiaries
(pursuant to authority contained in Article TENTH). The amount distributed to the
Decedent was the actuarial value of Decedent's interest on the date of the
distribution, detennined based on the actuarial tables contained in the regulations.
The Decedent died the following day on Date 4.
The IRS argued that the grantor's death may have been imminent so the actuarial tables would not apply.
However, its primary argument was under section 2035:
In United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (lOth Cir. 1961), the settlor created an
irrevocable trust reserving an income interest for her life in a portion ofthe trust.
Subsequently, the settlor sold her income interest in the trust to her son in exchange
for an amount equal to the actuarial value of the income interest. The estate
acknowledged that ifthe decedent had gratuitously transferred her income interest
in the trust, the trust corpus would be includable under section 81 I(cXl)(A) ofthe
1939 Code, the predecessor to section 2035. However, because the settlor received
adequate consideration for the transferofthe income interest, the estateargued that·
section 811(c)(1XA) did not apply. The court concluded that in orderto remove the
trust, property from a decedent's gross estate under the bona fide sale exception to
section 811(c)(1)(A), the consideration received for the sale had to be at least equal
to the value ofthe property that would have been included in the gross estate ifthe
interest had been retained. In Allen, since the settlor had reserved an income
interest in part of the trust corpus, the portion of the trust associated with the
reserved income interest would have been included in the settlor's gross estate upon
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the settlor's death. Thus, payment equal to the value ofthe income interest was not
adequate and full consideration for purposes ofthe statute, because the value ofthe
income interest was less than the value ofthe trust portion that would otherwise be
included in the settlor's gross estate if the income interest had been retained until
death.
******
There is little distinction between the sale considered by the court in United States
v. Allen and the commutation involved in the instant case. In Allen, the decedent
transferred her interest to her son in exchange for cash. In this case, the
commutation effectuated a transfer ofthe decedent's interest to the trust (or the trust
remaindennen) in exchange for cash. The amount received by the Decedent for the
transfer of her income interest did not constitute adequate and full consideration
for purposes ofthe "bona fide sale" exception contained in section 2035, since the
amount received was only a fraction of the value of the trust corpus subject to
inclusion under section 2036. Further, it is questionable whether the commutation
transaction could be characterized as a sale, but in any event, it would clearly not
constitute a "bona fide" sale. As the facts indicate, the intra-family transaction was
consummated shortly before Decedent's death. The amount received by the
Decedent, considering the state of Decedent's health, was wholly inadequate, in
view ofthe right ofDecedent's revocable trust to receive the entire trust corpus in
the event Decedent died prior to the expiration ofthe 10 year trust term. The parties
were clearly not dealing at ann's length. Accordingly, as was the case in Allen, the
entire trust corpus (less the payment received for the income interest) should be
included in the gross estate under section 2035.
Taxpayer argues that sections 2035(a) and 2035(dX2) do not apply to the
transaction, because the Decedent did not "transfer" the retained interest. Rather
the tenn "transfer" implies a volitional act. Here taxpayer was required to
relinquish her interest pursuant to the tenns of the trust authorizing the trustee to
commute her interest. However, in this case, the Trustee's actions effectuated a
transfer of Decedent's retained interest in the trust for a cash payment Although
the tmstee may have initiated the transaction, nonetheless, the transaction resulted
in a transfer by the Decedent of her retained interest for purposes of section
2035(d)(2). The Decedent authorized the commutation clause in the trust with the
intent and expectation that the trustee would exercise the power in appropriate
circumstances, such as a situation where the Decedent's death was imminent. Thus,
although the Decedent did not formally initiate the commutation, the exercise ofthe
power by the trustee was consistent with Decedent's intent and was authorized, if
not implicitly directed, by the Decedent. Further, the transaction was entirely intra-
family between the Decedent and her children, and was consummated solely to
reduce the impending estate tax liability. Thus, even assuming that statute requires
that an intra-family transaction must be initiated or consented to by the decedent,
it is difficult to characterize the transaction in this case as other than a "transfer"
within the purview ofsection 2035, by the Decedent. As the court noted in United
States v. Allen, "It does not seem plausible ... that Congress intended to allow
such an easy avoidance of the taxable incidence befalling reserved life estates."
5. Change of Interest Rate in Buy-Sell Does Not Violate Sections 2703 or 2704. PLR 200015012
confirms that a change in a pre-October 8, 1990 partnership agreement to change the interest rate paid on repurchases
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ofpartnership interests from 5% to the greater of 5% or the section 1274 long-term rate will not violate sections 2703
or 2704.
6. Joint Purchase of Residence. PLR 200112023 deals with a trust into which parents contributed
enough cash to purchase the life interest in a residence and son contributed the amountofthe remainder interest. Parents
could live in the residence until the death of the second of them and the residence would not be included in either of
their estates.
R. SECTION 6166 - EXTENSION OF TIME TO PAY TAX
I. Transfer of Sole Proprietorship Assets to LLC. In PLR 200043030 the Service approved the
reorganization ofbusiness assets. Specifically approved were:
(I) The distribution of excess capital held in the name of the Sole
Proprietorship to Decedent's estate will not constitute a disposition as defined
under section 6166(g).
(2) The conversion ofthe Sole Proprietorship into an LLC and the dissolution
of the Corporation will not be treated as dispositions under section 6166(g).
(3) The distribution offannland from Decedent's estate to Daughter's estate
is not a disposition under section 6166(g).
(4) The farmland leased by Daughter's estate to the LLC remains active, and
entering into the lease is not a disposition under section 6166(g).
(5) The distribution ofprofits ofthe LLC and the Quarry LLC to Decedent's
estate is not a disposition under section 6) 66(g).
The third and fifth rulings are interesting:
Section 6166(g)(1)(A)(i) provides that ifany portion ofan interest in a closely held
business which qualifies under section 6166(a)(I) is distributed, sold, exchanged,
or otherwise disposed of, or money and other property attributable to such an
interest is withdrawn from such trade or business, and (ii) the aggregate of such
distributions, sales, exchanges, or other dispositions and withdrawal equals or
exceeds 50 percent of the value of such interest, then the extension of time for
payment of tax provided in subsection (a) shall cease to apply, and the unpaid
portion of the tax payable in installments shall be paid upon notice and demand
from the Secretary.
Section 6166(g)(I)(D) provides that section 6 I66(g)(I)(A)(i) does not apply to a
transfer ofproperty ofthe decedent to a person entitled by reason ofthe decedent's
death to receive the property under the decedent's will, the applicable law of
descent and distribution, or a trust created by the decedent. A similar rule applies
in the case ofa series ofsubsequent transfers ofthe property by reason ofdeath so
long as each transfer is to a member of the family (within the meaning of section
267(c)(4» of the transferor in such transfer.
Section 20.6166A-3(e)(1) provides, in pertin~l'ltpart, that a transfer by the executor
of an interest in a closely held business to a beneficiary or trustee named in the
decedent's will, or an heir who is· entitled to receive the interest under the
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applicable intestacy law, does not constitute a distribution thereof for purposes of
determining whether 50 percent or more of an interest in a closely held business
has been distributed, sold, exchanged, or othetwise disposed of.
In this case, pursuant to Article IV of Decedent's will, the residue of Decedent's
estate (including the farmland) passes outright to Daughter. Accordingly, the
transfer ofthe farmland by Decedent's estate to Daughter's estate (the estate ofthe
person entitled by reason of Decedent's death to receive the property under
Decedent's will) in order to limit Decedent's estate's potential liability from third-
parties who could be injured by the continued farming operations will not
constitute a distribution thereoffor purposes ofdetermining whether 50 percent or
more ofan interest in a closely held business has been distributed, sold, exchanged,
or otherwise disposed of.
According to the terms ofDaughter's will, the residue of Daughter's estate passes
to Trust. Therefore, the executor of Daughter's estate will distribute the residue of
Daughter's estate, including the farmland received as part of Decedent's residuary
bequest to Daughter, to Trust.
It is represented that the farming business will be operated through the LLC.
Although the core of the farming operation is conducted through the LLC, the
fannland constitutes a fundamental part of the overall fanning operation and will
continue to be utilized in the fanning operation. Thus, the transfer ofthe fannland
by Daughter's estate to Trust pursuant to the tenns ofDaughter's will not constitute
a distribution thereof for purposes ofdetermining whether 50 percent or more of
an interest in a closely held business has been distributed, sold, exchanged, or
othelWise disposed of.
******
Section 20.6166A-3(dX1) provides that in any case where money or other property
is withdrawn from the trade or business and the aggregate withdrawals of money
or other property equal or exceed 50 percent ofthe value ofthe trade or business,
the privilege of paying the tax in installments terminates and the whole of the
unpaid portion of the tax which is payable in installments becomes due and shall
be paid upon notice and demand from the District Director. A withdrawal will
trigger this acceleration provision only if the withdrawn money or other property
constitutes "included property" within the meaning ofthat term as used in section
20.2032-1 (d). Section 20.2032-1(d) defines included property as all property
interests existing at the decedent's death which fonn a part ofthe gross estate. The
provisions of section 20.6166A-3(d)(1) do not apply to the withdrawal of money
or other property which constitutes "excluded property." Section 20.2032~1(d)
defmes excluded property as property earned or accrued after the date ofdecedent's
death.
The profits earned by the LLC and the Quarry LILC after the date of Decedent's
death are excluded property under section 20.2032-I(d), and as such, would not
constitute a withdrawal of money or other property from a closely held business
within the meaning ofsection 6 I66(g). Accordingly, the withdrawal ofcurrent and
future profits from the ILLC and the Quarry ILLC will not be considered a
disposition or a withdrawal of funds from the closely held business for purposes
of section 6166(g)(I)(A)(i). However, withdrawal of any included property (as
A - 165
defined under section 20.2032-I(d» from the closely held business will be
considered a disposition for purposes of section 6 I66(g).
PLR 200043031 grants an additional request, that a protective section 2013 election can be made.
s. TAX ADMINISTRATION
1. Attachment of Federal Tax Lien to Disclaimed Property. Maya beneficiary who owes federal
taxes avoi~ the attachment ofa federal tax lien to inherited property by disclaiming? The answer appears to depend on
the character of the right to inherited property under applicable state law.
The Eighth Circuit construed Arkansas law in Drve Family 1995 Trust v. United States, 82 A.F.T.R.2d98-5190
(8th. Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court upheld at 84 AFTR2d 11" 99-5563. The Court stated:
The Eighth Circuit, with fidelity to the relevant Code provisions and our case law,
detennined fITSt what rights state law accorded Drye in his mother's estate. It is
beyond debate, the Court ofAppeals observed, that under Arkansas law Drye had,
at his mother's death, a valuable, transferable, legally protected right to the property
at issue. See 152 F.3d, at 895 (although Code does not defme "property" or "rights
to property," appellate courts read those tenns to encompass "state-law rights or
interests that have pecuniary value and are transferable"). The court note~ for
example, that a prospective heir may effectively assign his expectancy in an estate
under Arkansas law, and the assignment will be enforced when the expectancy
ripens into a present estate. See id., at 895-896 (citing several Arkansas Supreme
Court decisions, including: Clark v. Rutherford, 227 Ark. 270,270-271,298 S.W.
2d 327, 330 (1957); Bradley Lumber Co. ofArk. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 172,
210 S.W.2d 284,288 (1948); Leggett v. Martin, 20JArk. 88,94, 156 S.W.2d 71,
74-75 (1941».
Drye emphasizes his undoubted right under Arkansas law to disclaim th~
inheritance, see Ark. Code Ann. section 28-2-101 (1987), a right that is indeed
personal and not marketable. See Brief for Petitioners 13 (right to disclaim is not
transferable and has no pecuniary value). But Arkansas law primarily gave Drye
a right of considerable value - the right either to inherit or to channel the .~
inheritance to a close family member (the next lineal descendant). That right simply
cannot be written offas a mere "personal right ... to accept or reject [a] gift." Brief
for Petitioners 13.
In pressing the analogy to a rejected gift, Drye overlooks this crucial distinction.
A donee who declines an inter vivos gift generally restores the status quo ante,
leaving the donor to do with the gift what she will.·The disclaiming heir or devisee,
in contrast, does not restore the status quo, for the decedent cannot be revived.
Thus the heir inevitably exercises dominion over the property. He detennines who
will receive the property - himself if he does n'ot disclaim, a known other if he
does. See Hirsch, The Problem ofthe Insolvent Heir, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 587,607-
608 (1989). This power to channel the estate's assets warrants the conclusion that
Drye held "property" or a "righ[t] to property" subject to the Government's liens.
******
In sum, in detennining whether a federal taxpayer's· state- law rights constitute
"property" or "rights to property," "[t]he important consideration is the breadth of
the control the [taxpayer] could exercise over the property." Morgan, 309 U.S., at
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83. Drye had the unqualified right to receive the entire value ofhis mother's estate
(less administrative expenses), see National Bank ofCommerce, 472 U.S., at 725
(confirming that unqualified "right to receive property is itself a property right"
subject to the tax collector's levy), or to channel that value to his daughter. The
control rein he held under state law, we hold, rendered the inheritance "property"
or "rights to property" belonging to him within the meaning of section 6321, and
hence subject to the federal tax liens that sparked this controversy.
2. Recalculation ofState Death Tax Credit. In TAM 199940005 the National Office held that where .
a state imposed an estate tax for the amount attributable to the recapture tax under section 2032A(c) the state death tax
credit would be redetennined. Presumably, the result will be the same with respect to a recapture tax under section
2057.
3. Reopening Audit After Erroneous Closing Letter. In Estate ofEileen K. Brocato v. Commissioner,
T.e. Memo. 1999-424, the court allowed the IRS to reopen an audit after a closing letter had been sent by mistake.
While the IRS was hiring an appraiser the estate filed a supplemental estate tax return to claim an additional interest
deduction. A clerk at the Ogden, Utah Service Center issued the closing letter. The opinion states:
Petitioner argues that respondent should be estopped from assessing additional
estate taxes on two grounds: (1) Respondent's closing letter constituted affIrnlative
misconduct on which petitioner relied to its detriment; and (2) respondent failed to
foIJow the procedures for reopening a case outlined in the Internal Revenue Manual
(the Manual) and closing letter.
There is no doubt that the Ogden Service Centerts closing letter was erroneous. It,
however, appears from the sparse record on this point that the error occurred
because an Ogden Service Center employee neglected to check the estatets
transcript which indicated an examination was underway before issuing the closing
letter. Respondent never affinnatively concealed the mistake. Once the mistake was
discovered, respondent immediately notified petitioner that the audit was still
underway. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how this isolated and careless a~t
amounts to affmnative misconduct going beyond mere negligence.
As for petitioner's second argument, we do not believe that respondent violated the
Manual procedures or the closing letterts description· of the circumstances for
reopening petitioners' case. Under section 4023.2(1) ofthe Manual, there are three
criteria for reopening an audit. The third criterion is that an audit may be reopened
where Itother circumstances exist which indicate failure to reopen would be a
serious administrative omission." 1 Audit, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), sec.
4023.2(1) at 7063-4. Under section 4023.5 ofthe Manual, a Itserious administrative
omission't is defined as a closed case where failure to reopen the case could "result
in serious criticism of the Service's administration of the tax lawst'. 1 Audit,
Internal Revenue Manual (eCH),. sec. 4023.5 at 7065. The closing letter stated:
"we will not reopen this return unless * * * other circumstances exist which
indicate that a failure to reopen would result in a serious administrative omission."
The reopening letter stated that the audit was being reopened because a "serious
administrative omission" had occurred and failure to reopen the case "would result
in criticism, undesirable precedent, or inconsistent treatment."
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Failure to reopen the audit, herein, would mean that a potential $1,373,797 ofestate
tax could go uncollected. The loss of such revenue could result in criticism ofthe
IRS' administration ofthe tax laws and inconsistent treatment among taxpayers. We
believe that respondent complied with the Manual's procedures and the closing
letter's description ofcircumstances for reopening an audit. Further, this Court has
stated numerous times that procedural roles of this sort are "merely directory, not
mandatory, 'and compliance with them is not essential to the validity ofa notice of
deficiency.'" Collins v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 693, 701 (1974)(quoting Luhring
v. Glotzbach, 304 F.2d 560, 563 (4th Cir. 1962».
We are also not convinced that the traditional elements of equitable estoppel are
satisfied. We doubt whether petitioner's reliance on the closing letter was
reasonable. On October 10, 1995, Mr. Samuelson notified petitioner's counsel that
the IRS intended to hire an appraiser to value the properties which would take at
least 3 months, and Mr. Samuelson would contact petitioners' counsel when the
expert was hired. On December 14, 1995, the Ogden Service Center issued the
closing letter. Neither petitioner's counsel nor a representative of petitioner
contacted Mr. Samuelson to discuss the issuance of the closing letter and the
inconsistencies between its issuance and the conversation between petitioner's
counsel and Mr. Samuelsonjust 2 months earlier. We believe that a reasonable and
prudent person would have inquired about these inconsistencies.
Additionally, we are skeptical as to petitioner's claim of detriment in this case.
Petitioner claims that it wanted to know the precise amount of estate tax owed
before formulating its plan to dispose ofthe Brocato properties and it relied on the
closing letter in detennining that amount. Ifpetitioner had not received the closing
letter, petitioner contends that it would have exercised its section 6166 election and
would have waited to sell 2360 Chestnut.after the property appreciated.
It is not disputed that petitioner had a valid section 6166 election and could have
deferred paymentofits estate tax. We, however, question whether petitioner would
have actually exercised its section 6166 election. Petitioner paid its estate tax
liability on May 22, 1996, approximately 3 years before it was required to pay
under section 6166. It is speculative whether petitioner would have continued to
take advantage ofthe section 6166 election had it been told ofthe increased estate
tax liability.
Petitioner also claims that the Chestnut property appreciated in value after its
premature sale, and petitioner would have been able to sell it for a higher sum but
for the issuance ofthe closing letter. Again, this involves conjecture. Petitioner has
failed to demonstrate that it suffered a detriment as a result of its reliance on the
closing letter.
4. Fiduciary Liability for Unpaid Income Taxes. William D. Little v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. No.
31, deals with a fiduciary's liability for unpaid income taxes when the fiduciary relies on an attorney's advice that no
taxes were owed. The opinion states:
Respondent argues that under 3 I U.S.C. section 3713(b), petitioner is personally
liable for the estate's unpaid income tax liabilities. Title 31 U.S.C. section 3713
provides:
Section 3713. Priority of Govemment claims
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(a)(I) A claim of the United States Government shall be paid
fITst when--
******
(B) the estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the executor or
administrator, is not enough to pay all debts of the debtor.
******
(b) A representative of a person or an estate * * * paying any
part ofa debt ofthe person or estate before paying a claim ofthe
Government is liable to the extent of the payment for unpaid
claims of the Government.
This section appears to impose strict liability on a fiduciary who makes a
disbursement which leaves the estate with insufficient funds with which to pay a
debt owed to the United States. However, courts have long departed from such a
rigid interpretation. "[I]t has long been held that a fiduciary is liable only if it had
notice of the claim of the United States before making the distribution." Want v.
Commissioner, 280 F.2d 777, 783 (2d eir. 1960); see also Leigh v. Commissioner,
72 T.e. 1105, 1109 (1979). Whether the fiduciary had notice is determined by
whether the executor knew or was chargeable with knowledge of the debt. "The
knowledge requirement of31 U.S.C.sec.192[now31 U.S.C.sec.3713]maybe
satisfied by either actual knowledge ofthe liability or notice ofsuch facts as would
put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry as to the existence ofthe unpaid claim
of the United States." Leigh v. Commissioner, supra at 1110 (citing Irving Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 146 (1937); Livingston v. Becker, 40 F.2d 673
(E.D. Mo. 1929». To be chargeable with knowledge ofsuch a debt, the executor
must be in possession of such facts as to "put him on inquiry." New v.
Commissioner, 48 T.e. 671, 676 (1967). "It is this knowing disregard ofthe debts
due to the United States th2t imposes liabHity on the fiducimy". l:eigb v.
Commissioner, supra at 1109-1110 (citing United States v. Crocker, 313 F.2d 946
(9th Cir. 1963».
It is clear that petitioner had no actual knowledge of the estate's income tax
liabilities at the time that he made disbursements and distributions from the estate.
However, respondent argues that petitioner's receipt ofFonns W-2 and 1099 and
subsequent notices would have put a reasonably prudent person in petitioner's
position on inquiry as to the existence of the debts due to the United States for
unpaid income ta'.'es.
We agree that the receipt of the tax information forms in January 1990 and 1991
was sufficient to put petitioner on inquiry. However, petitioner, having been put on
inquiry, acted in a prudent and reasonable manner consistent with his fiduciary
duties. Petitioner forwarded the fonns to the estate's attorney.. Mr. Lahr, and sought
his advice. Mr. Lahr informed petitioner that because ofthe estate's size, the estate
had no income tax liabilities. Mr. Lahr's legal advice was wrong.
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Petitioner continued to receive the same advice from Mr. Lahr after giving him
other notices from respondent that indicated there might be unpaid income taxes
for which the estate might be liable. It was not until the summer of 1993 when Mr.
Dilg was brought in and prepared and filed delinquent returns that the tax liabilities
in issue were discovered by Mr. Lahr. But almost all the estate's assets had already
been distributed by then. As a result, on November 30, 1993, petitioner submitted
an Offer in Compromise and sent a check for $17,586.07, the balance ofthe estate's
assets, to respondent. The offer was not accepted, and several months later
respondent returned the check to petitioner without explanation. Petitioner
immediately informed Mr. Lahr. Thereafter, Mr. Lahr and Mr. Dilg met with
representatives of respondent and erroneously concluded that respondent would
drop the tax claims against the estate. They informed petitioner of this, and Mr.
Lahr advised petitioner to make the final disbursements and to close the estate.
Relying on the advice of the estate's attorney and the certified public accountant,
petitioner closed the estate.
5. Post-Death Events Relevant to Whether Failure to Pay Estate Tax Was Reasonable. The Fifth
Circuit has held in Estate of Willie Mae Sowell v. United States, 84 AFTR2d Par. 99-5583 (1999), that post-death
events are relevant. The opinion states:
The Estate argues that since "reasonable cause" and "willful neglect" are
detennined as of the date the taxes are due, any events subsequent to that date are
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. We disagree. The post-due date evidence was
introduced by the government to rebut the Estate's argument that it used "ordinary
care and prudence" in attempting to pay the tax before it was due. For example, the
fact that the Estate did not attempt to obtain a loan for the entire four-year period
following the due date is certainly relevant to whether its failure to arrange for a
loan before the due date was "reasonable." Further, the Estate's failure to appeal the
IRS's denial of its request for an extension clearly affects whether the 'Estate's
overall failure to pay on time was "reasonable." Such infonnation is more than
merely relevant, it is quite probative of "reasonableness", and outweighs any
unduly prejudicial effect it may have had on the estate.
Under the Estate's rationale, evidence that an executor used estate funds to
purchase a fleet of luxury cars and an island in the South Pacific after the date the
taxes were due ·Nould be inadmissible to prove that the executor's failure to pay the
estate taxes on time was unreasonable. This is plainly wrong. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing introduction oCthe post-due
date evidence as admissible to prove that the Estate was unreasonable in failing to
pay its taxes on the due date.
The court also found that the trial court could exclude expert testimony on whether the estate acted reasonably.
6. Collateral Estoppel Prevents Estate From Excluding Ranch. In Estate of Theodore C.
Chemodurow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-14 (2001), the Tax Court held that the estate was precluded from
arguing that a ranch and is equipment had been sold to the decedent's daughter because in two actions in Montana state
court this had been detennined that the sale was invalid. The applicable law was set forth by the court as follows:
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The doctrine ofissue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, provides that, once an issue
of fact or law is "actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a
different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. 't Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 ( 1979) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322,326 n.5 (1979». Issue preclusion is ajudiciallycreatedequitabledoctrine
the purposes of which are to protect parties from unnecessary and redundant
litigation, to conserve judicial resources, and to foster certainty in and reliance on
judicial action. See, e.g., ide at 153-154; United States v. IlT Rayonier, Inc., 627
F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1980). In Peck v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 162, 166-167
(1988), affd. 904 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1990), we set forth the following five
conditions that must be satisfied prior to application of issue preclusion in the
context ofa factual dispute (the Peck requirements):
(1) The issue in the second suit must be identical in all respects with
the one decided in the first suit.
(2) There must be a final judgment rendered by a court ofcompetent
jurisdiction.
(3) Collateral estoppel may be invoked against parties and their
privies to the prior judgment.
(4) The parties must actually have litigated the issues and the
resolution of these issues must have been essential to the prior decision.
(5) The controlling facts and applicable legal rules must remain
unchanged from those in the prior litigation. [Citations omitted.]
Even if the Peck requirements are satisfied, however, we have broad discretion to
determine when issue preclusion should apply, and we may refuse to apply it
where, for instance, it is to be applied offensively, and the party against whom it
is to be applied had little incentive to defend in the fIrSt action or where the second
action affords the party procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that
could readily cause a different result. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322, 330-331 (1979); see also McQuade v. Commissioner, 84 T.e. 137, 143
(1985).
In considering respondent's position that preclusive effect attaches to the findings
of the State court, we inquire whether the courts of Montana would accord such
findings preclusive effect. See 28 U.s.C. sec. 1738 (2000) (the records andjudicial
proceedings ofa State shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States as they have in the courts ofthe State from which they are taken);
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S,. 461, 482 (1982) (ftCongress has
specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court
judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged
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would do so", quoting Allen v. McCurrey, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980»; Bertoli v.
Commissioner, 103 T.e. 501, 508 (1994). The doctrine of collateral estoppel is
recognized in the courts of Montana. E.g., Rafanelli v. Dale, 971 P.2d 371, 373
(Mont. 1998) ("The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party against whom the
claim is asserted or a party in privity with the earlier party, from relitigating an
issue which has been decided in a different cause ofaction."). The Supreme Court
ofMontana applies a three-part test to determine whether collateral estoppel bars
litigation: (1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? (2) Was there a final judgment on the merits?
(3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party in privity with a party
to the prior litigation? See ide at 373-374. Although the three-part test applied by
the Supreme Court ofMontana does not specifically recognize the fourth and fifth
Peck requirements (actual litigation ofan issue whose resolution was essential to
prior case and no change in controlling facts and applicable legal rules), we believe
that those requirements are inherent in Montana's three-part test. Since the parties
have couched their arguments in terms ofthe Peck requirements, we shall respond
accordingly.
7. Refund Suit Under Section 6166. In Hansen v.United States, 87 AFTR2d, 2001-846 (April 2001),
the Eighth Circuit held that the district court had no jurisdiction in a refund case if the estate had elected to make
payments under section 6166 but was behind in the payments.
T. MISCELLANEOUS
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1.0I CLAIMS AGAINST MY ESTATE. I direct my Executor, hereinafter named,
to payout of the general funds of my estate the cost of the administration of my
estate, aU my legal debts, expenses of last illness, and funeral expenses.
1.02 PAYMENT OF TAXES. I direct my Executor to payout of my residuary
estate, otherwise passing under Article III hereof, and as soon as practical, all
inheritance, estate, transfer, and succession taxes payable by reason ofmy death
(including interest and penalties thereon in the discretion ofmy Executor) assessed
on my property or interest included in my gross estate for tax purposes. I direct that
my Executor shall not require that any part ofsuch taxes by [sic] recovered from,




DISPOSITION OF RESIDUARY ESTATE
All the rest, residue and remainder ofmy property, real and personal, tangible and
intangible, wheresoever situate and howsoever held, including any property over
which I may have a power of appointment, herein referred to as my residuary
estate, I give, devise, and bequeath to First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company, as
Trustee under that certain Trust Agreement dated the. 17th day of June, 1988,
wherein I am the Grantor and First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company is Trustee, to
be held and administered as a part of the trust hereby [sic] created.
The trust provided that the trust assets would be divided into three shares, the last ofwhich was equal to three-
fifths ofthe estate and was to be distributed among various charitable organizations.. The trust agreement provided that
that share should "not be reduced by any taxes chargeable against the Grantor's gross estate."
At issue before the court was whether the charitable share was calculated as a percentage ofthe entire estate,
unreduced by federal estate taxes, or after the payment of federal estate taxes. The court determined that the language
of the Will waived any general apportionment statutes under applicable state law (North Carolina) as well as section
2206 (apportionment to life insurance). The court found that the clause in the trust was insufficient to overcome the
waiver ofapportionment in the Will stating that the "apportionment clause in the trust agreement deals with an allocation
ofthe tax burden on property that the beneficiaries ofthe trust are entitled to receive from the trust, not what the trust
is entitled to receive from the grantor-decedent's estate."
In TAM 199915001 the decedent had a Will that provided for the payment ofall estate taxes from the residue
ofthe estate without apportionment. The decedent's estate plan also included a revocable trust and an irrevocable life
insurance trust, the insurance proceeds payable to which were included in the decedent's gross estate. The TAM
concludes that the general tax clause waived apportionment under section 2206 and thus the insurance trust would not
be required to reimburse the probate estate but that reimbursement under section 2207B was not waived and thus taxes
would be apportioned against the revocable trust because it was included in the decedent's estate under section 2036.
An issue not addressed was whether the revocable trust is also included under section 2038 or instead under
section 2038. Section 22078 applies only to section 2036.
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Section 2206 gives the executor a right of reimbursement against the beneficiary of life insurance, unless the
decedent otherwise directs in his Will. The meaning of"otherwise directs" was before the Supreme Court ofGeorgia
in Emmertz v. Cherry, 271 Ga. 458 (1999). The option states:
The will in issue here in the fIrst sentence of Item IV directs the payment
of "all Estate, inheritance, succession or death taxes" from the residuum,
but it does not contain language specifically providing for the payment of
taxes on the life insurance proceeds from the residual estate. The third
sentence of Item IV reflects the testator's knowledge of the estate tax
consequences ofnonprobate property and his express exclusion from the
initial "pay all taxes" provision ofthose taxes his estate could incur from
two specific types of nonprobate property, i.e., QTIP and power of
appointment property, pursuant to IRC ss 2207 and 2207A.
We agree with the probate court that there existed adequate proof of the
testator's intention in Item IV to include the taxes on the life insurance
proceeds in the "pay all taxes" provision in the first sentence by reading
that sentence together with the third sentence. In this regard, the·third
sentence indicated that the testator knew he owned nonprobate property
on which taxes would be due and also indicated that the testator believed
that the first sentence would encompass taxes on such nonprobate
property unless he expressly exempted that property from the "pay all
taxes" provision. The testator accomplished this exemption in the third
sentence as to QTIP and power of assignment property but deliberately
declined to include the life insurance proceeds within the exemption.
Accordingly, by omitting life insurance proceeds among those nonprobate
properties the taxes on which the executor was specifically instructed in
the third sentence to recover, the testator thus indicated that he intended
for the taxes on the life insurance proceeds to be included in the "pay all
taxes" provision of the first sentence. We thus reject the executor's
argument that because the will does not expressly direct the executor not
to recover the pro rata share of estate taxes paid on the life insurance
policies proceeds, the testator did not udirect[ ] otherwise" pursuant to s
2206.
2. ResultingTrustArgumentRejected. InEstateofHorstmeierv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-
145, the court held that 100% of the residence titled in the name of the decedent would be included in the decedent's
estate and rejected the estate's contention that a resulting trust in favor of the decedent's life partner was valid. The
estate claimed that the decedent's life partner had beneficial interest in halfofthe property based on an understanding
and agreement with the decedent that the decedent purchase the residence and would, in effect, transfer the residence
over time to the life partner in exchange for services~ The tax court found insufficient evidence of a resulting trust.
A somewhat different conclusion was reached in the Kentucky case ofRakhman v. Zusstone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d
241 (1997), in which Zusstone bought the residence and Rakhman contended that the residence was a gift to her on the
occasion ofthe birth oftheir second child. The parties began living together, unmarried, in 1979, their second child was
born in 1985, and the home was used as their residence until their separation in 1992. Any evidence that the residence
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was a gift was in testimony ofRakhman, although the court did find other instances in which Zusstone bought property
and had it "held" in someone else's name.
The Kentucky Supreme Court found fIrst that Rakhman was the natural object ofZusstone's affection stating
"one with whom the donor has shared a home for nearly twelve years, who has been represented to the public as the
donor's spouse, who has adopted the use of the donor's surname, and who has borne the donor two children and has
shared the demands andjoys ofparenting with the donor, would come within a practical defmition of the, phrase." In
1985 when the property was purchased, Zusstone transferred funds into a bank account over which Rakhman had sole
control, she wrote and signed the check in payment for the house, and the deed was placed in her name alone. Thus,
there was presumption that the gift was made to her.
3. Biological Twins Conceived By In-Vitro Fertilization and Born Eighteen Months After
Decedent's Death Were Heirs at Law of Decedent. In In the Matter of the Estate of William J. Kolacy, 753 A.2d
1257 (N.J. Sup.Ct. 2000), the court stated:
Given that general legislative intent, it seems to me that once we establish, as we
have in this case, that a child is indeed the offspring of a decedent, we should
routinely grant that child the legal status of being an heir of the decedent, unless
doing so would unfairly intrude on the rights of other persons or would cause
serious problems in terms of the orderly administration of estates.
I note that after born children who come into existence because of modem
reproductive techniques pose special challenges to society and to our legal system.
Historically, after born children were conceived and in their mother's womb at the
time of a decedent's death and they could be counted on to appear no later than
approximately nine months after that death. Now they can appear after the death.
of either a mother or a father and they can appear a number of years after that
death. Estates cannot be held open for years simply to allow for the possibility that
after born children may come into existence. People alive at the time of a
decedent's death who are entitled to receive property from the decedent's estate are
entitled to receive it reasonably promptly. It would undoubtedly be both fair and
constitutional for a Legislature to impose time limits and other situationally
described limits on the ability of after born children to take from or through a
parent. In the absence oflegislative provision in that regard, it would undoubtedly
be fair and constitutional for courts to impose limits on the ability of after born
children to take in particular cases. ·
In our present case, there are no estate administration problems involved and there
are no competing interests ofother persons who were alive at the time ofWilliam
Kolacy's death which would be unfairly frustrated by recognizing Amanda and
Elyse as his heirs. Even in situations where competing interests such as other
children born during the lifetime ofthe decedent are in existence at the time ofhis
death, it might be possible to accommodate those interests with the interests ofafter
born children. For example, by statutory provision or decisional rule, payments
made in the course of routine estate administration before the advent ofafter born
children could be treated as vested and left undisturbed, while distributions made
following the birth of after born children could be made to both categories of
children.
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4. Ability ofAttorney in Fact to Make Gifts. Mayan attorney in fact make gifts to himselfor herself
without express authority in the power of attorney document? In Wabner v. Black, Ky. 7 S.W.3rd 379 (2000), the
Kentucky Supreme Court answered yes, so long as the attorney in fact acted with the "utmost good faith." The facts
before the court were as follows:
On March 11, 1994, elderly George Tapp executed a durable power ofattorney in
favor of his niece, Nancy Wabner. He had recently relocated from Evansville,
Indiana, to Poole, Kentucky, where he lived with his sister, Leona Poole.
According to Ms. Wabner, after her uncle executed the power ofattorney (in the
presence of Leona Poole and Jimmy Vaughn of Poole Deposit Bank), her uncle
instructed her to collect his Evansville bank accounts and certificates of deposit
into a local bank account naming her as joint owner with right of survivorship.
Leona Poole confirmed that these were Tapp's instructions to Wabner.
Tapp's will, drafted in 1986, expressly provided that any such accounts existing at
the time ofhis death would become the property ofthe joint owner. His will also
passed the family fann to Wabner (whose father had once owned a one-halfinterest
in the farm) and made one-quarter residuary bequests to the Garvinwood Baptist
Church, the General Baptist Foundation, Poole, and Wabner.
Pursuant to the power ofattorney and allegedly complying with oral instructions
from her uncle, who purportQdly maintained his mental faculties until his death,
Wabner collected assets valued at over$200,000 intojoint bank accounts. George
Tapp died on April 21 , 1994 at the age of94. At that time, Wabner had collected
into the accounts approximately 80% ofher uncle's assets other than the fann.
The opinion relies on Deaton v. Hale, Ky., 592 S.W.2d 127 (1979):
In Deaton, the attorney in fact (second wife ofher principal) was alleged to have
made gifts to herself from her principal's estate and to have maintained her
principal's cash estate in a joint checking account. This Court refused to adopt a
per se restoration rule and instead announced an ttutmost good faith" standard by
which to judge the transactions made by the attorney in fact. In so holding, the
Court stated:
An attorney-in-fact, one acting under a Power ofAttorney, must account
for any and all property, real or person~l,that is received by him from or
for his principal. The accounting must be for all property that is received
by him while acting in his official capacity or otherwise. We do not
mean to say, and we do not hold, that an agent operating in a fiduciary
capacity, such as in the instant case, is liable for restoration or
reimbursement for all properties received by him from the principal or
from whatever source. What we are saying is that the agent does have
the responsibility of explaining to the satisfaction of the Court what
disposition was made of the properties. The agent is required to go
forward with an explanation when proof is introduced showing that the
property was in the hands of the agent. The burden of going forward
with the proof so as to exp~ain the disposition of any and all properties
received by the agent is then with him. The issue thereby presented is
one of fact to be decided by the court or by a jury, as the case may be.
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The court concluded:
The power ofattorney executed by Tapp was unambiguous. It expressly provided
in writing that Wabner was to have the full power "to cash any certificates of
deposits which I own or to change and redesignate the ownership thereof in his
[her] sole discretion." When Wabner changed her uncle's accounts to joint
accounts, she did what was expressly authorized by the power of attorney. The
only question then was whether Wabner's exercise ofthe express authority granted
by the power of attorney was attended by the utmost good faith. This was a
question of fact for the jury.
• •••••
The "flat rule" announced by the Court of Appeals has the advantage that every
per se rule has in that it allows certainty and predictability. We do not believe,
however, that this rule of law should be adopted here in light of Deaton and the
clear language of the power ofattorney authorizing Wabner to make the disputed
transactions. The better approach, consistent with firmly established law, is to
allow the court or the jury, as it may be, to detennine as a matter of fact the
propriety of the transactions. Although this Court may not agree with the verdict
reached by the jury here, it is not the place ofan appellate tribunal to substitute its
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A. Estate, Gift and Generation-Skipping Tax Provisions That Are
Effective Immediately.
1. Conservation Easements. With respect to decedents dying after December
31, 2000 the requirement that land eligible for a qualified conservation easement be within a
certain distance from a metropolitan area, national park, wilderness area, or Urban National
Forest is eliminated. Although most areas of the country were already covered, this redu~es the
complexity of a very useful planning technique.,
2. Generation-Skippina: Transfer Tax Rules. The Act contains a number of
"savings" provisions related to the GST. The provisions were advocated primarily by the
accounting profession in order to ward ofmalpractice claims by fixing certain kinds ofproblems
- - e.g. failure to allocate exemption on a timely filed form 709 - - and by making it possible to
fix certain problems after the fact.
a. Deemed Allocations. GST exemption will be deemed allocated to
"indirect skips", which are transfers to a "GST trust," to the extent necessary to produce an
inclusion ratio of zero, unless the transferor elects not to have the deemed allocation rules apply
by gift tax retJrn filed for the period in '\vhich the transfer is made or deemed to be made. .A GST
trust is defined by the statute as a trust that could have a generation-skipping transfer with respect
to the transferor unless:
"(i) the trust instrument provides that more than 25 percent of the trust corpus must be distributed to or may
be withdrawn by one or more individuals who are non-skip persons -- -
"(I) before the date that the individual attains age 46,
"(II) on or before one or more dates specified in the trust instrument that will occur before the date that such
individual attains age 46, or
"(III) upon the occurrence of an event that, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary, may
reasonably be expected to occur before the date that such individual attains age 46,
"(ii) the trust instrument provides that more than 25 percent of the trust corpus must be distributed to or
may be withdrawn by one or more individuals who are non-skip persons and who are living on the date of
death of another person identified in the instrument (by name or by class) who is more than 10 years older
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than such individuals,
n(iii) the trust instrument provides that, if one or more individuals who are non-skip persons die on or
before a date or event described in clause (i) or (ii), more than 25 percent of the trust cOlpus either must be
distributed to the estate or estates of one or more of such individuals or is subject to a general power of
appointment exercisable by one or more of such individuals,
"(iv) the trust is a trust any portion ofwhich would be included in the gross estate ofa non-skip person
(ether than the transferor) if such person died immediately after the transfer,
tt(v) the trust is a charitable lead annuity trust (within the meaning of section 2642(e)(3)(A» or a charitable
remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder unitrust (within the meaning of section 664(d», or
"(vi) the trust is a trust with respect to which a deduction was allowed under section 2522 for the amount of
an interest in the form of the right to receive annual payments ofa fIXed percentage of the net fair market
value of the trost property (detennined yearly) and which is required to pay principal to a non-skip person
if such person is alive when the yearly payments for which the deduction was allowed terminate. For
purposes of this subparagraph, the value of transferred property shall not be considered to be includible in
the gross estate of a non-skip person or subject to a right of withdrawal by reason ofsuch person holding a
right to withdraw so much of such property as does not exceed the amount referred to in section 2503(b)
with respect to any transferor, and it shall be assumed that powers of appointment held by non-sKip persons
will not be exercised.
In general it remains more advisable to allocate GST exemption on a timely filed gift tax
return to avoid confusion. Allocations should always be made by fonnula to reduce the chances
that insufficient exemption will be allocated and to cover the risk that the automatic allocation
rules will have inadvertently used exemption not leaving enough to cover a subsequent transfer.
b. Retroactive Allocations. In certain instances retroactive allocations of
GST exemption will be allowed. In general this will occur where a transfer is made to a trust
which has a non-skip person as a beneficiary and the non-skip person dies prior to the transferor.
The statute provides as follows:
"(1) IN GENERAL. -- If--
n(A) a non-skip person has an interest or a future interest in a trust to which any transfer has been
made,
"(B) such person--
"(i) is a lineal descendant of a gmndparent of the transferor or of a grandparent of the transferor's spouse or former
spouse, and
"(ii) is assigned to a generation below the generation assignment of the transferor, and
"(C) such person predeceases the transferor,
then the transferor may make an allocation of any of such transferor's unused GST exemption to any previous
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transfer or transfers to the trust on a chronological basis.
"(2) SPECIAL RULES. - If the allocation under paragraph (1) by the transferor is made on a gift tax
return filed on or before the date prescribed by section 6075(b) for gifts made within the calendar year
within which the non-skip person's death occurred --
U(A) the value of such transfer or transfers for pwposes of section 2642(a) shall be detennined as
ifsuch allocation had been made on a timely filed gift tax return for each calendar year within
which each transfer was made,
tt(B) such allocation shall be effective immediately before such death, and
tt(C) the amount of the transferor's unused GST exemption available to be allocated shall be
determined immediately before such death.
"(3) FUTURE INTEREST. -- For purposes of this subsection, a person has a future interest in a trust if the
trust may pennit income or corpus to be paid to such person on a date or dates in the future.".
The operation of this provision in certain situations is not entirely clear. For instance,
suppose a trust has only one beneficiary, a skip person who also has a special power of -
appointment. The skip person adds a non-skip person as a beneficiary, and the non-skip person
dies. Is there a retroactive allocation?
c. Severance OfTrusts With Inclusion Ratios Greater Than Zero. The
Act allows trusts with inclusion ratios ofother than zero to be severed into two trusts ifdone on a
fractional basis, one with an inclusion ratio ofone and the other with an inclusion ratio ofzero.
The severance must be done under the tenns of the governing instrument or under' applicable
state law. The statute also allows the severance ofother trusts as follows:
I}! GENERAL...- The term 'q-aalified severance' mear.s the division ofa single trust ~1J.d the creation (by
any means available under the governing instrument or under local law) of two or more trusts if --
"(I) the single trust was divided on a fractional basis, and
"(II) the terms of the new trusts, in the aggregate, provide for the same succession of interests Qf
beneficiaries as are provided in the original trust. .
d. Valuation Rules. New rules are added to say that the value ofGST
transfers will be the same as detennined for gift or estate tax purposes as the case may be as of
the time of the transfer or the close ofthe estate tax inclusion period (if applicable). This is
helpful in certain instances, such as the treatment of split-dollar life insurance.
e. Relief from LateElecti~ns and Substantial Compliance. Treasury is
directed to issue regulations allowing relief from late elections where there has been substantial
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compliance.
B. Estate, Gift and Generation-Skipping Tax Provisions That Are
Effective Between 2001 and 2009.
1. Change in Rates and Applicable Credit Amounts. As explained by The Joint
Committee on Taxation Summary of the Act:
Under the conference agreement, in 2002, the 5-percent surtax (which phases out
the benefit of the graduated rates) and the rates in excess of50 percent are repealed. In addition,
in 2002, the unified credit effective exemption amount (for both estate and gift tax purposes) is
increased to $1 million.
In 2003, the estate and gift tax rates in excess of49 percent are repealed.
In 2004, the estate and gift tax rates in excess of48 percent are repealed, and the
unified credit effective exemption amount for estate tax purposes is increased to $1.5 mi1lion.
(The unified credit effective exemption amount for gift tax purposes remains at $1 million as
increased in 2002.) In addition, in 2004, the family-owned business deduction is repealed.
In 2005, the estate and gift tax rates in excess of47 percent are repealed.
In 2006, the estate and gift tax rates in excess of46 percent are repealed, and the
unified credit effective exemption amount for estate tax purposes is increased to $2 million.
In 2007, the estate and gift tax rates in excess of45 percent are repealed.
In 2009, the unified credit effective exemption amount is increased to $3.5
million.
The GST exemption remains at $1,060,000 adjusted for inflation until 2004 when
it increases to $1,500,000 and thereafter it is the same as the estate tax exemption.
2. State Death Tax Credit. The Act makes significant changes in the state death
tax credit. The credit remains the same through the end of2001.
In 2002 the credit is 75% of the amount allowed by section 201 1(b), in 2003 it is
50%, in 2004 it is 25%.
For decedent's dying after December 31, 2004, the state death tax credit is
repealed and replaced with a deduction equal to "the amount of any estate, inheritance, legacy, or
succession taxes actually paid to any State or the District ofColumbia, in respect ofany property
included in the gross estate (not including any such taxes paid with respect to the estate of a
person other than the decedent)."
What does the parenthetical mean? Does it apply to section 2044 property?
Most states with estate taxes equal to the amount of the state death tax credit will
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need to amend their statutes if they want to continue to generate revenue because after 2004 there
will be no such credit. If some states elect not to impose a new estate tax that will create a
substantial benefit for those dying residents of such states.
Depending on the amount ofany new state estate taxes decedent's dying in 2005
and thereafter may be subject to a higher rate of tax than they would have been before refonn.
For instance, in 2005 the maximum estate tax rate is 47%. If a state imposed an estate tax with a
top rate of 16% that would net to 8.48% after deducting it on the federal return. The total tax,
therefore would be 55.48%.
There are certain limitations described by the Statement ofManagers as follows:
Such State taxes must have been paid and claimed before the later of: (1) four
years after the filing of the estate tax return; or (2) (a) 60 days after a decision of the u.s. Tax
Court determining the estate tax liability becomes final, (b) the expiration of the period of
extension to pay estate taxes over time under section 6166, or (c) the expiration of the period of
limitations in which to file a claim for refund or 60 days after a decision of a court in which such
refund suit has become final.
3. Expansion ofsection 6166. The number ofpartners and shareholders
permitted for section 6166 property is increased from 15 to 45. An additional provision is added
for certain·lending and finance businesses. These provisions are effective for decedents dying
after December 31, 200 I.
4. Estate Tax Recapture from Cash Rents ofsection 2032A property. The Joint
Committee Summary provides:
The conference agreement provides that, ifon the date ofenactment or at
any time within one year after the date ofenactment, a claim for refund or credit ofany
overpayment of tax resulting from the application ofnet cash lease provisions for spouses and
lineal descendants (sec. 2032_A(c)(7)(E) is barred by operation oflaw or rule of law, then the
refund or credit of such overpayment shall, nonetheless, be allowed ifa claim therefore is filed
before the date that is one year after the date ofenactment. This provision is effective for refund
claims filed prior to the date that is one year after the date ofenactment.
5. Repeal of section 2057. Effective for decedents dying after December 31,
2003. The net effect of this repeal, and the increase in the exemption, is a slight benefit for
owners ofclosely-held businesses.
c. Estate, Gift and Generation-Skippin2 Tax Provisions That Are
Effective After 2009.
1. Repeal of the Estate Tax. The estate tax is repealed for decedents dying after
December 31, 2009.
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2. Continuation and Modification of the Gift Tax. The gift tax continues with the
top tax rate being the highest individual income tax rate (35%). The $1,000,000 lifetime
exemption continues as does the $10,000 annual exclusion.
Except as Treasury may provide in regulations, a transfer in trust will be treated as
a taxable gift under section 2503 unless the trust is treated as wholly owned by the donor or the
donor's spouse under subpart E ofpart I ofsubchapter J ofchapter 1. That is, transfers to grantor
trusts are not treated as taxable gifts. The purpose of this provision is presumably to ensure that
a transfer is either taxed for income tax purposes or remains as a part of the income base of the
donor. The provision is unclear in a number ofrespects. For instance, what are the
consequences of transfers from the grantor trust? Will that be gift? If so, then will use ofassets
by trust beneficiaries be deemed to be a gift, for instance?
3. Elimination ofllie Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax. The GST is eliminated
for transfers after December 31, 2009.
4. Changes in Basis. The step-up in basis rules of section 1014 are repealed for
decedents dying after December 31, 2009.
Assets acquired from a decedent will have as basis the lower of fair market value
as of the date ofdeath and the decedent's adjusted basis, plus (1) up to $1,300,000 in the
aggregate (limited by unused built-in losses and loss carryovers), and (2) up to $3,000,000 if
acquired by a surviving spouse, of additional basis may be allocated to property owned by the
decedent (but not in excess of the fair market value of the assets). These amounts will be
adjusted for inflation after 2009. The specifics of the latter provision are as follows:
"(I) IN GENERAL. -- In the case ofproperty to which this subsection applies and which is qualified
spousal property, the basis of such property under subsection (a) (as increased under subsection (b» shall be
increased by its spousal property basis increase.
"(2) SPOUSAL PROPERTY BASIS INCREASE. -- For purposes of this subsection --
"(A) IN GENERAL. -- The spousal property basis increase for property referred to in paragraph
(1) is the portion of the aggregate spousal property basis increase which is allocated t,() the property pursuant to this
section.
"(B) AGGREGATE SPOlJSAL PROPERlY BASIS INCREASE. -- In the case ofany estate, the
aggregate spousal property basis increase is $3,000,000.
"(3) QUALIFIED SPOUSAL PROPERlY. -- For pwposes of this subsection, the term 'qualified spousal
property' means --
"(A) outright transfer property, and
"(B) qualified terminable interest property.
"(4) OUTRIGHT TRANSFER PROPERlY. -- For pwposes of this subsection-
"(A) IN GENERAL. -- The tenn 'outright transfer property' means any interest in property
acquired from the decedent by the decedent's surviving spouse.
"(B) EXCEPTION. -- Subparagraph (A) shall not apply where, on the lapse of time, on the
occurrence of an event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to
the surviving spouse will terminate or fail --
"(i)(I) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an adequate and full consideration in money
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or money's worth) from the decedent to any person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse),
and
"(II) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs.or assigns) may possess or enjoy any part of such
property after such termination or failure of the interest so passing to the surviving spouse, or
tt(ii) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse, pursuant to directions of the decedent, by his executor
or by the trustee ofa trust. For pwposes of this subparagraph, an interest shall not be considered as an interest which
will terminate or fail merely because it is the ownership of a bond, note, or similar contractual obligation, the
discharge ·of which would not have the effect ofan annuity for life or for a term.
n(c) INTEREST OF SPOUSE CONDITIONAL ON SURVIVAL FOR LIMITED PERIOD. -- For
pwposes of this paragraph, an interest passing to the surviving spouse shall not be considered as an interest which
will terminate or fail on the death of such spouse if -
"(i) such death will cause a termination or failure of such interest only if it occurs within a period not exceeding 6
months after the decedent's death, or only if it occurs as a result of a common disaster resulting in the death of the
decedent and the surviving spouse, or only if it occurs in the case of either such event, and
"(ii) such tennination or failure does not in fact occur.
U(5) QUALIFIED TERMINABLE INTEREST PROPERTY. For purposes of this subsection --
tt(A) IN GENERAL. -- The tenn 'qualified tenninable interest property' means property---
tt(i) which passes from the decedent, and
U(ii) in which the surviving spouse has a qualifying income interest for life.
u(B) QUALIFYING INCOME INTEREST FOR LIFE. The surviving spouse has a qualifying
income interest for life if --
U(i) the surviving spouse is entitled to all the income from the property, payable annually or at more frequent
intervals, or has a usufruct interest for life in the property, and
"(ii) no person has a power to appoint any part of the property to any person other than the surviving spouse.
Clause (ii) shall not apply to a power exercisable only at or after the death of the surviving
spouse. To the extent provided in regulations, an annuity shall be treated in a manner similar to an income interest in
property (regardless of whether the property from which the annuity is payable can be separately identified).
"(C) PROPERn- INCLUDES INTEREST THEREIN. ine term ~property' includes an interest ill
property.
"(D) SPECIFIC PORTION TREATED AS SEPARATE PROPERTY. -- A specific'portionof
property shall be treated as separate property. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 'specific portion'
only includes (l portion detennined on a fractional or percentage basis.
There are various special rules. With respect to joint property, so long as only the
decedent and the surviving spouse are joint tenants or tenants by the entirety the decedent will be
treated as owning only 50% of the property but ifotherwise then it is a consideration test.
Community property is treated as being owned entirely by the decedent spouse.
A decedent is treated as owning the property in a revocable trust (as defined in
section 645(b)(1». A decedent is not treated as owning property by reason of a power of
appointment; however, property transferred to a trust with respect to which the decedent reserved
the right to make any change in the enjoyment tllereofthrough the exercise of a power to alter,
A·187
amend, or tenninate the trust. In addition, other property passing from a decedent by reason of
death to the extent it passes without consideration may have additional basis allocated to it.
Property acquired by a decedent by gift or inter vivos transfer for less than full
and adequate consideration within three years ofdeath is not eligible for the allocation of
additional basis. This limit does not apply to property acquired from a spouse unless the spouse
acquired the property within three years by gift or inter vivos transfer for less than full
consideration.
Section 691 property (income in respect ofa decedent property) is not eligible for
additional basis allocations.
Beneficiaries other than tax-exempt entities will not recognize gain upon receipt
ofproperty from an estate where the liabilities exceed basis (so-called negative basis property).
Section 101 dealing with life insurance is unaffected.
Section 121 will be amended to allow an estate, a revocable trust, or heirs, to
exclude gain on the sale of a principal residence to the same extent the decedent could have.
The Section allows a $250,000 exclusion ($500,000 for married taxpayers fi1ing
jointly) ofgain on a principal residence used as such for two of the preceding five years.
Various rules dealing with foreign entities are included and the estate of a
nonresident alien will be allowed a $60,000 aggregate basis increase.
s. Returns for Large Transfers. Instead ofestate and gift tax returns there will be
other returns required for transfers in excess of$1,300,000.
6. Distributions from Qualifying Domestic Trusts. Distributions from QDOTs
will continue to be taxed as they are under current law through December 31, 2020" "However,
QDOTs will not be taxed at death in the estate of the surviving spouse after December 31, 2009.
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1. Repeal will not exist for only one year. Reasonable people refuse to believe that
the tax act will be allowed to apply literally. It is simply unbelievable that the estate tax would
disappear in 2010 only for the system we have today to reappear in 2011.
2. Thus, tIle law must be changed. Ho\v can it be changed? In at least three ways:
(a) repeal can be made permanent, (2) the 2009 regime can be made pennanent, or (3) an entirely
new approach (e.g. a capital gains tax at death) can be imposed.
If the repeal is made permanent we can assume that many of the glitches, loopholes,
and inconsistencies in the carry-over basis regime will be fixed between now and then. Thus we
should consider what will happen with carry-over basis but we should not be too concerned with
many of the specifics.
If the 2009 regime - - i.e., the current estate tax system with increases in the amount
ofthe exemption - - is maintained we should expect certain glitches and loopholes to be fixed over
time. An example might be the limiting ofvaluation discounts. .
We cannot reasonably speculate on the effects of an entirely different system that
might replace the estate tax.
3. What factors affect how the law is changed? One is the ongoing budget battle - -
the tension between those who want to limit spending by depriving the federal government of
revenue (because that is more politically palatable than actually opposing spending) and those who
want to do-things with the revenue (whether it be spend it, pay down debt with i~ appl)! i~ ~o "fix"
Medicare or Social Security, or whatever) will continue. Crucial is whether deficits or surpluses are
projected; at the moment surpluses are projected because economic growth is projected to continue
at, more or less~ 3.1% annually adjusted for inflation, but ifthat drops to 2.7% the projections change
to a substantial deficit.
A related factor includes control ofCongress and the Presidencyoverthe next decade.
One way to look at this is that with a President who campaigned to eliminate the estate tax and a
Congress that was largely in favor of doing so, all that could be accomplished was repeal for one
year. On the other hand, another way to look at it is that a future Congress will be very reluctant to
reirnpose what has been described as repealed. Reinstatetnent ofa tax, as a public relations matter,
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is surely more difficult than raising rates (as with the income tax).
Some experts argue that by the latter part ofthe decade there will be other problems
that will occupy Congress. For instance, ever increasing numbers oftaxpayers will be subject to the
AMT. Refonning that system will reduce tax revenues; if revenues need to be increased then the
estate tax is a possible target.
Campaign fmance refonn is another factor. One driving force for repeal are taxpayers
who have more than any reasonable exemption amount would protect but not enough that they can
leave virtually any amount to descendants regardless of the amoWlt of tax. Those taxpayers
contribute heavily to political campaigns, directly and indirectly, and they want repeal. If their
contributions are reduced somewhat then perhaps their influence will be as well.
A final factor is the predilections oftIle early and mid-generation baby boomers. On
the one hand, in 10 years the earliest boomers will be ready to retire and will want, it is said, Social
Security on a sound footing. The same is said to be true for those boomers who are a bit younger,
being born through the early 1950s.
On the other hand, some of those boomers will be looking to an elderly surviving
parent and the amount they receive by inheritance will depend directly on the operation ofthe estate
tax. IfSocial Security and Medicare are "fixed," whatever that may mean at that time, these boomers
- - affluent, well-educated, used to being listened to - - can be expected to be a potent force in favor
ofpermanent repeal.
4. In talking to clients, that repeal must be reinstated in order to be eff~ctiveafter
20 I0 has great psychological importance. Many c,four wealthier clients will not want to rely on one
or more future Congresses (and Presidents) reinstating repeal and will conclude that it is more
pro.dent to assume that repeal will not be reinstated. This should open the door to continue most of
the planning that has been available. Clients who are likelyto fall within the increased exemptions
may want to wait and see what happens in the next few years before going beyond basic marital
deduction/exemption equivalent planning.
B.- U.se Exemption Now.
1. Make gifts to grantor trusts with broad standards and beneficiaries, including
the grantor's spouse. This preserves maximum flexibility whether the estate tax is repealed or
not. Income and appreciation may be removed from the grantor's estate. Further distributions
may be made if income shifting becomes desirable. Grantor trust status enables the grantor to
"switch" assets with the trust should estate tax repeal and carryover basis be implemented.
2. Use the most leveraged transaction with which the client is comfortable. There
are not good policy arguments for maintaining discounts outside ofoperating businesses and it is
always possible that Congress will act to eliminate them.
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If a client wants to go slowly and create virtually no audit risk, give $675,000
away today, taking a high discount and fully disclosing that on the gift tax return. If the gift is
adjusted nothing has been lost and it: more likely, there is no adjustment, in three years
additional gifts may be made.
If the client is likely to die more than three years after a transaction, but before
December 31, 2009, paying gift tax may continue to be a very good idea Otherwise it would
not be. S·i~ilarly, paying estate tax in the estate of the first spouse to die continues to be a good
idea but only so long as the spouse is likely to die before repeal becomes effective.
3. For elderly clients, arrangements like partnerships that create the possibility of
discounts have no downside in today's environment. The worst that happens is that they do not
work and the client's estate pays the same estate tax that would have been paid ordinarily.
c. Review Your Formula Divisions Now.
1. Begin with the stereotype: husband has two children by his first marriage;
remarries and has two children with his second wife. He has an estate of$6,000,000 let's
suppose and second wife has $1,000,000. Husband is 55, his children by his first marriage are 31
and 29. Second wife is 45 and his children with her are 10 and 8.
Husband realized several years ago that he should give something to his older
children at his death because his second wife is 10 years younger and is likely to survive him by
close to 20 years. Husband decides to leave the maximum amount he can without creating estate
tax to his older children - .;. $600,000 at the time. The division was written as a forritula with no
caps or minimums.
If husband dies today the older children will receive $675,000 rather than
$600)000. !fhusha'1d dies v-rith the s3.tne fo:m.u!a in place t.~e amount the older cl'J!dren will
receive increases to $3,500~OOO. That is probably not what husband had in mind, but who is to
say. Litigation may result.
. --- - 2. Let's suppose now that we have husband and wife, each with $3,500,OQO, fIrSt
marriage, and everyone gets along. Under a traditional fonnula, when the first spouse dies
everything will be added to a trust for the benefit of spouse and descendants. What sort, if any,
instructions should be given to the trustee about making distributions among the spouse and
descendants? Is a boilerplate statement that spouse is the primary beneficiary but her taxable
estate should be considered good enough?
Consider the effect if spouse survives past repeal. Spouse has no taxable estate.
Does that mean that spouse should receive more from the trust, and what does "more" mean if
the trust has standards like health, maintenance, and support?
3. More spouses may be tempted to elect to take against the Will, depending on .
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the terms of the credit shelter and marital disposition. This possibility may pose additional
ethical issues when representing both husband and wife. In addition, more postnuptial
agreements may be required.
D. Review Your Estate Plans Generally.
. . 1. Charitable Beneficiaries. Where plans have charity in as a beneficiary either
because of, or the amount is because ot: the estate tax the plan needs to be revisited. That can
work in favor ofor against charitable bequests.
Suppose, for instance, elderly parent has no spouse and a $3,000,000 estate.
Parent has decided that each of two children should receive.$I,OOO,OOO; the estate tax would be a
little over $1,000,000, and so there is nothing left over for charity, despite what parent would like
to do. Ifparent lives until 2006 parent can leave $1,000,000 to each child without estate tax.
What does that mean parent would like to do?
Suppost=? parent has looked at the assets ofchildren and grandchildren and-has
decided that they have "enough" and that it is too expensive to give them more. With the change
in the law, especially repeal of the estate and generation-skipping tax, that may change. What
does parent want to do?
In general we know that parents want their children to get more than 50% (more
or less) of their estates, otherwise they would not pay estate planners to plan. Does that mean
that parents want their descendants to get 100% of their estates?
2. Trust Provisions. Trusts continue to be an excellent planning device. They
may help avoid creditors, they may limit property subject to division in divorce, and they may
enable income shifting as years pass. Trusts need to be drafted as flexibly as possible. The
in.t~r~stsof the benefici3ries nther than w.xes ne~rl to be considered. The pO·Ncr of indepcn.dent
trustees to create new trusts and divide trusts should be given. Beneficiaries should be given
broad special powers ofappointment in most instances.
. -:.. -- 3. Exit Strategies. Ifyou have GRATs, Sales to Grantor Trusts, QPRTs, and the
like in existence that will continue after the repeal ofthe estate tax consider whether an~xit"
strategy is desirable and, if so, what it might be. The gift tax persists after the estate tax is
repealed other than for gifts to grantor trusts. There may be reasons to try and collapse
transactions if repeal become imminent to ensure that grantors who are the most likely to· die
have sufficient property to which to allocate basis.
4. Reverse Exit Strategies. Discounts will not necessarily be a good thing after
repeal in a carryover basis regime. Thus., ensuring that the decedent has control of entities will
become important. How is that control to be obtained? Perhaps through gifts from the younger
generations or purcllases by the older generation. Ensuring that those transactions can occur
easily becomes an important part of planning.
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5. Life Insurance. Because of the special treatment of life insurance under section
101, appreciation inside a life insurance policy will receive, in effect, a basis step-up. Assuming
the law does not cllange on this point, life insurance becomes a desirable asset to own. Insurance
should be held in a trust to avoid estate tax should death occur prior to repeal.
6. Tax Increase for Smaller Estates. The beneficiaries ofan estate ofa single
person worth $3,000,000 may actually be worse offafter repeal than before. Before repeal, in
2009, the estate would pa)' no estate tax and the assets would pass to the beneficiaries with"a full
basis step-up. After repeal, in 2010, the estate would pay no estate tax but the basis step-up
would be limited to the basis of the assets plus $1,300,000. Stated differently, if the decedent
had an adjusted basis ofiess than $1,700,000 in the example the beneficiaries would be worse
off. Clients and beneficiaries will need to be made aware of such oddities because they may
affect a client's decisions.
E. Choice of Jurisdiction.
1. Rule Against Perpetuities. States continue to repeal the rule against
perpetuities. Those states will become increasingly desirable places to situate trusts if the
generation-skipping tax is repealed.
2. State Income Taxes. State income taxes cannot be forgotten by planners.
Existing trusts which are not grantor trusts with respect to any of the beneficiaries in many
instances may be moved from state to state to avoid or minimize state income taxes.
3. State Inheritance or Estate Taxes. If some states impose an estate· or
inheritance tax after the state death tax credit is repealed other states that have no such taxes will
become more desirable places in which to be domiciled at death. Florida, for instance, receives
only about 2% of its revenues from it pick-up tax and may decide to forgo that revenue in favor
ofbeing a "tax-haven" for the elderly.
4. Other State Law Changes. Some states may pass statutes allowing for trusts to
be modified to take into consideration changing tax laws.
F. Drafting To Direct Allocation of Basis.
In addition to the fonnula clause drafting issues that arise, the question of
directing the personal representative how to allocate basis increases becomes important. Many
estate plans contain provisions that allow a personal representative or trustee to ignore basis in
allocating assets; generall~T that is because all assets, other than IRD, are assumed to have a
stepped-up basis as of date ofdeath. That will no longer be the case and such directions will
probably be inappropriate.
Ho\v basis is to be allocated among beneficiaries is not obvious in many instances.
For instance, suppose the family farm, with improvements, is passing to one beneficiaI)T who is
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not going to sell it. Does that mean neither the farm nor the improvements should receive
additional basis? What about depreciation? The same issue arises for many business interests.
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Nothing remains constant in this world, except, possibly, the terms of the irrevocable
documents written by lawyers for their clients. There are many areas where it is
impossible to predict future events which, if known in advance, would cause the client's
estate planning documents to be drafted differently. Such areas include:
A. Changes in the tax or probate laws which will alter the desirability of the making
of gifts in outright vs. trust form, or that will alter the desired details of trust
arrangements.
B. Financial bad luck or imprudence, resulting in creditor problems or bankruptcy.
c. Bad marriages, resulting in overreaching spouses and/or divorce.
D. Beneficiaries who are more or less successful than anticipated, or who develop
mental, physical, drug, alcohol, or other problems.
Only dispositions in trust offer the flexibility and protection necessary to subsequently
adapt gifts made under an irrevocable estate plan for changed circumstances.
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II. Basic Planning and Drafting for Tax Flexibility
There is great skepticism concerning whether or not the new 2001 tax law will really
phase in as scheduled. However, there are a number of tax-oriented planning and drafting
techniques that make sense. Some are tried and true techniques that are often ignored.
A. Husband and wife can review the titling of their assets, and their beneficiary
designations, to assure that the less wealthy spouse will have sufficient assets to
fully utilize the changing exemption equivalent (if he or she dies first).
B. Husband and wife can utilize disclaimer trust arrangements, rather than a marital
deduction formula clause, where it is possible that the increasing exemption
equivalent will eliminate the need for a bypass trust.
C. Husband and wife can continue to each use a survivorship presumption (in the
event of simultaneous death) that provides that the other was the survivor. In the
event of simultaneous deaths, one estate will have 9 months to disclaim assets
from the other. But this will allow the estates to be equalized (causing neither
being in a higher estate tax bracket than is necessary).
D. Husband and wife can continue to utilize QTIP trusts, and to extend the due date
for filing the estate tax return for 6 months, in order to preserve the right for 15
months to equalize the estates by filing a partial QTP election (causing neither to
be in a higher estate tax bracket than is necessary).
E. Bypass trusts can be drafted to allow the surviving spouse, who may also be the
trustee, to selectively release powers and benefits, either in a fiduciary or non-
fiduciary capacity, in case the law changes.
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F. In bypass trusts, consideration should be given to whether payment of income
should be discretionary (to allow income tax planning flexibility), or whether the
surviving spouse should be granted mandatory income payments and a Five-by-
Five withdrawal right (to maximize the TPT credit in the event of limited survival'
by the surviving spouse).
G. Beneficiaries of trusts (such as surviving spouses benefitting from QTIP trusts)
should be en'couraged to make annual exclusion gifts to non-beneficiaries of such
trusts - possibly by directing the distribution of additional principal to the trust
beneficiary if such gifts are made.
H. Grant special powers of appointment to allow the rewriting of remainder interests
where changes in the tax laws make it beneficial to do so.
I. Draft in contemplation of disclaimers (i.e., include well planned cascading default
provisions).
J. Provide for a flexible "Crummey" clause by:
1. Causing indirect gifts, such as direct premium payments, to trigger the
Crummey withdrawal right.
2. Payments in satisfaction of a Crummey withdrawal right to be made in
kind.
3. The ability to exclude persons in the withdrawal class from having
withdrawal rights in advance of future gifts.
4. Tiered withdrawal rights (i.e., the first $5000/year withdrawal by spouse,
balance, if any, of withdrawal to be held equally by children, etc.) and
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hanging powers to allow trust to be used in the future for larger than
originally contemplated future gifting.
K. If drafting intentionally defective trusts, provide a means for the grantor to get out
of grantor trust status if it later becomes to too burdensome.
L. Consider gifts in trust, with flexible provisions, rather than outright gifts, to
protect the assets from taxation at the beneficiary's death. A beneficiary can have
many powers and rights without causing such beneficiary to own such trust for
estate tax purposes, including:
1. The right to receive trust income.
2. The right to be trustee and make (i.e., self-determine) discretionary
distributions for health, education, support, and maintenance.
3. The right to say where the trust goes (i.e., a special power of appointment).
4. The right to control trust investments.
5. The right to vote trust securities.
6. The right to hire and fire trustees.
7. A Five-by-Five withdrawal right (subject to estate taxation of any
outstanding, unexercised power at death).
M. Consider allowing the attorneys in fact named in durable powers of attorney (and
trustees of revocable trusts where the grantor old and/or sick) to make annual
exclusion gifts.
1. Define "annual exclusion" generically, so that it won't be limited to
$10,000 as future increases phase in.
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2. It may be wise to require that similarly situated beneficiaries (Le.,
children) or branches of the family (i.e., each child and his or her family)
to be treated equally.
3. Limit what the power holder can give himself or herself, to avoid the
argument that the power holder has a taxable power of appointment if he
or she dies while the power of attorney is still outstanding.
N. Allow the trustee to grant to (and to take away from) a general power of attorney,
so that basis step-up and generation-skipping tax consequences can be controlled..
o. Utilize statements of intent and savings clauses, so that technical drafting errors
can be fixed through a valid construction or reformation of the document.
III. General Planning and Drafting Ideas
A. Allow attorneys in fact under financial and medical powers of attorney to name
substitutes and successors.
B. If it is desired that children become fiduciaries when old enough, draft them into
the documents now on a contingent basis.
c. When identifying family members, consideration should be given to future
changed circumstances (divorces, births, adoptions by and away, children in
gestation, etc.). For example, in an irrevocable life insurance trust, should
"spouse" be: (1) the current spouse in all event (i.e., even if subsequently
divorced), (2) whoever the spouse if at the insured's date of death, or (3) the
current spouse if still married to the insured at death, otherwise no spouse (i.e.,
children become the beneficiaries).
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D. When making gifts of specifically-described assets, consider what is desired if
such assets are sold, added to, or converted to different assets.
E. When making pecuniary gifts or mandating periodic fixed-dollar distributions
from trusts, consider providing an inflation adjustment factor and/or interest on
delayed payments.
F. In irrevocable life insurance trusts, allow distributions prior to the death of the
insured.
G. Allow trustees to early terminate smaller trusts that no longer are feasible, or
larger trusts that no longer fulfill their purpose.
H. Allow executors and trustees broad powers to distribute funds to guardians,
custodians, etc., on behalf of an incapacitated beneficiary. Allow the trustee to
distribute to other trusts for the beneficiary's benefit. Also, allow trustees to
distribute income "to or for the benefit of' the beneficiary, so that a beneficiary's
bills can be paid directly where the beneficiary has creditor problems.
I. Authorize unusual distributions, such as for legal expenses to enforce the support
obligation a beneficiary's natural parent, the burial ofa beneficiary (even though
they would otherwise no longer be a beneficiary), etc.
J. Allow alternative ways for beneficiaries to benefit from the trust, such as the
making of loans, the use of trust property, investment by the trust in the
beneficiary's business, etc.
K. Provide that a specific state's law is to govern the validity and construction of the .
will or trust, but that its administration will be governed by the law of situs.
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L. Allow the trustee to change the situs of a trust.
M. Allow the trustee to be changed, including firing present trustees and overriding
the appointment of successor trustees, by specific trustees and/or beneficiaries.
N. Provide for unitrust payments, rather than income payments, to be made to an
intended "income beneficiary" to allow the trustee more flexibility to invest for
total return.
O. Allow maximum flexibility by appointing trust protectors and granting third
parties broad special powers of appointment, so that the trust's terms can be
rewritten in the future.
P. Grant carefully drafted special powers of appointment to the beneficiary.
1. Should the power normally be limited to exercise in favor of the settlor's
descendants?
2. Should the beneficiary's surviving spouse also be an object of the power,
perhaps limited to a % of the trust's or to income only?
3. What if all descendants have already died - should the objects of the power
then be expanded?
Q. Consider jurisdiction shopping for a state with no rule against perpetuities, no
state income taxes on trusts, and/or with stronger protection of trusts against
creditors.
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IV. The "Dead Hand" Approach to Estate Planning
A. Many clients desire to influence and control the behavior of their heirs long after
the client's death. Such controls are valid as long as they don't violate public
policy.
B. Rewarding Desired Behavior
1. Authorize (and possibly give bonus distributions) upon the beneficiary's
achieving good grades, graduation from college or graduate school, getting
married, having children, keeping a job, etc.
2. Provide some sort of matching distributions based on the beneficiary's
earned income, and allow the trustee to supplement worthwhile but
unremunerative work with added distributions.
3. Authorize and encourage distributions to allow the purchase of a home,
starting a business, marriage, travel, or other desired activities.
C. Discouraging Undesired Behavior
1. Require the beneficiary to furnish reasonably required information to the
trustee, and penalize the failure to do so.
2. Authorize or direct the trustee to require drug and alcohol testing, and to
withhold all distributions to beneficiaries who fail such tests.
3. Generally allow the trustee to postpone the termination of a trust if the
trustee believes that the settlor's purposes would not be fulfilled (i.e., the
beneficiary has a problem, such as a pending divorce or bankruptcy,
B-8
involvement in a cult, a drug or alcohol problem, is terminally ill and an
adverse tax result would occur, etc.).
v. Conclusion
It is impossible to foresee all of the changes that may take place prior to complete
disposition being made under the estate planning documents that we draft. Accordingly,
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ESTATE PLANNING IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2001 TAX ACT
The panel discussion will expand upon the earlier coverage of the estate planning
provisions of the 2001 Tax Act in the sessions of Tumey Berry and Ted Atlass. Discussion of
planning ideas and implications arising from the new law will be covered, and, to the extent time
allows, questions will be taken from the audience.
Discussion topics will include:
1. Do we believe that the new law will actually phase in as currently planned?
2. What do we tell the clients who call and ask if they need to review their estate plans?
3. What planning steps do we need to undertake, short-term and long-term?
4. When, and how, do we start drafting for possible estate tax repeal?
5. Will dynasty trusts still make sense after estate tax repeal?
C ·1
6. How ~ill spouses, and surviving spouses, be impacted?
7. How will charities be impacted?
8. How will states be impacted?
9. How will the life insurance industry be impacted?
10. How will trust departments be impacted?
11. How will accountants be impacted?
12. How will probate litigation be impacted?
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13. How will appraisers be impacted?
14. What impact will the new law have on T&E practice, generally?
15. Concluding thoughts by panelists.
c-a
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WHAT ESTATE PLANNERS NEED TO DO IN THE WAKE OF H.R. 1836: A DIGEST
OF CURRENT IDEAS AND CONCERNS FLOATING AROUND THE INTERNET
By
James C. Worthington!
Stites & Harbison, PLLC
I. Funding Formulas
A. Overfunding of the Credit Shelter Trust will be a particular concern where the
marital share and non-marital share beneficiaries are not the same.
B. The formula should fund the marital share first, especially if it is to a marital fund
because that indicates a client's desire to place the surviving spouse's assets in
trust to the least extent possible. By drafting the formula this way, the Credit
Shelter Trust will be completely unfunded ifrepeal takes place. For an example
of a fonnula that accomplishes this, see Exhibit A to this Outline. Where the
client is only using the Credit Shelter Trust to preserve the exemption, this should
be a satisfactory result if repeal takes effect. .
C. When the exemption equivalent is $2 million or $3.5 million, or where the
beneficiaries of the marital and non-marital shares are different, some suggest
placing a dollar limit on the amount going into the non-marital trust.
1. Has anybody seen proposed language?
2. If the limit is either a dollar amount or a percentage, it will be hard to
accommodate some asset mixes, such as those with rapidly fluctuating
values.
D. Review your existing GST Exempt Trusts
1. If a GST trust is to be funded by reference to the maximum available
exemption, was it your client's intent to fund the trust with:
a $3.5 million?
b O?
2. For existing irrevocable trusts, stop funding them.
3. For existing revocable trusts, this could be a serious problem if the grantor
or testator is no longer able to amend the document.-----------
1 The author thanks Lea Ann Breeden, a Brandeis School of Law student working in the firm's Louisville
office, for her research assistance in preparing this manuscript.
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II. Provisions for Amendment by a Trust Protector or Otherwise
A. For an examples, see Exhibit B.
B. When drafting, one must be careful to avoid creating a general power of
appointment.
C. When drafting, one must be careful to avoid making gifts incomplete.
D. Will banks and trust companies be willing to take on this responsibility?
E. Special Issues with QTIP Trusts:
1. The power to terminate may create a terminable interest that results in the
loss of the marital deduction.
2. QTIP trusts should be drafted so that remainder interests are not
contingent and are not spendthrift. Doing so may make it easier to
terminate the trust by the agreement ofparties or by court order.
III. Disclaimer Trusts
A. The advantage is flexibility. This may be especially important for couples with
combined estates under $3 million. After 2004, when the exemption equivalent is
$1.5 million, the use of Disclaimer Trusts will avoid very over-funded Credit
Shelter Trusts for a group of clients who probably don't want a surviving spouse
to be a "trust fund kid".
B. Many professionals criticize them for at least two reasons:
1. The surviving spouse might not cooperate.
2. The surviving spouse may not have even a special power to appoint
because Code § 2518(c) requires that the disclaimed property "passes
without any direction" by the person making the disclailner.
C. If using this technique, you should probably draft a closing letter reminding the
client that their estate plan will require professional advice during the estate
administration, and that the surviving spouse is not required to cooperate and that
failure to do so could have costly estate tax consequences for the surviving
spouse.
D. Some practitioners have suggested the use of a partial QTIP election in the
amount of the available exemption equivalent as an alternative to the Disclaimer
Trust. That non-elected amount would fund a bypass-type trust. Advocates of
this alternative note that it gives 15 months, rather than 9 months with a qualified
disclaimer, to decide how to dispose of the estate.
C-6
IV. Gifts
A. We should advise our clients to continue making exemption gifts.
1. Clients with the available exemption equivalent can give up to
$675,000.00 each this year. Plan on a busy last week of the year.
2. And don't plan a New Years vacation: We will be making first of the year
gifts to use the difference between that and next year's $1 million
exemption.
B. We should not advise our clients to make gifts that require the payment ofgift tax
in an era of estate tax reform and possible repeal.
C. We should continue to use techniques, such as Family LLCs, to leverage gifts.
For example, a client who makes a gift of either $675,000 or $1 million of
underlying assets, and claims a discount should not have to pay any tax even if the
Service completely ignores the discount valuation.
V. Business Succession Planning: The de-unification of the estate and gift taxes may
discourage lifetime business succession planning. However, by developing ways to split
income and control, we should be able to accommodate clients' needs within the
framework of estate tax reform.
VI. Miscellaneous Ideas
A. Remind clients to begin keeping records with respect to capital gains.
B. Every Power of Attorney should include provisions for making gifts and making
disclaimers. If not, you should have a reason you did not include those
provisions.
C. We need to determine the extent of our duty to inform clients of the new law.
D. We should be prepared to talk with clients who want us to revise their Living Will
Directives to avoid December 31, 2010 ("Y2l 0") problems.
E. Some of our clients' Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts may want to buy
convertible term insurance to handle potential estate taxes for the next few years
and possibly beyond.
F. A few prognosticating professionals predict that use of Dynasty Trusts, especially
those established in states that have repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities
(possibly Kentucky?) and that do not have a state income tax, will be more
widespread if repeal happens.
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VII. Synthesized Consensus
A. If our colleagues ask us whether we have updated our resume, we should let them
know that we would be very busy even without an estate tax. The following
techniques are not exclusively estate tax driven:
1. Charitable Remainder Trusts.
2. Family LLCs.
3. Special Needs Trusts.
4. Trusts for Children and Grandchildren.
B. This new law will test our role as counselors and our ability to persuade our
clients to continue thinking about and taking action to plan their estates despite a
popular perception that they do not need to do that.
c. We should treat the new law as a reform, not a repeal.
D. In fact, ifwe sharpen our persuasive skills and convince our clients to act now
rather than to procrastinate, we have an opportunity to be very busy in 2002.
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EXHIBIT A
The Trustee shall first transfer to my spouse in fee simple, the MARITAL FUND share,
consisting of trust assets selected by it and that have a value which when added to the value of all
other interests in property passing to my spouse as a result ofmy death or otherwise in a manner
qualified for the marital deduction under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at
the time ofmy death will equal the maximum marital deduction allowable to my estate under the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, less the amount, if any, required to increase my taxable
estate to the maximum amount as to which, considering the unified credit (the applicable
exclusion amount) and the credit for state death taxes (provided use of this credit does not
require an increase in the state death tax paid) but no other credit, there will be no federal estate
tax payable by reason of my death. The Trustee shall satisfy this provision by transferring to the
MARITAL FUND only cash or other assets that are capable of qualifying for the marital
deduction. In satisfying this division, the Trustee shall value the assets allocated to the
MARITAL FUND for the purpose of this Paragraph as of the date or dates of transfer to the
MARITAL FUND. In no event shall the assets transferred to the MARITAL FUND be liable for
the payment of inheritance, estate, or other similar death taxes of the United States of America,
of any of its states or territories, or of any foreign country or territory, imposed against my estate
or the recipients of my estate, whether passing by my Will or otherwise. The Trustee shall
transfer the remaining trust assets to the FAMILY TRUST, to be held, administered and
distributed as provided in the next Paragraph.
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EXHIBITB
Special Provisions for Trust Protector
The Grantors hereby designate as the initial Trust Protector.
The Trust Protector shall have the power, by an instrument filed with the Trustee, to amend the
dispositive or administrative provisions of this Trust (including the provisions relating to the
Trustee); provided that only descendants of the Grantors shall benefit from any dispositive
amendment and the Grantors shall not be given any right or power with respect to the Trust
assets and, provided further, that all trusts shall tenninate within the applicable rule against
perpetuities as provided herein. The Trust Protector may use this power to address unforeseen
changes in or application of federal and state tax laws and/or regulations. The Trust Protector
may exercise this power from time to time, and may release this power in whole or in part. In
the event that the initial Trust Protector is unwilling or unable to serve as a Trust Protector
hereunder, a majority of the Beneficiaries of the Trust, with the guardian of a minor Beneficiary
representing such Beneficiary's interest, (in consultation with the initial Trust protector, if
available) shall be authorized to appoint a successor Trust Protector, which shall be a corporate
institution within the continental United States having trust assets under administration of at least
$10,000,000 or an individual (other than either of the Grantors, any other person who has
contributed property to the Trust, any descendant of the Grantors or any spouse of any
descendant of the Grantors). The Trust Protector shall not at any time be liable for any action or
default by it in connection with the administration of the Trust estate, unless caused by a willful
commission by it or an act in breach of this Trust Agreement. The Trust protector shall be
entitled to reimbursement for expenses and reasonable compensation for services actually
rendered.
. C - 10
ASSET PROTECTION IN A DIVORCE CONTEXT
Dwayne W. Barrett
Stites & Harbison PLLC
Nashville, Tennessee
James C. Worthington
Stites & Harbison PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Copyright 2001, Dwayne W. Barrett, James C. Worthington
SECTIOND

ASSET PROTECTION IN A DIVORCE CONTEXT
A. CREATING TRUSTS AND ESTATE PLANNING DEVICES THAT
PROTECT FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE EVENT OF A DIVORCE D-l
1. Trusts D-l
(a) Revocable Trusts D-l
(b) Irrevocable Trusts D-2
2. Separate Or Marital Property In A Divorce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-2
3. Income From Trusts Characterized As Property Or Otherwise. . . . . . . . . . .. D-3
4. Discretionary And Non-Discretionary Trusts And Their
Impact In Divorce D-3
B. SHELTERING ASSETS TO PROTECT AGAINST CLAIMS OR
SPOUSES UPON DEATH OR DIVORCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-3
1. Identification Of Claims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-3
(a) Divorce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-3
(i) Alimony. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-3
(ii) Property Settlement D-3
(iii) Child Support D-4
(b) Death. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-4
(i) Elective Share of Surviving Spouse D-4
(ii) Spousal Exemptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-4
(iii) Dower/Curtesy D-4
2. Sheltering Assets D-4
(a) Marital Agreements .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-4
(i) Prenuptial Agreements D-5
(ii) Postnuptial Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-6
(1) Reconciliation Agreements D-6
(2) Postnuptial Contracts D-7
SECTIOND
(b) Corporations, Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies . . . . . .. D-7
(i) Limited Liability Companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-7
(1) Advantages of Limited Liability Companies D-7
(2) Disadvantages of Limited Liability Companies . . . . . . . .. D-7
(ii) Partnerships D-8
(1) Advantages of Limited Partnership D-8
(2) Disadvantage of Limited Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-9
(iii) Corporations D-9
(1) Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-9
(2) Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-I0
(c) Other Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-I0
(d) Fraudulent Conveyances D-I0
c. MARITAL AGREEMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-ll
1. Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-l1
2. Death Provisions D-ll
(a) Percentage of Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-ll
(i) Outright Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-ll
(ii) In Trust. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-l1
(iii) Vesting Schedules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-12
(b) Sum Certain From Estate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-12
(c) Liability For Taxes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-12
3. Divorce Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-12
4. Remaining Provisions D-13
D. TOOLS AVAILABLE FOR ESTATE PLANNING IN A SEPARATION
AGREEMENT D-13
1. Saving Taxes For Clients In Their Divorces; Use of IRe Sec. 1041 D-13
2. Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-14
3. Deductible Alimony Payments D-14
SECTIOND
4. Child Support Payments D-14
5. Taking Advantage Of The Dependency Exemption D-15
6. Personal Residence Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-15
APPENDIX A: KRS 403.190 - DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY D-17
APPENDIX B: KRS 381.180 - ESTATES IN TRUST SUBJECT TO DEBTS
OF BENEFICIARY - SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
EXCEPTED - OTHER EXCEPTIONS D-19
SECTIOND






Stites & Harbison, PLLC
This Article discusses a number of different mechanisms that may be utilized to protect
assets from the claims of spouses in the event of death or divorce.
A. CREATING TRUSTS AND ESTATE PLANNING DEVICES THAT PROTECT
FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE EVENT OF A DIVORCE
1. Trusts. The use of trusts to protect assets with respect to potential domestic disputes has
been around for a long period of time. Typically, these trusts were used by senior
generations passing property to younger generations either through an inter vivos or a
testamentary trust. The typical situation involves property that is placed in trust to
benefit a child and any lineal descendants. An additional technique involves the naming
of siblings as trustees of reciprocal trusts for the children. In that situation, only the
trustee may terminate the trust as desired instead of automatic termination at a particular
age of a particular beneficiary. This technique will prevent the spouse of a beneficiary
for whom a trust is named from attempting to claim an interest in a trust through
transmutation. It also helps to ensure that the beneficial interest in the trust will retain its
characterization as separate property.
The creation of a trust is fairly straightforward. A written document or agreement should
set forth the obligations and responsibilities of the trustee and the rights retained by the
grantor. Additionally, there must be a transfer of some value to the trustee
contemporaneously with the execution of the agreement. Finally, there must be an intent
by the grantor to create a trust arrangement. With respect to inter vivos trusts, there are
two types that may be established. The first type is referred to as a living or revocable
trust. The second type is an irrevocable trust.
(a) Revocable Trusts. In a revocable trust, the grantor typically reserves the right to
amend or revoke the trust at any time during his life. This retained power may result in
the assets in this trust being subject to the claims of the spouse as marital property. These
trusts are recommended primarily in the context of funding with separate property prior
to marriage. In that case, these trusts create a clear paper trail to help with the
identification of the assets and the income and appreciation thereon as separate property.
These trusts should not be relied upon to insulate assets acquired during the marriage.
1 The authors thank Jason C. Williams, a University of Kentucky College of Law student working in the
finn's Louisville office, for his research assistance in preparing this manuscript.
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(b) Irrevocable Trusts. Funding an irrevocable trust with separate property prior to the
marriage is the best use of a trust to protect assets. In that event, the grantor converts the
separate property interests into a beneficial interest, if any, in the trusts. The vesting in
an independent trustee of discretion to make distributions of income and principal from
the trust will further reduce the likelihood of a spouse claiming an interest in the
underlying property. It also will diminish further the value that may be placed on the
beneficial interest in the trust. Many people, however, are reluctant to completely part
with the control of an asset that is necessary in this context.
2. Separate or Marital Property in a Divorce. The statutes that govern divorce proceedings
are found in Chapter 403 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS). The property of an
estate can either be separate or marital, and the disposition of property is governed by
KRS 403.190, a copy of which is included in the Appendix of this manuscript.
Property is presumed to be marital, unless shown to be separate property. KRS
403.190(3). Appreciation of non-marital property, however, may itself be marital
property. Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). In the
case of Glidewell v. Glidewell, 859 S.W.2d 675 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), the court found that
non-vested retirement pension rights are part of the marital estate since the funds that
contributed to the pension were funds that could have been spent by the family during the
marriage. Division should wait, however, until the pension vests.
Using a similar analysis, the Court of Appeals found in Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370
(Ky. Ct. App. 1982) that the husband's degree to practice pharmacy is marital property.
The Court valued the right as the amount spent for direct support and school expenses
during the period of education, plus reasonable interest and adjustments for inflation.
Despite the rule that a professional license is not marital property, the Court in Owens v.
Owens, 672 S.W.2d 67 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) determined that the value of the husband's
law practice was "marital property" since the value of the practice, as it would be
exchanged for a whole or partnership interest, would necessarily not include the transfer
of the license.
Spendthrift trusts are generally created to allow the beneficiary to receive payments in the
future, to guarantee that the beneficiary will not transfer those rights, and to guarantee
that the payments will not be taken to pay the beneficiary's debts. One may not create a
spendthrift trust for one's own benefit. KRS 381.180(7)(a). Kentucky Courts would not
consider an irrevocable spendthrift trust as "property" of the marital estate. It might,
however, be treated as a source of income that courts could consider in determining child
support. The Kentucky statute providing for spendthrift clauses in trusts is KRS 381.180,
a copy of which is included in the Appendix to this manuscript.
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3. Income From Trusts Characterized as Property or Otherwise.
Pursuant to the alimony or maintenance statute, KRS 403.200, the court shall consider
several factors in determining whether to award alimony. These factors include the
"financial resources of the party" seeking support. KRS 403.200(2)(a). Thus, whether a
trust is marital or non-marital property, its existence affects the married couple's rights
because trust income is a factor in settling both alimony, Ahrens v. Ahrens, 230 S.W.2d
73 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950), and child support. KRS 403.212(2)(b).
4. Discretionary and Non-discretionary Trusts and Their Impact in Divorce.
If the terms of the trust allow the trustee the power and duty to perform acts of
management and require the trustee to exercise judgment, the trust is called a
discretionary or active trust. Under a discretionary trust, the beneficiary has no control
over the distribution of money.
If the terms of the trust only give the trustee the power to perform mechanical acts and
the trustee is merely the recipient of property, it is a non-discretionary trust or passive
trust. Under a non-discretionary trust, the beneficiary has control over the distribution of
money.
The impact on whether the beneficiary has a "property" interest for divorce purposes
depends upon the classification of the trust. If the beneficiary has no control over the
trust proceeds, how and when the money is dispersed, there is no property right. The
Family Court should not consider the trust as "property" and the proceeds should not be
reachable by creditors.
If the beneficiary can control how and when the distribution of the trust is made, then the
court could consider at least a portion of the trust as "property."
B. SHELTERING ASSETS TO PROTECT AGAINST CLAIMS OF SPOUSES UPON
DEATH OR DIVORCE
1. Identification of Claims.
The different claims that arise under state law for a spouse in the event of death or divorce
are discussed below.
(a) Divorce.
(i) Alimony. KRS 403.200.
(ii) Property Settlement. In order to settle marital property rights, the property must
first be classified as either marital or separate property pursuant to KRS 403.190.
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(iii) Child Support. Child support obligations, although a consideration in a divorce
that involves children, KRS 403.212, may not be resolved by the spouses prior to the
marriage. Specifically, child support obligations may not be affected by a marital
agreement. Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941,946 (Ky. 1990).
(b) Death.
(i) Elective Share of Surviving Spouse. KRS 392.020.
(ii) Spousal Exemptions. A surviving spouse may, upon application to the District
court, withdraw up to $1,000.00 from the deceased spouse's bank account. KRS
391.030(2). In addition, the first $7,500.00 of money or personal property is exempt
from creditors' claims in favor of a surviving spouse or children if there is no
surviving spouse. KRS 391.030(1)(c).
(iii) Dower / Curtesy. KRS 392.020 governs this issue and states as follows:
After the death of the husband or wife intestate, the survivor shall have an
estate in fee of one-half (1/2) of the surplus real estate of which the other
spouse or anyone for the use of the other spouse, was seized of an estate in
fee simple at the time of death, and shall have an estate for his or her life
in one-third (1/3) of any real estate of which the other spouse or anyone
for the use of the other spouse, was seized of an estate in fee simple during
the coverture but not at the time of death, unless the survivor's right to
such interest has been barred, forfeited or relinquished. The survivor shall
also have an absolute estate in one-half (1/2) of the surplus personalty left
by the decedent. Unless the context otherwise requires, any reference in
the statutes of the state to "dower" or "curtesy" shall be deemed to refer to
the surviving spouse's interest created by this section.
.2. Sheltering Assets.
A variety of methods are available to shelter assets from the claims of a spouse. The
preferred mechanism is a prenuptial agreement that satisfies the statutory requirements. In
Kentucky, such agreements have been recognized for estate planning purposes since 1916.
Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W. 522 (Ky. 1916). Our courts, however, have only recognized
them in the divorce context since 1990. See Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990);
Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990). If for whatever reason a prenuptial
agreement is not utilized, there are several other vehicles that may prove to be effective to
protect assets from a claim of a spouse.
(a) Marital Agreements.
The use of marital agreements by spouses takes on varying levels of importance
depending upon the perspective of the parties involved. The following discussion of
marital agreements should be construed according to two different perspectives. First, a
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spouse entering into a marriage may insist upon a marital agreement to insulate his or her
existing assets from the claims of the spouse (e.g., such a request for a marital agreement
often occurs in second marriages). The second perspective is from that of the senior
generation that has transferred substantial assets to a younger generation. Many times
these assets are considered to be "family monies" that the younger generation should not
expose to the claims of a spouse in the event of a divorce. In the latter situation,
however, it is frequently difficult to convince younger generation members to even
request a potential spouse to enter into marital agreements. However, partnerships and
limited liability companies may be used by the older generation in such situations without
the direct participation by the younger generation.
(i) Prenuptial Agreements. The preferred mechanism to shelter assets from the
claims of a spouse is a prenuptial agreement.
Prior to 1990, a marital agreement made in contemplation of divorce was deemed to
be void. Specifically, Kentucky courts determined that "the marital relation should
not be disturbed or its happiness marred, but that it should be upheld and encouraged,
and that the parties to it should not be led into the breaking of its vows by the
allurements of any stipulations which they may enter into before marriage." Stratton,
185 S.W. at 525.
In 1990 the Kentucky Supreme Court put an end to this policy by holding "that a
husband and wife in Kentucky may define by agreement their rights in each other's
property, regardless of any rights which would otherwise have been excluded or
conferred by KRS 403.190. Such agreements, provided they are otherwise valid
contracts, are entitled to enforcement upon dissolution of the marriage." Gentry, 798
S.W.2d at 934.
To be enforceable in Kentucky, a prenuptial agreement must be entered into fully and
voluntarily, it must be conscionable with full disclosure of pertinent assets, it cannot
lack mutuality, nor be procured by fraud or duress, and can only apply to disposition
ofproperty and maintenance.
In Edwardson, the court determined that "before parties should be bound by
agreements which affect their substantial rights upon dissolution of marriage, it
should appear that the agreement was free of any material omission or
misrepresentation." 798 S.W.2d at 945.
In Kentucky, to determine whether the "knowledge" element is satisfied, consultation
with an attorney prior to the execution of the marital agreement is important;
however, the consultation does not mean that the spouse necessarily entered into the
agreement knowledgeably. Moreover, determining whether duress or undue
influence occurred largely depends upon the specifics involved. The presentation of a
prenuptial agreement to a spouse at the last minute prior to the wedding is likely to
support a claim of duress.
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To be enforceable, a marital agreement must have full and adequate disclosure.
At one extreme, parties would be required to make written
disclosure of every asset together with appraised values. At
the other extreme, a vague oral disclosure in which the
parties provided one anther with some general information
would be sufficient.... [A]s a practical matter, the more
complete the disclosure which is required, the greater the
likelihood that the agreement will ultimately be held invalid.
A requirement of precise disclosure would therefore defeat
what has been determined to be sound policy. On the other
hand, if we uphold agreements on the basis of just 'any old
disclosure,' then the disclosure requirement will have been
essentially eliminated from the law....Such agreements
should not be held invalid unless there appears to have been
deception, fraud or material omission.
Lawson v. Loid, 896 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1995).
(ii) Postnuptial Agreements. More and more married couples are attempting to use
postnuptial agreements to address marital rights prior to the actual commencement of
divorce proceedings. These fall into two categories, Reconciliation Agreements and
Postnuptial Contracts.
(1) Reconciliation Agreements. Reconciliation agreements allow a spouse who
has grounds for a divorce to defer a pursuit of those rights in exchange for certain
concessions with respect to interests in marital property. Kentucky courts seem
deliberately silent on the enforceability of such agreements. One court
determined that the reconciliation agreement between the parties was
unenforceable but added that it did "not mean to intimate that all separation or
property settlement or reconciliation agreements are unenforceable...." Clark v.
Clark, 425 S.W.2d 745, 748 (1968).
Adding some clarity, our Court of Appeals observed that "KRS 403.180 neither
addresses itself to nor affects or prohibits reconciliation agreements. It is
axiomatic in this jurisdiction that the law favors any steps parties may take to
settle litigation, especially those which have the effect of reuniting a family."
Whalen v. Whalen, 581 S.W.2d 578,579 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). When determining
whether or not reconciliation agreements were against public policy, the court
looked to a 1906 case: "It (the law) favors the reconciliation of husband and wife.
A contract for the re-establishment of a ruined home is one which equity is swift
to approve. Whether the contract in question is contrary to public policy is not to
be determined from one clause of it but from the whole instrument. The contract
as a whole does not tend to produce estrangement between husband and wife.
The contract brought them together, and, taken as a whole, it is in aid of the
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marital relation, and is therefore not opposed to public policy, but in accord with
it." Id. at 580.
It thus appears that a reconciliation agreement would be enforceable in Kentucky,
subject to the usual concerns about fairness, disclosure, and the like.
(2) Postnuptial Contracts. The Court of Appeals has stated that two parties could
enter into a valid postnuptial contract "if such an agreement was fair and
equitable, and supported by an adequate consideration." Campbell v. Campbell,
377 S.W.2d 93, 94 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964). The court went on to explain that "if the
subject of a contract is lawful and the parties are sui juris, the right to bind
themselves cannot be restricted because it is to the disadvantage of one of the
parties making it." Id. at 95.
The concern of adequate consideration was also explained by the Campbell
Court's statement that "mutual promises form a valuable consideration for an
agreement where there is benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee."
Id. at 95.
(b) Comorations, Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies.
These entities also may be used by spouses to protect their respective assets. The transfer
of assets to these types of entities does not necessarily result in the assets being
determined to be separate property. Use of these entities does, however, enhance the
ability to determine which assets are marital property and which assets retain separate
property status. The advantages and disadvantages of each of these types of entities is
discussed briefly below.
(i) Limited Liability Companies. In recent years, the most popular vehicle for
sheltering assets, after the prenuptial agreement, has been the limited liability
company. These are particularly attractive when a senior generation is attempting to
impose upon the younger generation a mechanism to protect the "family monies."
(1) Advantages of Limited Liability Companies.
a) Limited Liability. Unlike a partnership, limited liability companies offer
limited liability to all members.
b) No Taxation. Limited liability companies may be taxed as partnerships for
federal tax purposes. As such, there is no entity level tax.
c) Eliminate Control. Non-voting members have no voice in the management
of the partnership. The voting members control the entity. A voting member
may retain the discretion to control distributions of cash. In other words,
although a member will receive his share of income from the business each
year and then report the same for federal tax purposes, that member may not
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necessarily receive distributions of cash. A spouse will not want to attempt to
claim an interest in an asset on which he or she will be paying tax e,ach year
because he or she may not necessarily receive any distributions of cash to
fund the obligation. In addition, it is easier in the LLC context to change the
allocation of income and expenses on an annual basis than in a corporation.
d) Diminish Value of Assets. The transfer of assets to a LLC can result in a
discounted valuation relative to that of the underlying assets. The typical
discounts are related to a minority interest and lack of marketability. These
discounts should not be affected by the recent legislation reforming the federal
estate and gift tax system. It is for this reason again that LLC interests are not
attractive for a spouse to attempt to claim in a divorce proceeding.
(2) Disadvantages of Limited Liability Companies. The primary disadvantages
of a limited liability company is the annual filing fee of $15.00 in Kentucky, and
the possibility of some increased accounting fees.
(ii) Partnerships. Partnerships are also useful for sheltering assets. In addition,
partnerships offer protection just in case an event occurs that could result in liability.
A general partnership should not be used; a limited partnership should be used to
shelter assets. In Kentucky, a limited partnership requires at least two individuals: a
general partner and a limited partner. A limited partner may also own a general
partnership interest. But, any general partner will be personally liable for acts and
errors of the entity.
(1) Advantages of Limited Partnership.
a) Limited Liability. The liability of a limited partner is limited to his
investment in the entity. General partners are personally liable for the
obligations of the entity.
b) No taxation. Partnerships are pass-through entities so there is no entity-
level taxation, unlike a corporation.
c) Control of Management. Limited partners have no voice in the
management of the partnership. General partners control the entity. A
general partner may retain the discretion to control distributions of cash. In
other words, although a partner will receive his share of income from the
business each year and then report the same for federal tax purposes, that
partner may not necessarily receive distributions of cash. A spouse will not
want to attempt to claim an interest in an asset on which he or she will be
paying tax each year because he or she may not necessarily receive any
distributions of cash to fund the obligation. In addition, it is easier in a
partnership context to change the allocation of income and expenses on an
annual basis as compared to a corporation.
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d) Diminish Assets for Valuation Purposes. The transfer of assets to a limited
partnership can result in a discounted valuation relative to that of the
underlying assets. The typical discounts are related to a minority interest and
lack of marketability. These discounts should not be affected by the recent
legislation reforming the federal estate and gift tax system. It is for this
reason again that these types of interests are not attractive for a spouse to
attempt to claim in a divorce proceeding.
(2) Disadvantage of Limited Partnership. The primary disadvantage of a limited
partnership is that some person must act as the general partner and therefore be
exposed to liability. This can be avoided through corporate general partners, but
that does add some complexity to the structure.
(iii) Corporations. Corporations are rarely used as estate planning devices or as
shelters for assets from the claims of spouses because of the growing popularity of
limited liability companies. Nevertheless, they are discussed as follows:
(1) Advantages. Set forth below is a brief listing of the advantages of
transferring assets to a corporation prior to marriage for purposes of sheltering the
assets, and income and appreciation thereon, from the claims of a spouse.
a) Shareholder Agreements. Shareholder agreements may be executed by the
stockholders of corporations. Although these agreements may address
ownership issues in the event of a divorce, it is not recommended that a
shareholder forfeit or agree to sell his interest in the company in the event of a
divorce. However, the agreements may so limit the ability of a shareholder to
control or be involved with a company that a spouse may not attempt to claim
an interest in the asset.
b) Diminish Assets for Valuation Purposes. The value of an interest in a
closely-held business is worth significantly less than the underlying assets
themselves. It is for this reason that a transfer to a different entity would
reduce the holdings of a spouse for purposes of calculating a spouse's net
work for property settlement. The implementation of discounts for minority
interest and lack of marketability are not necessarily available when a spouse
owns property outright. See Rev. Proc. 59-60 regarding the valuation of
closely-held businesses.
c) Control over Governance. A spouse may transfer significant assets to a
corporation yet still control management or governance of the entity. This
control will also discourage a spouse from attempting to claim an interest in
these types ofproperty interests.
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d) Limited Liability. A spouse will gain a level of protection with respect to
the liability upon transferring assets to a corporation. This benefit is
particularly significant when the spouse is not involved in the day-to-day
operations of the property.
(2) Disadvantages.
a) Federal and State Taxation. A disadvantage to transferring assets to a
corporation is that the corporation will be required to file federal and state tax
returns and pay tax on the income therefrom. Federal taxation of corporations
begins at 15% and rises to 35%. In Kentucky, each corporation is required to
pay taxes ranging from 3% to 7.25% depending on the corporation's taxable
net income. Upon the dissolution of the corporation, it is responsible for
payment of taxes assessed during the period of that taxable year in which the
corporation had an income in the state. The use of an S corporation may not
relieve Kentucky residents of the obligation to pay taxes. The relevant section
ofKRS 141.040 states:
Every S corporation shall pay the tax imposed under subsection (1) of this
section whenever the net capital gain of such corporation exceeds twenty-
five thousand dollars ($25,000), and exceeds fifty percent (50%) of its
taxable income for the taxable year and its taxable income for such year
exceeds twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).
b) Costs of Administration. The administration and management of a
corporation can be costly, especially compared to the benefits. For example,
stock certificates must be issued anytime there is a change ofownership.
(iv) Funding. When creating any of the entities referenced above, an important issue
is whether the spouse has commingled any marital property with the separate property
that is placed into the entity. If so, the use of marital property may effect a
transmutation of the interest in the entity from separate to marital property.
(c) Other Methods. Another method used to shelter assets is an Acknowledgment,
Waiver, and Release of rights in specific separate property. This form may be utilized
when the spouse who anticipates receiving the separate property (e.g., typically the
recipient of a gift from a senior generation) does not have sufficient consideration to enter
into a postnuptial agreement. These types of forms would typically be between the senior
generation and the spouse of the younger generation family member. It is prudent to
recite that the younger generation family member is a third-party beneficiary of the
agreement.
(d) Fraudulent Conveyances. With respect to the funding and transfers of assets to the
entities referenced above, KRS 378.010 addresses fraudulent conveyances. Kentucky
courts have held that a transfer of assets immediately prior to marriage may constitute









1. Elements. Prenuptial agreements typically include a waiver of all state law rights of the
respective spouses upon both death and divorce. The document should contain
references to property rights that may be in dispute between the parties in the event of a
death or divorce. Ownership is determined by the name or names in which the· property
interest is titled or registered, provided that all state law rights have been eliminated.
This structure is an attempt to eliminate the notion of transmutation of assets from
separate to martial property based upon a party's purported contribution to the
preservation and appreciation of the property interests. Set forth below is both a brief
discussion of some of the dispositive provisions of the agreement and issues that should
be considered during negotiation of a prenuptial agreement.
2. Death Provisions. The negotiations for prenuptial agreements frequently start with the
notion that each party should retain the property brought into the marriage in the event of
death or divorce. Although this position is reasonable with respect to divorce, it may not
necessarily reflect the intent of the parties if the marriage is dissolved by death.
Frequently, in those situations, the parties are in an amicable relationship. Also, upon
separation by death there is an overall greater sense of fairness with respect to the
division of property rights between the parties. Set forth below are some suggestions on
how to negotiate a share of the predeceased spouse's estate.
(a) Percentage of Estate. To determine the percentage of the estate to which a surviving
spouse is entitled first requires the agreement of what constitutes the "estate." Many
times, the computation requires the determination of gross estate for federal tax purposes
less certain deductions and expenses (i.e., funeral administration expenses, secured
debts). In other cases, the percentage of the estate is determined with reference to the
appreciation of the predeceased spouse's estate from the date of the marriage to the date
of death. In that event, there needs to be consensus on the valuation of the estate at the
time of the marriage. Also, a similar valuation must be used for determining the date of
death value. The values that are used for estate tax purposes should not be referenced
because it is in the best interest of the estate beneficiaries that these values be as low as
possible, and that conflicts with the surviving spouse's goals.
(i) Outright Distribution. A spouse will frequently attempt to obtain an outright
distribution from the estate of the predeceased spouse. In that event, the following
issues must be determined: (1) when the outright distribution will be paid; (2) the
form in which the outright distribution should be paid (e.g., whether the value may be
paid in cash or in kind); and (3) when in-kind distributions are permitted (which may
be required when an illiquid estate is involved), who selects the assets that may be
used to satisfy this obligation.
(ii) In Trust. Often a spouse prefers to leave certain assets of the estate in trust for
the surviving spouse with the knowledge that upon the death of the surviving spouse,
those assets will be transferred to the beneficiaries designated by the first spouse. In
that event, several issues need to be addressed. First, the trustee must be identified.
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Also, since no federal taxes are due on certain qualifying property interests
transferred to a surviving spouse, the trust provisions should comply with the marital
deduction requirements under Internal Revenue Code Section 2056 to ensure this tax-
advantaged treatment.
Another important issue is the term of the trust. To comply with Section 2056, this
term will need to be for the life of the surviving spouse. What constitutes income and
the amount of income distributed each year and whether the trustee has the ability to
encroach upon the principal of the trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse must
also be determined.
(iii) Vesting Schedules. The spouses may negotiate over a schedule of percentages
to be used in the event the marriage is dissolved by death. A schedule of percentages
that increases with the length of the marriage accommodates the changing
circumstances of the couple's life together. Although Kentucky does not have a
statutory vesting schedule, we need only look one state to the south at the vesting
schedule set forth at § 31-4-101 of the Tennessee Code Annotated. That statutory
vesting schedule starts with 10% and increases to 40% after eight years of marriage.
This concept has been utilized with lower percentages and longer vesting schedules
(e.g., 4% per year for every year after the 3rd anniversary of the marriage, not to
exceed 40%). It is always recommended, however, that a minimum and/or a
maximum percentage be used.
(b) Sum Certain from Estate. In other situations, the parties may agree that regardless of
the value of a predeceased spouse's estate, the surviving spouse will get a stated amount.
Frequently, this amount is obtained through an insurance policy. The prenuptial
agreement should include a covenant to maintain the insurance policy. It also should
provide that in the event the insurance proceeds are insufficient, the surviving spouse
may claim an interest to the extent of the insufficiency against all assets included in the
estate.
(c) Liability for Taxes. For federal estate tax purposes, it is important to ensure that
property that passes to the surviving spouse qualifies for the marital deduction. The
surviving spouse must obtain at least a qualifying income interest for life in the property,
meaning that he or she must receive distributions of all income from the property at least
once a year. In addition, no person other than the surviving spouse may control or direct
the disposition of this property during the spouse's lifetime. It is also recommended that
a stipulation provide that the federal taxes will not be imposed upon property passing to
the surviving spouse.
3. Divorce Provisions. The prenuptial agreement provides that both parties waive any rights
to maintenance, alimony, or spousal support. As such, parties frequently engage in the
negotiation of property rights in lieu of alimony. The primary distinction between
alimony and property settlements is the taxation of the distributions. It is highly
recommended that the payments upon divorce if any, be determined as property
settlements or payments constituting alimony for federal income tax purposes. Payments
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in lieu of alimony and property settlements may be tied to appreciation of net worth and
lor an investment schedule that increases during the length of the marriage. In addition,
how long the spouse will be required to pay the obligation should be addressed. Finally,
whether any interest will accrue on the payments during such period of time should also
be resolved.
4. Remaining Provisions. The remaining provisions of the form agreement address such
issues as the obligation to waive rights in qualified retirement plans after the marriage as
required by federal law, the resolution of debts incurred prior to the marriage in the
separate names of the spouses, and responsibility for legal fees and disclosure
requirements.
D. TOOLS AVAILABLE FOR ESTATE PLANNING IN A SEPARATION
AGREEMENT
There are various methods whereby one or both of the parties in a divorce can benefit form
appropriate structuring.
1. Saving Taxes for Clients in Their Divorces: Use of Internal Revenue Code § 1041.
Under IRC § 1041, no gain or loss is recognized on a transfer of property between
spouses, or former spouses, if incident to a divorce. Under this Internal Revenue Code
section, the transferee's basis for determining gain or loss, is equal to the transferor's
basis immediately before the transfer. This rule covers transfers at any time during the
marriage whether or not the spouses are contemplating a divorce, and also covers
transfers between former spouses if "incident to a divorce." A transfer between former
spouses is treated as incident to divorce if it (1) occurs within one year after the date on
which the marriage ceases; or (2) is related to the cessation of marriage. A transfer of
properties is treated as related to the cessation of marriage if the transfer is pursuant to a
divorce of separation agreement, and the transfer occurs not more than six years after the
date on which the marriage ceases. IRC § 1041 also applies where the transfer of
property to a third person on behalf of a spouse is either (1) required under the divorce or
separation agreement; (2) pursuant to the request of the former spouse; or (3) the former
spouse consented to or ratified the transfer to the third party.
The parties could use IRC § 1041 if the parties wish to fund a trust which would enable
the "poorer" spouse to utilize his or her unified exemption equivalent (currently $675,000
but increasing to $3.5 Million over the next eight (8) years) when he or she dies. The
trust would provide for mandatory income distributions with the principal remaining at
the "spouse's" death to be held in trust and/or distributed to the children. This technique
could save the family hundreds of thousands of dollars in estate taxes (assuming the
"wealthier" spouse has assets exceeding $675,000 prior to the transfer).
This Internal Revenue Code Section could also be used to dispose of an interest in a
closely held business. For example, one spouse could transfer stock in a closely held
corporation to the other spouse, and after the divorce becomes final, the corporation
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could redeem the stock of the spouse who no longer wishes to have an interest in the
business. If structured properly, the redemption would qualify for favorable capital gain
treatment and would not be treated as a dividend.
One must also meet the requirement of IRC § 2516 to avoid the imposition of gift tax on
a transfer between spouses. Section 2516 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
where a husband and wife enter into a written agreement relative to the marital property
rights and a divorce occurs either one year before or two years after the execution of the
agreement, any transfer of property pursuant to the agreement to either spouse in
settlement of his or her marital rights or to provide a reasonable allowance for support of
the issue of the marriage during minority is deemed to be a transfer made for full and
adequate consideration. Any transfers in excess of a reasonable allowance are treated as
gifts.
2. Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("oDRO"). Under IRC § 414(p), a QDRO could be
utilized to obtain the cash that is "trapped" in a spouse's retirement plan. This Code
Section has certain specific requirements that must be met, and if structured properly, the
income tax consequence shifts form the Plan Participant to the transferee. If not
structured correctly, the Plan Participant must report the income even though such
Participant receives no money from the Plan. Moreover, if the ultimate recipient of the
segregated funds is a person other than the former spouse, the recipient is deemed to be a
person other than an alternate payee, as defined in IRC § 414(p), and the Plan Participant,
not the recipient, is subject to tax upon the distribution.
If the transferee does not wish to pay income taxes on the distribution, he or she can
rollover such distribution to an IRA and defer the payment of income tax until he or she
receives payments form the IRA.
IRC § 408(d)(6) provides that the transfer of an IRA or any part thereof to a former
spouse under a decree of divorce or a written instrument incident to divorce is a non-
taxable transaction, and that the IRA will thereafter, be treated as the IRA of the
transferee spouse. Although a QDRO is not necessary, however, the property settlement
agreement or similar instrument must be drafted appropriately.
3. Deductible Alimony Payments. Depending on the parties' desires, payments between
spouses incident to a divorce can be deductible by the payor and includible in income by
the payee. IRC § 71 contains the various rules, and onc.e again, certain specific
requirements must be met. The most obvious requirement is a stipulation by the parties
of the intent to treat the payments as deductible alimony to the payor and includible in
taxable income to the recipient. Failure to meet these requirements could cause
unintended income tax consequences to the parties.
4. Child Support Payments. Child support payments, which are specifically designated as
child support (or if such a payment is reduced upon the happening of a contingency
relating to a child's attaining a specific age, marrying, dying, leaving school, or
otherwise) are not deductible.
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5. Taking Advantage of the Dependency Exemption. In general, the custodial parent is
entitled to the dependency exemption assuming that the parents together (or at least one
of them) contribute one-half of the child's actual support. The parties can agree to
"allocate" the dependency exemption, but if the non-custodial parent is utilizing the
dependency exemption, IRS Form 8332 must be attached to that parent's income tax
return for the year he or she claims the dependency exemption.
6. Personal Residence Planning. Under IRC § 121, an individual can exclude up to
$250,000 of gain form the sale of a marital residence. In order to qualify for this
exclusion, the taxpayer must have owned the residence for at least two of the five years
immediately before the sale, the residence must be used by the taxpayer as a principal
residence for periods totaling at least two of the five years immediately before the sale,
and the taxpayer cannot use IRC § 121 more than once within a two-year period.
IRC § 121(d)(3) contains a special provision for divorce situations. Under this Code
Section, if an individual has received the property transaction governed by IRC § 1041,
the period such individual transferee owned such property is the period the transferor
owned the property. In addition, for purposes of determining the use of the property, an
individual is treated as using property as such individual's principal residence during any
period of ownership while such individual's spouse or former spouse is granted use of the
property under a divorce or separation instrument. Another alternative would be for the
parties to sell the house while they are married, which would qualify for the $500,000
gain exclusion, and then transfer the sales proceeds or a portion thereof, from one spouse




KRS 403.190. Disposition of property.
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage or for legal separation, or in a
proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of the marriage by a
court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction
to dispose of the property, the court shall assign each spouse's property to him. It also
shall divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just
proportions considering all relevant factors including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, including
contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to
become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right
to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children.
(2) For the purpose of this chapter, "marital property" means all property acquired by
either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent during the marriage and the
income derived therefrom unless there are significant activities of either spouse which
contributed to the increase in value of said property and the income earned therefrom;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or in
exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(e) The increase in value of property acquired before the marriage to the extent that
such increase did not result from the efforts of the parties during marriage.
(3) All property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a decree of
legal separation is presumed to be marital property, regardless of whether title is held
individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety, and community property. The
presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was
acquired by a method listed in subsection (2) of this section.
(4) If the retirement benefits of one spouse are excepted from classification as marital
property, or not considered as an economic circumstance during the division of
marital property, then the retirement benefits of the other spouse shall also be
excepted, or not considered, as the case may be. However, the level of exception
provided to the spouse with the greater retirement benefit shall not exceed the level of
exception provided to the other spouse. Retirement benefits, for the purposes of this
subsection shall include retirement or disability allowances, accumulated
contributions, or any other benefit of a retirement system or plan regulated by the
Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, or of a public retirement system
administered by an agency of a state or local government, including deferred






contribution or money purchase plans qualified under Section 401(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
History
(Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 182, § 9; 1986, ch. 441, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1996, ch.
328, §§ 1, 2, effective July 15, 1996.)
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APPENDIXB
381.180. Estates in trust subject to debts ofbeneficiary - Spendthrift trusts excepted-
Other exceptions.
(1) Estates of every kind held or possessed in trust shall be subject to the debts and
charges of the beneficiaries thereof the same as if the beneficiaries also owned the
similar legal interest in the property, unless the trust is a spendthrift trust.
(2) As used herein, unless the context otherwise requires, "spendthrift trust" means a
trust in which by the terms of the instrument creating it a valid restraint on the
voluntary and involuntary alienation of the interest of a beneficiary is imposed.
(3) Specific language shall not be necessary to create a spendthrift trust and it shall
be sufficient if the instrument creating the trust manifests an intention to create a
spendthrift trust.
(4) If an instrument creating a trust provides that a beneficiary is entitled to receive
income of the trust and that his interest shall not be alienable by him and shall not be
subject to alienation by operation of law or legal process, the restraint on the
voluntary and involuntary alienation of his right to income due and to accrue shall be
valid.
(5) If an instrument creating a trust provides that a beneficiary is entitled to receive
principal of the trust at a future time and that his interest shall not be alienable by him
and shall not be subject to alienation by operation of law or legal process, the restraint
on the voluntary and involuntary alienation of his right to principal shall be valid.
(6) Although a trust is a spendthrift trust, the interest of the beneficiary shall be
subject to the satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the beneficiary:
(a) By the spouse or child of the beneficiary for support, or by the spouse for
maintenance;
(b) If the trust is not a trust described in subsection (7)(b) of this section by providers
ofnecessary services rendered to the beneficiary or necessary supplies furnished to
him; and
(c) By the United States or the Commonwealth of Kentucky for taxes due from him
on account ofhis interest in the trust or the income therefrom.
(7) (a) If a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a provision restraining the
voluntary or involuntary alienation of his interest, his interest nevertheless shall be
subject to alienation by operation of law or legal process.
(b) This subsection shall not be construed to subject to alienation any interest in an
individual retirement account or annuity, tax sheltered annuity, simplified employee
pension, pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other retirement plan described in
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, which qualifies for the deferral of
current income tax until the date benefits are distributed.
History
(2355: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 61, § 1; 1974, ch. 386, § 69; 1990, ch. 220, § 1,
effective July 13, 1990.)
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SECTIONE

Dealing with Life Insurance in the Estate Planning Process
I. Basic Uses of life insurance
A. To create a larger estate thereby assuring adequate funds
for survivors.
B. Liquidity to pay taxes and expenses, -- avoidance of a
forced sale of valuable non liquid assets
c. Life insurance may constitute a source of funds for the
surviving family members during interim period of estate
administration.
D. In business context, life insurance proceeds may be used
to fund obligations under agreements w/ surviving owners
and/or business entity to purchase the deceased owner's
business interest.
II. Overview of federal taxation of life insurance
A. Estate Tax Consequences
The proceeds of a life insurance policy under the terms
of which the decedent is the insured are included in the
gross estate of the decedent/insured if the proceeds are
either
1. Payable to the executor, IRC §2042(1), or
2. Payable to designated beneficiaries if the decedent
had any incidents of ownership in the policy. IRC
§2042(2)
a. Incidents of ownership include the right of
the insured or her estate to the economic
benefits of the insurance, including the power
to change the beneficiary, to surrender or
cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to
revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for
a loan or to obtain from the insurer a loan
against the surrender value of the policy.
Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(c) (2).
b. Incidents of ownership may include powers over
the choice of settlement option, and the
retention of a possible reversionary interest
by the insured. Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(c) (3)
& (4).
(1) A reversionary interest is an incident of
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ownership only if the value of the
reversionary interest exceeded 5 percent
of the value of the policy immediately
before the decedent's death. IRe
§2042 (2) .
(2) It is immaterial whether the reversionary
interest arose by express provision in
the insurance policy or any instrument of
transfer or by operation. of law.
c. A decedent does not possess incidents of
ownership over an insurance policy on her life
where the decedent's powers devolved to her as
a fiduciary and were not exercisable for her
personal benefit, provided that the decedent
did not transfer the policy to the trust and
did not furnish consideration for maintaining
the policy. Rev. Rul. 84-179, 1984-2 C.B. 195.
d. Where the insured is a sole or controlling
shareholder of a corporation, incidents of
ownership possessed by the corporation may be
attributed to that shareholder with respect to
proceeds payable to a beneficiary other than
the corporation. Treas. Reg. §20. 2042-
l(c) (6), Skifter Est. v. Cornr. 468 F.2d 699
(2dCir., 1972).
e. A life insurance policy owned by a
partnership, with the proceeds payable other
than to, or for the benefi t of the
partnership, may be includible in the deceased
insured partner's gross estate. See Rev. Rul.
83-147, 1983-2 C.B. 158.
3. Transfer of life insurance policy within three
years of death
a. Transfer of the policy within three years of
death of the transferor-insured results in the
full amount of proceeds payable by reason of
death being included in the gross estate. IRC
§2035 (a) (2) .
b. Where the policy is transferred more than
three years prior to insured's death, the
proceeds should not be included in the
insured's gross estate even if the decedent
continues to pay the premiums.
c . Note that in accidental death policies or
E-2
similar situations [i.e., certain term
policies] each premium payment may be deemed
to create a new policy. See Bel v. U.S., 452
F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.s. 919 (1972) where each payment of the
annual premium after the creation of the
policy was considered a purchase of a new
policy.
B. Income Tax Treatment
1. Income earned by the investment of policy assets is
not taxed to the insured even though it inures to
the benefit of the insured either by increasing the
cash surrender value or by being available to pay
insurance proceeds.
2. Generally the interest paid on loans incurred to
purchase and/or maintain life insurance policies is
not deductible. IRC §264(a).
3 . Policy-loan interest is generally subj ect to the
general rules which preclude a deduction for
consumer interest expense per IRC §163(h) (1).
4. Life insurance proceeds payable by reason of death
of the insured are not gross income to the payee.
I.R.C. §101
5. Any amounts received under a life insurance
contract on the life of one who is terminally ill
or chronically ill are excluded from gross income
as amounts paid by reason of the death of the
insured. IRC §101(g) (1).
6. If any portion of the death benefit under a life
insurance contract on the life of a terminally ill
or chronically ill insured is sold or assigned to a
viatical settlement provider, the amount paid for
the sale or assignment shall be treated as an
amount paid under the life insurance contract by
reason of the death of the insured. IRC
101 (g) (2) (A)
7. If a life insurance policy is transferred to
another for valuable consideration, the amount
excluded from gross income shall not exceed an
amount equal to the sum of the actual value of such
consideration and the premiums and other amounts
subsequently paid by the transferee. IRC
§101 (a) (2) .
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a. Two exceptions:
(1) gifts or other transfers where the basis
of the transferee is determined in whole
or in part from the basis of the
transferor.
(2) transfer to the insured, a partner of the
insured, a partnership in which the
insured is a partner, or to a corporation
in which the insured is a shareholder or
officer.
b. Example: Insured sells the life insurance
policy on Insured's life to Purchaser for the
full fair market value. At the death of
Insured, Purchaser has gross income to the
extent that the proceeds payable at death
exceed the amount paid (including any
subsequent payment of premiums)
8. Post-death interest on insurance proceeds is
included in the gross income of the recipient. IRC
§101(d)
C. Gift Tax Consequences
1. Transfer of the policy results in a transfer [gift]
in the amount of the replacement value of the
policy. Treas. Reg. §25.2512-6(a).
2. This may be a present interest and may therefore
qualify for the annual exclusion.
III. Insurance Trusts
A. Estate Planning advantages
1. Proceeds can be paid to beneficiary at time of
insured's death so that trustee may immediately
invest the cash proceeds received from the insurer
2. Trust can coordinate collection, investment and
disposition of proceeds of several policies
3. Trust can be used for purposes similar to those of
any other trust, [e.g., sprinkling income and
corpus, generation-skipping, marital deduction
provisions, and avoidance of intricate local law
problems, such as paying proceeds to minors and








was irrevocable prior to
B. Revocable Insurance trusts
1. May be funded or unfunded
2. Trustee may own the policy during insured's life
3. Insured may own policy and designate trust as
beneficiary
4. Funded insurance trust
a. Grantor transfers property to the trust and
income from trust corpus is used to pay
premiums on policies.
b. Insurance policies are often transferred to
the trust
5. Taxation of revocable insurance trust
a. No gift on transfer of policy and/or other
property to the trust as there has been no
surrender of dominion and control. Treas.
Reg. §25.2511-2(b).
b. No estate tax advantage.
(1) Full value of trust, including the life
insurance proceeds, is included in the
gross estate of decedent per IRC §2038.
(2) Note that the insured is considered to
have an "incident of ownership" in life
insurance policy held in trust, if under
the terms of the policy the insured has
the power (as trustee or otherwise) to
change beneficial ownership in the policy
or its proceeds. Treas. Reg. §20.2042-
1 (c) (4)
(3) Insurance proceeds may qualify for the
estate tax marital deduction if the trust
qualified under IRC §2056(b) (5) or (7).
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c. The trust income remains taxable to the
grantor of the trust. IRC §676(a).
C. Irrevocable Inter Vivos Trust
1. Life insurance policy is transferred to the trust
which may be otherwise funded or unfunded.
a. If unfunded, the life insurance premiums must
be paid by someone other than the trust,
presumably the insured or a beneficiary of the
trust.
b. If funded, the grantor will transfer
sufficient property to pay the premiums .or the




(1) Transfer of property, including life
insurance policies, to trust is a gift
for federal tax purposes.
(2) If trust is unfunded, payment of premiums
on life insurance owned by the trust
constitutes an additional gift.
(3) But payment of premiums by trust using
trust income or property is not an
additional gift.
(4) If annual exclusion is desired, trust
should have a demand (Crummey) power.
b. Estate tax
(1) Assuming that the grantor has retained no
incidents of ownership in the insurance
policies and retained no beneficial
interest in the trust itself, and the
irrevocable transfer was completed during
life, the death of the grantor /insured
should result in the imposition of no
estate tax.
(2) However, if the trust directs the trustee
to pay debts and taxes of the estate of
the decedent from policy proceeds, funds
required for such purposes are includible
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in the decedent's gross estate.
Reg. §20.2042-1(b) (1).
Treas.
(3) If decedent purchased an insurance policy
as collateral security for a loan or
other accommodation, its proceeds are
considered receivable for the benefit of
the estate. Id.
(4) If the trust instrument authorizes the
trustee to make loans to the executor to
pay estate debts and taxes, or authorizes
the trustee to purchase assets from the
estate, such loans and/or purchases do
not trigger the estate tax.
(5) If, the policy is transferred to the
trust wi thin three years of death, the
proceeds will be included in the
insured's gross estate. IRe §2035(a) (2).
(6) But if the policy is acquired directly by
the trust from the insurance company
within 3 years of the death of the
insured, §2035 should not apply. See
Headrick Est. v. Comr., 93 T.C. 171
(19 89 ) a f f I d., 918 F. 2d 1263 (6th Ci r .
1990).
c. Income Tax
The grantor of a funded insurance trust will
be taxed on that portion of the trust income
that is or may be applied to the payment of
premiums on policies insuring the life of the
grantor or the spouse of the grantor. IRe
§677 (~) (3).
D. Testamentary trusts
1. Established for nontax reasons.
2. Since there is no transfer during life, no gift tax
will apply.
3. Full value of insurance proceeds will be subject to
the estate tax.
4. No income tax planning needed as proceeds will not
be paid to the trust until after death of insured.
5. Estate planner should determine under local law
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a. Whether policy proceeds can be paid directly
to the testamentary trustee. If not, proceeds
could be paid to the estate for distribution
to the testamentary trustee
b. Whether, if desired, the insurance policy
proceeds will be safeguarded from the claims
of creditors
c. Whether the proceeds will be included in the
probate estate, and thereby subj ect to the
probate costs.
d. Whether beneficiary designations and similar
insurance documents must be completed wi th
testamentary formalities and
e. Whether periodic probate accountings will be
required for the testamentary trust even
though specifically waived in the trust
instrument.
E. Preparation of the Insurance Trust Agreement
1. Whether the trust is to be funded or unfunded
2. If unfunded, who has the responsibility for paying
periodic insurance premiums
3. If funded, who has responsibility for paying
periodic insurance premiums, particularly if the
income generated from other trust assets is
insufficient for this purpose
4. If trust investment income is in excess of premium
requirements, whether that income is to be
accumulated or distributed to trust beneficiaries
5. Whether the trust is to be revocable or irrevocable
6. Whether policy proceeds should be used to alleviate
liquidity problems in the grantor's estate, either
by a loan, a contribution to the estate, or a
purchase of assets from the estate









8. Administrative powers of the trustee (including
powers to use any corpus to pay insurance premiums
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and to purchase new policies on the life of the
trust grantor or the trust grantor's spouse)
IV. Insurance Planning and the Marital Deduction
A. Insurance trust can be structured so that it is not
subject to tax in the estate of either spouse
B. Insurance proceeds which are taxed in the estate of the
insured may qualify for the estate tax marital deduction
where
1. The surviving spouse is the beneficiary
2. The insurance trust assets are includible in the
insured's gross estate and the trust qualifies
either under IRe § 2056(b) (5) (life estate with
general power of appointment or §2056(b) (7)
(qualified terminable interest property) .
C. Cross-ownership of policies (each spouse purchases the
policy insuring the life of the other spouse)
1. Since there is no transfer by the insured, §2035
does not apply in the event .of the death of the
insured within three years.
2. If the insured spouse dies first, the proceeds are
potentially subject to the estate tax in the estate
of the surviving spouse.
3. If the owner spouse predeceases, the value of the
life insurance policy is included in the gross
estate under IRC §2033. However the amount
includible is the replacement value of the policy
rather than proceeds.
4. The owner spouse may dispose of the policy by will,
designating someone other than the insured as the
owner of the policy.
Note: if the insured spouse is the executor
of the owner's estate, the insured could be
deemed to have incidents of ownership in
his/her capacity as executor.
5. Disadvantage of cross-ownership of policies
a. If owner-spouse becomes incompetent his/her
attorney in fact or guardian has control of
the policy
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b. In the event of separation or divorce the
ownership of insurance policies may become an
issue.
c. Where the insurance policy is owned by the
spouse and the beneficiary is someone other
than the spouse, at the death of the insured
spouse the owner-spouse is considered to make
a gift of the entire policy death proceeds to
the beneficiary. Goodman, 156 F.2d 218, (2d
Cir.1946).
D. Joint and survivor life insurance policies
1. Proceeds are payable on the death of the surviving
spouse and will be available to meet the liquidity
needs of that estate.
2. Premiums may be structured to be payable only until
the first insured dies.
3. Disadvantages
a. Proceeds not available to family on the death
of the first spouse to die, although borrowing
against the cash value of the policy may be
possible.
b. Disposition in event of divorce may be unclear
v. Employment related life insurance
A. Group Term life insurance
1. Employee may exclude from income the cost of non-
discriminatory group term life insurance provided
by the employer up to the cost of $50,000 of such
insurance. IRC §79(a).
2. Employer may deduct the full cost of such insurance
as an ordinary and necessary business expense under
I RC § 162 (a) (1) .
3 . The assignment of an interest in a group term
policy is subject to the gift tax.
a. The value of the gift will be small because
term policy has no cash or loan value.
b. Each payment of premiums to continue coverage
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constitutes an indirect gift to the assignee
and outright assignments of the policy to an
individual should qualify for the annual donee
gift tax exclusion to the employee/donor.
c. The transfer of a group term policy to a trust
and subsequent payments of premiums may be
future interest not qualifying for the annual
exclusion, depending on the terms of the
trust.
4. As the employee has incidents of ownership in such
policy, such policy will be includible in the
employee's gross estate unless assigned to another.
5. Employee can assign all incidents of ownership in
the policy to another person or to a trust assuming
permitted to so do under state law and the terms of
the master policy.
a. Many policies contain a conversion privilege
permitting the employee to convert to
individual insurance upon termination of
employment. Retention of such conversion
privilege is not considered an incident of
ownership for purposes of Section 2042. Rev.
Rul. 84-130, 1984-2 C.B. 194, acquiescing in
Smead Est. v. Comr., 78 T.C. 43 (1982).
b. Where employee has assigned all incidents of
ownership in the policy to another, the
employee must continue to include in gross
income the cost of the policy in excess of
$50,000 .
6. Transfer of group term policy and section 2035(a).
a. Issue is whether the group-term insurance
policy is treated as a one-year contract which
the employer purchases and the employee
transfers each year, or whether the coverage
is of a continuing nature, automatically
renewable each year, so that a new transfer
(for §2035 purposes) does not occur each year.
b. Where the group-term policy is renewable
automatically upon the payment of the premium
without further evidence of insurability, the
rights and obligations of the parties continue
from the policy's inception. The renewal does
not create new rights or constitute a new
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purchase of insurance and therefore payment of
the renewal premium is not a "transfer" for
purposes of IRC §2035. Rev. Rul. 82-13, 1982-
2 C.B. 132.
c. A change in the empl.oyer' s master insurance
plan carrier where the new policy is
"identical in all relevant respects" to the
previous arrangement, should nOL trigger the
application of §2035. See Rev. Rul. 80-289,
1980-2 C.B. 270; PLR 9436036.
d. Does an increase in the amount of face value
coverage under the same policy wi thin three
years of death constitute a transfer for
purposes of §2035?
7. The e~tate planner should"
a. Be sure that both statutory and policy
procedures are followed in order to assure the
effective transfer of all policy rights.
b. Insured must make an absolute and irrevocable
assignment of all rights under the policy,
including incidents of ownership enumerated in
the policy and any "non-policy" incidents.
c. The assignment of incidents of ownership
should include an anticipatory assignment of
all replacement coverage and any increases in
coverage under the same or a different master
policy.
d. Ensure that the policy does not return to the
insured by the terms of the will of the donee
or by intestate succession, or in a capacity
as executor of the estate of the donee or as
trustee of a trust created by a donee;
e. Consider how the policy proceeds can continue
to be made available to meet the liquidi ty
needs of the insured's estate without having
those proceeds included in the gross estate.
B. Split-dollar Insurance
1. Split-dollar life insurance is an arrangement
between two parties (usually an employer and
employee) to share the cost of life insurance
premiums and to divide the proceeds between the
employer and the employee's beneficiary.
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2. Employer pays that part of the annual premium cost
equal to the current year's increase in cash
surrender value of the policy, while the employee
pays the balance of that premium cost.
a. Since the cash surrender value increases
slowly during the early years of a policy, the
employee bears a substantial portion of the
premium cost during those years. After the
first year, the employee's share of the
premium decreases and, in some situations,
that share becomes zero after the policy has
been in force for several years.
3. Notice 2001-10, [2001-5 IRB 459]
a. Table 2001 is substituted for P.S. 58
(1) much lower values, based on the more-
recent mortality experience reflected in
the tables under Section 79(c), relating
to the valuation of group-term life
insurance coverage.
(2) applies regardless of the date on which
the split-dollar arrangement was
implemented.
(3) Taxpayers may use either Table· 2001 or
P.S. 58 rates for taxable years ending on
or before 12/31/01.
(4) Taxpayers must use Table 2001 for
taxable years ending after 12/31/01 and
until issuance of permanent guidelines
b. Taxpayers may continue to determine the value
of current life insurance protection by using
the insurer's lower published premium rates
that are available to all standard risks for
initial issue one-year term insurance, subject
to several restrictions:
(1) Three requirements must be met in order
to use insurer's published premium rates
rather than Table 2001:
(a) The insurer generally makes those
rates known to persons who apply to
the insurer for term insurance
coverage
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(b) The insurer regularly sells term
insurance at such rates through its
normal distribution channels and
(c) Insurer does not more commonly sell
term insurance at higher premium
rates to standard risk individuals
(using the definition of "standard
risk" most commonly used by the
insurer for the issuance of term
insurance) .
(2) There is no assurance that the insurer's
published premium can be used to value
the term coverage after 12/31/03 with
respect to a life insurance contract (or
individual certificate) issued after
3/1/01.
c. Equity split-dollar arrangements is defined by
Notice 2001-10 as "an arrangement under which
the employer's interest in the policy's cash
surrender value is generally limited to the
aggregate amount of the employer's premium
payments". The employee receives the benefit
of any growth in the cash surrender value
above the amount of premiums paid by the
employer, or the employee derives the economic
benefit of any positive return on the
employer's investment in the policy.
(1) policy cash values accruing to the
employee will be taxable as either
compensation income under §83 or as a
loan under §7872.
(2) characterization will depend on the
substance of the transaction, including
the contractual positions and actions of
the parties.
(3) for example, an equity split-dollar
arrangement would be treated as a loan if
there ,were a reasonable and bona fide
expectation that the .employer would
receive repayment of its share of the
premiums at a fixed or determinable
future date, and if the cash surrender
value of the contract did not, by its
terms, represent property transferred to
the employee for purposes of Section 83.
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d. Notice 2001-10 establishes 6 specific rules
for determining whether an equity split-dollar
plan should be taxed as a loan or as current
compensation income.
(1 ) The IRS will accept the parties'
characterization of the employer's
payments under a split-dollar
arrangement, if
(a) that characterization is not clearly
inconsistent with the substance of
the arrangement,
(b) that characterization has been
consistently followed by the parties
from the inception of the
arrangement, and
(c) the parties fully account for all
economic benefits conferred on the
employee in a manner consistent with
that characterization.
(2) An equity split-dollar arrangement that
is ~haracterized as a loan will be taxed
under §7872, the employee will have no
addi tional compensation income for the
value of the insurance protection
provided under the life insurance
contract, and the cash surrender value of
the contract will not be taxed as
property transferred to the employee
under Section 83.
(a) The employee would have additional
gross income if the employer's
premium payments were not repaid in
accordance with the terms of the
agreement , and to the extent that
Section 72 applies to distributions
actually received by the employee
under the insurance contract.
(3) Parties to an equity split-dollar
arrangement will be treated as having
adopted non-loan treatment if the
employer's payments are not consistently
treated as loans. The parties, in such
case, must fully account for all the
economic benefits that the employee
derives from the arrangement. This
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means that:
(a) the employer will be treated as
having acquired beneficial ownership
of the life insurance contract
through its share of the premium
payments,
(b) the employee will have compensation
income under Section 61 equal to the
value of the life insurance
protection provided to the employee
each year, reduced by any payments
made by the employee for such
protection
(c) the employee will have compensation
income under Section 61 equal to any
dividends or similar distributions
made to the employee under the life
insurance contract and
(d) the employee will have compensation
income under Section 83 (a) to the
extent that the employee acquires a
substantially vested interest in the
cash surrender value of the life
insurance contract, reduced under
Section 83 (a) (2) by any
consideration paid by the employee
for such interest in the cash
surrender value.
(4) The IRS will not treat an employer as
having transferred part of the cash
surrender value to an employee under
Section 83, merely because the interest
or other earnings credited to the cash
surrender value of the contract cause the
cash surrender value to exceed the
po~tion thereof payable to the employer
on termination of the split-dollar
arrangement.
(5) If compensation treatment is selected by
the parties, the employee has currently
reportable income under Section 61 for
the term insurance coverage (technically
the amount at ri"sk), reduced by premiums
the employee has made or reduced by any
taxable income the employee was required
to report because of dividends received
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or credited as well as any income
reportable under section 83.
IRS will accept any reasonable method for
determining the allocation, including a
pro-rata allocation.
(6) Employer's premium or other payment for
the benefit of an employee under a split-
dollar arrangement will be treated as
compensation income to the employee under
Sect~on 61, if the employer neither
acquires a beneficial ownership interest
in the life insurance contract through
such payment nor has a reasonable
expectation of receiving repayment of
that amount through the policy proceeds
or otherwise.
e. Planning under 2001-10
(1) All existing plans must be immediately
reviewed and parties must determine how
to report the economic benefits from such
arrangements in the future, whether to
terminate and how to terminate.
(2) Future equity split dollar arrangement
will have to be drafted to fi t clearly
within either the loan or compensation
definitions.
(3) Notice 2001-10 applies to existing split-
dollar arrangements as well as those
created after issuance of the Notice.
(4) May have serious problems. because· plans
may have been drafted wi thout care to
distinguish between loan and compensation
characterization, or plans were drafted
as one but administered as the other.
f. Conventional split-dollar insurance should
become more popular because Table 2001 reduces
the amount of taxable income imputed to the
insured. [It also increases the amount the
employer must contribute]
g. Equity split-dollar insurance is more complex
under Notice 2001-10.




(b) Employer investment in the contract
that will be returned to the
employer at some future date (the
extent to which the employee has no
current or future taxable income; or
(c) Compensation .income, taxable
currently to the insured employee
under Section 61 or Section 83.
(2) If treated as below-market loan,
(a) Section 7872 causes current income
taxation on the imputed interest,
but avoids additional taxation when
the employee receives the balance of
the policy equity at the termination
of the policy.
(b) Should be able to treat the
employer's portion of the premium as
a loan if payable at some fixed and
determinable date.
(3) If structured as compensation unde~
section 83,
(a) Employee is not required to
recognize income if the increase in
the employe~'s interest in the cash
surrender value of the policy is
subject to substantial risk of
forfeiture.
(b) But if the employee's entire
interest in the policy is currently
transferable, it is not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture.
(c) IRS has stated in 2001-10 that
employee can avoid current income
taxation on the equity built up in
the policy and not returnable to the
employer until the agreement is
terminated "pending the publication
of further guidance".
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Conclusion: Life insurance will continue to be important part of
estate planning even if estate tax is repealed for more than one
year.
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Ogden, Newell & Welch, PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Like many areas of the law - and indeed the world - the advancements in, and
proliferation of, estate planning and administration software can feel mind-boggling, and
often is. When we last presented this session in 1998, the computer and internet were
still relative novelties, and there were relatively few software systems (not to mention
good systems) available for the estate planner to review, evaluate, and use. Now there is
so much material and so many good systems from which to choose, that it's even more
mind-boggling to think about evaluating all of the available systems to determine which
are best for your office. We will attempt in;this session to give you a "heads-up" on
software·and systems which are available for your use - after you do your own due
diligence, of course.
Attached to this introduction is a listing of most of the major products which are
presently available on the market for assisting the estate planner in the following areas:
I. Estate Planning
A. General Calculations and Illustrations
B. Charitable Giving
C. Retirement Planning
D. Tax Utilities (factors, rates, other calculations)
II. Document Drafting




A. Tax Forms on CD ROMs
B. Form 706 Death Tax Preparation
C. Form 709 Gift Tax Preparation
D. Form 1041 Fiduciary Income Tax Preparation
VII. Research (on-line and CD-ROM)
(Also see Ted Atlass' Comprehensive Outline)
I have also attached computer generated copies of the following articles which I
believe you will find of Interest:
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I. If There's a Will, There's a Way on the Web, Robert J. Bmbrogi, American
Lawyer Media (law.com), December 21,2000.
II. Inherit the Windfall, Flush with parents' money, baby boomers keep wealth
management lawyers rolling in the dough, Sharon Harvey Rosenberg, Miami
Daily Business Review, (law.com), June 26, 2001.
III. Coping With a Tax That Has Nine Lives, David Cay Johnston, New York
Times (nytimes.qpass.com), June 24, 2001.
While the programs and choices of software can seem overwhelming, they are
also (generally speaking) much more sophisticated and user-friendly than just 3 years
ago. However, there is no substitute to investigating each and every system you intend to
consider using - particularly with regard to compatibility with your current system. You
should also focus on what you intend to accomplish with each system you purchase and
whether it may be integrated with other systems you are using or considering using. In
this respect, using systems of the same publisher can often (although not necessarily
always) prove helpful and productive. Whatever choices you make, relax, have fun
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If the only certainties in life are death and taxes, then it is easy to
understand the value of an estate-planning lawyer whose job it is to apply the
laws governing both. For the lawyers who toil in this field, the Internet offers
a way to research tax and probate laws, keep current with new developments, and
even obtain sample estate plans.
While the Web is home to a surprisingly large number of estate-planning sites,
the bulk of them are aimed at consumers and offer little of use to
professionals. For this reason, a good place to start is the Estate Planning
Links Web Site, http://www.estateplanninglinks.com/. Created and maintained by
lawyers, it may well be the most extensive collection of estate-planning links,
with pointers to sites for estate and gift taxes, elder law, probate and trusts,
charitable planning and philanthropy, and estate planning software. Originally
compiled in 1995 by Dennis Kennedy, then a trusts and estates lawyer in St.
Louis, it is now maintained by Dennis Toman, partner with Booth Harrington Johns
& Toman, in Greensboro, N.C.
Another comprehensive, well-organized, and up-to-date collection of links to
estate-planning resources on the Web is Legal Research for Estate Planners,
http://www.geocities.com/jasonhavens
ILREP.html. Created by Jason Havens, an estate-planning lawyer in Fort Myers,
Fla., this annotated guide covers both national and state-specific sites and
also indexes sites by topic and type of resource.
Always a good place to start for research into any legal topic is Cornell
University's Legal Information Institute (LII), and such is the case with its
library of Estate Planning Law Materials, http://www.law.comell.edu/ topics
/estate_planning.html. Here you will find hypertext versions of 26 U.S.C.
Subtitle B, covering federal estate and gift taxes, as well as the related
provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Also available are recent U.S. Supreme Court cases related to estate and gift
taxes and the texts of the Uniform Probate Code, the Uniform Principal and
Income Act, the Uniform Trusts Act, and the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. The LII
also includes links to the Internal Revenue Service and related state probate,
property, and tax statutes.
What was once one of the better estate-planning destinations -- California
Estate Planning, Probate, and Trust Law, at http://www.ca-probate.com/-- has
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grown somewhat out of date, with a few too many stale articles and expired
links, but remains a useful starting point nonetheless. Although oriented to
California consumers, the site also offers much for lawyers in any state.
Among the features are an analysis of estate and gift tax aspects of the 1997
Budget Act, a collection of legal articles, a forms library, and links to other
sites. Probably the most popular feature is the site's collection of wills on
the Web -- one that includes the wills of such celebrities as Princess Diana,
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, Elvis Presley, and Marilyn Monroe, as well as those
of ordinary people, in some cases dating to the 15th and 16th centuries.
Two other sites with a state focus but broader appeal are the Pennsylvania
Estate and Trust Cybrary, http://evans-Iegal.com/dan, and the Texas Probate Web
Site, http://www.texasprobate.com/.Philadelphia lawyer Daniel Evans, an active
member of and frequent author for the American Bar Association's Real Property,
Probate, and Trust Law and Small Firm Management sections, maintains the former.
It contains a number of useful articles on estate planning, practice management
and legal technology.
The Texas site, published by Austin lawyer Glenn M. Karisch, grew out of his
efforts to track and report on probate legislation in the state, and the
legislation section remains a primary feature, with up-to-date information on
bills affecting estate planning, probate law and trust law. A collection of
links, prepared by Karisch for a presentation at the 1999 annual meeting of the
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, includes his annotations, with the
best earning his "four chili pepper" rating.
THE NATIONAL OVERVIEW
For keeping current with the law on a national basis, a good bet is RIA,
http://www.riahome.com/. the publisher of tax research products and software.
Much of its sizable catalog of estate-planning products is available for
delivery via the Web, including the monthly newsletter, Estate Planner's Alert;
the more analytical Estate Planning Journal; the book, "Estate Planning Law &
Taxation"; and several others. Of course, although they can be found on the Web,
they're not free. An annual subscription to Estate Planner's Alert, for example,
costs $165. But RIA offers free trials of some of its Web-based products and
free demos of others.
Another tax and business-law publisher with a catalog of Web-based estate-
planning products is CCH Federal and State Tax, http://tax.cch.com/. Follow the
link "Financial and Estate Planning" to find online offerings such as CCH
Solutions for Financial Planning, a Web-based library written by financial
planning experts that includes analysis, advice, an online discussion forum,
sample forms and documents, checklists, and more. Also featured is the Financial
and Estate Planning Library, a comprehensive, online library that combines
electronic versions of several CCH publications to provide daily news, in-depth
analysis, expert commentary, full-text laws, financial calculators, interactive
tax forms, and other practical features.
The site offers no pricing information, but provides phone numbers and e-mail
addresses for those wanting to learn more.
While RIA and CCH require a paid subscription, a free site with a broad range of
tax-analysis articles, including many on estate planning, is that of San
Francisco lawyer and columnist Robert Sommers, aka The Tax Prophet,
http://www.taxprophet.com/. Sommers has written prolifically for the former San
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Francisco Examiner and elsewhere, and he publishes his many columns and
scholarly articles on his Web site, richly illustrated with wizards and crystal
balls. For a shortcut to his estate-planning articles, follow the "Tax Class"
link to a page where he has indexed his articles by subject matter and level of
sophistication.
SUBSTANCE WITHOUT SLICKNESS
In contrast to Sommers' professionally designed site, there is something
decidedly homespun about Trusts and Estates.net,
http://www.trustsandestates.net/. from Fort Worth, Texas, estate-planning lawyer
Noel Ice. Take, for example, Ice's front-page photo, with its label, "Not my
best picture." But beneath the amateurish facade, there is real substance.
Ice has written a virtual treatise on estate planning for distributions from
qualified plans and IRAs, which is available here in toto. He also offers a
series of "nutshell" guides to estate planning topics, written for legal
consumers. A variety of other articles, some written specifically for lawyers,
fill out the site.
Bar association sites focusing on estate planning vary in substance and depth.
Some provide only general membership information, while others strive to provide
deeper levels of practical resources. One of the best comes from the National
Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, http://www.naela.com/. an organization of
lawyers who concentrate in legal issues affecting the elderly and disabled,
including estate planning. NAELA restricts part of its site to members, but the
public area has several useful features. For those seeking a lawyer, NAELA
provides a directory of its members, which can be searched by lawyer name, firm
name, location, or area of proficiency. NAELA's collection of links is
particularly well done, with each link annotated with a brief description.
Less robust is the site of the American Bar Association Section on Real
Property, Probate, and Trust Law, http://www.abanet.org/ rppt/home.html, with
general information about section activities, membership and publications. It
has the full text of Probate & Property, its bimonthly magazine, although access
to many articles is restricted to section members, while only selected articles
are available to non-members. It also has the tables of contents of Real
Property, Probate, and Trust Journal, with selected issues available in full
text, although, again, only to section members. Visitors can browse a catalog of
estate-planning books and media published by the ABA and make purchases online.
The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, http://www.actec.org/, also
limits much of its Web site to its members. The public area provides little of
substance. It includes a haphazard collection of links to estate-planning and
other Internet resources. It also has the tables of contents from its
newsletter, but no ability to retrieve the full text of any article. The
membership section allows anyone to search for ACTEC fellows by state.
If your practice skills are a bit rusty, you may want to end your tour of
estate-planning sites with the Crash Course in Wills and Trusts,
http://www.mtpalermo.com/. What started as an outline by Kentucky lawyer Michael
Palermo for an adult education class at a local community college evolved into
this fairly detailed, hypertext manuscript covering the basics of estate
planning. Browse the table of contents for specific chapters or flip page by
page through the entire work. This award-winning site has been online several
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--------------------------------- Inherit the Windfall Flush with parents' money, baby boomers keep
wealth management lawyers rolling in the dough Sharon Harvey Rosenberg Miami Daily
Business Review June 26, 2001 After a stint as a special adviser to the u.S. Mission in Bosnia,
Michael Kavoukjian, a trust and estate attorney, transferred from the New York office of White
& Case to the law firm's Miami office in 1998. His work in war-torn Bosnia, he says, made his
new assignment look easy by comparison. "Once you've negotiated with Serbs and Muslims,
helping to resolve squabbles within a Miami family is a piece of cake," says Kavoukjian, who
notes that relatives battling over inheritances are somewhat less likely to shoot you. Kavoukjian
became the first full-time trust and estate specialist in the Miami office of White & Case. Since
then, the department has grown rapidly. It now has 16 lawyers. As head of the wealth
management practice in Miami, which it calls its private clients group, Kavoukjian is recruiting
more attorneys. White & Case is not alone. Throughout Florida, law firms like Akerman
Senterfitt, Greenberg Traurig, Shutts & Bowen and Gunster Yoakley are beefing up their wealth
management and trust and estate planning departments. That's largely because of the trillions of
dollars baby boomers are in the process of inheriting from their savings-oriented parents. "We
are in the midst of the greatest intergenerational transfer of wealth," says Kavoukjian, the former
co-chair of the American Bar Association's committee on estate planning and drafting. "The
sums are staggering even with the current decline in the stock market." OVERLAPPING WITH
BANKERS Law firms' so-called private client services groups bear a striking resemblance to
private banking and trust management departments in the financial services world. Both focus on
preserving the wealth of affluent individuals and families, which are typically those with at least
$5 million to $10 million in investible assets. In that niche, lawyers and bankers often collaborate
and refer business leads to each other. "We tend to look at it as a partnership," says Richard
Ditizio, managing director of the Palm Beach, Fla., office of Citigroup Private Bank. While there
is some overlap between banking and legal teams in the wealth management business, bankers,
unlike lawyers, are able to sell a wide range of financial products such as mutual funds,
investment services and insurance. In a few years, however, some lawyers predict that they, too,
will be able to peddle financial products. That would be a new source of fees. But some ethics
mavens fear that it could compromise the objectivity of advice offered to clients. RULES FROM
THE GRAVE Some trusts drawn up by legal specialists in the trust and estate planning field
enable wealthy individuals to continue exercising control over their assets even after death.
These instruments accomplish this by establishing controls and stipulations with which heirs
must comply to receive inherited funds. "It's making sure the money works for [the heirs] and not
against them," says Nick Rubino of Rubino & Associates, a three-lawyer firm in Altamonte
Springs, Fla. For example, fears of funding a do-nothing lifestyle can prompt a wealthy
individual to link annual trust payments to an heir's gainful employment. Other trust stipulations
limit amounts that can be spent on weddings, homes or new business ventures. One middle-aged
South Florida man discovered after.his parents' death that his sizable inheritance was tied to
getting a college degree, according to trust professionals who handled the estate. He had resisted
his parents' demand that he do so for decades. Only after he went to college and earned his
degree did he inherit the money. In-law trusts and what Rubino calls "bimbo trusts" are other
vehicles used to shield family assets from an offspring's spouse, or from a second or third wife.
An in-law trust, for example, enables a married daughter or son to tap a family trust, but
prohibits the child's spouses from getting direct access to the account. Like private bankers,
estate planning attorneys often become intimately involved in family politics, real estate
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transactions and other financial maneuvers. For instance, Greenberg Traurig attorneys have
11elped clients buy vacation homes and lease private planes, says Daniel Mielnicki, national
coordinator of Greenberg's wealth preservation group. Attorneys also get heavily involved in
family businesses. At the ISO-lawyer Gunster Yoakley, a West Palm Beach-based firm with 24
attorneys on its private wealth services team, James Davis recently crafted a benefits plan,
employment contracts, a shareholders plan, a family trust and corporate succession plans for a
large, family-run business involving parents and their adult children. "We're so close, we even e-
mail jokes back and forth," Davis says. FROM BANKER TO LAWYER The movement of
lawyers between wealth management law practice and private banking is brisk. Mielnicki, who
works in Greenberg's Boca Raton, Fla., office, spent 20 years at a major New York firm before
he moved to Florida in 1990 and joined Citigroup's Private Bank unit, where he was a tax
planning specialist. He returned to law firm work five years ago. "It was a very enlightening
period," Mielnicki says of his stint at Citibank. He says he got experience in cash flow,
investment management and the risk-tolerance characteristics of the wealthy. Rubino says his
background as a banker helps him understand the day-to-day administration of trust funds and
investments. Rubino previously worked as an estate planning attorney for the Internal Revenue
Service, then served as a trust officer for banks in Pennsylvania and Florida. "I've been doing the
same thing, just from different sides of the table," Rubino says. The number of attorneys seeking
trust and estate planning board certification has exploded in the last few years, says John Tan, a
Bar certification specialist in Tallahassee, Fla. The increase has been driven by younger
attorneys seeking to make themselves more marketable. In the past two years, more than 50
lawyers have applied for the annual trust and estate certification exam. In contrast, from 1988
through 1992, the average was only 15. From 1997 through 1999, the average was 31. There now
are 319 board-certified specialists in Florida, compared with 278 five years ago. CONDITIONS
RIPE With the current intergenerational wealth hand-off, the population demographics have
never been better for lawyers. And as their own mortality looms, boomers are thinking ahead to
their own legacies. A recent best-selling book about wealth in the United States, "The
Millionaire Next Door," by Thomas J. Stanley and William D. Danko, identifies estate planning
law as the top career choice for the next few years. The generation born before World War II is
concerned about passing on wealth to grandchildren, while paying as little as possible in estate
taxes, says Linda Suzanne Griffin, a Clearwater, Fla., trust and estate planning attorney. During
the last 10 years, her practice volume has tripled. Griffin, a sole practitioner with two employees,
has had to refer excess work to other lawyers. Ironically, the recent repeal of the federal estate
tax laws may offer a boost to the field. While total repeal of the estate tax mayor may not occur
ultimately, new complications could send many Americans rushing to find a trust and estate
planning lawyer. Some attorneys joke that proposed changes should be dubbed the Estate
Planning Lawyers Full-Employment Act. "It's going to be a boon to this area of law practice,"
says Jerry Wolf, a shareholder in the Boca Raton and Fort Lauderdale, Fla., offices of Akerman
Senterfitt, which employs 25 lawyers in its private client services unit. He's already noticed a
growth in recruitment ads seeking estate and trust lawyers. Other firms see an increase in family
disputes over large inheritances and are targeting the field of probation and estate planning
litigation. They anticipate that the stock market decline will spark more lawsuits. Faced with
diminished inheritances, family members are more likely to sue each other to get a larger slice of
a smaller pie, says Miami lawyer William Palmer, who recently moved from Adorno & Zeder to
Shutts & Bowen. Or else, he says, they'll sue account trustees and investment managers on the
grounds that they've mishandled funds. "It just goes on forever," Palmer says.
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Coping With a Tax That Has Nine Lives
By DAVID CAY JOHNSTON
PRESIDENT BUSH'S idea was simple enough: First thing we do, let's kill all the
death taxes.
The execution, alas, was not so simple.
His new tax law, which reduces estate taxes in stages starting next year,
repeals them for the year 2010 and then resurrects them in 2011, is laced with
many subtle provisions. And they can cause the uninformed to pay taxes
unnecessarily, leave a spouse and heirs much more -- or much less -- than was
intended and, perhaps, prompt litigation among family members.
But there are easy new ways for most people, especially those with more than $1
million and less than about $5 million of wealth, to avoid these problems.
Anyone who has a will should review it with a lawyer, even though few wills may
need to be rewritten; everyone without a will should get one. And particularly
affluent people who have established trusts for their heirs should make sure
that those trusts will still achieve what they were intended to do.
For residents of many higher-tax states, including New York, New Jersey and
Connecticut, it may come as a surprise that total estate taxes will actually
rise over the next few years.
That is because the law that will slowly, and temporarily, eliminate the federal
estate tax also will reduce the credit allowed for state-level estate taxes.
That potentially costly detail received little attention as politicians
trumpeted the tax cut.
The law also poses difficult new questions about when to buy, keep or drop life
insurance in a future that may, or may not, include an estate tax.
And what about making gifts to heirs over the coming years, especially gifts
that would themselves be liable to tax? What about gifts to charities?
Congress and Mr. Bush have assured Americans of one thing: the coming decade
will be rife with uncertainty about estate taxes. Experts on all sides of the
debate agree that the new tax law will have to be modified, and some contend
that it is so unworkable that it might have to be undone. Whether repeal is real
remains an open question.
Most Americans die without a will, and the biggest mistake that even moderately
wealthy people can make is to think that, now especially, they do not need to
plan for the organization and disposition of their assets. That could be a very
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costly mistake, especially when a family-owned business is involved, according
to business-valuation experts, financial planners and estate-tax lawyers.
In another of its many counterintuitive effects, the repeal of the estate tax is
likely to benefit some charities but cost others dearly, often in ways that are
difficult to anticipate. And that, in turn, may create new tensions in wealthy
families, tensions that will require more planning.
To gauge the complexities of the tax changes and what they may mean to your
life, consider this situation: Suppose your parents are among the very rich,
with at least $10 million. Under current law, estate taxes would take more than
half of that amount if the second of them died this year.
Reasonably, you may be anticipating that, if your parents live until the tax is
repealed in 2010, your inheritance will more than double, since all the money
that would have gone to taxes can flow to you.
But odds are against such a windfall coming your way, said Douglas K. Freeman of
Freeman, Freeman & Smiley, a large tax-law firm with offices throughout
California. Just because there is less for the government does not mean there
will be more for you. Many rich parents, after all, pick specific sums of money
they want to leave to each child, Mr. Freeman and others said. Such decisions,
these experts say, have less to do with taxes than with the parents' attitudes
about money and the quality of their relationships with their children.
These experts said many wealthy people agreed with the philosophy of the
billionaire investor Warren E. Buffett who has said that he will leave his
children enough money to do anything, but not so much that they can do nothing.
Mr. Freeman said clients had already begun contacting him to "ask what changes
they need to make in their wills so that their children do not get more money."
So if heirs will not get the money that would have gone to estate taxes, who
will?
"Charities will be major beneficiaries of repealing the estate tax," said Paul
G. Schervish, a professor of sociology at Boston College who has spent years
interviewing the rich about their behavior. Indeed, Mr. Freeman and a few other
estate-tax lawyers say they have received calls from clients who want to make
sure that money that does not go to estate taxes is donated to charity.
Veteran fund-raisers, however, say they expect the law to change the way people
donate to charity, a shift that may benefit some charities while hurting others.
"Museums are going to lose out, because art they had expected in a bequest is
going to stay in the family if the estate tax is repealed," said Robert F.
Sharpe, a fund-raising consultant in Memphis.
Consider what happens if you have a $100 million estate -- $55 million in
investments and $45 million worth of art -- and you want to limit your
children's inheritance to $25 million.
Under current law, if you leave it all to your children, they would have to turn
over the entire $55 million to pay the estate taxes, leaving them with only the
art, which they could enjoy or sell, pocketing $45 million tax-free.
Alternatively, you could donate the art to a museum or other charity, reducing
the estate tax to a bit more than $30 million and leaving almost $25 million for
your children.
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Without the estate tax, however, there is no financial incentive to leave art to
charities. The children could keep both the art and the entire $55 million
portfolio -- unwelcome news for art museums that count on death bequests to
enlarge their collections.
Charities will benefit from the law only if rich parents want to limit the
amounts inherited by their children or other relatives. For example, if the
parent with the $100 million estate wanted her children to receive only $25
million, she could still donate the art to a museum and give to charity the
$30.25 million that would have gone to estate taxes. That would leave the
children with the same $24.75 million they would have received before the
federal estate tax was repealed.
Accountants and lawyers say a smarter tax strategy, if estate taxes are
repealed, would be for the rich parent to give the art to charity during her
lifetime and take the income-tax deduction herself, then put the $30 million
gift to charity into a donor-advised fund at a community foundation with the
children as the advisers. The fund would both teach the children about how to
give and provide them with a source for charitable gifts that would not require
them to dig into their own pockets.
Here is a guide for the wealthy, heirs and charities to changes in the estate-
tax law -- and issues to discuss with family members and professional advisers.
Wills and Estate Plans
People with estate plans or wills should ask a lawyer to review them to make
sure they take best advantage of the new law. Most plans and wills do not need
revisions, but wills that use a formula to divide assets among a surviving
spouse and children may find that the changes in estate-tax exemptions and the
repeal for the year 2010 will result in too much or too little going to the
spouse.
People with children from previous marriages need to be especially careful in
this area, estate-tax lawyers say, to prevent litigation within the family.
Of course, even people who do not have enough assets to be liable for estate
taxes should have a will, experts say, so that their property is disposed of as
they intend.
The Moderately Wealthy
Next year, people can leave as much as $1 million without incurring estate
taxes, up from $675,000 this year. That change alone will reduce the number of
estates subject to estate taxes by about 40 percent. With a little bit of
planning -- starting by making sure that at least $1 million in assets is in the
name of each spouse a married couple can pass along $2 million tax-free.
The threshold rises to $1.5 million ($3 million for couples who plan) in 2004,
$2 million ($4 million) in 2006 and $3.5 ($7 million) million in 2009. At that
point, even considering growing wealth, fewer than 10,000 estates are likely to
be subject to estate taxes. In 2011, when the estate tax is scheduled to resume,




In 2010, the year of the repeal, people can pass along as much as $3 million of
investment gains to a spouse and up to $1.3 million to other heirs without
having to pay capital gains tax. For the maximum tax break, people should make
sure that their wills give spouses the top priority in receiving property that
has grown significantly in value, lawyers and other tax advisers say.
In other words, specifically bequeath to your spouse that Exxon Mobil stock that
you bought at a split-adjusted $1 a share and now fetches nearly $90, or that
Monet you picked up for a song decades ago that is now worth millions, so that
you get the maximum benefit.
Wills should also guide executors on how to distribute property to take full
advantage of the law. That means considering holdings like retirement accounts
that pass outside the will and are not under an executor's control. In giving
guidance on dividing tax-free and taxable property among heirs, you should also
pay attention to whether an asset is likely to be sold by the recipient or, in
the case of a family home on the lake, is likely to stay in the family for
generations, said Sanford J. Schlesinger of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler, a law firm based in Manhattan.
But people who have some warning of their deaths, usually because of terminal
illness, can easily circumvent the limitations on tax-free gifts, said Jonathan
G. Blattmachr, who represents hundreds of the richest families in the United
States for Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, a law firm based in Manhattan. They
can borrow against their assets and give cash or new securities bought with the
borrowed money to heirs.
Consider someone with a $100 million estate, all of which is appreciated
property. By borrowing $90 million and then giving away the borrowed money at
death, the heirs would owe no taxes. The original property could then be given
to a charity, which would sell the bequest to payoff the $90 million loan and
keep the $10 million balance.
Retirement Accounts
The tax-law changes, combined with new I.R.S. rules, create opportunities to
avoid or defer taxes on money inherited from retirement accounts. These accounts
are not governed by wills, so their transfer must be coordinated with a will to
achieve maximum tax savings.
Ed Slott, an accountant in Rockville Centre, N.Y., who publishes Ed Slott's IRA
Advisor newsletter, recommends dividing retirement savings into several
Individual Retirement Accounts and designating a different heir for each. Under
the new I.R.S. rules, money can be moved back and forth among these accounts,
without incurring taxes, so that each heir receives exactly the amount exempted
from estate taxes. These allocations should change annually as the exempt amount
rises to $3.5 million in 2009 from $1 million next year.
Even after you die, your children and grandchildren can split an inherited
I.R.A. themselves. If it is a conventional I.R.A., each heir would pay taxes on
the money only as they withdraw it. With a Roth IRA, withdrawals are tax-free.
Heirs, however, must divide the money into separate accounts before the end of
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the year after you die. If they miss that deadline, the deferral will be limited
to the life span of the oldest heir.
The best new device, Mr. Slott said, is a rule allowing a spouse to reject his
or her share of the retirement account within nine months after being widowed.
If that is done, those who were named as contingent beneficiaries get the
account instead and can make withdrawals over their lifetimes.
Remember, beneficiaries of these retirement plans are not determined by a will,
but by the documents governing each account. This means that the will must be
coordinated with the retirement accounts to get the maximum tax savings.
If you want to ensure that your grandchild, upon reaching adulthood, does not
cash in his inherited account and spend it all on a sports car, you can create a
trust for each beneficiary that governs withdrawals, said Seymour Goldberg, an
accountant in Garden City, N.Y.
Family Gifts
Congress lets individuals make gifts of up to $10,000 a year to as many
different people as they want. Couples may give twice as much. Larger gifts are
subject to gift taxes, but those levies are not due until the donor has used up
his lifetime exclusion. Next year, this limit will rise to $1 million, from
$675,000, and stay there even during repeal of the estate tax and after it is
resurrected.
Individuals who can afford it, and who want to, should make additional gifts up
to the $1 million limit, said Sherman F. Levey, the senior estate partner at
Boylan, Brown, Code, Vigdor & Wilson, a law firm in Rochester. Gifts above the
tax-free limit are generally unwise, he said, because of the uncertainly about
estate-tax repeal.
Charitable Gifts
Until the estate tax is fully repealed in 2010, people should rely on their
conventional Individual Retirement Accounts as their first source for charitable
giving, because the balance is subject to the estate tax and withdrawals are
taxed as income, said Alan Halperin, an estate tax specialist at Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan, a law firm in Manhattan. Donating these assets to charity
"avoids both income and estate taxes," he said.
Roth IRA's are not attractive for charitable giving, he added, because
withdrawals from those accounts are free of income tax.
If the estate tax is repealed as planned, accountants and lawyers say they will
advise clients to donate money while they are still alive, and thus able to
deduct their gifts from their income taxes.
Repeal of the estate tax would also make charitable remainder trusts more
attractive for the charitably inclined, Mr. Halperin said. These trusts allow
the donor to take an immediate income-tax deduction, avoid capital gains taxes




As cold as it may sound, some people who expect inheritances have already asked
tax lawyers about the cost -- and the legality -- of keeping a rich relative who
has been declared brain dead on life support until the estate-tax repeal takes
effect in 2010. Others have asked about terminating life support for a wealthy
relative as that year draws to a close.
Mr. Blattmachr said wealthy individuals should carefully review the documents
they have signed governing health care and life support in case they become
incapacitated. The goal is to ensure that their wishes, not those of greedy
relatives, prevail.
Insurance
Many people buy life insurance and put it into a trust so that their children
can receive the proceeds tax-free as a replacement for money paid in estate
taxes. Small businesses also use insurance to pay estate taxes and buyout the
heirs of partners who die. Second-to-die life insurance, which pays off when the
surviving spouse dies, is inexpensive and yet exceptionally profitable for
insurers.
Estate-tax lawyers disagree about whether to buy such policies, continue
existing ones or let them drop. The most cautious advice is to keep existing
policies, because Congress may change its mind about repealing the estate tax,
and future illness may make it impossible or prohibitively expensive to buy the
same insurance later.
People who have sophisticated strategies in place to pass along wealth before
the scheduled repeal, such as Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts and Qualified
Personal Residence Trusts, may want to keep their insurance until these
transfers are completed.
That way, if the benefactor dies before the gifts are disbursed, a process that
could take 20 years, the insurance payout can still help the heirs pay whatever
estate taxes are still due.
Falling (and Rising) Taxes
The highest federal estate-tax rate, paid on estates of more than $3 million,
falls next year to 50 percent from 55 percent. The rate then falls by one
percentage point annually until it reaches 45 percent in 2007.
But in 2004, a special exemption for family-owned businesses will cease to
exist. That will mean higher estate taxes through 2009 for some wealthy
Americans. (Special exemptions for working farms will continue.)
Further complicating the issue, Congress decided to undo the careful
coordination of federal and state estate taxes, by limiting the credit for
state-level taxes.
New Yorkers, for example, can apply only part of their state-level estate taxes
to offset the federal levy. In the most extreme example, in 2004, on estates
valued at more than $10.1 million, New Yorkers will pay 48 percent to the
federal government and an additional 12 percent to the state, for a total of 60
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percent, instead of the 55 percent total had the law not changed. Similar tax
increases will affect those who die in most other states.
Organizations mentioned in this article:
Related Terms:
You may print this article now, or save it on your computer for future
reference. Instructions for saving this article on your computer are also
available.








For many years the major tax publishers (i.e., BNA, CCH and RIA) had a near-monopoly
on the materials that tax professionals use for basic tax reference and research purposes.
Admittedly, that is still true as to the detailed narrative test provided in the major tax services and
the older case law. But current materials (cases, rulings, forms, and publications) are readily
available for little or no cost over the internet, and a number of sources now provide historical
materials (cases, rulings, etc.) at a fraction of what has been charged for such information in the
past. Let us explore what low-cost and no-cost alternatives now exist utilizing the internet.











F. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro
http://www.pmstax.com/afr/
G. Time Value Software
http://www.timevalue.com/afrindex.htm






C. Cornell Law School
htt.p://www.law.comell.edu/opinions.html
D. Emory Law School
http://www.law.emory.edu/LAW/refdesk/country/us/fedlaw.html






H. Washburn Law School
http://lawlib.wuacc.edu/washlaw/searchlaw.html
III. Federal Legislative and Regulatory Materials
A. Office of Law Revision Counsel (OLRC)
htt.p://uscode.house.gov/
B. ORLC - u.S. Code Search
http://uscode.house.gov/usc.htm
C. ORLC - u.S. Code Download
http://uscode.house.gov/download.htm
D. ORLC - u.S. Code Classification Tables
http://uscode.house.gov/uscct.htm
E. ORLC - Codification Legislation
http://uscode.house.gov/cod.htm
F. CapWeb -- The Internet Guide to the u.S. Congress
http://www.capweb.net/classic/index.morph
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G. Congressional Bills (GPO)
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/cong009.html
H. Congressional Directory (GPO)
http://www.access.gpo. gOY/congress/congO16.html




K. Congressional Record (GPO)
http://www.access.gpo.gOY/su docs/aces/aces150.html
L. Congressional Record Index (GPO)
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su docs/aces/aaces190.html
M. NARA - Code of Federal Regulations
http://www.access.gpo. gOY/naraJcfr/index.html
N. NARA - Federal Register (1995 - date)
http://www.access.gpo.gOY/su docs/aces/aces140.html
O. NARA - Public Laws
http://www.access.gpo.gov/naraJnara005.html
P. Federal Register (via GPO Gate)
http://www.gpo.ucop.edu/
Q. GPO Access on the Web (via Purdue)
http://thorplus.lib.purdue.edu/gpo/
R. History of Bills (GPO)
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su docs/aces/aaces200.html
S. Line Item Veto Notices (GPO)
htt.p://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/nara004.html
T. Senate, House & Executive Reports
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/cong005.html
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W. Thomas - Legislative Information on the Internet (LOC)
http://thomas.loc.gov/
x. Today in Congress (Washington Post)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/cong2day.htm
Y. u.s. Code (Cornell) - Can be Updated
htt.p://www4.law.comell.edu/uscode/index.html
z. U.S. Code Classification Tables (U.S. House of Reps.)
http://law.house.gov/uscct.htm
AA. U.S. House of Representative - Misc. Pubs. And Committees
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/index.html
BB. U.S. Senate - Misc. Pubs. And Committees
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/index.html
IV. Gateway Sites --- Federal Tax Forms & Publications
A. AICPA - Federal Tax Forms & Publications
http://www.aicpa.org/irs/index.htm
B. FedWorld - Directory of all Files in IRS-UTL Library
fip://fip.fedworid.gov/pub/irs-utl/OO-index.txt
C. FedWorld - All Files in IRS-UTL Library
fip://fip.fedworid.gov/pub/irs-uti/
D. IRS Forms and Publications
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/forms pubs/index.html




B. ABA - RPPTL Section Links
htl.p://www.abanet.org/rppt/sites.html






F. Chicago Kent Links
http://www.kentlaw.edu/clc/lrs/lawlinks/taxes.shtml
G. Cyber CPA Links
http://www.cyber-cpa.com/research.html
H. Emory - Tax Links
http://www.law.emory.edu/FOCAL/tax.html
I. Emory - T&E Links
http://www.law.emory.edu/FOCAL/trusts.html
J. Guidestar - Charity Info
htt.p://www.guidestar.org/index.html
K. Time Value Software - Links
http://www.timevalue.com/links.htm
L. Johnson's Tax Page
http://www.unf.edu/students/jmayer/tax.html
M. ONU - Links
http://www.la~.onu.edu/faculty/haight/tax sites.html
N. PPC Tax - Links
htt.p://www.p.pcinfo.com/links.htm
O. Rutgers - Links
http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/intemet/tax.htm
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P. Schmidt - Links
http://www.taxsites.com/
Q. Teahan - Links
http://wwwl.mhv.netl-teahan/weblaw.htm
R. Tax Law Sites
http://members.tripod.com/inetgroup/tax/
S. Tax Sites - Emory
http://www.law.emory.edu/LAW/refdesk/subjectltax.html
T. TaxMaster - Links
htt.p:/Ivls.law.vill.edu/prof/maule/taxmaster/taxhome.htm
u. TaxResources - Links
http://WWW.TaxResources.Com/
V. Kent Info - Links
http://www.kentis.com/siteseeker/taxlink.html
W. Essential Links - Taxes
http://www.el.com/elinks/taxes/




z. Will Yancey - Links
http://www.willyancey.com/
VI. Gateway Sites - International Tax Links
A. Canadian Legal Resources
http://www.mbnet.mb.cal-~psim/can law.html
B. Canadian Tax Links
http://info.ic.gc.calCBSC/english/tax.html
c. International Tax Links
http://www.taxsites.com/international.html
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VII. Gateway Sites - State Tax Forms & Links
A. AICPA State Information
http://www.aicpa.org/states/info/index.htm
B. Colorado Tax Forms
http://www.state.co.us/gov dir/revenue dir/forms download.html
C. Cyber CPA - State Tax Forms
htt.p://www.cyber-cpa.com/statetax.html
D. Federation of Tax Administrators - State Tax Forms
http://www.irs.ustreas. gOY/prod/forms pubs/ftaframes.html
E. Schmidt - State & Local Taxes
http://www.taxsites.com/state.html
F. Sales/Use Tax Registration Forms - Multi State Tax Commission
http://www.mtc.gov/txpyrsvs/actualpage.htm
VIII. Internal Revenue Code
A. Internal Revenue Code (via Cornell) - 1/26/98 - Can be Updated
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/26/
B. Internal Revenue Code (via Walker) - 1/24/94 - Not Updated
http://www.fourmilab.ch/ustax/ustax.html
C. Internal Revenue Code (via MIT) - 10/21/93 - Not Updated
htt.p://www.tns.lcs.mit.edu:80/uscode/
IX. Internal Revenue Service
A. IRS Gateway
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/cover.html
B. Plain Language Regulations
http://www.irs.llstreas. gOY/tax regs/regslist.html
C. Exempt Organization Search
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/search/eosearch.html
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D. Forms and Publications
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/forms-pubs/index.html
E. Summary of 1997 Tax Law
fip://fip.fedworld.gov/pub/irs-utl/doc10288.pdf
F. Internal Revenue Bulletins
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/bus info/bullet.html
G. Join the Digital Dispatch Mailing List
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/help/newmail/maillist.html
H. Latest AFR Rate
fip://fip.fedworld.gov/pub/irs-utl/afrs.pdf
I. Comment on Proposed Regulation
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/tax regs/regslist.html
J. Tax Professional's Comer
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/bus info/tax pro/index.html
K. Code and Subject IRS Telephone Directory
http://www.timevalue.comJirsindex.htm
x. Internet - Intro to Legal Research
A. Guide to Legal Research (ALI-ABA)
http://www.ali-aba.org/aliaba/intro.htm
B. Compleat Internet Researcher
http://www.aallnet.org/products/crab/index.html
C. Government INFOMINE Search Screen
http://infomine.ucr.edu/search!govpubsearch.phtml




F. Internet for the Trusts and Estates Lawyer
http://members.iex.netl--'j ghodges/t&etxt13.htm
F - 30
G. Robot-Driven Search Engine Evaluation Overview
http://www.curtin.edu.au!curtin/library/staffpages/gwpersonal/senginestudy/
H. Virtual Chase - Internet Research
http://www.virtualchase.com/internet research.shtml
XI. Legal Search Engines
A. All Law - Internet Gateway
http://www.alllaw.com/
B. FindLaw - Internet Resources
http://www.findlaw.com/
C. FindLaw - Law Crawler
http://www.lawcrawler.com
D. Lawguru.com - Legal Research
http://www.lawguru.com/search/lawsearch.html
E. Law Runner - Legal Research
http://www.lawrunner.com/
XII. Tax Associations and Organizations
A. American Institute of CPAs
http://www.aicpa.org/
B. American Bar Association - Tax Section
htt.p://www.abanet.org/tax/home.html
C. Tax Associations - Schmidt
http://www.taxsites.com/associations.html#tax
XIII. Tax News and Current Developments
A. AICPA - News Flash
http://www.aicpa.org/news/index.htm
B. Deloitte Touche - Tax News and Views
http://www.dtonline.com/tnv/tnv.htm
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C. Ernst & Young - TaxCast
http://www.taxcast.com/f-taxnews.htm
D. IRS - New Stand
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/news/index.html
E. PPC - Five Minute Update
http://www.ppcinfo.com!taxprod/5-min.htm
F. PriceWaterhouseCoopers - Tax News Update
http://www.taxnews.com!tnn publici
G. Tax Analysts -
http://www.taxbase.org/
H. Tax Analysts -
http://www.tax.org/TaxWire/taxwire.htm







D. Bureau of National Affairs
http://www.bna.com!









I. Matthew Bender & Co.
http://www.bencler.com!
J. Practising Law Institute
http://www.pli.edu/
K. Practitioners; Publishing Company
http://www.ppcinfo.com!
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
This seminar outline and the seminar presentation is intended to provide the
participants with guidance in estate planning and administration. The materials and the
comments of the speaker do not constitute, and should not be treated as, legal advice
regarding the use of any particular estate planning technique or the tax consequences
associated with any such technique. Although every effort has been made to assure the
accuracy of this material and comments, the speaker does not assume responsibility for
any individual's reliance on the written or oral information disseminated. You should
independently verify all statements made in this outline and at the 28th Annual Estate
Planning Institute held on July 13, 2001 before applying them to a particular fact
situation, and you need to independently determine both the tax and non tax
consequences of using any particular estate planning technique before recommending that
technique to a client or implementing it on a client's or your own behalf.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PLANNING FOR DISTRIBUTIONS OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS
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EDWARD A. ROTHSCHILD, ATTORNEY & CPA
Rothschild, Aberson & Miller
239 South Fifth Street, 17th Floor
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Louisville KY 40202
I. GENERAL COMMENTS
We are finding quiet frequently that the largest single asset in our clients' estates are the total of their
qualified plan and IRA accounts. These assets have very unique tax implications and are extremely hard
to deal with in adopting practical estate planning for our clients.. However, on January 17, 2001, the
IRS' New Proposed Regulations on minimum required distributions (hereinafter referred to as 'MRD")
were published in the Federal Register. These proposed regulations replace the proposed regulations
originally issued on July 17, 1987 relative to the required minimum distribution rules. IRA owners and
participants in qualified plan (hereinafter referred to as "Participant") may elect to rely on these
proposed regulations for distribution made in the 2001 calendar year and this regulations is mandatory
for the calendar year 2002 and thereafter. We will address these changes including updating Roth
IRA's, in this Lecture. The interplay of the various income, excise and transfer taxes creates an array of
opportunities, some of which will be simpler beginning in calendar year 2001, However, when dealing
with qualified plans and IRA distributions careful planning is still imperative to save your clients sizable
tax dollars.
II. REQUIRED BEGINNING DATE FOR QUALIFIED PLANS AND TRADITIONAL IRA'S
A. The required beginning date is the date on which periodic payments have to be paid to the
qualified plan or IRA participant. The required beginning date (RBD) is normally April 1
immediately following the year in which the participant or IRA owner reaches age 70 ~.
B. The exception is if the participant of a qualified plan is still employed at age 70 'l2 and owns
less than a 5% equity interest in the employer, then he or she can postpone the mandatory pay
out period until April 1 immediately following the date of retirement. (Small Business
Protection Act of 1996).
1. One problem with the new definition of RBD under the 1996 Act is the uncertainty
of the term "Retires".
a) Must the participant work full-time or will merely be working on a part-
time basis to qualify to defer the commencement of required distributions
until sometime after the participant reaches 70 ~.
b) A non-binding discussion of "retiree" by IRS
representatives have stated that 5% owner and retirement status are
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determined separately for each qualified plan in which the individual
participates. If so it appears that:
(i) A participant will be required to take distributions from plans in which
he or she participated that are sponsored by employers for whom the
participant no longer works, even though the participant continues to
work for another employer after reaching age 70 'l2.
(ii) A participant in a plan sponsored by an employer with respect to
which the participant was a more than five-percent owner will be able
to roll his or her accrued benefit into the plan of a new employer with
respect to which the participant is not a more than five-percent owner
and thereby defer the payment of the accrued benefit until he or she
retires from the new employer.
c. If a participant dies before reaching his or her RBD and he or she has a designated
beneficiary as of December 31 of the calendar year following the calendar year of his or her
death, the minimum distribution rules require that the deceased participant's plan benefits
and IRAs be distributed over the designated beneficiary's life expectancy, beginning no later
than the end of the calendar year after the participant dies. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401 (a)(9)-
3,A-3(a) and 1.401(a)(9)-5,A-5(b).
1. If the participant's sole designated beneficiary is his or her surviving spouse and the
spouse does not rollover the benefits, the distribution must commence by the end of
the calendar year in which the participant would have reached age 70~. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-3, A-3(b). However, if the spouse rolls over the benefits,
the spouse can wait until he or she is 70 'l2 before reaching his or her RBD.
2. If the surviving spouse is the participant's sole designated beneficiary, while a
spouse is alive the applicable distribution period is the spouse's life expectancy
determined each year.
a) Once the spouse dies, the remaining applicable distribution period is the
spouse's life expectancy in the calendar year of his or her death, reduced
by one for each calendar year that has elapsed since the year immediately
following the calendar year of the spouse's death.
Prop. Tres. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5,A-5(c)(2)
3. Unless the surviving spouse is the participant's sole designated beneficiary, the life
expectancy of the designated beneficiary is determined in the calend~ year
following the calendar year of the participant's death, and is reduced by one year
for each year thereafter. Prop. Treas.Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5,A-5(c)(1).
4. If the participant does not have a designated beneficiary by December 31 of the
calendar year following the calendar year of his or her death, (the Estate as an
example) the participant's plan benefits or IRAs must be distributed by the end of
the fifth calendar year following the calendar year of the participant's death. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-5(c)(3).
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D. If a participant dies after his or her RBD, the remaining plan benefits or IRAs must be paid to
-the participant's designated beneficiary over the designated beneficiary's life expectancy,
determined in the year following the calendar year of the participant's death, reduced by one
year for each year thereafter, commencing by the end of the calendar year following the
participant's death. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.40I(a)(9)-5, A-5(a)(I).
1. However, if the participant's sole designated beneficiary is the participant's spouse,
the applicable distribution period is the spouse's life expectancy determined each
year until his or her death, when it then becomes the life expectancy of the spouse
determined in the calendar year of the surviving spouse's death, reduced by one for
each calendar year that has elapsed since the calendar year immediately following
the calendar year of the spouse's death. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5,A-
5(c)(2).
2. If there is no designated beneficiary by December 31 of the calendar year following
the calendar year of the participant's death, the applicable distribution period is the
life expectancy of the participant determined in the year of his or her death, reduced
by one year for each year thereafter, Rather than all the benefits having to be paid
out by the end of the calendar year immediately following the participant's death as
under the prior temporary regulation. Prop. Treas. Reg § 1.401(a)(9)-5,A-5(a)(2).
E. Regardless of whether the participant dies before or after his or her RBD, if the spouse is the
beneficiary of all or part of the participant's benefit or IRA, he or she may roll the benefit (or
the part of which he or she is beneficiary) into his or her own IRA, or, in the case of an IRA,
treat the decedent's IRA as his or her own IRA. I.R.C. §402©(9) and Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.401 (a)-8,A-5(a).
1. If the participant dies after his or her RBD, and the required minimum distribution
has not been distributed to him or her before his or her death, the required annual
minimum distribution for that year would have to be paid to the surviving spouse
before the end of the year. Prop. Tr~as. Reg. § 1.408-8,A-5(a).
2. If the surviving spouse has already reached his or her RBD, he or she must begin
receiving required minimum distributions in the year following the year of the
participant's death.
3. Apparently, the election to treat the decedent's IRA as the spouse's IRA may be
made at any time after the participant's death. Prop. Treas. Reg. § I.4Q8-8,A-5(a).
F. A designated beneficiary must be an individual. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.40I(a)(9)-4,A-l.
1. An individual beneficiary of a trust may be treated as a designated beneficiary if the
trust meets certain requirements. Prop. Treas. Reg. § I.401(a)(9)-4,A5
2. If there are two or more beneficiaries, only the oldest beneficiary will be treated as
a designated beneficiary unless each beneficiary is entitled to a separate share of
account. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5,A-7(a)(I).
3. If there are two or more beneficiaries and one of the beneficiaries is not an
individual, the participant will be treated as not having any designated beneficiary
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unless the non-individual beneficiary is entitled to a separate share or a separate
account. Prop. Treas. Reg. § I.40I(a)(9)-5,A-7(a)(l).
a) A separate account of a participant's benefit determined by an acceptable
separate accounting including allocating investment gains and losses, and
contributions and forfeitures, on a pro rata basis in a reasonable and
consistent manner between such portion and any other benefits. Further, the
amounts of each such portion of the benefit will be separately determined for
purposes of determining the amount of the required minimum distribution.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-8,A-3(a).
b) A benefit in a defined benefit plan is separated into segregated shares if it
consists of separate identifiable components that may be separately
distributed. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-8, A-3(b).
4. An individual, to be treated as a designated beneficiary, must be designated under
the terms of the plan, including an affirmative election by the participant pursuant
to the terms of the plan. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4,A-l.
a) An individl:lal who becomes entitled to the benefit under applicable state law is
not a designated beneficiary. Prop. Treas. Reg. § I.40I(a)(9)-4, A-I.
b) Although not free from doubt, the participant will not have a designated
beneficiary if his or her estate is the named beneficiary, even though an
individual becomes entitled to receive the benefit by December 31 of the year
following the year of the participant's death. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-
4,A-3(a).
III. METHOD OF CALCULATING DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Required Minimum Distribution
The new proposed regulations simplify the minimum required distribution rules by providing a
simple uniform distribution table (See Exhibit A) that all participants can use to determine the
minimum distribution required during their lifetimes with the exception of a spouse who is more
than 10 years younger than the participant where a different table may be used.
B. This table known as the Minimum Distribution Incidental Benefit (hereinafter referred to as a
("DDT"), eliminates the following prior requirements:
1. The need to determine a beneficiary by the required beginning date.
2. The need to decide whether or not to recalculate life expectancy each year in determining
required minimum distributions, and
3. The need to satisfy a separate minimum incidental death benefit
rule.
c. The new proposed regulations permit the required minimum distribution during the participants
lifetime to be calculated without regard to the beneficiary's age (except when required
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distributions can be reduced by taking into account the age of a beneficiary who is a spouse more
than 10 years younger than the participant) and permit the beneficiary to be determined as late as
the end of the year following the year of the participant death.
1. When a designated beneficiary is the individuals spouse and is more than 10 years
younger than the participant, the participant and spouse's actual joint life expectancy can
be used to figure MRD's. (See Table VI (Reg. 1.72-9 IRS Publication 590 Ind.ividual
Retirement Arrangements and IRS Publication 939.
2. The new proposed regulations allows the participant to change designated beneficiaries
after the required beginning date without increasing the required minimum distribution
and allows the beneficiary to be changed after the participant's death, such as by one or
more beneficiaries disclaiming or being cashed out.
3. The new proposed regulations permit the calculation of post-death minimum distributions
to take into account the participant's remaining life expectancy at the time of death, thus
allowing distributions in all cases to be spread over a number of years after death.
4. There can be a major problem if the beneficiary of the Plan dies before December 31 of
the year following the date of the participant's death
D. The Uniform Distribution Period:
1. The required minimum distribution is determined by dividing the account balance as of
December 31 st of each year by the distribution period. For lifetime required minimum
distributions, the new proposed regulations provide a uniform distribution period for all
participants of the same age.
2. The UDT table is based on the joint life expectancies of the participant and an imaginary
survivor 10 years younger at each age beginning at age 70.
3. For years after the year of the participant's death, the distribution period is generally the
remaining life expectancy of the designated beneficiary. The beneficiary's remaining life
expectancy is calculated using the age of the beneficiary in the year following the year of
the participant's death, reduced by one for each subsequent year.
4. If the participant's spouse is the participant's sole beneficiary at the end of the year
following the year of the death, the distribution period during the spouse's life is the
spouse's single life expectancy. For years after the year of the spouse's death, the
distribution period is the spouse's. life expectancy calculated in the year of death, reduced
by one for each subsequent year.
5. If there is no designated beneficiary as of the end of the year after the partic.ipant's death,
the distribution period is the participant's life expectancy calculated in the year of death,
reduced by one for each subsequent year.
E. Determination of Designated Beneficiary:
1. These proposed regulations provide that, generally, the designated beneficiary is
determined as of the end of the year following the year of the participant's death rather
than as of the participant's required beginning date or date of participants death as under
the 1987 proposed regulations. If participant dies prior to his MRD then decisions on post
death distributions must be made no later than December 31, of the year following the
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participants' death. If a beneficiary fails to take the first post death MRD based on his
single life expectancy by that date then the entire account must be distributed no later than
the last day of the fifth year after the year of participants' death.
The new rules enable those who have already been taking MRD to effectively correct past
mistakes which might have included not naming beneficiaries or of selecting a distribution
method they later regretted. Since beneficiary designation (other than a much younger
spouse) doesn't effect the MRD and since there's no longer any choice of distribution
methods other than in the spouses exception, past decisions or lack there of are completely
wiped out.
2. Thus, any beneficiary eliminated by distribution of the benefit or through disclaimer (or
otherwise) during the period between the participant's death and the end of the year
following the year of death is disregarded in determining the participant's designated
beneficiary for purposes of calculating the required minimum distributions.
3. If, as of the end of the year following the year of the participant's death, the participant has
more than one designated beneficiary and the account or benefit has not been divided into
separate accounts or shares for each beneficiary, the beneficiary with the shortest life
expectancy is the designated beneficiary, consistent with the approach in the 1987
proposed regulations.
F. Default Rule for Post-Death Distributions
1. The new proposed regulations change the default rule in the case of death before
the participant's required beginning date for a non-spouse designated beneficiary
from the 5-year rule in Code Section 401(a)(9)(B)(ii) to the life expectancy rule in
Code Section 401 (a)(9)(B)(iii). Thus, absent a plan provision or election of the 5-
year rule, the life expectancy rule would apply in all cases in which the participant
has a designated beneficiary.
2. As in the case of death on or after the participant's required beginning date, the
designated beneficiary whose life expectancy is used to determine the distribution
period would be determined as of the end of the year following the year of the
participant's death rather than as of the participant's date of death (as would have
been required under the 1987 proposed regulations).
3. The 5-year rule would apply automatically only if the participant did not have a
designated beneficiary as of the end of the year following the year of the
participant's death.
G. The MDR rules only dictate the minimum amounts that must be taken from qualified plans and
lRAs. As under the prior proposed regulations. Participants and beneficiaries thereafter can always take
larger distributions if desired.
H. The Economic Growth and Relief Act of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as "2001 Act", states IRS
must review the life expectancy tables used for calculating distributions under the required minimum
distribution rules in order to reflect current life expectancies.
1. The preamble of the proposed regulations indicate that the IRS is aware of
suggestions that the Section 72 Life Expectancy Tables used to calculate MRD should
be revised to reflect increases in longevity because life expectancy has increased
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increased since the 72 tables were issued in 1986. Therefore, future tables may be
more beneficial to participants, spouses, and beneficiaries who wish to only receive
the MRD. each year.
2. The 2001 Act does not provide a date by which the IRS must revisit the Life
Expectancy Tables
IV. FUNDING A TRUST WITH QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLAN AND IRA DEATH BENEFITS
AS A BENEFICIARY
A. In order for an individual who is the beneficiary of a trust to be treated ~s the participant's
designated beneficiary, the trust must satisfy four requirements during any period during which
required. minimum distributions are being determined by taking into account the designated
beneficiary's life expectancy.
1. The trust must be a valid trust or would be a valid trust under state law if it had a
corpus.
2. The beneficiaries of the trust entitled to the plan benefits or IRA must be identifiable.
3.- The trust must be either irrevocable or, by its terms, will become irrevocable at the
participant's death.
4. Certain documentation requirements must be satisfied.
B. Unless the participant's designated beneficiary is his or her spouse and the spouse is more than ten
years younger than the participant, these requirements (including the documentation requirements)
must be satisfied by December 31 of the calendar year following the calendar year in which the
participant dies. .
1. If the spouse is the designated beneficiary and is more than ten years younger than
the participant, these requirements must be satisfied at the RBD.
c. The requirement that the beneficiaries entitled to the plan benefits or IRAs be identifiable is
necessary because the age of the old~st beneficiary is required to calculate the minimum
distribution.
1. If there are any beneficiaries entitled to the plan benefits or lRAs which do not
qualify as designated beneficiaries for purposes of calculating minimum distributions,
such as charities or creditors, (e.g., funeral expenses, etc.), the participant may be
treated as not having a designated beneficiary. PLR 9820021.
D. Under the documentation requirements, the participant or trustee must furnish" to the plan
administrator by the participant's RBD or December 31 of the calendar year following the calendar
year in which the participant died either the trust instrument or a list of beneficiaries, including
contingent and remainder beneficiaries, and the conditions on their entitlement.
1. In addition, the participant or trustee would have to certify that the list is complete
and agree to furnish a copy of the trust instrument if requested.
2. If the spouse is the designated beneficiary and is more than ten years younger than the
participant, and the trust agreement is amended, a copy of the amendment or
corrected certification, if the amendment changes the information certified, must be
furnished to the plan administrator within a reasonable time.
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Prop. Treas. Reg. § I.40I(a)(9)-4,A-6.
3. The documentation requirements are over-broad, since in many cases there will be
numerous contingent and remainder beneficiaries that will have to be listed, as well as
a description ofhow they will become entitled to receive a benefit.
a.) Only the name and age of the oldest beneficiary of each separate share of
the trust that is a beneficiary of the trust with respect to the plan benefit is
needed by the plan administrator to determine the required minimum
distribution.
b.) A plan administrator will not usually be qualified to interpret the terms of
a trust agreement.
c.) No documentation should be required to be provided to the financial
institution sponsoring an IRA, since IRA sponsors are not responsjble for
determining required minimum distributions and the account holder may
take the total of the required minimum distributions calculated separately
for each of his or her IRAs from any ol1;e or more of his or her IRA. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § I.408-8,A-9.
E. If a trust is the beneficiary of a qualified plan benefit or IRA, the question arises as to which
beneficiaries of the trust must be considered in determining who is the oldest beneficiary and whether
any beneficiary is not an individual.
1. If at least one beneficiary of the trust that must be considered for this purpose is not an
individual, such as a charitable organization, then the participant will be treated as not
having a designated beneficiary.
2. Apparently, any potential beneficiary of the trust including a non-individual beneficiary or
a beneficiary who is older than the apparent designated beneficiary, must be taken into
account in determining whether there is a "designated beneficiary" under the minimum
distribution rules, unless such beneficiary would only become entitled to receive
distributions from the plan or IRA if a prior individual beneficiary or beneficiaries hav~
died prematurely.
a.) The IRS has apparently taken the position that the only beneficiaries of the trust
who can be disregarded are those who will only become entitled to receive a plan
benefit or IRA distribution if he, she or it survives another beneficiary, and that
beneficiary would either receive the balance of the plan benefit or IRA if he or she
were alive at the relevant event (such as the death of the individual who was the
original designated beneficiary), or all required minimum distributions made to the
trust must be redistributed to the individual beneficiaries while they are alive.
i. Example: If a participant names a trust as his or her beneficiary, and
under the terms of the trust the oldest beneficiary is the participant's
spouse, then following the spouse's death the assets of the trust, including
the right to receive the remaining plan benefits are payable outright in
equal shares to the participant's three children who survive the spouse,
further, if there are no children then living, to a charitable organization,
the charitable organization would not be considered in determining
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whether the participant had a designated beneficiary, because its
entitlement to receive some of the plan benefit or IRA depends on none of
the participant's children surviving the spouse. On the other hand, if the
trust provided that the trust continues in existence after the spouse's' death,
and at the death of the last child to die the assets were payable to the
charitable organization, the charitable organization would be considered in
determining whether the participant had a designated beneficiary unless all
required minimum distributions were required to be distributed to
individual beneficiaries of the trust when received by the trust.
ii. In addition, at least the terms of the trust must not direct the use of any
plan benefit or IRA distributions of the trust being used to pay debts or
expenses of the participant's estate, including federal and state estate or
inheritance taxes; otherwise the participant may not be treated as having a
designated beneficiary because the participant's estate will be treated as a
beneficiary of part of the plan benefit or IRA.
3. Some of the above problems can be eliminated after the participant's death by cashing
out certain beneficiaries, such as the charity referred to in the example above, or, by having
certain beneficiaries disclaim their interests, and by segregating plan benefits or account
balances into separate accounts before December 31 of the year following the year of the
participant's death. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(9)-4, A-4(a) and 1.401(a)(9)-4,A-7(a).
v. PREMATURE DISTRIBUTIONS
One of those exceptions relates to distributions of substantially equal periodic
payments over the life expectancy of the participant or over the joint life
expectancies of the participant and his or her beneficiary. For this exception
to apply to distributions from a qualified retirement plan, the plan participant
must have terminated employment. This termination of employment
requirement, however, does not apply to distribution from an IRA § 72(T).
b. A distribution rolled over to an IRA or another qualified retirement
plan.
A distribution to an alternate payee (spouse) pursuant to a QDROc.
A. A ten percent additional penalty tax is imposed on withdrawals from an IRA or from a qualified
retirement plan before the participant attains the age of 59· Y2.
1. The most noted exception to this penalty tax are distributions to a beneficiary prior to age 59 ~
made because of the death or disability of the participant
2. There are a number of other popular exceptions to the imposition of this penalty tax including the
following:
a.
3. If the payment method changes before the later of five years after payments commence or
attainment of age 59 Y2, there is a ten percent recapture tax penalty. The ten percent premature
penalty tax is applied retroactively to payments that were previously exempt. An individual who
has multiple IRAs can use the equal payment exception for one IRA without having to take
distributions from any other IRA. § 72(t)(4); PLRs 9243054, 9050030 and 8946045.
4. Under the 2001 Act, qualified plans must provide that distributions of non-forfeitable accrued
benefit of less than 5000 but more than 1000 i~ made from a qualified plan to an IRA if the
participant does not elect to roll the funds into another qualified plan or IRA and does not elect
to receive the distribution directly. The Plan Administrator is required not only to make the
transfer to an IRA but also must notify the participant in writing that the distribution may be
transferred without loss or penalty to another IRA. (see 401(a)(31)(B) and Sec: 402 (F)(1)(A)
both as amended by the 2001 Act § 657 (a) (1) and 657 (b»
VI. ROLLOVERS
A. A participant in a qualified retirement plan may avoid current taxation on a distribution by
rolling the distribution over into another qualified retirement plan or ~nto an individual
retirement plan.
B. There are five types of rollovers:.
1. Amounts may be transferred from one IRA to another.
2. Amounts may be transferred from a qualified retirement plan to an IRA.
3. A rollover from one qualified retirement plan to another.
4. A rollover to a qualified retirement plan from an IRA if all amounts in the IRA are
attributable to an earlier rollover contribution from a qualified retirement plan.
5. A Roth IRA can only be rolled over to another Roth IRA.
C. An eligible rollover distribution is subject to automatic 20% withholding unless the
distribution is transferred by a direct rollover to an eligible retirement plan that permits the
acceptance of rollover distributions. A direct rollover is an eligible rollover distribution
that is paid directly to an eligible retirement plan for the benefit of the distribute (i.e., the
distribution is made in the form of a direct trustee-to-trustee transfer from a qualified
retirement plan to the eligible retirement plan). Y 401 (a)(3 1); Reg. Y I.40I(a)(3I)-I.
D. With regard to a rollover from a qualified retirement plan to an IRA, the payout must be
transferred into one or more IRAs within 60 days after receipt. It is not necessary,
however, to transfer the entire amount into the IRA; but the portion not rolled over is taxed
as ordinary income in the year received. However, unless the distribution is transferred by
a direct rollover to the IRA, the distribution is subject to automatic 20 percent withholding.
Reg. § 1.402(c)-2. In addition, don't buy stock or other property with any cash distribution
without first putting the cash back into the rollover IRA. Reinvesting cash distributions
from a qualified plan or Keogh account into other property before depositing the property
into a rollover IRA, even within the 60 day rollover period, does not qualifY as a rollover
contribution and instead, subjects the taxpayer to tax on the entire amount of distribution.
Lemishow v. Commr 110 Tx INOII (1998).
1. The spouse of an participant who receives an eligible rollover distribution from a
qualified retirement plan or is the beneficiary of an IRA at the death of the
participant, is permitted to rollover all or part of the distribution to an IRA or his or
her own. The IRS has also ruled that, if the deceased spouse's qualified retirement
plan benefits are paid to a trust and the trust distributes the benefits to the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse may rollover the distribution. PLRs 9633-
43,9633042,9533042, 9509028 and 9234032.
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2. If the deceased spouse's qualified retirement plan benefits are paid to the decedent's
estate and the surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary of the decedent's residuary
estate, IRS has ruled that the surviving spouse may rollover the distribution to an
IRA. PLRs 9402023, 9351041, 9229022 and 9138067.
3. The surviving spouse was permitted to rollover the benefit to an IRA when the
deceased spouse named a trust as the beneficiary of the death benefit payable from
a qualified retirement plan, the trust beneficiaries disclaimed the benefit, and, as a
result of the disclaimer, the benefit was paid to the surviving spouse. PLRs
9450041 and 9247026.
4 The spouse may establish an IRA rollover account even if the spouse would not be
eligible to establish a regular IRA. However, the surviving spouse may not roll
over the distribution to another qualified retirement plan or from the rollover IRA to
another qualified retirement plan in which the spouse is a participant. Y 402(c)(9).
5. Generally, a rollover by the surviying spouse is permitted where there is no
discretion on the part of someone other than the surviving spouse. PLRs 9721028,
9710034, 9703036,9626049,9623064,9623056 and 9620038.
F. An IRA acquired by a beneficiary upon the death of a non-spouse is an inherited IRA and does not
qualify for rollover treatment. To the beneficiary's own IRA.
G. The following distributions are not eligible as rollovers to an IRA: (Reg. 1.402(c)-2 [Q 7 A 4]
1. ESOP Dividends. Deductible dividends paid to participants by an ESOP. Therefore, a
rollover of appreciated employer securities does not defer tax on net unrealized
appreciation.
2. Life insurance policies.
3. A participant's loan that is treated as a distribution is therefore not eligible for rollover.
(Reg. 1.402(c)-2 [Q & A 4(d)].
VII. LUMP SUM DISTRIBUTIONS FROM RETIREMENT PLANS
A. A lump-sum distribution is a distribution from a qualified retirement plan made within one taxable
year to the recipient, represents the balance to the credit of the participant and meets the following
requirements::
1. Only applicable to individuals born prior to January 1,1936.
2. On account of separation from service in the case of an employee participant; or
3.0n account of the participant's death or,
4. On account of disability in the case of a self-employed individual. Disability for this purpose
means unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determined physical or mental impainnent which can be expected to result in death or to be of
long continued and indefinite duration. Y 72 (m) (7).
B. "One taxable year" will usually be the calendar year.
C. To satisfy the requirement that the distribution be the "balance to the credit"
of the participant, all pension plans are aggregated and all profit sharing plans are aggregated. A
participant may receive a lump-sum distribution from a pension plan in one year and a lump-sum
distribution from a profit sharing plan in a later year. However, special income averaging can only
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be elected one time. A money purchase pension plan is aggregated with a defined benefit pension
plan. Do not take out both profit sharing and pension plan benefits entirely in the same year. Lump
sum treatment is not automatic, it has to be elected by filing Form 4972.
D. The taxable amount of a lump-sum distribution is the total distribution reduced by the participant's
basis, unrealized appreciation on employer securities (unless an election is made to include such
unrealized appreciation) and accumulated deductible participant contributions plus income
attributable to such contributions.
E. Lump sum averaging now only available to a participant born prior to 1936 (currently over 65 years
of age). The recipient may elect ten-year averaging only. The calculation is computed as follows:
1. In calculating the ten-year averaging tax on a lump-sum distribution, based on the 1986
single, individual Federal income tax rates.
2. If th~ participant was age 50 on January 1, 1986, and commenced participation in the plan
prior to 1974, then a portion of the distribution may be taxed as long-term capital gain at the
20 percent capital gain rate that was in existence in 1986. TRA'86, Act Y 1122(h) (3).
3. A lump sum distribution is excluded from the recipient's adjusted gross income (AGI) Y
402(d) (3); Y 62(a)(8).
4. Only individual estates and trusts can elect to lump sum average. Partnerships or corporations
will not qualify. Y 402(d) (4) (B).
5. The special tax treatment of a lump-sum distribution is not available to IRA's, SEP-IRA's or
403(b) Plans or if any part of the distribution is rolled over either to another qualified
retirement plan or an individual retirement plan.
VIII. ROTH IRA
A. For taxable years beginning after 1997, TRA'97 created a new nondeductible IRA called the Roth
IRA. The income and appreciation inside the Roth IRA is not taxable upon a qualified
distribution, if made after five years of Roth IRA participation. However, a Roth IRA, like all
other IRA's is taxable for Federal estate tax purposes.
B. Qualified distributions from a Roth IRA are not included in the taxpayer's gross income and are
not subject to the additional 10% early withdrawal tax. To be a qualified distribution, the
distribution must satisfy the five-year holding period and must meet one of four requirements,
which are:
1. Individual attains age 59 ~; or
2. made to a beneficiary (or the individual's estate) on or after the individual's death; or
3. attributable to the individual being disabled; or
4. A distribution to pay for "qualified first-time home buyer expenses".
C. Qualification to participate in a Roth IRA is subject to the following adjusted gross income (AGI)
limitations: The maximum yearly contribution that can be made to an IRA is phased out for single
taxpayers with AGI between $95,000 and $110,000 and for joint filers with AGI between
$150,000 and $160,000. (Code Section 408A(6)(3). In addition, you are not allowed to rollover a
regular IRA into a Roth IRA if a single taxpayer or a joint filer has an AGI in excess of $1 00,000.
D. Taxpayer and his or her spouse may contribute a maximum of $2,000 each per year to all IRA's
(deductible, and non-deductible Roth IRA's). The $2,000 annual limit does not include rollover
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contributions. Excess contributions to a Roth IRA are subject to a 6% excise tax under Code Sec
4973 (F). Roth IRA contributions are not deductible for Federal income tax purposes.
E. Distribution from one Roth IRA may only be rolled over tax-free to another Roth IRA.
F. There is no rule requiring any distribution to a Roth IRA participant before his or her death.
However, unlike the original participant the person who inherits a Roth IRA is required to take
distributions. Since the minimum distribution rules apply to ~ll IRA's including Roth IRA's after
the participants death. Therefore, the same rules apply as to Roth IRA's based on the participant's
death either before or after the Participant of Roth IRA reaches age 70 12 .
G. Conversions from traditional IRA:
1. A traditional IRA can be converted or rolled into a Roth IRA as long as the taxpayer is either
a single filer or a married person filing jointly whose MAGI does not exceed $100,000.
I.R.C. §§ 408A(c)(3)(B) and (d)(3).
2. The regulations call such a rollover a "conversion". Treas. Reg. Y 1.408A-8(b)(2).
3. The $100,000 MAGI limit for traditional IRA to Roth IRA rollovers is determined in the year
that the amount is distributed from the traditional IRA.
4. Effective in 2005, required minimum distributions under I.R.C. Y 401 (a)(9) from traditional
IRAs and qualified retirement plans are excluded for purposes of the $100,000 MAGI
limitation for conversions.
H. You can contribute to a Roth IRA even if you are over 70 Y2 years old. However, contributions
can only be made if the taxpayer has employment income and his or her adjusted gross income is
below the limits discussed
above.
I. The deadline for a contribution to a Roth IRA (like a deductible IRA) is the due date for filing the
individual's tax return for the year (without regard to extensions). Code Sec 408A(c) (7). Further,
the 5-year holding period begins to run with the tax year to which the contribution relates, not the
year in which the contribution is actually made.
J. A Roth IRA must be clearly designated as such in the IRA document Treas. Reg. 1.408A-2
K. A Simplified Participant Pension (SEP) or a Simple Retirement Account may be converted to a
Roth IRA.
L. Traditional IRA to Roth IRA conversions are not allowed for married persons filing separate
returns IRC 408A(c) (3) (B) (iii)
M. Under the 2001 Act, the maximum annual contribution that can be made to a Roth IRA each year
under Code Section 219 (b) (1) (A) as amended by the 2001 Act will be as follows:
For taxable years be2inning in: The deductible amount is:
2002 through 2004 $3,000
2005 through 2007 $4000
2008 and thereafter $5,000
N. For individuals 50 or older the increased maximum annual contribution that can be made to a
Roth IRA each year will be as follows:
For Year: The deductible amount is:
2002 through 2004 $3,500
2005 $4,500
2006 and 2007 $5,000
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I2008 and thereafter $6,000
o. In certain Employee Plans, the employee may elect to make qualified Roth contributions.
IX. CONCLUSION
Important binding decisions to be made by the participant prior to his or her required beginning date to
take certain mandatory distributions have been eliminated in the new proposed regulations. There is a
single uniform distribJ.ltion table that fits all except a spouse who is more than ten years younger than the
participant, which will result in a smaller minimum annual distribution amount than under the uniform
distribution table. It no longer makes any difference what age the beneficiary is or even if th"ere is a
beneficiary at or after RBD in determining the minimum required distribution to be paid to the
participant. The fact that the designated beneficiary does not have to be determined until the end of the
year following the death of the participant, potential post mortem tax planning particularly if the Federal
Estate Tax is eliminated or greatly reduced, will still require important post death planning for
beneficiaries of qualified plans and IRA's
The use of trusts as a beneficiary of qualified plan and IRA benefits can increase the payout period of
benefits under the new proposed regulations and result in the long run in paying out more total benefits
by increasing the life of the invested qualified plan or IRA funds. However, to accomplish this benefit,
careful drafting of both the trust and beneficiary designation is required.
Although leaving the plan or IRA benefits to the participant's estate is not as harse as under the prior
temporary regulations, still in almost all cases, the estate of the participant should not be named the
beneficiary by the participant
All qualified plan and IRA assets are included in the decedent's estate, for Federal Estate Tax purposes
and in some states for State Inheritance Tax purposes as well. In addition, the following penalty taxes
may also be applicable: A 10% penalty for taking out the benefits when the Participant is too young; a
50% penalty if the minimum annual distribution is not distributed when the Participant reaches his or her
required beginning date. In addition, a Generation Skipping Penalty tax of 55% can also be assessed if
too much of the Participant's total assets, which includes all qualified plan and IRA benefits, skip a
generation which is usually grandchildren, but not always.
The Roth IRA has some sizable benefits over the years but is not available to many of our clients
because of the adjusted gross income limitations. Very careful overall tax planning. needs to be
considered prior to transferring a taxable IRA into a Roth IRA.
.Therefore even now after the proposed regulations the total value of the participant's qualified plan
and/or IRA benefits can still be reduced by up to 80% in taxes through the combination of income taxes,
death taxes, and generation skipping taxes.
The new proposed regulations do not reduce the careful estate planning needs during the lifetime of the







































































































115 & Older 1.8 55.5556%
NOTE: The distribution period is based on the joint and last survivor expectancy of an individual with an age
in the first column and a beneficiary 10 years younger than the participant redetennined each year.. The .
applicable percentage, is rounded to four decimal places, determined by dividing the distribution period into
100. However, if the participant's designated beneficiary is a spouse who is more than ten years younger than
the participant, the applicable distribution period is their joint and last survivor expectancy as redetermined each
year under Table VI under the new proposed regulations.
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Family Limited Partnerships and the U.S. Tax Court (What should be learned from
the Jones, Knight, Shephard and Strangi Cases?)
The purpose of this presentation is to consider four cases decided within the past year that
relate to the valuation of partnership entities established for estate planning purposes. I
was consulted as an expert and had post-trial discussions in two of the cases and have
familiarity with the parties in the other two cases tried. In addition, I plan to discuss
some other cases that settled before trial, the valuation and litigation strategies of the
parties, and the range of outcomes I am seeing as an expert in these cases. Time
permitting, I may further outline some of my own preferences for estate planning and the
ranges of discounts and approaches I tend to apply as a function of the types of assets and
interests being evaluated.
The lessons from these cases and experiences are as follows:
1. The Tax Court appears to be disinclined to disallow the form of the entity
from which gifts are being made or interests held in the estate are valued;
thus, the variety of recent arguments advanced by the IRS as to why family
limited partnerships should be deemed legally invalid for gift and estate tax
purposes.
2. The Tax Court will strictly and liberally apply the willing seller concept to
reduce the applicable discounts and restrictions, consider control aspects of all
of the interests contained in a single gift or estate, and apply other aspects of
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the transfers to invalidate or reduce the discounts applied to the underlying
property transferred to a partnership.
3. The Tax Court will tend to choose discounts for lack of control and lack of
marketability that are: (i) based on appropriate market data; (ii) carefully
explained in the context of the market data considered; and (iii) moderate in
amount. The court is likely to find disfavor with experts that appear to be
stretching to excessive discounts, including double discounting or assuming
the worst restrictions to be applicable, or that look at the issue from the
"willing buyer" perspective and ignore the "willing seller" perspective.
4. Absent the legal issues, there is a fairly tight range of minority interest
discounts applied by most experts in these cases. Experts tend to use closed-
end fund discounts to determine discounts for lack of control. Experts will
tend to differ more on discounts for lack of marketability. These differences
are based on their interpretation and application of the restricted stock studies
and observed secondary market discounts for limited partnerships. I often
find these minority and lack of marketability discount issues resolved or
settled at trial.
Estate of Albert Strangi, Deceased, Rosalie Gulig, Independent Executrix,
Petitioneer, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent
This case was tried in September 1999 and decided by Judge Cohen. The
decision was filed on November 30, 2000, at 115 T.e. No. 35.
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The issues for decision were: (1) whether the Strangi Family Limited Partnership
(SFLP) should be disregarded for federal tax purposes because it lacks business purpose
and economic substance; (2) whether SFLP is a restriction on sale or use of property that
should be disregarded pursuant to section 2703(a); (3) whether the transfer of assets to
SFLP was a taxable gift; and (4) the fair market value of decedent's interest in SFLP at
the date of death.
Note: Our firm had discussions with counsel for both the respondent and petitioner but
was disqualified from appearing at trial due to a conflict.
SFLP was formed on August 12, 1994, as a limited partnership in Texas with a
1% corporate general partner, Stranco. A total of $9,876,929 was contributed to the
partnership upon formation. Approximately 75% of that amount was composed of cash
equivalents and marketable securities. The remaining 25% included real estate and other
income rights.
The decedent owned 47% of Stranco and Ms. Gulig purchased 53% of Stranco
on behalf of herself and the three children of decedent. Thus, the general partner was
owned 47% by decedant and 13.25% each by four individuals. [This was extremely
helpful in obtaining discounts. The lack of a controlling shareholder of Stranco and the
purchasee of shares in Stranco by the decedent's heirs allowed for the minority status of
decedent's interests to be sustained and full discounts on valuation to be realized.] Mr.
Gulig, spouse of Ms. Gulig, was employed to manage the daily affairs of SFLP and
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Straqco on behalf of the partners. [This was also a very helpful fact. It meant that a
separate individual with the capacity to perform management services was responsible to
the partnership and Stranco.]
From September 1993 until his death on October 14, 1994, the decedent was ill
(died of cancer) and had 24-hour home healthcare. [The fact of the illness, lack of
capacity, and potential risk of death led respondent to argue that the SFLP was set up
solely as a device for reducing estate taxes.] A person providing services to decedent
hurt her back and her medical surgery was paid for by the partnership. [Not a good fact
for the estate. Potentially establishes a failure to operate SFLP independent of donor.]
In 1995, SFLP made 'distributions to the estate of $3,187,800 in order to allow the
estate to pay inheritance taxes. Also, distributions to the heirs were made in 1995 and
1996. The partnership extended lines of credit to the individuals partners in 1996 and
established divided accounts for the four heirs. In 1997, SFLP advanced funds to the
estate to post bonds in connection with the review of the estate tax issue. [These facts
were used by the respondent as evidence of a lack of substance and of the lack of a
legitimate business purpose for the SFLP.]
Discussion ofthe Legal Findings
I was surprised by the court's findings on pages 13 and 14 of the opinion. I felt
that there were legitimate business and estate preservation motives that the court
appeared to dismiss in its opinion. This appeared to reflect to court's lack of appreciation
of the risks that can arise once a decedent is no longer available and the risks in this
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instance. In my own experience, [see my Thursday presentation] the risks of suits and
litigation involving the estate are real and more common than the court realizes.
That being said, my concerns were over the following issues: (1) a failure of the
decedent to make timely gifts or to sell or convey a larger percentage of SFLP during his
lifetime; (2) the short amount of time between the date of formation of SFLP and the date
of death; and (3) the use of funds from SFLP to serve the interests of the estate both
before and after the date of death. Thus, reading the opinion of the court up to page 15
would lead to the conclusion that the court would disallow the discounts associated with
interests in SFLP and sustain the legal position of the respondent. Indeed, Judge Parr, in
a dissent [pages 29-31] reaches the conclusion that no valuation discounts should be
allowed for this reason. Nevertheless, on page 16, the court finds that SFLP was validly
formed and, despite the "subjective intentions" [in other words, tax motives], the form of
the partnership should be respected.
The court also rejects that respondent's argument that the effect of placing assets
in a partnership creates a restriction on the transfer or sale that should be disregarded
under section 2703(a).
The court further rejected the gift on formation argument raised by the petitioner
on pages 19 to 21 of the opinion. The court appears to find the respondent's arguments to
be persuasive in a number of ways, but concludes that the arguments should be applied in
assessing the credibility of the experts. "Realistically, in this case, the disparity·between
the value of the assets in the hands of the decedent and the alleged value of his
partnership interest reflects on the credibility of the claimed discount applicable to the
partnership interest. It does not reflect a taxable gift." [page 21]
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After speaking with the attorneys for both sides after this decision, both were of
the opinion that the court is saying two things: First, the court is likely to decline to rule
that FLPs established consistent with state laws are invalid and that the discounts
associated with FLPs should be ignored for gift or estate tax purposes; and second, the
court is inclined to consider many of the arguments made by the respondent as strong
evidence for limiting the discounts off of net asset value allowed by the court in such
cases.
Discussion ofthe Valuation Issues
One important finding in this case is that the court ruled that the estate's
ownership of a 47% interest in the 1% general partner corporation, Stranco, and a 99%
limited partnership interest should be valued together, not as separate assets. The court
stated [page 23], "We agree with respondent that the relationship between the limited
partnership interest and the interest in Stranco cannot be disregarded. The entities were
created as a unit and operated as a unit and were functionally inseparable."
Petitioner's counsel is of the opinion that this conclusion was inappropriate under
the law. It is an indirect means of the court considering intrinsic value, as opposed to fair
market value. Intrinsic value is the value to a specific willing buyer or willing seller.
Intrinsic value may greatly exceed fair market value in a valuation of a family limited
partnership interest. I have heard debates on both sides regarding this issue and, as a
valuation expert, have to rely on the advice of counsel about how to address this issue in
a report prepared for estate and gift tax purposes and for trial.
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One means of avoiding the aggregation of interests held by the estate is to gift
away the general partnership shares entirely or to ensure that a substantially smaller
percentage of the general partnership corporation remains in the estate. We typically
prefer to see the gifts of minority equity interests in the corporation's general partnership
occurring at a separate time and as a separate event from other gifts and transactions
involving the partnership. This will ensure that there will be no attribution of elements of
control to the estate's remaining interests in the palinership. In the alternative, we prefer
to see limited partnership interest gifted away in sufficient amounts prior to the date of
death to avoid the court arguing that the estate still owns most of the partnership and has
the power to affect the affairs of the partnership or to remove the general paliner.
The original valuation report and the valuation presented by taxpayer's expert at
trial were both weak in terms of substance, support, and analysis. The level and quality
of the support for the 25% marketability discount, 25% minority interest discount, and
43.75% combined discount off of net asset value was limited. Respondent's expert
valued the 99% limited partnership interest with a 25% discount for lack of marketability
and an 8% minority interest discount. Respondent's expert valued the 47% interest in the
general partnership with a 25% discount for lack of marketability and a 5% minority
interest discount due to the relative size of the interest as a percentage of Stranco. [We
often refer to this as a split-interest discount. A split interest discount recognizes that an
equity interest representing less than 50% of the total voting interests may 11ave elements
of control due to the lack of a larger block of interests and the substantial size of the
interest relative to the other equity interests.]
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Our review of the expert reports concluded that the respondent's expert was more
correct in his determination of value. Neither report adequately considered the mix and
type of assets in the determination of the marketability discounts, but the use of closed-
end fund discounts by respondent's expert for the determination of a minority interest
discount was sound and standard valuation practice. Petitioner's counsel was
complimentary of respondent's expert on this issue and relatively pleased with a
combined discount in excess of 30%.
The court clearly implied that it would have chosen a lower discount had the
respondent provided expert testimony for it. The court stated, "We believe that the result
of respondent's expert's discount may still be overgenerous to petitioner, but that result is
the one that we must reach under the evidence and under the applicable statutes."
Conclusions
My understanding is that the respondent viewed this as a test case and litigating
vehicle. The hope was to invalidate FLPs for valuation purposes in estate and gift tax
cases. It is clear that the issues of economic substance, motive, and business purposes are
fact specific and may continue to lead to challenges to the form of the FLP. In most of
the FLPs I have been involved in valuing, I do believe the facts will support a finding of
economic substance, business purpose, or other purpose beyond the mere reduction of
estate and gift taxes. The majority of the court appears to be saying that the form will
generally be respected and discounts will be allowed even when the motives appear to be
primarily, if not exclusively, based on the reduction in estate taxes. The majority of the
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court also appears to be of the view that the discounts that should be allowed in these
cases must be moderate and limited by the facts and circumstances.
It should be noted that respondent is becoming more aggressive on the discount
Issue. As the Knight case will demonstrate, one approach is attack the petitioner's expert
and leave the estate with no alternative. The other approach is a find an expert that
believes that the discounts for lack of marketability are less than 25%. For example, one
expert being used by the respondent is of the opinion that the appropriate marketability
discount is only 7% to 8% of average. While his methodology and conclusions are
flawed (and I have written rebuttals to that analysis), he is forcing some taxpayers in
docketed cases to settle for lower discounts.
Ina F. Knight, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent and
Herbert D. Knight, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent
This case was decided by Judge Colvin in an opinion filed on November 30,
2000, at 115 T.C. No. 36.
On December 28, 1994, the Petitioners established a trust with one of the donors
as the trustees, a family limited partnership with the management trust as the general
partner, and two trusts (one for each of the petitioners' two adult children). Three parcels
of land and financial assets were transferred into the partnership and gifts of 22.3% each
were made by each petitioner to each of their two children's trusts. TIle four gifts
represented 89% of the partnership interests.
Counsel for the respondent was the same as in the Strangi case.
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Petitioners transferred into the partnership $10,000 in cash, approximately $1.06
million worth of a municipal bond mutual funds, $460,000 in U.S. Treasury notes, an
insurance policy worth $52,000, a ranch (with mineral rights) valued at $182,000, and
two residential properties valued at $312,000.
The partnership was managed by the petitioner through a management trust. The
partnership did not buy or sell significant assets (other than the roll-over investments as
they matured in comparable securities), manage a business (other than a modest amount
of cattle on the ranch), or rent property. The real property was primarily held and used
. for personal purposes. The Petitioners paid no rent for the use of the two residential
properties until December 1998.
Discussion ofthe Legal Findings
The opinion in this case was issued at the same time as the Strangi opinion. The
core of the respondent's legal position was similar to that in the Strangi case (a case in
which Judge Colvin concurred with Judge Cohen's opinion).
The court agreed with the petitioners that the form of the partnership should be
respected for valuation purposes. The court found that "the transferred interests are
interests in a partnership under Texas law. Petitioners have burdened the partnership
with restrictions that apparently are valid and enforceable under Texas law." The court
then applied a similar logic to the economic substance issues and did not discuss at length
respondent's arguments as to the lack of economic substance or the fact that certain
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subsequent actions by the general partner (such as not requiring rent for the use of real
property) established a lack of economic substance.
Discussion ofthe Valuation Issues
Given the common counsel of respondent as in the Strangi case, we were
surprised to learn that no expert was offered by the respondent at trial. Petitioner's expert
was, accordingly, unreasonably aggressive and arrived at certain conclusions that are
outside of the accepted or common range of discounts commonly observed in practice.
First, petitioner's expert applied a 10% portfolio discount. This was based on an
article that found that publicly traded conglomerates experienced a 10% to 15% discount
off the value of their underlying subsidiaries due to the mix of entities and assets. The
study was not accepted by the court as reasonably applicable to the situation in this
instance. Furthermore, a conglomeration discount represents part of the minority interest
discount. Thus, the expert double-counted the minority interest discount by applying a
conglomeration discount.
Second, the petitioner's expert applied a 10% discount for lack of control based
on the average discount observed in closed end bond funds. This is probably a lower
than appropriate discount given the mix of assets in the partnership. The court,
surprisingly, rejected the expert's analysis on the basis that the closed end bond funds are
not reasonably comparable. I would concede that the market data relied on by the expert
is not as comparable as one would like, but the information provides the best evidence of
the minimum minority interest discount.
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Third, petitioner's expert applied a 30% discount for lack of marketability based
on a review of seven restricted stock studies. The court found that the expert did not
demonstrate that the companies in those studies were reasonable comparable and did not
explain sufficiently how he accounted for the information in those studies to alTive at his
30% discount.
Finally, the court concluded that the expert was an "advocate" and "not
objective." On that basis, the court largely disregarded the expert's testimony and arrived
at a discount of 15% based on the closed end bond fund discount information provided by
the expert.
Conclusion
It is interesting that the entire U.S. Tax Court reviewed this opinion and that there
was only one dissenting opinion. Judge Foley wrote a concurring opinion indicating that
he felt that economic substance issue is not appropriate in these types of cases and is
misplaced. He concluded, "If taxpayers, however, are willing to burden their property
with binding legal restrictions that, in fact, reduce the value of such property, we cannot
disregard such restrictions." Thus, all but one of the judges agreed with the result, but a
few may differ on their respective approaches to some of the legal issues.
The Knight case appears to make clear that attacks on limited partnerships based
on a lack of economic substance or lack of business purpose will generally fail. Only in
the most extreme cases where the form of the partnership is not respected after the gifts
and/or the estate planning is performed contemporaneously with (or even after) the
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donor's death, is there much risk of a complete loss of discounts associated with the court
disregarding the form of the partnership. The Knight and Strangi cases provide evidence
that the court is inclined to be skeptical of large discounts and to favor more moderate or
limited discounts with very detailed, asset specific, and partnership specific analyses
applied to the specific facts.
Estate of W.W. Jones II, Deceased, A. C. Jones IV, Independent Executor,
Petitioner, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent
The decision in this case was filed on March 6,2001, at 116 T.e. No. 11.
The lead attorneys for both parties in this case were the same as in the Knight
case, with the same counsel for respondent as in the Strangi case, as well.
Two family limited partnerships were formed. In the first (JBLP), decedent
contributed real property (a ranch), cattle, and certain personal property in return for a
95.5389 percent limited partnership interest. A son contributed real property (a fractional
interest in the same real property) in exchange for limited and general partnership
interests in JBLP. In the second (AVLP), decedent transferred real property (surface
rights to ranch land) and received an 88.178% limited partnership interest. Each daughter
(four total) of the decedent transferred real property (fractional interests in various ranch
properties) to AVLP in return for limited and general partnership interests.
Having established each partnership and contributed property on January-I, 1995,
decedent then gifted to each of his four daughters a 16.915% limited partnership interest
H·13
in AVLP, retaining only 20.518% for himself. Decedent also gifted an 83.08% limited
partnership interest in JBLP to his son.
Both partnerships contained restrictions of transferability of interests. JBLP
required the written consents of 100% of the partnership interests. AVLP required the
written consent of 75% of the limited partners and 100% of the general partners. The
partnerships contain certain rights of first refusal with respect to the possible sale of
partnership interests to unrelated persons.
Both partnerships also provided rights to remove the general partners. JBLP
allowed the holders of at least 51 % of the partnership interests to remove the general
partner. AVLP allowed the holder of at least 75% of the partnership interests to remove
the general partner.
Not surprisingly, respondents raised many of the same legal arguments as in
Knight and Strangi as to why the form of the partnerships should be disregarded. Both
the respondent and petitioner offered different valuation experts and testimony than was
seen in Knight and Strangi.
Discussion ofthe Legal Findings
The respondent claimed that there was an implied gift upon formation. The court
found that it did not enhance the value of the other partnership interests as a result of the
contribution of property by the decedent and rejected the gift upon formation theory.
The court similarly rejected the application of section 2704(b) (lapsing restrictions
and restrictions of liquidation beyond state law are to be ignored). The court found that
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the restrictions were allowed by state law and not more generally restrictive than state
law.
The most interesting finding of the court was that the large gift of an 83.08%
limited partnership interest in JBLP to the son conferred effective control to the son. The
court found that since 51 % of the partnership interests could remove and appoint the
general partner, this conferred elements of control to the interest gifted and negated most
of the discounts that ordinarily would be allowed by the court.
Discussion ofthe Valuation Issues
The petitioner's expert opined that one should apply a 55% secondary market
discount, a 20% lack of marketability discount, and an additional discount for built-in
capital gains in evaluating the 83.08% limited partnership interest in JBLP. Respondent's
expert opined that no discount was appropriate. The court denied the 55% secondary
market discount, denied the built-in capital gains discount, and allowed only an 8% lack
of marketability discount.
The petitioner argued that restrictions on approval of the transfers of partnership
interests to the hypothetical willing buyers resulted in the requirement that the interest be
discounted substantially. The court rejected this argument and found that "self-imposed
limitations on the interest, created with the purpose of minimizing value for transfer tax
purposes, are likely to be waived or disregarded when the owner of the interest becomes a
hypothetical willing seller, seeking the highest price that the interest will bring from a
willing buyer." The court found that only an 8% discount for the risk and difficulty
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associated with potential litigation upon forced liquidation would be applicable in this
instance. [page 25]
The court rejected the built-in capital gains argument by relying on the logic that a
willing seller would not unnecessarily encumber a sale by denying the buyer a section
754 election. [pages 26-28] The court distinguished between the cases where a built-in
capital gains discount was allowed for the sale of stock in a corporation from the sale of a
partnership interest, where a section 754 election was available.
In the valuation of AVLP, petitioner's expert applied a 45% secondary market
discount, a 20% discount for lack of marketability, and an additional discount for built-in
capital gains. Respondent's expert allowed for a 38% secondary market discount, a 7.5%
lack of marketability discount, and no discount for built-in capital gains.
Both experts relied on average discounts for limited partnership interests quoted
in same publication. Since the issue .was not properly raised, the court missed the fact
that the average discounts cited are highly inappropriate when applied to a specific
partnership. First, one must adjust for differences in cash yields. Low cash yields result
in substantially greater average discounts. Second, one must adjust for the presence of
leverage (debt or more senior interests). Low levels of debt reduce significantly the
appropriate discounts. Third, one must adjust for the characteristics of the underlying
assets held by the partnership. Ranch land is not a desirable type of property to hold
through a limited partnership. The low returns often provided by ranch land cause
discounts to be substantially greater than average. Two of these three factors will
generally cause discounts to be substantially greater than the average. The low cash
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yields (close to zero) and the low returns associated with ranching properties and cattle
ranching should typically cause the discounts to exceed 50%.
The court rightly criticized the petitioner's expert for double discounting, noting
that the secondary market discount already includes a discount for lack of marketability.
The court, therefore, rejected the application of an additional 20% lack of marketability
discount. The court also found that the petitioner's expert's "cumulation of discounts
does not survive a sanity check."
The court chose a 40% secondary market discount (rounding up the average
discounts cited by the respondent's expert) and added an additional 8% discount for lack
of marketability associated with this partnership beyond the discount suggested by the
secondary market discount data. The court, unlike the opinion in Strangi, did not criticize
respondent's expert for being too generous or indicate that respondent's expert could
have reached a lower conclusion as to the appropriate discount.
Conclusion
The court again indicated a tendency to respect the form of the partnership but to
apply the specific aspects of each partnership to each interest being evaluated with a
critical eye toward not allowing large discounts. The court will apply very strictly the
willing seller test to assert that a group of interests in a single gift or single estate should
be valued as a group when a willing seller would not logically divide or separate the
interests received because those interests provide elements of control value. Arbitrary or
extra provisions that appear to discourage or restrict willing buyers from paying full
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value are not necessarily rejected outright, but, rather, emphasis is placed on what a
reasonable willing seller would seek (in reducing or eliminating such restrictions) when
attempting to sell an interest to a willing buyer.
The court is signaling a discomfort with large valuation discounts and a tendency
to side with respondent's experts. Petitioner's experts that go to far or are too aggressive
will be rejected.
J. C. Shepherd, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent
The decision in this case was filed October 26, 2000, at 115 T.e. No. 30.
I was one of the experts on the valuation discounts (offered by respondent). The
opposing expert suggested a discount relatively close to the discount suggested in my
report and fell within the reasonable range of discounts found in my report. Upon the
court's suggestion, the discount issue was stipulated to at 33% (a 50/50 split between the
experts).
In August 1991, the Shepherd Family Partnership (SFP) was created under the
laws of the state of Alabama. The partnership involved the father (50%), as the
managing partner, and two sons (25% each). The initial capitalization was $10 from the
father and $5 from each son.
At or about the same time as the fonnation of the partnership, the petitioner and
his wife each contributed a 50% interest in timberland to the partnership. The timberland
had a long-tenn lease associated with it that effectively limited the use or sale of the land
until the lease expired in 2023. The lessee paid a fixed annual rent per acre to the lessor,
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increased each year based on a price index. One month later, the petitioner transferred
stock in three small banks to the partnership.
Originally, the petitioner reported in 1991 a gift to each son based on the
contribution of the leased land and bank stock to the partnership. Since each son 'owned
25% of the partnership, the gifts were valued at 25% of the value of the assets transferred
to the partnership. Petitioner valued the bank stock with a 15% minority interest discount
and valued the leased land using a relatively high discount rate. The valuation of the
bank stock was not at issue in the notice of deficiency. The valuation of the timber
interests was deemed to be too low in the original notice of deficiency.
The petitioner's counsel argued that the notice of deficiency was in error and,
further, that the petitioner should be entitled to claim greater discounts of 33.5% off the
valuation of the assets contributed to the partnership. Respondent contended that the
valuation of the timberland was proper and that the gifts were actually made to the sons
as part of their respective contributions of capital to the partnership.
Discussion ofthe Legal Findings
The court found that the transfer by the donor was of the property and not an
indirect gift to the sons through the partnership. The court further found that a gift could
be direct or indirect. An indirect gift is taxable when "the transfer is not made for
adequate and full consideration." Thus, a taxable indirect gift of 25% of the value of the
leased timberland and the bank stocks was made to the sons. It would seem to me that
had the donors transferred the assets in the partnership at time when they owned 100% of
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the partnership and then clearly gifted 25% partnership interests to each of tIle sons, the
result would have been in the favor of the petitioner.
There are concurring, concurring in part, and dissenting opinions issued in
connection with this opinion.
Discussion ofthe Valuation Issues
It is clear from reviewing the opinion and the expert reports that a lot of confusing
issues were raised by real estate appraisers that lack understanding of the core concepts
underlying the choice of discount rates. It did not help that petitioner offered three
experts on the valuation issue (in a case with a notice of deficiency of only $168,577!! !).
[Expect some additional comments on this during my presentation.]
I found the overall quality of the analysis by each expert to be deficient. First, the
experts used an inflation rate of 1.5% to 1.87% based on historical averages. There are
published market studies on inflation expectations that apparently none of the experts
looked at. Second, the experts wandered off into a debate over taxable v. untaxable
discount rates. It made little sense in the context of modem finance and in the context of
timber properties being sold off to pass-through entities that avoid double-taxation in the
late 1980s and 1990s. Third, the petitioner's experts increased the discount rate for the
lack of marketability associated with a fractional interest. The court essentially agreed
with this concept, even though it is specifically and emphatically rejected in the academic
literature. If one does increase the discount rate for the lack of marketability t11en an
additional discount for lack of marketability would be inappropriate and a fonn of double
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discounting. The amazing thing is that these "experts" appeared to be unfamiliar with
some of the discount rates and capitalization rates quoted for timberland in the relevant
time period.
After all the confusing testimony, the court's conclusion of value was $757,064
for the leased land. The court implicitly discounted the 100% valuation of the timberland
for lack of marketability and gave too m.uch credence to the pre-tax v. after-tax
discussion. My own assessment of the timberland value would have been between
$900,000 to $1,000,000, as compared with respondent's expert's valuation of $1,547,000
and petitioner's experts' valuations of $850,000 and $495,000, respectively.
The final issue was the discount for fractional interests. The court allowed 15%
(probably appropriate). The respondent argued for the nominal cost to partition. The
petitioner argued for discounts between 15% and 27%, depending on the expert.
Conclusion
The Shepherd case is an example of poor estate planning and overly aggressive claims by
the petitioner. In contrast with the real estate experts, the valuation experts generally
were in agreement and their issue was settled. The case illustrates how even relatively
simple valuation issues can become confused by multiple experts and can confuse the
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ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE ESTATES AND TRUSTS LAWYER:
THE ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND NOTES ON ETHICS 2000
Bruce S. Ross
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules ofProfessional
Conduct
In October 1993, after four years of intensive study and debate, the
Board of Regents of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel
("ACTEC") unanimously adopted the ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (the "Commentaries"). Originally authored by Professor
John R. Price of the University of Washington School of Law pursuant to a
grant from the nonprofit ACTEC Foundation, the Commentaries are designed to
give "particularized guidance" to ACTEC Fellows, estates and trusts lawyers
generally, and others regarding the professional responsibilities of lawyers
engaged in a trusts and estates practice. The Commentaries reflect a concerted
and thoughtful effort on the part of experienced probate practitioners to
harmonize the "black letter" restrictions of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (and the Comments thereto) with the ethical dictates of a generally
non-adversarial and family oriented trusts and estates practice.
In March 1995 the ACTEe Board of Regents adopted the Second Edition
of the ACTEC Commentaries which among other things dramatically expanded
the annotations to relevant case law and ethics opinions. In March 1999 the
ACTEC Board of Regents approved the Third Edition of the Commentaries
(published in October 1999). Unlike the Second Edition, which included
numerous substantive additions and editorial changes from the First Edition,
the new Third Edition reflects far fewer departures from the prior Edition. The
two main editorial additions are new Commentaries on Rule 1.16 (Declining or
Terminating Representation) and Rule 3.7 (Lawyer as Witness). The Third
Edition also includes many new Annotations to recent cases and ethics
opinions and some very modest editorial changes from the Second Edition. In
addition to the foregoing, to make the Commentaries even more user-friendly,
the Third Edition includes a Table of Authorities, with citations, organized by
state, to all relevant Rules of Professional Conduct, cases and ethics opinions
cited in the ACTEC Commentaries. Simultaneously with the publication of the
ACTEC Commentaries, the ACTEC Foundation published Engagement Letters:
A Guide to Practitioners, a practice guide filled with engagement letter forms
designed to be used in conjunction with the ACTEC Commentaries.
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B. Ethics 2000
In 1997 the American Bar Association impaneled the Commission on
Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, properly known as "Ethics
2000," under the chairmanship of Maryland Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey.
Charged with making an intensive analysis and reevaluation of all Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, after three years of study and public debate the
Commission issued its Final Report in November 2000. The Commission
Report, the recommended changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(hereinafter "MRPC") and related materials are available on the Internet at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k. The complete Commission Report is
available for $40 from the Center for Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association. (To order by phone call the ABA Service Center at
(800) 285-2221 and ask for PC No. 5610159. )
According to Justice Veasey, the principal reasons driving the ABA's
decision to revisit the MRPC were the growing disparity in state ethics codes
and concerns about "some substantive shortcomings and lack of clarity in
particular Rules, both exemplified and aggravated by dissonance between Rule
text and Comment." The Commission nevertheless retained the basic
architecture of the MRPC including lithe primary disciplinary function of the
Rules, resisting the temptation to preach aspirationally about 'best practices' or
professionalism concepts." (Chair's Introduction and Executive Summary.) The
Report will now generate further public comments and discussion and,
ultimately, will be presented to the ABA House of Delegates for review, debate
and approval. Additional changes, some no doubt significant, can be
anticipated. Nevertheless, it is fair now to say that many of the
recommendations for changes in the MRPC endorsed by the Commission reflect
a positive response to long stated concerns of ACTEC that the present MRPC do
not adequately address issues specific to different specialties in the profession,
including the estates and trusts area.
The following Article selectively discusses and focuses upon the most
important of the MRPC discussed by the ACTEC Commentaries. Following the
discussion of each selected Commentary is appended a brief summary of any
changes to the applicable Model Rule recommended by the Ethics 2000
Commission that appear to be directly relevant to the estates and trusts
lawyer.
It is worth noting here that the Ethics 2000 Commission has proposed
an addition of several new MRPC, including a new MRPC 1.0, entitled
"Terminology", which will elevate the definitions of certain key terms to the
status of a formal Rule. Proposed new MRPC 1.0 includes definitions of
"confirmed in writing," "informed consent," and other key terms. The concept
of "informed consent" replaces the current concept of "consent after
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consultation" . This proposed change is further discussed infra at the
conclusion of the discussion of the ACTEC Commentary to MRPC 1.4.
II. OVERVIEW: THE COMMENTARIES' BASIC THEMES AND
STRUCTURE
As stated in the Reporter's Note preceding the ACTEC Commentaries
(authored by Professor Price and this author as Chair of ACTEC's Professional
Standards Committee):
"Basic Themes of Commentaries. The main themes of
the Commentaries are: (1) the relative freedom that lawyers
and clients have to write their own charter with respect to a
representation in the trusts and estates field; (2) the
generally non-adversarial nature of the trusts and estate
practice; (3) the utility and propriety, in this area of law, of
representing multiple clients, whose interests may differ but
are not necessarily adversarial; and (4) the opportunity, with
full disclosure, to moderate or eliminate many problems that
might otherwise arise under the MRPC." 1
As the Preface to the ACTEC Commentaries notes, "While the
Commentaries are intended to provide general guidance, ACTEC recognizes and
respects the wide variation in the rules, decisions, and ethics opinions adopted
by the several jurisdictions with respect to many of the subjects. "2
The structure of the ACTEC Commentaries follows that of the Model
Rules and the comments thereto: Each Model Rule with respect to which
ACTEC has offered a Commentary is quoted in full, followed by the
Commentary thereon, extensive annotations to relevant case law and ethics
opinions from many jurisdictions and other secondary authorities. "The
Annotations that follow each Commentary include references to a broad range
of the cases, ethics opinions and articles that deal with the professional
responsibility of trusts and estates lawyers. Reflecting various approaches
taken in different jurisdictions, the cases and ethics opinions are often
inconsistent and cannot be harmonized. The summaries of the cases and
ethics opinions are not part of the ACTEC Commentaries. They are included for
illustrative purposes only and do not necessarily reflect the judgment of the
Reporter or ACTEC regarding the issues involved. "3
1 Reporter's Note, ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct
(ACTEC Foundation 3d ed. 1999), p.1 (hereinafter" Commentaries").
2 Preface to Commentaries.
3 Commentaries, p. 6.
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III. COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL RULES
A. Commentary to MRPC 1.1: Competence
The most important contribution of the ACTEC Commentaries on Model
Rule 1.1, dealing with competence, is the principle that the estate planning
lawyer "is generally entitled to rely upon information supplied by the client
unless the circumstances indicate that the information should be verified."4
Furthermore, although the ACTEC Commentaries emphasize that the estate
planning lawyer should generally supervise the execution of all estate planning
documents, if such supervision is not practical, then the lawyer may arrange
for the documents to be delivered to the client with written instructions
regarding the manner in which they should be executed. (Of course, this
principle presupposes the client's ability to understand the instructions given.)
B. Commentary to MRPC 1.2: Scope of Representation
In General
The Commentaries emphasize that the client and the lawyer, "working
together, are relatively free to define the scope and objectives of the
representation, including the extent to which information will be shared among
multiple clients and the nature and extent of the obligations that the lawyer
will have to the client."s
Representing Fiduciaries
While recognizing that the lawyer for the fiduciary retained to assist the
fiduciary in the administration of an estate or trust generally represents only
the fiduciary, the Commentaries permit direct communication between the
lawyer and the beneficiaries while noting that the fiduciary is primarily
responsible for such communication.
"As a general rule, the lawyer for the fiduciary should inform the
beneficiaries that the lawyer has been retained by the fiduciary regarding the
fiduciary estate and that the fiduciary is the lawyer's client; that while the
fiduciary and the lawyer will, from time to time, provide information to the
beneficiaries regarding the fiduciary estate, the lawyer does not represent
them; and that the beneficiaries may wish to retain independent counsel to
represent their interests."6
4 [d., p. 22.
5 Commentaries, p. 50.
6 [d., p. 52.
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The Commentary to MRPC 1.2 notes that it may be permissible for the
lawyer to represent the fiduciary both in a representative capacity and as a
beneficiary provided that such representation is not otherwise proscribed by
the dictates of MRPC 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General Rule).
The Commentary notes:
"Example 1.2-1. Lawyer (L) drew a will for X in which
X left her entire estate in equal shares to A and Band
appointed A as executor. X died survived by A and B. A
asked L to represent her both as executor and as beneficiary.
L explained to A the duties A would have as personal
representative, including the duty of impartiality toward the
beneficiaries. L also described to A the implications of the
common representation, to which A consented. L may
properly represent A in both capacities. However, L should
inform B of the dual representation and indicate that B may,
at his or her own expense, retain independent counsel. In
addition, L should maintain separate records with respect to
the individual representation of A, who should be charged a
separate fee (payable by A individually) for that
representation. L may properly counsel A with respect to her
interests as beneficiary. However, L may not assert A's
individual rights on A's behalf in a way that conflicts with A's
duties as personal representative. If a conflict develops that
materially limits L's ability to function as A's lawyer in both
capacities, L should withdraw from representing A in one or
both capacities. See MRPC 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General
Rule) and MRPC 1.16 (Declining or Terminating
Representation). "7
The nature and extent of the duties, if any, owed by the lawyer for the
fiduciary to the beneficiaries of an estate or trust is one of the most
controversial topics touched upon by the Commentaries. The majority of the
cases dealing with this issue have found that the attorney's duty to exercise
reasonable care is owed only to the fiduciary client.8 As a California court has
observed:
"Particularly in the case of services rendered for the
fiduciary of a decedent's estate, we would apprehend great
danger in finding stray duties in favor of beneficiaries.
Typically in estate administration conflicting interests vie for
7 Commentaries, pp. 52-53.
8 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Frye, 217 Cal.App.3d 1258,266 Cal.Rptr. 483 (1990).
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recognition. The very purpose of the fiduciary is to serve the
interests of the estate, not to promote the objectives of one
group of legatees over the interests of conflicting claimants.
[Citation omitted.] The fiduciary's attorney, as his legal
adviser, is faced with the same task of disposition of
conflicts. It is of course the purpose and obligation of both
the fiduciary and his attorney to serve the estate. In such
capacity they are obligated to communicate with, and to
arbitrate conflicting claims among, those interested in the
estate. While the fiduciary in the performance of this service
may be exposed to the potential of malpractice (and hence is
subject to surcharge when his administration is completed),
the attorney by definition represents only one party: the
fiduciary. It would be very dangerous to conclude that the
attorney, through performance of his service to the
administrator and by way of communication to estate
beneficiaries, subjects himself to claims of negligence from
the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries are entitled to even-
handed and fair administration by the fiduciary. They are
not owed a ,duty directly by the fiduciary's attorney.
[Citations omitted.l"g
This principle is not accepted in all jurisdictions, however. For example,
the Supreme Court of Nevada has ruled:
"[W]hen an attorney represents a trustee in his or her
capacity as trustee, that attorney assumes a duty of care
and fiduciary duties towards the beneficiaries as a matter of
law."tO
The Supreme Court of Washington has reversed itself on this issue. In
1985, in passing upon the reasonableness of an estate lawyer's fee request, the
Court overturned decisions of a court commissioner, the trial court and an
appellate court affirming the award of fees and, in so doing, observed:
9 Goldberg v. Frye, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d 1258, at 1269, 266 Cal.Rptr. 483 at 489-90.
See also, e.g., Thompson v. Vinson & Elkins, 859 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.App. 1993); Spinner v. Nutt,
417 Mass. 549,631 N.E.2d 542 (1994).
10 Charleson v. Hardesty, 839 P.2d 1303, at 1307 (Nev. 1992); see also, e.g., Fickett v.
Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. App. 1976) (held that the lawyer for a guardian owed
fiduciary duties to the ward and that privity of contract between the lawyer and the ward was
not required in order for the ward to pursue a claim for malpractice against the lawyer for the
guardian). For a discussion of the Fickett decision and its implications, see Johns, Fickett's
Thicket: The Lawyerts Expanding Fiduciary and Ethical Boundaries When Serving Older
Americans of Moderate Wealth, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 445 (Summer 1997).
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"The personal representative stands in a fiduciary
relationship to those beneficially interested in the estate. He
is obligated to exercise the utmost good faith and diligence in
administering the estate in the best interests of the heirs...
. The personal representative employs an attorney to assist
him in the proper administration of the .estate. Thus, the
fiduciary duties of the attorney run not only to the personal
representative, but also to the heirs. [Citations omitted.]"ll
Nine years later, in 1994, the Supreme Court of Washington held that a
multi-factor balancing test (first applied by the Supreme Court of California in
Binkanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (1958)) should be applicable in deciding
whether the beneficiary of a decedent's estate may bring an action against the
lawyer who represented the executor in her fiduciary capacity. The court
concluded:
"After analyzing our modified multi-factor balancing
test, we hold that a duty is not owed from an attorney hired
by the personal representative of an estate to the estate or to
the estate beneficiaries." 12
With respect to this troubling issue of the duties arguably owed to the
beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate by an attorney retained to represent the
fiduciary generally (i.e., in the fiduciary's representative capacity), the
Commentaries conclude:
"The nature and extent of the lawyer's duties to the
beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate may vary according to
the circumstances, including the nature and extent of the
representation and the terms of any understanding or
agreement among the parties (the lawyer, the fiduciary, and
the beneficiaries). The lawyer for the fiduciary owes some
duties to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate although he
or she does not represent them. The duties, which are
largely restrictive in nature, prohibit the lawyer from taking
advantage of his or her position to the disadvantage of the
fiduciary estate or the beneficiaries. In addition, in some
circumstances the lawyer may be obligated to take
affirmative action to protect the interests of- the beneficiaries.
Some courts have characterized the beneficiaries of a
fiduciary estate as derivative or secondary clients of the
lawyer for the fiduciary. The beneficiaries of a fiduciary
11 Estate ofLarson, 694 P.2d 1051, at 1054 (Wash. 1985).
12 Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080, at 1085 (Wash. 1994).
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estate are generally not characterized as direct clients of the
lawyer for the fiduciary merely because the lawyer represents
the fiduciary generally with respect to the fiduciary estate." 13
Although the duties undertaken by the lawyer for the fiduciary to the
beneficiaries are constricted, it is clear that the lawyer may not make false and
misleading statements to the beneficiaries and may, in some jurisdictions, be
required to disclose to a court or to the beneficiaries acts or omissions by the
fiduciary that might constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.
The Commentaries suggest that this problem may well be resolved by
advanced planning with the scrivener of the document including a provision in
the will that conditions the appointment of the fiduciary upon the fiduciary's
agreement that the lawyer may disclose to the beneficiaries or to an
appropriate court actions of the fiduciary that might constitute a breach of
fiduciary duty.
The Commentaries include a helpful discussion of the distinction between
representing a fiduciary generally and representing the fiduciary individually.
Thus, in the latter case, the lawyer represents only the fiduciary when the
lawyer is retained for the limited purposes of advancing the interests of the
fiduciary and not necessarily the interests of the fiduciary estate or its
beneficiaries. Common examples of this type of representation are the
retention of an attorney to negotiate with the beneficiaries with respect to the
fiduciary's compensation or to defend the fiduciary in litigation charging
misadministration.
Comment re Ethics 2000: The Commission Report proposes changing
the title of MRPC 1.2 to "Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority
between Client and Lawyer." The new Rule will expressly permit reasonable
limitations on the scope of the lawyer's representation and will expressly
acknowledge the lawyer's implied authority to take action to carry out the
representation.
C. Commentary to MRPC 1.4: Communication
Recognizing that "[c]ommunication between the lawyer and client is one
of the most important ingredients of an effective lawyer-client relationship,"14
the Commentaries emphasize that the extent and nature of the
communications by the lawyer are affected by numerous factors "including the
13 Commentaries, p. 57.
14 Commentaries, p. 91.
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age, competence, and experience of the client, the amount involved, the
complexity of the matter, cost control and other relevant considerations."ls
One of the many important contributions of the Commentaries to the
practice of the estate planning lawyer is the notion of the "Dormant
Representation."
"The execution of estate planning documents and the
completion of related matters, such as changes in beneficiary
designations and the transfer of assets to the trustee of a
trust, normally ends the period during which the estate
planning lawyer actively represents an estate planning client.
At that time, unless the representation is terminated by the
lawyer or client, the representation becomes dormant,
awaiting activation by the client. At the client's request the
lawyer may retain the original documents executed by the
client. See ACTEC Commentary on MRPC 1.7 (Conflicts).
While the lawyer remains bound to the client by some
obligation, including the duty of confidentiality, the lawyer's
responsibilities are diminished by the completion of the
active phase of the representation. As a service the lawyer
may communicate periodically with the client regarding the
desirability of reviewing his or her estate planning
documents. Similarly, the lawyer may send the client an
individual letter or a form letter, pamphlet, or brochure
regarding changes in the law that might affect the client. In
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the lawyer is
not obligated to send a reminder to a client whose
representation is dormant or to advise the client of the effect
that changes in the law or the client's circumstances might
have on the client's legal affairs."16
The Commentary gives the following helpful examples:
"Example 1.4-1: Lawyer (L) prepared and completed
an estate plan for Client (C) in 1992. At C's request L
retained the original documents executed by C. L performed
no other legal work for C in 1993 or 1994 but has no reason
to believe thatC has engaged other estate planning counsel.
15 Id.
16 Commentaries, p. 93; see, fuel v. Zuspann, 803 P.2d 205 (Kan. 1990), modifying 795
P.2d 42 (1990) (modification deleted language from earlier opinion indicating that lawyer had
continuing duty to estate planning client to effectuate the client's plan), appeal after remand,
845 P.2d 37 (Kan. 1993).
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L's representation of C is dormant. L may, but is not
obligated to, communicate with C regarding changes in the
law. If L communicates with C about changes in the law, but
is not asked by C to perform any legal services, L's
representation remains dormant. C is properly characterized
as a client and nota former client for purposes of MRPCs 1.7
and 1.9.
"Example 1.4-2. Assume the same facts as in Example
1.4-1 except that L's partner (P) in 1993 and 1994 renders
legal services to C in matters completely unrelated to estate
planning, such as a criminal representation. L's
representation of C with respect to estate planning matters
remains dormant, subject to activation by C." 17
Comment re Ethics 2000: The Commission has placed great stress on
the importance of clear communication between lawyer and client. Proposed
n.ew MRPC 1.0 (Terminology) requires that client consent must be "informed"
which is defined to mean a client's agreement "after the lawyer has
communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks
of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct." In
many cases client consent will be required to be confirmed in writing
(principally in situations involving conflict waivers). The Commission proposes
to beef up MRPC 1.4 with language covering all aspects of a lawyer's duty to
communicate with the client (which includes moving language from some other
Rules such as in MRPC 1.2).
D. Commentary to MRPC 1.6: Confidentiality of Information
The nature of an attorney's representation of husband and wife in estate
planning and the scope of the attorney-client privilege governing confidential
communications in this context were the subject of considerable debate in the
years leading up to the adoption of the Commentaries. The majority view is
that the most common representation of husband and wife in estate planning
is "joint" in nature. Generally, in a joint representation, all communications
between either husband or wife to the attorney are confidential as to the
outside world but not confidential (at least for evidentiary purposes) as between
the husband and wife. Thus, the lawyer's receipt of information from one
spouse that the communicating spouse clearly does not wish to share with the
other spouse embroils the lawyer in a dilemma central to the lawyer's
representation of both spouses. The Commentary to MRPC 1.6 recommends:
"As soon as practicable the lawyer should consider the
relevance and significance of the information and decide
17 Id., pp. 94-95. See, e.g., Stangland v. Brock, 747 P.2d 464 (Wash. 1987).
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upon the appropriate manner in which to proceed. The
potential courses of action include, inter alia, (1) taking no
action with respect to communications regarding irrelevant
(or trivial) matters; (2) encouraging the communicating client
to provide the information to the other client or to allow the
lawyer to do so; and, (3) withdrawing from the representation.
if the communication reflects serious adversity between the
parties...
In order to mInImIze the risk of harm to the clients'
relationship and, possibly, to retain the lawyer's ability to
represent both of them, the lawyer may properly urge the
communicating client himself or herself to impart the
confidential information directly to the other client. . .. In
doing so the lawyer may properly remind the communicating
client of the explicit or implicit understanding that relevant
information would be shared and of the lawyer's obligation to
share the information with the other client. The lawyer may
also point out the possible legal consequences of not
disclosing the confidence to the other client, including the
possibility that the validity of actions previously taken or
planned by one or both of the clients may be jeopardized. In
addition, the lawyer may mention that the failure to
communicate the information to the other client may result
in a disciplinary or malpractice action against the lawyer.
If the communicating client continues to oppose
disclosing the confidence to the other client, the lawyer faces
an extremely difficult situation with respect to which' there is
often no clearly proper course of action. In such cases the
lawyer should have a reasonable degree of discretion in
determining how to respond to any particular case. In
fashioning a response the lawyer should consider his or her
duties of impartiality and loyalty to the clients; any express
or implied agreement among the lawyer and the joint clients
that information communicated by either client to the lawyer
regarding the subject of the representation would be shared
with the other client; the reasonable expectations of the
clients; and the nature of the confidence and the harm that
may result if the confidence is, or is not, disclosed. In some
instances the lawyer must also consider whether the
situation involves such adversity that the lawyer can no
longer effectively represent both clients and is required to
withdraw from representing one or both of them. See ACTEC
Commentary on MRPC 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General
Rule). A letter of withdrawal that is sent to the other client
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may arouse the other client's suspicions to the point that the
communicating client or the lawyer may ultimately be
required to disclose the information." 18
The Commentary supports the suggestion of the ABA Special Probate
and Trust Division Study Committee on Professional Responsibility19
emphasizing the importance of having an agreement between the husband and
wife and the lawyer, preferably in writing, that sets out the ground rules of the
representation.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in A v. B v. Hill Wallack, 726 A.2d 924
(N.J. 1999), cited extensively and approvingly to the Commentary to MRPC 1.6
as well as to the Report of the ABA Special Probate and Trust Division Study
Committee on Professional Responsibility. In this case, construing New
Jersey's broad client-fraud exception to the New Jersey version of MRPC 1.6,
the court held that a law firm that was jointly representing a husband and wife
in the planning of their estates was entitled to disclose to the wife the existence
(but not the identity) of husband's child born out of wedlock. The court
reasoned that the husband's deliberate failure to mention the existence of this
child when discussing his estate plan with the law firm constituted a fraud on
the wife which the firm was permitted to rectify under MRPC 1.6(c).
Interestingly, the law firm learned about the child born out of wedlock not from
the husband but from the child's mother who had retained the law firm. The
court also based its decision permitting disclosure on the existence of a written
agreement between the husband and wife, on the one hand, and the law firm,
on the other, waiving any potential conflicts of interest. The court suggested
that the letter reflected the couple's implied intent to share all material
information with each other in the course of the estate planning.
The Commentary to MRPC 1.6 also suggests that with full disclosure and
the consent of the clients it may be possible to represent husbands and wives
as separate clients and thereby guarantee the confidentiality of unilateral
18 Commentaries, pp. 120-122. Compare Advisory Opinion 95-4 (State Bar of Florida May
1997) ("In a joint representation between husband and wife in estate planning, an attorney is
not required to discuss issues regarding confidentiality at the outset of representation. The
attorney may not reveal confidential information to the wife when the husband tells the
attorney that he wishes to provide for a beneficiary that is unknown to the wife. The attorney
must withdraw from the representation of both husband and wife because of the conflict
presented when the attorney must maintain the husband's separate confidences regarding the
joint representation. If)
19 See, Moore & Hilker, "Representing Both Spouses: The New Section Recommendations,"
7 Probate & Property 26, 30 (July/Aug. 1993). The Committee produced three Reports:
Comments and Recommendations on the Lawyer's Duties in Representing Husband and Wife;
Preparation of Wills and Trusts that Name Drafting Lawyer as Fiduciary; and Counseling the
Fiduciary, 28 Real Property Probate and Trust Journal (No.4, Winter 1994).
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communications to the lawyer by either spouse if the communicating spouse
does not wish to impart them to the other spouse. Although this concept has
met with a nearly unanimous negative reaction among academicians in the
estate and trust field, ACTEC recognized that several sophisticated,
experienced and ethical practitioners follow this practice and deemed it
inappropriate to condemn the practice.
With respect to the lawyer's duty of confidentiality to a fiduciary client
and the possible disclosure by the lawyer of a fiduciary's breach of duty, the
Commentary to MRPC 1.6 emphasizes the importance of the agreement
between the lawyer and the fiduciary recommended in the Commentary to
MRPC 1.2 and, absent such an agreement, adherence to the applicable law (see
text accompanying fns. 6-12, supra).
The Commentary continues:
"Whether or not the lawyer and fiduciary enter into
such an agreement, the lawyer for the fiduciary ordinarily
owes some duties to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary estate.
See ACTEC Commentary on MRPC 1.2 (Scope of
Representation). The existence of those duties alone may
qualify the lawyer's duty of confidentiality with respect to the
fiduciary. Moreover, the fiduciary's retention of the lawyer to
represent the fiduciary generally in the administration of the
fiduciary estate may impliedly authorize the lawyer to make
disclosures in order to protect the interests of the
beneficiaries. In addition, the lawyer's duties to the court
may require the lawyer for a court-appointed fiduciary to
disclose to the court any acts of misconduct committed by
the fiduciary. See MRPC 3.3(b) (Candor toward the
Tribunal), which requires disclosure to the court 'even if
compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6.' In any event, the lawyer may not
knowingly provide the beneficiaries or the court with false or
misleading information. See MRPCs 4.1-4.3 (Truthfulness in
Statements to Others; Communications with Person
Represented by Counsel; Dealing with Unrepresented
Person). "20
Example 1.6-1 is illustrative:
"Lawyer (L) was retained by Trustee (T) to advise T
regarding the administration of the trust. T consulted L
regarding the consequences of investing trust funds in
20 Commentaries, pp. 125-126.
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commodity futures. L advised T that neither the governing
instrument nor the local law allowed the trustee to invest in
commodity futures. T invested trust funds in wheat futures
contrary to L'sadvice. The trust suffered a substantial loss
on the investments. Unless explicitly or implicitly required
to do so by the terms of the representation, L was not
required to monitor the investments made by T or otherwise
to investigate the propriety of the investments. The following
alternatives extend the subject of this example:
(1) L, in preparing the annual accounting for the trust,
discovered T's investment in wheat futures, and the resulting
loss. Tasked L to prepare the accounting in a way that
disguised the investment and the loss. L may not
participate in a transaction that misleads the court or the
beneficiaries with respect to the administration of the trust--
which is the subject of the representation. L should attempt
to persuade T that the accounting must properly reflect the
investment and otherwise be accurate. If T refuses to accept
L's advice, L must not prepare an accounting that L knows
to be false or misleading. If T does not properly disclose the
investment to the beneficiaries, in some states L may be
required to disclose the investment to them. In states that
neither require nor permit such disclosures the lawyer
should resign from representing T. See ACTEC Commentary
on MRPC 1.6 (Confidentiality).
(2) L first learned of T's investment in commodity
futures when L reviewed trust records in connection with the
preparation of the trust accounting for the year. The
accounting prepared by L properly disclosed the investment,
was signed by T, and was distributed to the beneficiaries.
L's investment advice to T was proper. L was not obligated
to determine whether or not T made investments contrary to
L's advice. L may not give legal advice to the beneficiaries
but may recommend that they obtain independent counsel.
In jurisdictions that permit the lawyer for a fiduciary to
make disclosures to the beneficiaries regarding the
fiduciary's possible breaches of trust, L should consider
whether to make such a disclosure."21
21 Commentaries, pp. 126-127.
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The recently published Restatement of The Law (Third), The Law
Governing Lawyers, in dealing with the duty of care owed by a lawyer to certain
non-clients, observes:
"For purposes of liability under §48 [Professional
Negligence - - Elements and Defenses Generally), a lawyer
owes a duty to use care within the meaning of §52 [Standard
of Care]:
(4) To a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) "the lawyer's client is a trustee, guardian,
executor, or fiduciary acting primarily to
perform similar functions for the
nonclient;
(b) the lawyer knows that appropriate action
by the lawyer is necessary with respect to
a matter within the scope of the
representation to prevent or rectify the
breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the
client to the nonclient, where (i) the
breach is a crime or fraud or (ii) the lawyer
has assisted or is assisting the breach;
(c) The nonclient is not reasonably able to
protect its rights; and
(d) Such a duty would not significantly impair
the performance of the lawyer's obligations
to the client. "22
The Restatement elucidates the foregoing principles with three relevant
illustrations:
"5. Lawyer represents Client in Client's capacity as
trustee of an express trust for the benefit of Beneficiary.
Client tells Lawyer that Client proposes to transfer trust
funds into Client's own account, in circumstances that
would constitute embezzlement. Lawyer informs Client that
the transfer would be criminal, but Client nevertheless
22 Restatement a/the Law (Third), The Law Governing Lawyers, §51 (American Law
Institute, West 2000) (hereinafter "Restatement").
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makes the transfer, as Lawyer then knows. Lawyer takes no
steps to prevent or rectify the consequences, for example by
warning Beneficiary or informing the court to which Client as
trustee must make an annual accounting. The jurisdiction's
professional rules do not forbid such disclosures (see § 67).
Client likewise makes no disclosure. The funds are lost, to
the harm of Beneficiary. Lawyer is subject to liability to
Beneficiary under this Section.
6. Same facts as in Illustration 5, except that
Client asserts to Lawyer that the account to which Client
proposes to transfer trust funds is the trust's account. Even
though lawyer could have exercised diligence and thereby
discovered this to be false, Lawyer does not do so. Lawyer is
not liable to the harmed Beneficiary. Lawyer did not owe
Beneficiary a duty to use care because Lawyer did not know
(although further investigation would have revealed) that
appropriate action was necessary to prevent a breach of
fiduciary duty by Client.
7. Same facts as in Illustration 5, except that
Client proposes to invest trust funds in a way that would be
unlawful, but would not constitute a crime or fraud under
applicable law. Lawyer's services are not used in
consummating the investment. Lawyer does nothing to
discourage the investment. Lawyer is not subject to liability
to Beneficiary under this Section. "23
Comment re Ethics 2000: Revisions to MRPC 1.6 proposed by the
Ethics 2000 Commission include, as previously noted, the concept of a client's
"informed consent". The Rule will also permit disclosure of information related
to the representation to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud
that is reasonably certain to result in "substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another in furtherance of which the client has used or is
using the lawyer's services," thus adopting the formulation of the Restatement.
Also consistently with the Restatement formulation, the revised Rule permits
(but not mandates) disclosure of information related to the representation to
"prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the
client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer's services." These proposed changes are expected to be
controversial.
23 Id., §51, Illustrations 5-7.
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E. Commentary to MRPC 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule
One of the Commentaries'most salutary c~ntributionsto the literature on
the subject of representing multiple client interests is the assertion that, given
the generally non-adversarial nature of an estates and trusts practice, in
appropriate cases the representation of multiple clients should be positively
encouraged.
"It is often appropriate for a lawyer to represent more
than one member of the same family in connection with their
estate plans, more than one beneficiary with common
interests in an estate or trust administration matter, or more
than one of the investors in a closely held business. See
ACTEC Commentary on MRPC 1.6 (Confidentiality of
Information). In some instances the clients may actually be
better served by such a representation, which can result in
more economical and better coordinated estate plans
prepared by counsel who has a better overall understanding
of all of the relevant family and property considerations. The
fact that the estate planning goals of the clients are not
entirely consistent does not necessarily preclude the lawyer
from representing them: Advising related clients who have
somewhat differing goals may be consistent with their
interests and the lawyer's traditional role as the lawyer for
the 'family'. Multiple representation is also generally
appropriate because the interests of the clients in
cooperation, including obtaining cost effective representation
and achieving common objectives, often clearly predominate
over their limited inconsistent interests. Recognition should
be given to the fact that estate planning is fundamentally
non-adversarial in nature and estate administration is
usually non-adversarial. "24
Of course, the Commentaries emphasize the importance of making
complete disclosure to all of the affected clients and obtaining the clients' fully
informed consent to the representation and urge consideration by the lawyer of
possible withdrawal whenever a potential conflict of interest ripens into an
actual conflict or controversy.25
Again, the examples given by the Commentaries are instructive:
First, in the estate planning context:
24 Commentaries, pp. 149-150.
25 Id., pp. 151-152.
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"Example 1.7-1. Lawyer (L) was asked to represent
Husband (H) and Wife (W) in connection with estate planning
matters. L had previously not represented either H or W. At
the outset L should discuss with Hand W the terms upon
which L would represent them. Many lawyers believe that it
is only appropriate to represent a husband and wife as joint
clients, between whom the lawyer could not maintain the
confidentiality of any information relevant to the
representation. However, some experienced estate planners
believe that it is appropriate to represent a husband and wife
as separate clients, each of whom is entitled to presume the
confidentiality of information disclosed to the lawyer in
connection with the representation. If permitted by the
jurisdiction in which the lawyer practices, the lawyer may
properly represent a husband and wife as separate clients.
Whether the lawyer represents the husband and wife jointly
or separately, the lawyer should do so only with their
consent after disclosure of the implications of doing so. The
same requirements apply to the representation of others as
joint or separate multiple clients, such as the representation
of other family members, business associates, etc. "26
Two additional examples deal with the representation of multiple clients
in a fiduciary administration:
"Example 1.7-2. Lawyer (L) represents Trustee (T) as
trustee of a trust created by X. L may properly represent T
in connection with other matters that do not involve a
conflict of interest, such as the preparation of a will or other
personal matters not related to the trust. L should not
charge the trust for any personal services that are performed
for T. Moreover, in order to avoid misunderstandings, L
should charge T for any substantial personal services that L
performs for T.27
"Example 1.7-3. Lawyer (L) represented Husband (H)
and Wife (W) jointly with respect to estate planning matters.
H died leaving a will that appointed Bank (B) as executor and
as trustee of a trust for the benefit of W that meets the QTIP
requirements under I.R.C. §2056(b)(7). L has agreed to
represent B and knows that W looks to him as her lawyer. L
may represent both Band W if the requirements of MRPC
26 Commentaries, p. 152.
27 Id., p. 153.
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1.7 are met. If a serious conflict arises between Band W, L
may be required to withdraw as counsel for B or W or both.
L may inform W of her elective share, support, homestead or
other rights under the local law without violating MRPC 1.9
(Conflict of Interest: Former Client). However, without the
informed consent of all affected parties L should not
represent W in connection with an attempt to set aside H's
will or to assert an elective share."28
The issue of whether or not an attorney may represent both parties to a
prenuptial agreement or "other matter with respect to which [the parties']
interests directly conflict to a substantial degree" generated much controversy.
In the end, the Commentary to MRPC 1.7 adopts a qualified view:
"[A] lawyer is almost always precluded from
representing both parties to a pre-nuptial agreement or other
matter with respect to which their interests directly conflict
to a substantial degree... On the other hand, if the actual or
potential conflicts between competent, independent parties
are not substantial, their common interests predominate,
and it otherwise appears appropriate to do so, the lawyer
and the parties may agree that the lawyer will represent
them jointly pursuant to MRPC 1.7 (Conflict of Interest:
General Rule) or act as an intermediary pursuant to MRPC
2.2. See MRPC 2.2 (Intermediary). Note, however, that in
some states unless each party to a pre-nuptial agreement is
independently represented the agreement may be
invalidated. "29
The Commentaries also support the arguably controversial position that
an individual should be free to select and appoint whomever he/she wishes to
a fiduciary office and that "[als a general proposition lawyers should be
permitted to assist adequately informed clients who wish to appoint their
lawyers as fiduciaries. "30 The Commentary to MRPC 1.7 finds this conclusion
to be consistent with ABA Ethical Consideration 5-6, which states:
"A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to
name him as an executor, trustee, or a lawyer in an
28 Commentaries., pp. 153-154.
29 Id., p. 154. Although the representation of both parties to a contract (such as a pre-
nuptial agreement) may be ethical in limited cases, from a malpractice avoidance perspective
such a representation should never be undertaken.
30 Id., p. 156.
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instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name
his lawyer as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to
avoid the appearance of impropriety. "31
The Commentary to MRPC 1.7 cites the case of Estate of Koch, 849 P.2d
977 (Kan. App. 1993), for the proposition that balance is required in
determining conflict of interest questions. In Koch the court upheld a will that
was drafted for the testator by a lawyer who also represented the testator and
two of her sons in litigation involving a charitable foundation brought by her
other two sons. Her will, which left the bulk of her estate to her four sons,
included a no-contest clause and a provision that conditioned the gifts on the
dismissal by a beneficiary of any litigation that was pending against her within
60 days following her death. The lawyer did not discuss the testator's will with
her sons, including the two sons who were clients of the firm in the litigation.
The sons were all unaware of the terms of their mother's will, which was
prepared "without any evidence of extraneous considerations." The Court
observed:
"The scrivener's representation of clients who may
become beneficiaries of a will does not by itself result in a
conflict of interest in the preparation of the will. Legal
services must be available to the public in an economical,
practical way, and looking for conflicts where none exist is
not of benefit to the public or the bar."32
Comment re Ethics 2000: The Ethics 2000 Report proposes changing
the title of MRPC 1.7 to "Conflict of Interest: General Rule" and would
reorganize the Rule to clarify it and to better educate lawyers regarding conflict
of interest subjects. Thus, there will be a single paragraph defining "conflict of
interest" and a single paragraph dealing with consentible waivers and informed
consent. As with virtually all of the MRPCs under discussion the Comment is
substantially revised to provide greater guidance to lawyers with respect to
application of the MRPC in particular contexts.
F. Commentary on MRPC 1.8: Conflict of Interest: Prohibited
Transactions
This Commentary's most significant contribution to the literature is the
principle that under some circumstances and at the client's fully infonned
request the lawyer "may properly include an exculpatory provision in the
document drafted by the lawyer for an unrelated client that appoints the lawyer
to a fiduciary office.... An exculpatory clause is often desired by a client who
31 ABA Ethical Consideration 5-6, cited at Commentaries, p. 157.
32 Estate o/Koch, supra, 849 P.2d 977, at 998.
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wishes to appoint an individual non-professional or family member as
fiduciary."33
However, the Commentary to MRPC 1.8 correctly takes a dim view of the
drafting of a document or testamentary instrument designating any particular
lawyer or law firm to serve as counsel to the fiduciary or directing the fiduciary
to retain a particular lawyer.
"Before drawing a document in which a fiduciary is
directed to retain the scrivener as counsel, the scrivener
should advise the client that it is neither necessary nor
customary to include such a direction in a will or trust. A
client who wishes to include such a direction in a document
should be advised as to whether or not such a direction is
binding on the fiduciary under the governing law. In most
states such a direction is usually not binding on a fiduciary,
who is generally free to select and retain counsel of his or
her own choice without regard to such a direction."34
This Commentary also supports the concept of a lawyer's retention of a
client's executed originals if it is the client's desire, while noting that any
lawyer retaining a client's documents should acknowledge that the documents
are held subject to the client's direction. Further, the Commentary suggests
that the mere retention of the client's original estate planning documents "does
not itself make the client an 'active' client or impose any obligation on the
lawyer to take steps to keep informed regarding the client's management of
property and family status. Similarly, sending a client periodic letters
encouraging the client to review the sufficiency of the client's estate plan or
calling a client's attention to subsequent legal developments do not increase
the lawyer's obligations to the client. "35
Comment re Ethics 2000: If the Ethics 2000 Commission Report is
adopted, MRPC 1.8's title will be changed to "Conflict of Interest: Current
Clients: Specific Rules." Among other changes to this Rule clients will have to
be advised in writing of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent
legal counsel before entering into business transactions with a lawyer and the
client must give informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the
33 Commentaries, p. 189.
34 Commentaries, p. 190. See also, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center v. Holman,
732 P.2d 974 (Wash. 1987) ("As the attorney engaged to write the decedent's will [defendant] is
precluded from reliance on the clause intended to limit his own liability when the testator did
not receive independent advice as to its meaning and effect. ")
35 Id., p. 191; see the concept of "Dormant Representation" in the ACTEC Commentary on
MRPC 1.4 (Communication), discussed, supra, at text accompanying fn. 16.
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essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role therein. The concept of
"informed consent" replaces the concept of "consent after consultation."
Lawyers will be expressly prohibited from soliciting substantial gifts and the
definition of those relationships that fall within the exception for lawyers
related to the client or the donee will be modified. Extensive changes are also
made to the Comment to MRPC 1.8.
G. Commentary on MRPC 1.14: Client Under a Disability
With respect to a lawyer's representation of the client whose competence
is questionable, the Commentary on MRPC 1.14 adopts the majority view:
"The lawyer for a client who appears to be disabled
may have implied authority to make disclosures and take
actions that the lawyer reasonably believes are in accordance
with the client's wishes that were clearly stated during his or
her competency. If the client's wishes were not clearly
expressed during competency, the lawyer may make
disclosures and take such actions as the lawyer reasonably
believes are in the client's best interests. It is not improper
for the lawyer to take actions on behalf of an apparently
disabled client that the lawyer reasonably believes are in the
best interests of the client. "36
In this regard, the Commentary criticizes the result reached in California
Ethics Opinion 1989-112 (1989), which held that, wIthout the consent of the
client, a lawyer may not initiate conservatorship proceedings on the client's
behalf even if the lawyer has concluded it is in the best interests of the client.
The Commentary finds the preferable view to be as expressed in ABA Infonnal
Opinion 89-1530:
"[T]he disclosure by the lawyer of information relating
to the representation to the extent necessary to serve the
36 Id., pp. 217-218. In February 1997 the Comment to MRPC 1.14 was amended to
include recommendations with respect to a lawyer's disclosure of the client's condition and the
rendering of emergency legal assistance. Specifically, Comment 6 provides: "In an emergency
where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person under a disability is threatened with
imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even
though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express
considered judgments about the matter, when the disabled person or another acting in good
faith on that person's behalf has consulted the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however,
the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other
lawyer, agent or other representative available." MRPC 1.14, Comment 6. In such cases the
lawyer should only act "to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or
otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm." In addition, the lawyer "should keep the
confidences of the disabled person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent
necessary to accomplish the intended protective action." MRPC 1.14, Comment 7.
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best interests of the client reasonably believed to be disabled
is impliedly authorized within the meaning of Model Rule 1.6.
Thus, the inquirer may consult a physician concerning the
suspected disability."37 [Emphasis added by Commentary.]
This Commentary has been praised in a recent work on the legal and
medical aspects of mental capacity:
"The approach taken by the Commentaries is
pragmatic and reflects a real world approach to handling the
disabled or incompetent client. After all, lawyers usually
attempt to assist a client in implementing the client's wishes,
as opposed to the wishes of others. It is important to
remember, as the Commentaries point out, that it is ·not the
decision that is made, but the rational and functional
process by which the client makes the decision that is
paramount. The Commentaries encourage the lawyer to
implement the client's wishes as expressed by the client
during the client's competency. Thus, knowing how to
assess the client's competency becomes very important.
"If the lawyer cannot follow the client's wishes as
expressed during a period of competency, perhaps because
no legal authority has been granted to a surrogate decision-
maker or agent and the client lacks sufficient capacity to
undertake the contemplated act, the lawyer should act in
such a way that the client's best interests are being served.
The best interest test is also a pragmatic real world approach
to solving the needs of the client."38
The Commentary on MRPC 1.14 also emphasizes the importance of
testamentary freedom and the lawyer's obligation to assist clients whose
testamentary capacity, although extant, appears to be borderline. The
Commentary suggests that in those cases involving a client's doubtful
testamentary capacity the lawyer may wish to consider any available
procedures for obtaining court supervision of the proposed estate plan (so
called "substituted judgment" proceedings).39
37 Commentaries, p. 218.
38 Walsh, Brown, Kaye & Grigsby, Mental Capacity: Legal and Medical Aspects of
Assessment and Treatment, p. 1-15 (Shepard's 2d Ed. 1994)
39 Commentaries, pp. 218-219; see, e.g., Cal. Probate Code § 2580, et seq. See also,
Restatement, §51, Illustration 4 (Lawyer who has drafted a will for client subsequently found to
lack testamentary capacity, as a result of which client's will is set aside, is not subject to
liability to heir in heir's suit for expenses incurred in the successful will contest: "Recognizing a
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Comment re Ethics 2000: The Commission has recommended
changing the title of MRPC 1.14 to "Client with Diminished Capacity", a
welcome revision. The Rule's terminology is also changed to reflect the change
of focus in the Rule to the continuum of a client's capacity. Additional
language is added regarding those protective measures a lawyer may take short
of requesting a guardian or conservator for a client and clarifying when it is
appropriate to take such protective action.
H. Commentary on MRPC 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal
This Commentary reaches the not unsurprising conclusion that "[a]
lawyer may not mislead the court with regard to any matter before it, including
ex parte applications. In particular, a lawyer may not assist a client by
presenting to the court any petition, accounting, or other document or evidence
that is false or fails to disclose a material fact if disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client."4o
The mere fact that most jurisdictions regard the lawyer who represents
the fiduciary as owing no direct duty to the beneficiaries of fiduciary estates
will not insulate the lawyer who intentionally aids and abets the fiduciary in
the commission of fraud or other breach of trust.41
CODlment re Ethics 2000: Proposed changes to MRPC 3.3 include
clarifying the lawyer's obligation of candor to the tribunal with respect to
testimony given and actions taken by the client and other witnesses, amplifying
the lawyer's duty not to make false statements to a tribunal, adding an
obligation to correct false statements previously made and clarifying Rule
language to reflect that the lawyer must take remedial measures when the
lawyer comes to know that material evidence previously offered by the client or
a witness called by the lawyer is false.
duty by lawyers to heirs to use care in not assisting incompetent clients to execute wills would
impair performance of lawyers' duty to assist clients even when the clients' competence might
later be challenged.") For further discussion of the lawyer's duties to a client with diminished
capacity, See Restatement, § 24.
40 Commentaries, p. 250.
41 See, e.g., Pierce v. Lyman, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 236 (1991): The beneficiary may state a direct
cause of action against the trustee's lawyer when the lawyer is alleged to have actively
participated in the trustee's breach of fiduciary duty. "Active concealment, misrepresentations
to court, and self dealing for personal financial gain are described. We find this is sufficient to
state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty [against the lawyer for the trustee]. II See
also, Wolfv. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1030,90 Cal.Rptr.2d 792
(Trust beneficiary has standing to bring direct action against the previous trustee's attorneys
and other third parties where the beneficiary alleges that the attorneys and third parties
actively participated in the previous trustee's breaches of trust).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the years leading up to the ACTEC Commentaries' adoption, a common
concern voiced by many concerned Fellows of the College was that the ACTEC
Commentaries, if adopted, would become weapons in the hands of disgruntled
clients and beneficiaries and other parties suing estates and trusts lawyers.
The contrary view, to which ACTEC ultimately subscribed, was that, as "the
best and brightest" members of the estates and trusts profession the Fellows of
ACTEC had a duty to their colleagues, their clients and the general public to
promote competent and ethical representation in the estates and trusts arena
by adopting ethical guidelines in harmony with the Model Rules but responsive
to the unique requirements of an estates and trusts practice and the
reasonable expectations of clients and beneficiaries. A concomitant benefit of
the ACTEC Commentaries' adoption will be raising the level of the debate and
improving the quality of decisions made by triers of fact (whether judges or
juries) in actions involving alleged legal malpractice or attorney misconduct.
The ACTEC Commentaries' emphasis on the generally non-adversarial
nature of the trusts and estates practice, the encouragement of the
representation of multiple clients, particularly in the family context, and an
emphasis on informed communication between lawyer and client will
ultimately improve the quality of legal representation in our field and increase
the confidence of both clients and the general public in the legal profession.
The ACTEC Commentaries are appropriately dedicated to that worthwhile goal.
The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel closely followed the
deliberations of the Ethics 2000 Commission and will continue to observe and
comment upon the Commission's Report as it is discussed and debated in the
months ahead. Assuming the American Bar Association ultimately adopts
revisions to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (together with the
Comments thereto) the next edition of the ACTEC Commentaries will cover all
aspects of the changes in the MRPC that are relevant to the trusts and estates
practitioner. Thus, the ACTEC Commentaries will continue to serve as an
ethical beacon for all estates and trusts practitioners interested in competently
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PLANNING FOR THE GENERATION-SKIPPING
TRANSFER TAX
Kelly S. Henry, Esq.
Ogden Newell & Welch PLLC
I. Overview -- Transfers Which Trigger GST
The generation-skipping transfer tax (hereafter, "GST "), chapter 13 ofthe Internal Revenue Code!,
was enacted by Congress in 1986 as a means of preventing wealthy families from creating large
trusts which would escape gift or estate taxation for multiple generations. Transfers which are not
exempt from GST are taxed at the maximum Federal estate rate, currently 55% (I.R.C. § 2641 (a)(1)).
A. Basic Terms
The GST tax applies to transfers of property to persons who are two or more generations
below that of the person transferring the property. Therefore, a clear understanding of the
identity of the parties to the transfer is imperative.
1. Transferor. The transferor is the person who disposes of the property transferred,
either during life or at death (I.R.C. § 2652(a)). If the transfer is subject to gift tax,
the transferor is the donor. Ifthe transfer is subject to estate tax, the transferor is the
decedent.
If a married couple elects to split gifts under section 2513, both the donor and the
donor's spouse are treated as the transferor of one half of the transferred property
(I.R.C. § 2652(a)(2)).
Note: In order to split gifts, both spouses must make an affirmative election
to do so (I.R.C. § 2513(a)(2)). A gift tax return must be filed to make this
election (Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-2).
An individual possessing a general power of appointment under section 2041 over
property held in trust will become the transferor of such property when the power is
exercised, released or lapsed (Treas. Reg. § 26.2652-1(a)).
2. Skip Person. A skip person is a person assigned to a generation which is two or
more generations below that of the transferor, e.g., a grandchild (I.R.C. § 2613(a)).
For relatives, generations are assigned along family lines and are traced back to the
transferor's grandparents (I.R.C. § 2651(b)(1)). The transferor's spouse is always
assigned to the same generation as the transferor regardless of the spouse's age
(I.R.C. §2651 (c)). The generation assignment for family members ofthe transferor's
1 All references to the "Code" refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended. All references to "sections" refer to sections of the Code.
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spouse is determined by reference to the spouse's grandparents (I.R.C. § 2651 (b)(2)).
For non-relatives, an individual is assigned to the same generation as the transferor
if such individual is not more than 12 1/2 years younger than the transferor (I.R.C.
§ 265I.(d)(I)). An individual is assigned to the first generation younger than the
transferor ifsuch individual is more than 12 1/2 years but not more than 37 1/2 years
younger than the transferor (I.R.C. § 265 1(d)(2)). Succeeding generations are
assigned under similar rules in 25-year increments (I.R.C. § 265 1(d)(3)).
A trust for the benefit of only skip persons is also deemed to be a skip person. A
trust will be deemed to be a skip person if: (1) all beneficiaries who are currently
entitled to receive income and principal are skip persons; or (2) no person is currently
entitled to receive income and principal and at no time may distributions (including
distributions upon termination) be made to a non-skip person (I.R.C. § 261 3(a)(2)).
3. Non-Skip Person. A non-skip person is any person or trust that is not a skip person,
e.g., a child (I.R.C. § 26I3(b)).
B. Transfers and Taxable Events
Once the identities of the parties to the transfer have been established, it is necessary to
determine the type of transfer. Three types of transfers are subject to GST: (1) a taxable
termination, (2) a taxable distribution, and (3) a direct skip. The determination of the type
of transfer will control the amount of tax due, the person liable for the payment of the tax,
and whether certain exemptions apply.
1. Taxable Termination. A taxable termination occurs when an interest in a trust
terminates unless (1) immediately after the termination, a non-skip person has an
interest in the trust property, or (2) at no time after the termination maya distribution
be made from the trust to a skip person (I.R.C. § 26I2(a)).
Example. The transferor, T, creates an irrevocable trust which pays income
to T's child, C, for life, and the remainder to T's grandchild, GC, if then
living. A taxable termination occurs when C dies because immediately after
the termination of C's interest, all interests in the trust are held by skip
persons (GC).
2. Taxable Distribution. A taxable distribution is any distribution from a trust to a
skip person (I.R.C. § 26I2(b)).
Example. T creates an irrevocable trust which provides for the payment of
income and principal to C and GC, at the trustee's discretion. A taxable
distribution occurs each time there is a distribution to Ge.
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3. Direct Skip. A direct skip is a transfer to a skip person (I.R.C. § 2612(c)). A direct
skip may take one of two forms: (1) an outright gift or bequest; or (2) a gift or a
transfer at death to a trust where all of the current beneficiaries are skip persons.
Example. T transferors 100 shares of ABC Corporation stock to GC.
Example. T transferors $40,000 to a trust for the benefit ofT's grandchildren
(all skip persons).
Case Study: T's will provides for pecuniary bequests to T's son, daughter,
and son-in-law, with the remainder passing to a testamentary trust. The will
directs the trustee to administer the trust primarily to provide for the care and
maintenance ofT's dogs according to their station in life when Twas living.
To the extent the net income is not used for the care and maintenance ofT's
dogs, the trustee in its sole discretion may provide for the education of T' s
issue per stirpes, as if T' s children are not then living. At the earlier of the
death ofthe last surviving dog or 20 years, the remaining trust assets will be
divided among T's then living issue, per stirpes.
~: Are the dogs skip persons or non-skip persons? See Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 9036043 (June 13, 1990).
Only one direct skip occurs when a single transfer of property skips two or more
generations (Treas. Reg. § 26.2612-1(a)).
Example. T transfers Blackacre to T's great-grandchild. Only one GST tax
is imposed although two generations are skipped. (Treas. Reg. § 26.2612-
1(t), Ex. 2).
4. Predeceased Ancestor Rule. As originally enacted, section 2612(c)(2) created what
came to be known as the "predeceased child exception." The purpose of section
2612(c)(2) was to close the gap between the transferor and the oldest living
descendant of a particular line.
If, at the time ofa transfer subject to GST, a child ofthe transferor (or the transferor's
spouse) had died, the child's children would be treated as having moved up a
generation for purposes of determining whether a direct skip occurred. The child's
grandchildren also moved up a generation. This benefit existed only for direct skips
and disclaimers could not be used to create a "predeceased" child.
For Transfers After January 1, 1998. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Pub. L.
No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997)), replaced section 2612(c)(2) with section 2651(e),
and expanded the application ofthe exemption beyond direct skips to include taxable
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terminations and taxable distributions, provided that the parent of the relevant
transferee was deceased at the time of the original transfer (I.R.C. § 2651(e)(1)).
TRA 1997 further expanded the predeceased child exception to include a transferor's
grandnieces and grandnephews where the transferor has no descendants and the
transferor's sibling has died (I.R.C. § 2651(e)(2)).
5. 90 Day Survivorship Rule. Treas. Reg. § 26.2612-1(a)(2) provides that if a living
descendant dies within 90 days after the GST transfer, then such descendant is treated
as having predeceased the transferor to the extent so provided by the terms of the
trust instrument or applicable state law. Note that former section 2612(c)(2) was
replaced by section 2651(e); however, no policy reason exists why the 90 day
survivorship rule would not be applied under the new statute.
6. Comparison of Types of GST Transfers. On a taxable termination, the taxable
amount is the value ofall property with respect to which the taxable termination has
occurred, reduced by certain deductions relating to expenses, indebtedness, and taxes
(I.R.C. § 2622). The trustee is responsible for payment of the tax (I.R.C. §
2603(a)(2)).
On a taxable distribution, the taxable amount is the value ofthe property received by
the transferee, reduced by any expense incurred by the transferee associated with the
payment or refund of tax (I.R.C. § 2621 (a)). The transferee is responsible for
payment of the tax (I.R.C. § 2603(a)(1)). If the tax is paid out of the trust, this
payment is also a taxable distribution (I.R.C. § 2621(b)).
In the case of a direct skip, the taxable amount is the value of the property received
by the transferee (I.R.C. § 2623). The transferor is the person liable for the payment
of tax (I.R.C. § 2603(a)(3)). Note, however, that under section 2515, by paying the
tax, the transferor is making an additional gift.
Taxable distributions and taxable terminations have the GST calculated on a tax-
inclusive basis. Direct skips, on the other hand, have the GST calculated on a tax-
exclusive basis. As a result, the "effective rate" on a direct skip is less than that
assessed against a taxable distribution or taxable termination.
Illustration. Assume a $1,000,000 transfer which is charged with paying the
GST. Ifthe transfer is a taxable distribution or taxable termination, the GST
is $550,000 ($1,000,000 x 55%). If the transfer is a direct skip, the GST is
$354,839 ($645,161 x 55%). The effective rate for direct skips is about
35.5% rather than 55% for taxable distribution and taxable termination.
For a discussion of why it is always advantageous to prepay wealth transfer taxes
regardless ofwhether it is the gift, estate, or GST tax, see Jeffrey N. Pennell and R.
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Mark Williamson, "The Economics ofPrepaying Wealth Transfer Taxes," Trust &
Estates, June-July-Aug. 1997, at 49, 40, 52. (The August article discusses the
GSTtax.)
Caveat: In light ofthe Economic Growth and Tax ReliefReconciliation Act
of 2001 (H.R. 1836), it is no longer advisable in most situations to prepay
wealth transfer taxes, especially gift tax, because of the scheduled repeal of
the estate and GST taxes in 2010.
7. Multiple Skips. Under section 2653, ifproperty remains in trust after a generation
skipping transfer occurs, for the purposes ofsubsequent transfers, the transferor will
be deemed to be assigned to one generation above that ofthe oldest beneficiary then
having an interest in the trust. (I.R.C. § 2653(a)). The purpose ofsection 2653 is to
convert the oldest beneficiary and all others assigned to this generation level from
skip persons to non-skip persons so that future distributions to them will not trigger
GST. However, if the property continues to be held in trust after a GST transfer has
occurred, it will continue to be subject to the GST tax for future generations.
Example. T's child is living and T creates an irrevocable trust for the benefit
of T's grandchild, GC, and T's great-grandchild, GGC, which provides for
the payment of income and principal to GC and GGC, at the trustee's
discretion. At GC's death, the trust property will be distributed to GGC. The
transfer by T to the trust is a direct skip, and the property is held in trust
immediately after the transfer. After the direct skip, the transferor is treated
as being one generation above GC, therefore, GC is no longer a skip person
and distributions to GC are not taxable distributions. However, because GGC
is assigned to a generation that is two generations below T's deemed
generation, GGC is a skip person and distributions of trust income to GGC
are taxable distributions.
Example. T creates an irrevocable trust for the benefit of T's child, C, for
life. At C's death, the trust property will continue in trust for the benefit of
T's grandchild, GC, for life. At GC's death, the trust property will be
distributed to T's great-grandchild, GGC. A taxable termination occurs at
C's death and then again at GC's death unless the property is included in their
estates by a general power of appointment under section 2041.
8. Transfers Excluded from GST Tax. Excluded from generation-skipping transfers
are transfers which would not be treated as taxable gifts under section 2503(e) (i.e.,
payment of tuition and medical expenses) (I.R.C. § 2611(b)(I)). Also excluded are
annual exclusion gifts which are direct skips (I.R.C. § 2642(c)). This exclusion also
applies to direct skips made in trust but only ifthe trust is for a single beneficiary and
the trust property will be included in the beneficiary's gross estate should the
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beneficiary die before the trust terminates (I.R.C. § 2642(c)(2)).
C. The GST Exemption
1. Amount ofExemption. Every individual is allowed a $1,000,000 GST exemption
which may be allocated to transfers made by that individual (I.R.C. § 2631(a)).
Beginning January 1, 1999, the GST exemption will be adjusted for inflation in
$10,000 increments (I.R.C. § 2631(c)).
For transfers made after December 31, 1998, the GST exemption is $1,010,000 (Rev.
Proc. 98-61, 1998-51 IRB 180); for transfers made after December 31, 1999, the
exemption is $1,030,000 (Rev. Proc. 99-42, 1999-46 IRB 568); and for transfers
made after December 31,2000, the exemption is $1,060,000 (Rev. Proc. 2000-13,
2001-3IRB 1).
2. Allocation of Exemption. Every individual (or his or her executor) may allocate
all or part of the individual's GST exemption to property transferred by such
individual at any time (I.R.C. § 2631(a)). Use of the exemption is entirely
discretionary. However, once made, an allocation is irrevocable (I.R.C. § 2631(b)).
Automatic Allocation. The GST exemption is automatically allocated to direct
skips made during the transferor's lifetime unless the transferor elects otherwise on
a timely filed gift tax return (I.R.C. § 2632(b)). Any unused GST exemption at the
transferor's death is automatically allocated, first to testamentary direct skips, and
then proportionately among trusts created by the transferor from which a taxable
distribution or taxable termination may occur (I.R.C. § 2632(c)).
3. Scope ofExemption. Once property has been designated as exempt from GST, the
property, the income generated by it, and its future appreciation are permanently
immune from the GST tax as long as the identity of the transferor does not change.
D. Calculating the GST Tax.
The GST tax is calculated by multiplying the "taxable amount" of the transfer by the
"applicable rate" (I.R.C. § 2602).
1. Applicable Rate. The applicable rate is the maximum federal estate tax rate
(currently 55%) multiplied by the inclusion ratio (I.R.C. § 2641).
55% x Inclusion Ratio
2. Inclusion Ratio. The inclusion ratio is 1 minus the "applicable fraction" (I.R.C. §§
2602, 2641).
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1 - Applicable Fraction
3. Applicable Fraction. The applicable fraction is a fraction, the numerator ofwhich
equals the amount of GST exemption allocated to the trust (or to the assets in the
case ofa direct skip not in trust) and the denominator equals the value ofthe property
transferred in trust (or transferred in a direct skip not in trust) reduced by the sum of
federal estate and state death tax incurred by and recovered from the trust or assets,
and the amount of charitable deduction allowed, if any (I.R.C. § 2642(a)(2)).
GST Exemption Allocated
Value of Transferred Property
4. Equation. In other words, the GST tax equals:
Taxable amount x 55% x 1 - ( GST Exemption Allocated)
(Value of Transferred Property)
5. Example. T transfers $1,000,000 to an irrevocable trust for the benefit ofT's child,
C, for life, with the remainder to T's grandchild, GC. T allocates $600,000 ofT's
GST exemption to the trust on a timely-filed gift tax return. The applicable fraction
with respect to the trust is .60 ($600,000 (the amount ofGST exemption allocated to
the trust) over $1,000,000 (the value of the property transferred to the trust)). The
inclusion ratio is .40 (1 - .60). If the maximum federal estate tax rate is 55 percent
at the time ofa GST, the rate of tax applicable to the transfer (applicable rate) will
be .22 (55 percent (the maximum estate tax rate) x .40 (the inclusion ratio)).
6. Desirable Inclusion Ratios. It is always desirable to have an inclusion ratio ofeither
one or zero. Ifthe applicable fraction is one, the inclusion ratio will be zero, and the
property transferred to the trust will be exempt from GST. If the applicable fraction
is zero, the inclusion ratio will be one, and the property transferred to the trust will
be subject to GST.
The inclusion ratio applies to all assets ofthe trust. Ifa trust is partially exempt from
generation skipping tax, then every generation skipping transfer from the trust will
be partially exempt and partially taxable. This situation occurs when the trust's
inclusion ratio is between one and zero, and has the effect ofwasting the transferor's
GST exemption. Thus, it is always preferable to create two trusts, one which is
entirely subject to the GST tax and another that is entirely exempt.
7. Credit for State GST Taxes. Section 2604 allows a credit not to exceed 5% ofthe
Federal GST tax imposed by section 2601 for GST taxes paid to any state (I.R.C. §
2604). Among the states that impose GST taxes are Indiana (Ind. Code Ann. § 6-4.1-
11.5-7 (West 2001)), Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 198.021 (West 2001)), Maryland
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(Md. Tax-Gen. Code Ann. § 7-402 (2001)), and Texas (Tex. Tax Code Ann. §
211.051 (West 2001».
E. Effective Date Rules.
The provisions of chapter 13 of the Code apply to all lifetime GST transfers made after
September 25, 1985, and to all testamentary GST transfers made after October 22, 1986
(Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(a». However, chapter 13 does not apply to transfers from trusts
which were irrevocable on September 25, 1985 (Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b».
J
A transfer under a trust that was irrevocable on September 25, 1985 will be exempt from
GST to the extent that the transfer is not made out of additions made to the trust after that
date (Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(I». A trust is considered irrevocable on that date if it
would not be included in the grantor's estate under sections 2038 or 2042 if the grantor had
died on September 25, 1985 (Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(I)(ii».
Great care must be taken when dealing with a grandfathered trust because subsequent
transactions may cause the trust to lose its exempt status. If an addition is made after
September 25, 1985 to an irrevocable trust which is exempt from GST, unless GST
exemption is allocated to the addition, a portion ofall subsequent distributions from the trust
will be subject to GST. (Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(I)(iv». Of particular concern are
transactions in which no actual property ~s added to the trust but are treated as a constructive
addition nonetheless (e.g., a lapse of a
1
power of appointment) (Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-
1(b)(1 )(v».
1. Final Regulations Issued in 1995. The Service first issued final regulations
regarding the effective date rules on December 27, 1995. Unfortunately, like the
statutory provisions and the legislative history, these regulations did not define what
is meant by an addition.
Given the exorbitant GST rate of 55%, taxpayers were reluctant to jeopardize the
exempt status of' existing trusts. As a result, the Service has issued hundreds of
private letter rulings since 1989 regarding the effect ofproposed changes to exempt
trusts for GST purposes. The rulings have consistently held that a modification of
an exempt trust that does not alter the quality, value, or timing of any powers,
beneficial interests, rights, or expectancies originally provided for in the trust will
not cause the trust to forfeit its exempt status. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199915038
(Apr. 16, 1999).
However, the regulations did define what is meant by a constructive addition. Under
the regulations, a constructive addition is any property remaining in trust after the
release, exercise or lapse of any power of appointment, if the release, exercise or
lapse is taxable to any extent (Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(I)(v». Nontaxable powers
such as limited powers of appointment or wholly non-taxable general powers of
appointment (e.g., "five and five" powers or pre-1942 general powers which lapse)
will not subject an exempt trust to GST tax.
2. Simpson v. United States. On July 23, 1999, in a surprising decision, especially for
the Service, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the exercise of a general
power ofappointment over a trust which became irrevocable in 1966 was not subject
to GST at the death of the power holder in 1993 when the power was exercised to
distribute the trust in favor ofskip persons. Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812
(8th Cir. 1999). The facts of the Simpson case are as follows.
Mr. Simpson died in 1966. His will created a traditional marital trust for the benefit
of his wife. Mrs. Simpson later remarried and became Mrs. Bryan. The trust gave
Mrs. Bryan a testamentary general power of appointment. When she died in 1993,
she exercised this power in favor of her grandchildren. This transfer is subject to
GST unless it is protected by the effective date rule.
The issue before the court was whether the exercise of the general power of
appointment was a constructive addition. The Missouri District Court held that the
effective date provisions did not apply to the transfer and, thus, the transfer was
subject to GST. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
In a literal reading ofthe statute, the Court held that the effective date rule ofsection
1433(b)(2)(A) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 applied to transfer. According to
section 1433(b)(2)(A) of the Act, the GST tax does not apply to any generation-
skipping transfer under a trust which was irrevocable on September 25, 1985, but
only to the extent that such transfer is not made out ofcorpus added to the trust after
September 25, 1985. The Court reasoned that because the trust was irrevocable on
September 25, 1985, the transfer was made possible by the trust; therefore, the
transfer was made under the trust and not out of an addition made to the trust.
The Court distinguished Simpson from a contrary decision reached by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals on similar facts in E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v.
Comm'r, 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996). Mr. Peterson died in 1974. He created a
similar trust for the benefit of his wife, including a general power of appointment.
If the power was not exercised, the corpus was to be set aside for the Petersons'
grandchildren. Mrs. Peterson died in 1987. She did not exercise her general power
of appointment so it lapsed. The Second Circuit held that the lapse of Mrs.
Peterson's general power ofappointment was a constructive addition to the trust. The
Eighth Circuit distinguished Simpson from Peterson on the grounds that unlike the
exercise of Mrs. Bryan's general power of appointment which caused nothing to
remain in trust, the lapse of Mrs. Peterson's power of appointment caused the
property to remain in the trust and, therefore, was an addition to the trust.
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On October 27, 2000, in a similar case, a California District Court held that the
decedent's partial exercise ofa testamentary general power of appointment created
upon the death of her husband in 1976 in favor of her grandchildren was subject to
GST. Bachler v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Cal. 2000). Although
the facts in Bachler were similar to those in Simpson, the court declined to follow the
Eighth Circuit's opinion in Simpson and instead chose to follow the Second Circuit's
decision in Peterson.
Shortly after issuing a notice that it would not acquiesce in the decision in Simpson,
the Service released Proposed Regulations REG-I03841-99 (the so called "Anti-
Simpson regulations") on November 18, 1999, to clarify that the transfer ofproperty
pursuant to the exercise, release, or lapse ofa general power ofappointment created
in an exempt trust is not a transfer under the trust, but rather is a transfer by the
power holder upon the exercise, release or lapse of such power (Treas. Reg. §
26.2601-1(b)(I)(i)). After incorporating several changes suggested by practitioners
in written comments and at a public hearing, the Service issued final regulations on
the effective date rules on December 20, 2000.
3. New Effective Date Regulations. The new regulations create four safe harbors for
modifications to exempt trusts that occur through (1) certain discretionary trustee
powers, (2) court-approved settlements, (3) judicial constructions, and (4) other
changes (Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)). The four safe harbors are not mutually
exclusive and a failure to qualify under a specific safe harbor does not mean
necessarily that a modification will result in a loss of exempt status. However,
Example 4 in the regulation is troublesome and suggests that the a failure to comply
with any of the safe harbors will result in the loss of exempt status (Treas. Reg. §
26.2601-1 (b)(4)(i)(E), Ex. 4).
These safe harbors apply only for GST purposes and do not apply for gift, estate, or
income tax purposes (Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)).
a. Trustee's Discretionary Powers. Under the first safe harbor, a trust will not
lose its exempt status when a new trust is created or property is retained in a
continuing trust if(l) the trustee is authorized to make distributions to a new
trust or to retain the property in a continuing trust without the consent or
approval of any beneficiary or court by either the terms of the governing
instrument or the state law in existence at the time the trust became
irrevocable, and (2) the terms of the governing instrument of the new or
continuing trust do not extend the time for vesting of any beneficial interest
in the trust in a manner that may postpone or suspend the vesting, absolute
ownership, or power of alienation of an interest in property for a period
measured by any life in being at the date the original trust became irrevocable
plus a period of21 years, plus ifnecessary, a reasonable period ofgestation,
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or 90 years, if shorter (Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)).
b. Court-Approved Settlements. The second safe harbor provided in the
regulations is a court-approved settlement of a bona fide issue regarding the
administration of the trust or the construction of terms of the governing
instrument will not cause an exempt trust to be subject to GST if (1) the
settlement is the product ofarm's length negotiations; and (2) the settlement
is within the range of reasonable outcomes under the governing instrument
and applicable state law addressing the issues resolved by the settlement
(Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1 (b)(4)(i)(B)). The regulates further state that a
settlement that results in a compromise between the litigating parties and
reflects the parties' assessments of the relative strengths of their positions is
a settlement that is within the range of reasonable outcomes. See Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 200112038 (Mar. 3, 2001).
c. Judicial Construction. The third safe harbor provides that a judicial
construction of a governing instrument to resolve an ambiguity in the terms
of the instrument or to correct a scrivener's error will not cause an exempt
trust to be subject to GST if (1) the judicial action involves a bona fide issue;
and (2) the judicial construction is consistent with the applicable state law
that would be applied by the highest court ofthe state (Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-
1(b)(4)(i)(C)). See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200114026 (Apr. 6,2001) (construction to
correct a scrivener's error); and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200116031 (Apr. 20, 2001)
(construction to clarify an ambiguity in a trust's terms).
d. Other Changes. Under the fourth and final safe harbor, a modification of
the governing instrument of a trust (including a modification through a
trustee's exercise ofa power ofdistribution, a court-approved settlement, or
a judicial construction that does not satisfy one of the three safe harbors
described above), will not cause an exempt trust to be subject to GST if: (1)
the modification does not shift a beneficial interest in the trust to any
beneficiary who occupies a lower generation) than the person or persons who
held the beneficial interest prior to the modification, and (2) the modification
does not extend the time for vesting of any beneficial interest in the trust
beyond the period provided for in the original trust (Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-
1(b)(4)(i)(D)).
A modification of an exempt trust will result in a shift in beneficial interest
to a lower generation beneficiary if the modification can result in either an
increase in the amount of a GST transfer or the creation of a new GST
transfer. To determine whether a modification of an irrevocable trust will
shift a beneficial interest in a trust to a beneficiary who occupies a lower
generation, the effect of the instrument on the date of the modification is
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measured against the effect ofthe instrument in existence immediately before
the modification. If the effect of the modification cannot be immediately
determined, a shift to a lower generation is deemed to have occurred. A
modification that is administrative in nature that only indirectly increases the
amount transferred (for example, by lowering administrative costs or income
taxes) will not be considered to be a shift of a beneficial interest in the trust
(Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(D)(2)).
(The Final Regulations are reproduced in Appendix A.)
II. Use of the GST Exemption
The most important planning tool provided by chapter 13 is the GST exemption. Once property is
exempt from GST, all subsequent transfers of the property, the income therefrom, and the
appreciation thereof, are also exempt. Because the amount of the GST exemption is the same for
both lifetime and testamentary transfers, it is more desirable for the transferor to make a lifetime
allocation of GST exemption, if the value of the trust to which the exemption is allocated is
anticipated to increase.
A. Division of Trusts
It is very desirable when designing an estate plan never to create a trust witll an inclusion
ratio of other than zero or one. Once the transferor's GST exemption has been allocated to
a trust thereby creating an inclusion ratio of between zero and one, the trustee cannot later
divide the trust into separate trusts -- one with an inclusion ratio ofzero and the other with
an inclusion ratio ofone -- in order to segregate the exemption (I.R.C. § 2654(b)). However,
if the trust is divided prior to the time that the GST exemption is allocated, two trusts with
inclusion ratios of zero and one can be established.
1. Separate Shares and Trusts. Section 2654(b) sets forth two circumstances in which
separate trusts will be recognized: (1) the portions ofa trust attributable to transfers
from different transferors will be treated as separate trusts; and (2) substantially
separate and independent shares ofdifferent beneficiaries in a trust will be treated as
separate shares (I.R.C. § 2654(b)).
a. Separate and Independent Shares. If a trust consists of substantially
separate and independent shares for different beneficiaries, each share will be
treated as a separate trust for purposes ofchapter 13. In general, the separate
share rules provided in § 1.663(c)-3 for income tax purposes will apply for
purposes of chapter 13. However, a portion of a trust will not be treated as
a separate share unless such share exists from and at all times after the
creation of the trust (Treas. Reg. § 26.2654-1(a)(1)(i)).
b. Multiple Transferors. If there is more than one transferor of property to a
trust, the portions of the trust attributable to the different transferors will be
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treated as separate trusts. (Treas. Reg. § 26.2654-1(a)(2)).
c. Severance of Trust. A single trust which is treated as separate trusts under
section 2654(b) may be divided into separate trusts at any time to reflect that
treatment (Treas. Reg. § 26.2654-1(a)(3)).
2. Separate Trusts Allowed by Regulations. The regulations will also recognize
separate trusts created under a single trust included in the transferor's gross estate (or
created under the transferor's will) if severance is mandated or granted by the
governing instrument or granted under local law (Treas. Reg. § 26.2654-1(b)(1)).
a. Authority to Divide the Trust. Authorization to divide the trust must be
given by the instrument itself or by applicable state law. (Treas. Reg. §
26.2654-1 (b)(1)). Ifthe applicable state law does not provide such authority,
a court order is necessary. The severance must occur (or the reformation
proceeding must begin) prior to the time the federal estate tax return is due
(including extensions actually granted) (Treas. Reg. § 26.2654-
1(b)(1 )(ii)(B)).
If severance is not mandated by the governing instrument, each of the new
trusts must provide the same succession of interests and beneficiaries as in
the original trust (Treas. Reg. § 26.2654-1(b)(1)(ii)(A)).
(See Appendix B for sample generation skipping provisions for trusts.)
b. Division ofAssets. Typically, assets are divided on a fractional basis. Ifso,
the assets need not be divided pro rata, provided funding is based on either
the fair market value of the assets at the date of funding or in a manner that
fairly reflects the net appreciation and depreciation in the value ofthe assets
from the date ofthe transfer (e.g., the transferor's date ofdeath) and the date
of funding (Treas. Reg. § 26.2654-1(b)(1)(C)).
If the governing instrument directs severance using a pecuniary amount,
interest must be paid on the pecuniary share or the assets must fairly reflect
appreciation and depreciation (Treas. Reg. § 26.2654-1 (b)(1 )(ii)(C)(2) and §
26.2654-1 (a)(l )(ii)).
B. Marital Deduction Planning and Reverse QTIP Election
As a general rule, estate planning will take precedence over GST planning. It is impossible
to coordinate the estate tax and GST tax perfectly because the applicable exclusion amount
(formerly, the unified credit amount) will always be smaller than the GST exemption
amount. Even ifthe applicable exclusion amount increases to $1,000,000 in 2006, the GST
exemption will be greater than $1,000,000 due to indexing. As a result, although exempt
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from GST tax, some transfers will be subject to gift or estate tax.
Most marital planning hinges on a marital deduction formula which divides the decedent's
assets into two funds: (1) the nonmarital trust which equals the decedent's remaining
applicable exclusion amount; and (2) the marital trust which equals the remaining assets of
the decedent's estate and is structured to qualify for the marital deduction. The effect ofthis
planning is to minimize the overall taxes of the couple, and to defer estate taxes until the
death of the surviving spouse.
The problem with this plan is that it does not fully use the first spouse's GST exemption. If
the decedent died in 2001, only $675,000 would be allocated to the nonmarital trust, leaving
$385,000 ofthe decedent's GST exemption unused. Because the marital trust will be taxed
to the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse will become the transferor of those assets for
GST purposes (I.R.C. § 2652(a».
Reverse QTIP Election. Fortunately, chapter 13 provides a solution to this problem. The
executor of the decedent's estate may make a "reverse QTIP" election for property
transferred to a QTIP marital trust (I.R.C. § 2652(a)(3». The effect ofthis election is to treat
the deceased spouse and not the surviving spouse as the transferor ofthe QTIP trust for GST
purposes although the QTIP assets are still included in the surviving spouse's estate for estate
tax purposes.
When making a reverse QTIP election, the election must be made for the entire QTIP trust.
A partial elections is not allowed. If the value of the QTIP trust exceeds the amount of the
decedent spouse's available GST exemption, as it often will, the trust must be divided so that
the reverse QTIP election may be made for one part of trust but not for the other.
The reverse QTIP election is only available to marital deduction trusts described under
section 2056(b)(7), i.e., QTIP trusts. It is not available for the general power ofappointment
marital deduction trust described under section 2056(b)(5). Therefore, before a reverse QTIP
election can be made for such a trust, the general power ofappointment must be eliminated
(e.g., by a disclaimer of the power by the surviving spouse).
(Appendix C illustrates how to make a reverse QTIP election on the Federal estate tax return
(Form 706).)
Section 9100 Relief. A reverse QTIP election must be made on a timely filed Federal estate
tax return to be effective (Treas. Reg. § 26.2652-2(b». However, if the executor fails to
make the election on the return, the executor may request an extension of time to make the
election under Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3.
Treasury Regulations § 301.9100-1, §30I.9100-2, and § 301.9100-3 set forth the standards
the Commissioner will use to determine whether to grant an extension of time to make a
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regulatory election. Regulatory elections are those elections which have due dates prescribed
by a regulation, revenue ruling, revenue procedure, notice or announcement (Treas. Reg. §
301.9100-1(b)).
Under Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3, the Commissioner has the discretion to grant an extension
of time (not to exceed 6 months) to make a regulatory election if the taxpayer can
demonstrate to the satisfaction ofthe Commissioner that: (1) the taxpayer acted reasonably
and in good faith; and (2) the grant ofreliefwill not prejudice the interests ofthe government
(Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3(a)). A taxpayer is deemed to have acted in good faith if the
taxpayer requests relief before the failure to make the election is discovered by the Service
and the taxpayer either failed to make the election because ofintervening events beyond the
taxpayer's control, failed to make the._ ele.ction because the taxpayer was unaware of the
necessity for the election, relied on written advice from the Service, or relied on the advice
ofa qualified tax professional (Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3(b)(1)).
The request for an extension of time under Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3 must be submitted as
a request for a private letter ruling and must include affidavits from the taxpayer and all other
parties with knowledge of the relevant facts (Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3(e)).
Case Study: The decedent's will provided that a QTIP marital trust was to be divided
into a GSTexempt trust and a GST non~exempttrust. AlthoughaQTIPelectionwas .-.. ._~ . ._._.._
made on Schedule M ofForm 706, the estate failed to indicate that the marital trust
would be divided. In addition, although the estate allocated the decedent's GST
exemption to the marital trust on Schedule R, the estate failed to make a reverse
QTIP election.. The Service _grant~d the estate a 30-dayextension of time under
Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3 to file an amended Schedule M and Schedule R to make
a reverse QTIP election because the estate acted reasonably and in good faith and
granting such reliefdid not prejudice the interests ofthe government. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200005030 (Feb. 4, 2000).
See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200028012 (July 14,2000); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200032028 (Aug.
11, 2000); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200037008 (Sept. 15, 2000); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200109007
(Mar. 2,2001); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200117007 (Apr. 27,2001); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200118037
(May 4, 2001); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200125040 (June 22, 2001).
(Private Letter Ruling 200125040, which was obtained by Ogden Newell & Welch, PLLC,
is reproduced in Appendix D.)
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III. Allocating GST Exemption to Lifetime Transfers
A. GST Annual Exclusion
As discussed earlier, annual exclusion gifts which are direct skips are excluded from the GST
tax (I.R.C. § 2642(c)). This exclusion applies to outright direct skips as well as to direct
skips made in trust but only if the trust is for a single beneficiary and the trust property will
be included in the beneficiary's gross estate should the beneficiary die before the trust
terminates (I.R.C. § 2642(c)(2)). Only section 2503(c) trusts and single beneficiary
Crummey trusts in which the skip person is given a general power of appointment qualify
for this exclusion.
B. Allocating GST Exemption to Lifetime Gifts
A major advantage of making a lifetime transfer is the ability to exclude the future income
and appreciation on the property from the transferor's estate. For gifts made in trust, an
allocation ofGST exemption to the trust will also protect such income and appreciation from
GSTtax.
Section 2632 provides automatic rules for the allocation of GST exemption for transfers
made both during the transferor's lifetime and at death. Reliance on the statute is undesirable
in that it may produce unintended results. Instead, the transferor (or the transferor's
executor) should allocate GST exemption specifically.
1. Timely Allocation. For lifetime direct skips, GST exemption is automatically
allocated unless the transferor elects otherwise (I.R.C. § 2632(b)(3)). For other
transfers, an allocation of GST exemption to property transferred during the
transferor's lifetime is made on a timely filed gift tax return, Form 709 (Treas. Reg.
§ 26.2632-1(b)(2)). If the allocation is made on a timely filed gift tax return, the
allocation is effective as of the date of the transfer (e.g., the date of the gift) (Treas.
Reg. § 26.2632-1(b)(2)(ii)).
To be an effective allocation, the allocation must clearly identify the trust to which
the allocation is being made and the amount ofGST exemption allocated to it. Ifthe
allocation is late or if an inclusion ratio greater than zero is claimed, the allocation
must also identify the value ofthe trust assets at the effective date ofallocation. The
allocation should also state the inclusion ratio ofthe trust after the allocation (Treas.
Reg. § 26.2632-1(b)(2)(i)).
If the transferor allocates more of the transferor's GST exemption to a trust than is
needed to produce an inclusion ratio ofzero, the excess allocation is void (except as
provided in Treas. Reg. § 26.2642-3 relating to charitable lead annuity trusts). An
allocation is also void ifthe allocation is made with respect to a trust that has no GST
potential with respect to the transferor making the allocation, at the time of
allocation. Note, however, that a trust has GST potential even if the possibility ofa
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generation skipping transfer is so remote as to be negligible (Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-
1(b)(2)(i».
Special Rule for CLATs: With a charitable lead annuity trust ("CLAT"), a
taxpayer's GST exemption is never effectively allocated until the end ofthe
charitable term. Instead, the GST exemption allocated to the trust at the time
ofits creation grows annually by the section 7520 rate in effect at the creation
of the trust until the charitable interest terminates. This enhanced or
"adjusted GST exemption" is then compared to the then value ofthe trust to
determine what part ofthe trust is exempt from GST (Treas. Reg. § 26.2642-
3). Note, however, that this rule does not apply to charitable lead unitrusts
("CLUTs").
There are three possible remedies available to a taxpayer ifa timely allocation is not
made: (1) substantial compliance; (2) nominal interest rule; and (3) automatic 6
month extension oftime to make a statutory election under Treas. Reg. § 301.91 00-2.
a. Substantial Compliance. Literal compliance with procedural instructions
is not always required to make an election. Compliance with the essential
requirements of a regulation may be sufficient for the Service to deem that
an allocation has been made.
Case Study: The taxpayer created an irrevocable trust for the benefit
of his spouse and two children. The taxpayer's spouse timely
renounced any interest that she had in the trust. Over a two-year
period, the taxpayer transferred cash and marketable securities to the
trust. The taxpayer and his spouse elected to split gifts, and in each
year the couple allocated a portion of their GST exemptions to the
gifts. Although the taxpayer and the taxpayer's spouse correctly
completed Schedules A and C of their gift tax returns (Forms 709),
they failed to attach a notice of GST allocation. The Service found
that the couple had provided enough information on their gift tax
returns to show that they intended to allocate GST exemption to the
trust (Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200017013 (Apr. 28, 2000».
See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199919027 (May 14, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200040013 (Oct. 6, 2000). But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199937026 (Sept.
17, 1999) (a decedent's trust was subject to the automatic allocation
rules because the executor did not elect the method allocating
exemption on the Federal estate tax return and the trust language was
insufficient to constitute substantial compliance).
b. Nominal Interest Rule. The purpose of the nominal interest rule is to
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prevent the use ofcertain interests to postpone a taxable termination. Section
2652(c)(2) provides that an interest which is used primarily to postpone or
avoid the GST tax will be disregarded for purposes ofchapter 13. An interest
is considered as used primarily to postpone or avoid the GST tax if a
significant purpose for the creation ofthe interest is to postpone or avoid the
tax (Treas. Reg. § 26.2612-1(e)(ii)).
The effect ofthe nominal interest rule is to disregard the nominal interests of
certain non-skip persons in determining whether the GST tax should be
imposed on certain transfers. In certain situations, the taxpayer may be able
to use the nominal interest rule to the taxpayer's advantage.
Example. T creates an irrevocable trust for the benefit of T's
descendants. The trustee has the discretion to pay income and
principal to T's descendants for the health, education, maintenance,
and support. T's children are independently wealthy, so they would
not be entitled to distributions from the trust. Under the nominal
interest rule, the interests of T's children (i.e., non-skip persons)
would be disregarded. Therefore, T's gift to the trust would be a
direct skip and there would be an automatic allocation of T's GST
exemption.
But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9811044 (Mar. 13, 1998), and Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9825020 (June 19, 1998), where the interests of non-skip persons
were not disregarded.
c. Section 9100 Relief. Treasury Regulation § 301.9100-2 provides an
automatic 6- month extension for regulatory and statutory elections where the
due dates for such elections are the due date ofa return including extensions.
Ifa taxpayer files a timely filed gift tax return and discovers that the taxpayer
failed to make an election to allocate GST exemption, the taxpayer has 6
months from the due date of the return excluding extensions to file an
amended gift tax return and make the allocation (Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-
2(b)).
Example. T timely files a gift tax return on April 15, 2001 but fails
to allocate GST exemption to T's gift. T has until October 15, 2001
to file an amended gift tax return and make the election.
The Service has taken the position that the election to allocate GST
exemption is a statutory election under section 2632. Therefore, discretionary
relief under Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3 is not available. See Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9226014 (June 26, 1992).
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2. Late Allocation. For allocations made after the due date for filing a gift tax return
(a late allocation), the allocation is effective on the date the return is filed (i.e., the
date it is postmarked to the Internal Revenue Service Center), and is deemed to have
preceded any taxable event occurring on the same date (Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-
1(b)(2)(ii)).
However, when a transferor makes a late allocation ofGST exemption to a trust, for
the purposes ofdetermining the value of the trust assets, the transferor may elect to
treat the allocation as having been made on the first day of the month during which
the late allocation is made.
Example. If the transferor files a late gift tax return on March 15, the trust
assets may be valued on March 1 for the purposes of allocating GST
exemption.
This prevents the necessity ofvaluing the assets on the same day that a return needs
to be filed. The election is not applicable to life insurance if the insured dies before
the gift tax return is filed (Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1(c)(2)).
3. Formula Allocations. Unless provided otherwise in the regulations, an allocation
ofGST exemption may be made by a formula; e.g., the allocation may be expressed
in terms of the amount necessary to produce an inclusion ratio of zero (Treas. Reg.
§ 26.2632-1 (b)(2)(i)). In general, all allocations of GST exemption, other than to
cash gifts, should be made by a formula. A typical formula is as follows:
Taxpayer allocates to the transfer the smallest amount ofGST exemption
necessary to produce an inclusion ratio ofzero. Taxpayer believes that the
amount necessary to create an inclusion ratio ofzero is $ . This is a
formula allocation which will change ifvalues are changed on audit.
4. Estate Tax Inclusion Period (ETIP). Treasury Regulation § 26.2632-1 (c) sets forth
special allocation rules for certain lifetime transfers which are treated as
"incomplete" for gift tax purposes. Section 2642(f) prohibits the transferor from
making an allocation ofGST exemption during to a lifetime transfer before the close
of the estate tax inclusion period ("ETIP"). An ETIP is the period during which the
value ofthe property transferred would be included (other than by reason of section
2035) in the gross estate ofthe transferor (or in limited cases, the gross estate of the
transferor's spouse) if death occurred. (Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1(c)(I)).
Example. On January 1, 2001, T transfers $500,000 to an irrevocable trust
for the benefit of T's descendants. T is the trustee. According to the trust
provisions, the trustee, in its sole and absolute discretion, may pay income
and principal to T's descendants. Undistributed income will added to
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principal. 1fT were to die on February 1, 2001, the value of the trust assets
would be included in T's estate under section 2036. Therefore, T cannot
allocate GST exemption to the trust until the ETIP terminates. On January
1,2002, when the value ofthe trust assets is $1,000,000, T resigns as trustee
and releases T's right to be appointed trustee again in the future. If T were
to die on February 1,2002, the value ofthe trust assets would be included in
T's estate under section 2035 not section 2036. As a result, the ETIP has
terminated and T may now allocate GST exemption to the trust based on the
value of the assets on January 1, 2002.
ETIPs usually arise in the context ofa grantor retained annuity trust ("GRAT") or a
qualified personal residence trust ("QPRT").
Example. T transferors T's personal residence to a QPRT. T retains the right
to the use residence for a period of5 years. 1fT were to die during the 5-year
period, the assets ofthe trust would be included in the T's estate. Thererfore,
T cannot allocate GST exemption to the QPRT until the ETIP terminates (in
this instance, when the property would no longer be included in T's estate --
at the end of the QPRT term).
ETIPs also arise in irrevocable Crummey trusts where the transferor's spouse has a
withdrawal right which is greater than $5,000 or 5 percent ofthe trust corpus (Treas.
Reg. § 26.2632-1(c)(2)(ii)(B)).
If an ETIP exists, any allocation made during that period is not effective until the
ETIP closes. Where an allocation has not been made prior to the termination of the
ETIP, the allocation will be effective as of the termination of the ETIP if it is made
on a timely filed gift tax return (Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1 (c)). An ETIP will terminate
on the first to occur the death ofthe transferor, a generation skipping transfer, or the
time at which no portion ofthe property is includible in the transferor's gross estate
(Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1(c)(3)).
(Appendix E contains sample notices of GST allocation for timely allocations, late
allocations, and allocations made at the close of an ETIP period. Appendix F
contains a sample of a timely filed gift tax return including a notice of allocation.)
5. Allocation at Death. A decedent's unused GST exemption is automatically
allocated on the due date for filing the federal estate tax return (Form 706) to the
extent it is not otherwise allocated by the decedent's executor on or before that date.
The automatic allocation occurs whether a return is actually required to be filed
(Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1(d)(2)).
As discussed earlier, the decedent's unused GST exemption is allocated first to direct
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skips treated as occurring at the transferor's death, and then proportionately among
trusts from which a taxable distribution or taxable termination may occur (Treas.
Reg. § 26.2632-1(d)(2)).
An executor may allocate generation skipping tax exemption either on a gift tax
return for property that was given during the transferor's lifetime, or on the f~deral
estate tax return (Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1(d)(I)). Once again, an allocation is void'
if the allocation is made for a trust that has no GST potential with respect to the
transferor for whom the allocation is being made, as ofthe transferor's date ofdeath.
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199908024 (Feb. 26, 1999). The executor should be given
authority to allocate the decedent's GST exemption in a provision similar to the
following:
Generation Skipping Tax Elections. To allocate any part ofmy generation
skipping tax exemption to any property ofwhich I was the transferor and
includingproperty transferred by me during life as to which I did not make
an allocationprior to my death. I desire Personal Representative to allocate
saidexemption in a manner which, in Personal Representative's opinion, will
most likelyproduce the least overallgeneration skipping tax and/or delay the
payment ofany such tax for as long a period as possible, for I realize that
this tax may be eliminatedor modified in thefuture. Personal Representative
will make no compensating adjustments as a result of Personal
Representative's decision regarding allocation ofmygeneration skipping tax
exemption.
C. Irrevocable Crummey Trusts Involving Insurance
Certain issues exist which make GST planning more complicated when the underlying asset
of an irrevocable Crummey trust is life insurance.
1. Intentional Late Allocation. Special planning opportunities arise when considering
whether to allocate GST exemption to life insurance. Generally, GST exemption
should not be allocated to the premiums paid to an irrevocable trust funded solely
with term insurance because most term insurance polices lapse prior to the insured's
death. On the other hand, premiums paid on permanent insurance, such as whole life,
which is likely to remain in force until the insured's death are more appropriate
candidates for the allocation of GST exemption.
For new policies, the value ofthe policy while it is relatively new but older than one
year will generally be less than the amount of the premiums paid. Therefore, a late
allocation of GST exemption may require less GST exemption to be allocated than
would have been allocated otherwise. If the insured dies, however, prior to the
allocation, GST exemption must be allocated to the full value of the insurance
proceeds. In addition, there may administrative difficulties when filing a late
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allocation, including the need to obtain from the insurance company the interpolated
terminal reserve of the policy (reported on Form 712) for a specific future date.
2. Spousal ETIP. As indicated earlier, the ETIP rules also apply to trusts in which the
transferor's spouse has certain rights. If the transferor's spouse is a beneficiary a
possessing Crummey withdrawal power, an ETIP will occur unless the spouse's
withdrawal right is limited to the greater of $5,000 or 5 percent of the trust corpus,
and such withdrawal right terminates no later than 60 days after the transfer to the
trust (Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1(c)(2)(ii)(B)). If an ETIP occurs, no GST exemption
may be allocated until the E'"fIP terminates. The ETIP will terminate at the first to
occur of the death of the transferor's spouse or the time at which no portion of the
property transferred would be includible in the spouse's gross estate (e.g., when the
spouse's withdrawal rights lapse) (Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1(c)(3)).
IV. Modifications of GST Tax under H.R. 1836
On May 26, 2001, Congress approved the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (the "Act"), after the measure cleared the House by
a vote of240-154 and the Senate by a vote of58-31. On June 7, the President signed the Act into
law.
The most notable effect of the Act is that it will repeal the estate and GST taxes in 2010 before it
expires December 31, 2010. However, prior to repeal (and reinstatement in 2011), the GST rate, like
the Federal estate tax rate, will from 55% to 45% by 2009. The GST exemption will continue to be
indexed for inflation until December 31, 2003, at which time it will track the applicable exclusion
amount for estate taxes, increasing from $1.5 million in 2004 to $3.5 million in 2009 (§ 521 ofthe
Act).
The Act makes six modifications to the GST tax. These are as follows.
A. Deemed Allocation of Exemption.
Section 561 of the Act provides that for all transfers made after December 31, 2000, the
transferor's unused GST exemption will be allocated automatically to all inter vivos transfers
in trust that are indirect skips to the extent necessary to produce the lowest possible inclusion
ratio. An "indirect skip" is any transfer ofproperty (other than a direct skip) subject to GST
tax that is made to a GST trust.
A "GST trust" is a trust that could have a generation-skipping transfer with respect to the
transferor unless:
(1) the trust instrument provides that more than 25 percent of the trust corpus must be
distributed to or may be withdrawn by one or more individuals who are non-skip
persons: (a) before the date that the individual attains age 46, (b) on or before one or
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more dates specified in the trust instrument that will occur before the date that such
individual attains age 46, or (c) upon the occurrence of an event that, in accordance
with the regulations, may reasonably be expected to occur before the date that such
individual attains age 46;
(2) the trust instrument provides that more than 25 percent of the trust corpus must be
distributed to or may be withdrawn by one or more individuals who are non-skip
persons and who are living on the date of death of another person identified in the
instrument (by name or by class) who is more than 10 years older than such
individuals;
(3) the trust instrument provides that if one or more individuals who are non-skip
persons die on or before a date or event described in (1) or (2) above, more than 25
percent ofthe trust corpus either must be distributed to the estate or estates ofone or
more ofsuch individuals or is subject to a general power ofappointment exercisable
by one or more of the individuals;
(4) the trust is a trust any portion of which would be included in the gross estate of a
non-skip person (other than the transferor) if that person died immediately after the
transfer;
(5) the trust is a charitable lead annuity trust, a charitable remainder annuity trust, or a
charitable remainder unitrust; or
(6) the trust is a trust with respect to which a deduction was allowed under section 2522
for the amount of an interest in the form of the right to receive annual payments of
a fixed percentage of the net fair market value of the trust property (determined
yearly) and which is required to pay principal to a non-skip person if that person is
alive when the yearly payments for which the deduction was allowed terminate.
The transferor may elect not to have the automatic allocation rules apply to an indirect skip.
The election will be deemed to be timely if filed on a timely filed gift tax return for the
calendar year in which the transfer was made or deemed to have been made. The transferor
may also elect not to have the automatic allocation rules apply to any or all transfers made
to a particular trust and may elect to treat any trust as a GST trust (§ 561 of the Act).
B. Retroactive Allocation of GST Exemption.
Under the Act, a transferor may make a retroactive allocation ofGST exemption when there
is an unnatural order of death. If a lineal descendant of the transferor who is a non-skip
person predeceases the transferor, the transferor may make an allocation ofany unused GST
exemption to previous transfers to the trust on a chronological basis. The allocation,
applicable fraction and inclusion ratio will be determined based on the value ofthe property
on the date it was transferred to the trust. This provision is effective for deaths ofnon-skip
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persons after December 31, 2000 (§ 561 of the Act).
c. Severing of Trusts.
Under the Act, a trust may be severed into separate trusts through a qualified severance. A
"qualified severance"automatically is a division of a single trust and the creation under the
governing instrument or local law oftwo or more trusts if(l) the single trust was divided on
a fractional basis, and (2) the terms ofthe new trusts, in the aggregate, provide for the same
succession of interests of beneficiaries as are provided in the original trust.
If a trust has an inclusion ratio of greater than zero and less than one, a severance is a
qualified severance only if the single trust is divided into two trusts, one of which receives
a fractional share of the total value of all trust assets equal to the applicable fraction of the
single trust immediately before the severance. In that case, the trust receiving the fractional
share will have an inclusion ratio of zero and the other trust will have an inclusion ratio of
one. A severance may be made at any time after December 31, 2000 (§ 562 of the Act).
D. Modification of Valuation Rules.
For timely and automatic allocations of GST exemption to transfers made after December
31,2000, the value ofthe property transferred for purposes ofdetermining the inclusion ratio
is its value as finally determined for Federal gift or estate tax purposes. For allocations of
exemption deemed to be made at the close ofan ETIP, the value ofthe property for purposes
of determining the inclusion ratio is its value at the close of the ETIP (§ 563 of the Act).
E. Relief for Late Elections.
The Act authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to grant extensions of time to make an
election to allocate GST exemption to a transfer to a trust, and to grant exceptions to the time
requirement for such extensions, without regard to whether any limitations period has
expired. If such relief is granted, the allocation would be made using the gift tax or estate
tax value ofthe transfer to the trust at the time ofthe transfer. The Service will consider all
relevant circumstances, including evidence of intent contained in the trust instrument or
instrument of transfer, in determining whether to grant relief. This provision is effective
retroactively for requests pending on December 31, 2000 (§ 564 of the Act).
F. Substantial Compliance.
For transfers made after December 31, 2000, if a transferor demonstrates an intent to make
an allocation of GST exemption under section 2632, the transferor will be deemed to have
allocated so much of the transferor's unused GST exemption as is necessary to produce the
lowest possible inclusion ratio. The Service will consider all relevant circumstances,
including evidence of intent contained in the trust instrument or instrument of transfer, in
determining whether there has been substantial compliance (§ 564 of the Act).
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APPENDIX A
Final Regulations on the Effective
Date Rules
T.D.8912,
65 Fed. Reg. No. 245,
pp. 7~735-79740
Released December 20, 2000
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Treasury Regulation § 26.2601-1(b)(4)
(4) Retention oftrust's exempt status in the case ofmodifications, etc. -- (i) In general.
This paragraph (b)(4) provides rules for detennining when a modification, judicial construction,
settlement agreement, or trustee action with respect to a trust that is exempt from the
generation-skipping transfer tax under paragraph (b)(1), (2), or (3) of this section (hereinafter
referred to as an exempt trust) will not cause the trust to lose its exempt status. The rules contained
in this paragraph (b)(4) are applicable only for purposes of detennining whether an exempt trust
retains its exempt status for generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. The rules do not apply in
detennining, for example, whether the transaction results in a gift subject to gift tax, or may cause
the trust to be included in the gross estate ofa beneficiary, or may result in the realization ofcapital
gain for purposes of section 1001.
(A) Discretionary powers. The distribution of trust principal from an exempt trust
to a new trust or retention oftrust principal in a continuing trust will not cause the new or continuing
trust to be subject to the provisions of chapter 13, if--
(1) Either --
(i) The tenns ofthe governing instrumentofthe exempt trust authorize
distributions to the new trust or the retention of trust principal in a continuing trust, without the
consent or approval of any beneficiary or court; or
(ii) at the time the exempt trust became irrevocable, state law
authorized distributions to the new trust or retention ofprincipal in the continuing trust, without the
consent or approval of any beneficiary or court; and
(2) The tenns of the governing instrument of the new or continuing trust do
not extend the time for vesting ofany beneficial interest in the trust in a manner that may postpone
or suspend the vesting, absolute ownership, or power of alienation of an interest in property for a
period, measured from the date the original trust became irrevocable, extending beyond any life in
being at the date the original trust became irrevocable plus a period of21 years, plus ifnecessary,
a reasonable period of gestation. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(4)(i)(A), the exercise of a
trustee's distributive power that validly postpones or suspends the vesting, absolute ownership, or
power of alienation of an interest in property for a tenn of years that will not exceed 90 years
(measured from the date the original trust became irrevocable) will not be considered an exercise
that postpones or suspends vesting, absolute ownership, or the power of alienation beyond the
perpetuities period. If a distributive power is exercised by creating another power, it is deemed to
be exercised to whatever extent the second power may be exercised.
(B) Settlement. A court-approved settlement of a bona fide issue regarding the
administration of the trust or the construction of tenns of the governing instrument will not cause
an exempt trust to be subject to the provisions ofchapter 13, if --
(1) The settlement is the product of arm's length negotiations;
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(2) The settlement is within the range of reasonable outcomes under the
governing instrument and applicable state law addressing the issues resolved by the settlement. A
settlement that results in a compromise between the positions of the litigating parties and reflects
the parties' assessments of the relative strengths of their positions is a settlement that is within the
range ofreasonable outcomes.
(C) Judicial construction. A judicial construction of a governing instrument to
resolve an ambiguity in the terms of the instrument or to correct a scrivener's error will not cause
an exempt trust to be subject to the provisions of chapter 13, if --
(1) The judicial action involves a bona fide issue; and
(2) The construction is consistent with applicable state law that would be
applied by the highest court of the state.
(D) Other changes. (1) A modification of the governing instrument of an exempt
trust (including a trustee distribution, settlement, or construction that does not satisfy paragraph
(b)(4)(i)(A), (B), or (C) of this section) by judicial reformation, or nonjudicial reformation that is
valid under applicable state law, will not cause an exempt trust to be subject to the provisions of
chapter 13, ifthe modification does not shift a beneficial interest in the trust to any beneficiary who
occupies a lower generation (as defined in section 2651) than the person or persons who held the
beneficial interest prior to the modification, and the modification does not extend the time for
vesting ofany beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the original trust.
(2) For purposes ofthis section, a modification ofan exempt trust will result
in a shift in beneficial interest to a lower generation beneficiary if the modification can result in
either an increase in the amount of a GST transfer or the creation of a new GST transfer. To
determine whether a modification ofan irrevocable trust will shift a beneficial interest in a trust to
a beneficiary who occupies a lower generation, the effect of the instrument on the date of the
modification is measured against the effect of the instrument in existence immediately before the
modification. If the effect of the modification cannot be immediately determined, it is deemed to
shift a beneficial interest in the trust to a beneficiary who occupies a lower generation (as defined
in section 2651) than the person or persons who held the beneficial interest prior to the modification.
A modification that is administrative in nature that only indirectly increases the amount transferred
(for example, by lowering administrative costs or income taxes) will not be considered to shift a
beneficial interest in the trust.
(E) Examples. The following examples illustrate the application of this paragraph
(b)(4). In each example, assume that the trust established in 1980 was irrevocable for purposes of
paragraph (b)(1)(ii) ofthis section and that there have been no additions to any trust after September
25, 1985. The examples are as follows:
Example 1. Trusteespower to distributeprincipalauthorizedunder trust instrument.
In 1980, Grantor established an irrevocable trust (Trust) for the benefit of Grantor's child, A, A's
spouse, and A's issue. At the time Trust was established, A had two children, B and C. A corporate
fiduciary was designated as trustee. Under the terms of Trust, the trustee has the discretion to
distribute all or part of the trust income to one or more ofthe group consisting ofA, A's spouse or
J·27
A's issue. The trustee is also authorized to distribute all or part ofthe trust principal to one or more
trusts for the benefit of A, A's spouse, or A's issue under terms specified by the trustee in the
trustee's discretion. Any trust established under Trust, however, must terminate 21 years after the
death ofthe last child ofA to die who was alive at the time Trust was executed. Trust will terminate
on the death ofA, at which time the remaining principal will be distributed to A's issue, per stirpes.
In 2002, the trustee distributes part ofTrust's principal to a new trust for the benefit ofB and C and
their issue. The new trust will terminate 21 years after the death ofthe survivor ofB and C, at which
time the trust principal will be distributed to the issue of B and C, per stirpes. The terms of the
governing instrument ofTrust authorize the trustee to make the distribution to a new trust without
the consent or approval of any beneficiary or court. In addition, the terms of the governing
instrument ofthe new trust do not extend the time for vesting ofany beneficial interest in a manner
that may postpone or suspend the vesting, absolute ownership or power ofalienation ofan interest
in property for a period, measured from the date of creation ofTrust, extending beyond any life in
being at the date ofcreation ofTrust plus a period of21 years, plus ifnecessary, a reasonable period
of gestation. Therefore, neither Trust nor the new trust will be subject to the provisions of chapter
13 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Example 2. Trustee'spower to distributeprincipalpursuant to state statute. In 1980,
Grantor established an irrevocable trust (Trust) for the benefit ofGrantor's child, A, A's spouse, and
A's issue. At the time Trust was established, A had two children, B and C. A corporate fiduciary was
designated as trustee. Under the terms ofTrust, the trustee has the discretion to distribute all or part
ofthe trust income or principal to one or more ofthe group consisting ofA, A's spouse or A's issue.
Trust will terminate on the death ofA, at which time, the trust principal will be distributed to A's
issue, per stirpes. Under a state statute enacted after 1980 that is applicable to Trust, a trustee who
has the absolute discretion under the terms ofa testamentary instrument or irrevocable inter vivos
trust agreement to invade the principal of a trust for the benefit of the income beneficiaries of the
trust, may exercise the discretion by appointing so much or all of the principal ofthe trust in favor
ofa trustee ofa trust under an instrument other than that under which the power to invade is created,
or under the same instrument. The trustee may take the action either with consent ofall the persons
interested in the trust but without prior court approval, or with court approval, upon notice to all of
the parties. The exercise of the discretion, however, must not reduce any fixed income interest of
any income beneficiary ofthe trust and must be in favor ofthe beneficiaries ofthe trust. Under state
law prior to the enactment of the state statute, the trustee did not have the authority to make
distributions in trust. In 2002, the trustee distributes one-halfofTrust's principal to a new trust that
provides for the payment of trust income to A for life and further provides that, at A's death,
one-half of the trust remainder will pass to B or B's issue and one- half of the trust will pass to C
or C's issue. Because the state statute was enacted after Trust was created and requires the consent
of all ofthe parties, the transaction constitutes a modification ofTrust. However, the modification
does not shift any beneficial interest in Trust to a beneficiary or beneficiaries who occupy a lower
generation than the person or persons who held the beneficial interest prior to the modification. In
addition, the modification does not extend the time for vesting of any beneficial interest in Trust
beyond the period provided for in the original trust. The new trust will terminate at the same date
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provided under Trust. Therefore, neither Trust nor the new trust will be subject to the provisions of
chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Example 3. Construction ofan ambiguous term in the instrument. In 1980, Grantor
established an irrevocable trust for the benefit of Grantor's children, A and B, and their issue. The
trust is to terminate on the death of the last to die of A and B, at which time the principal is to be
distributed to their issue. However, the provision governing the termination ofthe trust is ambiguous
regarding whether the trust principal is to be distributed per stirpes, only to the children ofA and
B, or per capita among the children, grandchildren, and more remote issue ofA and B. In 2002, the
trustee files a construction suit with the appropriate local court to resolve the ambiguity. The court
issues an order construing the instrument to provide for per capita distributions to the children,
grandchildren, and more remote issue ofA and B living at the time the trust terminates. The court's
construction resolves a bona fide issue regarding the proper interpretation of the instrument and is
consistent with applicable state law as it would be interpreted by the highest court of the state.
Therefore, the trust will not be subject to the provisions ofchapter 13 ofthe Internal Revenue Code.
Example 4. Change in trust situs. In 1980, Grantor, who was domiciled in State X,
executed an irrevocable trust for the benefit of Grantor's issue, naming a State X bank as trustee.
Under the terms of the trust, the trust is to terminate, in all events, no later than 21 years after the
death ofthe last to die ofcertain designated individuals living at the time the trust was executed. The
provisions ofthe trust do not specify that any particular state law is to govern the administration and
construction of the trust. In State X, the common law rule against perpetuities applies to trusts. In
2002, a State Y bank is named as sole trustee. The effect ofchanging trustees is that the situs ofthe
trust changes to State Y, and the laws of State Y govern the administration and construction of the
trust. State Y law contains no rule against perpetuities. In this case, however, in view of the terms
ofthe trust instrument, the trust will terminate at the same time before and after the change in situs.
Accordingly, the change in situs does not shift any beneficial interest in the trust to a beneficiary
who occupies a lower generation (as defined in section 2651) than the person or persons who held
the beneficial interest prior to the transfer.~Furthermore,the change in situs does not extend the time
for vesting of any beneficial interest in the trust beyond that provided for in the original trust.
Therefore, the trust will not be subject to the provisions ofchapter 13 ofthe Internal Revenue Code.
If, in this example, as a result of the change in situs, State Y law governed such that the time for
vesting was extended beyond the period prescribed under the terms ofthe original trust instrument,
the trust would not retain exempt status.
Example 5. Division ofa trust. In 1980, Grantor established an irrevocable trust for
the benefit ofhis two children, A and B, and their issue. Under the terms ofthe trust, the trustee has
the discretion to distribute income and principal to A, B, and their issue in such amounts as the
trustee deems appropriate. On the death of the last to die of A and B, the trust principal is to be
distributed to the living issue ofA and B, per stirpes. In 2002, the appropriate local court approved
the division of the trust into two equal trusts, one for the benefit ofA and A's issue and one for the
benefit ofB and B's issue. The trust for A and A's issue provides that the trustee has the discretion
to distribute trust income and principal to A and A's issue in such amounts as the trustee deems
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appropriate. On A's death, the trust principal is to be distributed equally to A's issue, per stirpes. If
A dies with no living descendants, the principal will be added to the trust for B and B's issue. The
trust for B and B's issue is identical (except for the beneficiaries), and terminates at B's death at
which time the trust principal is to be distributed equally to B's issue, per stirpes. IfB dies with no
living descendants, principal will be added to the trust for A and A's issue. The division ofthe trust
into two trusts does not shift any beneficial interest in the trust to a beneficiary who occupies a lower
generation (as defined in section 2651) than the person or persons who held the beneficial interest
prior to the division. In addition, the division does not extend the time for vesting ofany beneficial
interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the original trust. Therefore, the two
partitioned trusts resulting from the division will not be subject to the provisions of chapter 13 of
the Internal Revenue Code.
Example 6. Merger oftwo trusts. In 1980, Grantor established an irrevocable trust
for Grantor's child and the child's issue. In 1983, Grantor's spouse also established a separate
irrevocable trust for the benefit of the same child and issue. The terms of the spouse's trust and
Grantor's trust are identical. In 2002, the appropriate local court approved the merger of the two
trusts into one trust to save administrative costs and enhance the management of the investments.
The merger of the two trusts does not shift any beneficial interest in the trust to a beneficiary who
occupies a lower generation (as defined in section 2651) than the person or persons who held the
beneficial interest prior to the merger. In addition, the merger does not extend the time for vesting
ofany beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the original trust. Therefore,
the trust that resulted from the merger will not be subject to the provisions of chapter 13 of the
Internal Revenue Code.
Example 7. Modification that does not shift an interest to a lower generation. In
1980, Grantor established an irrevocable trust for the benefit ofGrantor's grandchildren, A, B, and
c. The trust provides that income is to be paid to A, B, and C, in equal shares for life. The trust
further provides that, upon the death ofthe first grandchild to die, one-third ofthe principal is to be
distributed to that grandchild's issue, per stirpes. Upon the death of the second grandchild to die,
one-half of the remaining trust principal is to be distributed to that grandchild's issue, per stirpes,
and upon the death of the last grandchild to die, the remaining principal is to be distributed to that
grandchild's issue, per stirpes. In 2002, A became disabled. Subsequently, the trustee, with the
consent ofB and C, petitioned the appropriate local court and the court approved a modification of
the trust that increased A's share oftrust income. The modification does not shift a beneficial interest
to a lower generation beneficiary because the modification does not increase the amount of a GST
transfer under the original trust or create the possibility that new GST transfers not contemplated
in the original trust may be made. In this case, the modification will increase the amount payable
to A who is a member of the same generation as B and C. In addition, the modification does not
extend t~e time for vesting ofany beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in
the original trust. Therefore, the trust as modified will not be subject to the provisions ofchapter 13
of the Internal Revenue Code. However, the modification increasing A's share of trust income is a
transfer by B and C to A for Federal gift tax purposes.
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Example 8. Conversion ofincome interest into unitrust interest. In 1980, Grantor
established an irrevocable trust under the tenns ofwhich trust income is payable to A for life and,
upon A's death, the remainder is to pass to A's issue, per stirpes. In 2002, the appropriate local court
approves a modification to the trust that converts A's income interest into the right to receive the
greater of the entire income of the trust or a fixed percentage of the trust assets valued annually
(unitrust interest) to be paid each year to A for life. The modification does not result in a shift in
beneficial interest to a beneficiary who occupies a lower generation (as defined in section 2651 ) than
the person or persons who held the beneficial interest prior to the modification. In this case, the
modification can only operate to increase the amount distributable to A and decrease the amount
distributable to A's issue. In addition, the modification does not extend the time for vesting of any
beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the original trust. Therefore, the
trust will not be subject to the provisions of chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Example 9. Allocation ofcapital gain to income. In 1980, Grantor established an
irrevocable trust under the tenns ofwhich trust income is payable to Grantor's child, A, for life, and
upon A's death, the remainder is to pass to A's issue, per stirpes. Under applicable state law, unless
the governing instrument provides otherwise, capital gain is allocated to principal. In 2002, the trust
is modified to allow the trustee to allocate capital gain to the income. The modification does not
shift any beneficial interest in the trust to a beneficiary who occupies a lower generation (as defined
in section 2651) than the person or persons who held the beneficial interest prior to the modification.
In this case, the modification can only have the effect of increasing the amount distributable to A,
and decreasing the amount distributable to A's issue. In addition, the modification does not extend
the time for vesting of any beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the
original trust. Therefore, the trust will not be subject to the provisions of chapter 13 of the Internal
Revenue Code.
Example 10. Administrative change to terms ofa trust. In 1980, Grantor executed
an irrevocable trust for the benefit of Grantor's issue, naming a bank and five other individuals as
trustees. In 2002, the appropriate local court approves a modification ofthe trust that decreases the
number of trustees which results in lower administrative costs. The modification pertains to the
administration ofthe trust and does not shift a beneficial interest in the trust to any beneficiary who
occupies a lower generation (as defined in section 2651) than the person or persons who held the
beneficial interest prior to the modification. In addition, the modification does not extend the time
for vesting ofany beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the original trust.
Therefore, the trust will not be subject to the provisions ofchapter 13 ofthe Internal Revenue Code.









.1 Regardless ofother provisions herein to the contrary, whenever a trust would have
an inclusion ratio ofother than zero, after any intended allocation to the trust ofgeneration skipping
tax ("GST") exemption, on account of an allocation or addition ofassets to the trust, then, prior to
such allocation or addition (and any intended application ofGST exemption), Trustee will divide
the trust (and/or the assets to be allocated or added to it) into two separate parts, each to be
administered as a separate trust upon tenns identical with those of the original trust. One separate
trust (after any intended allocation of GST exemption) will have an inclusion ratio of zero (the
"GST Exempt Trust") and the other separate trust will have an inclusion ratio ofmore than zero (the
"GST Non-Exempt Trust"). The GST Exempt Trust and GST Non-Exempt Trust created from an
original trust will be referred to as "related trusts."
.2 In addition, and regardless of other provisions herein to the contrary, Trustee will
have authority to:
A. Make distributions ofincome and principal from related trusts, including upon
the tennination of related trusts, from a GST Exempt Trust to skip persons and from a GST Non-
Exempt Trust to non-skip persons, so as to maximize the total assets from the related trusts which
the beneficiaries ofthe related trusts eventually will receive after payment ofall applicable transfer
taxes; and
B. Pay federal and state transfer taxes payable from or on account ofone or both
of the related trusts from a GST Non-Exempt Trust to the extent possible.
.3 The definitions of"inclusion ratio," "GST exemption," "skip persons," and "non-skip








Sample Form 706 - Notice of GST Allocation and Reverse QTIP Election
Francis J. Smith 2001 Form 706
Assume:
1. Francis J. Smith dies on May 1, 2001 with a net estate of2,000,000 and without having used
any ofhis GST Exemption during his lifetime.
2. According to the tenns ofFrancis' will, the residue ofhis estate is added to his revocable
trust agreement. The trust contains a marital deduction formula which provides for a fixed
Fund A with the residue to Fund B.
3. The trust authorizes the trustee to divide the trust into separate trusts, one with an inclusion
ratio of0, and one with an inclusion ratio of 1.
4. The estate tax return is timely filed.
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Form 706 Rev. 7-99
ranC1S J. ~ tlule R-Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax
Note: To avoid application of the deemed allocation rules, Form 706 and Schedule R should be filed to allocate the GST exemption
to trusts that may later have taxable terminations or distributions under section 2612 even if the form is not required to be
filed to report estate or GST tax.
The GST tax is imposed on taxable transfers of interests in property located outside the United States as well as property
located inside the United States.
See instructions beginning on page 19.
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Part 1.-GST Exemption Reconciliation (Section 2631) and Section 2652(a)(3) (Special QTIP) Election
You no longer need to check a box to make a section 2652(a)(3) (special QTIP) election. If you
list qualifying property in Part 1, line 9, below, you will be considered to have made this election.
See page 21 of the separate instructions for details.
1 Maximum allowable GST exemption 1 1 060 000
2 Total GST exemption allocated by the decedent against decedent's lifetime transfers
3 Total GST exemption allocated by the executor, using Form 709, against decedent's lifetime
transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
3
4 GST exemption allocated on line 6 of Schedule R, Part 2 4
5 GST exemption allocated on line 6 of Schedule R, Part 3 5
6 Total GST exemption allocated on line 4 of Schedule(s) R-1 6
7 Total GST exemption allocated to intervivos transfers and direct skips (add lines 2-6)
8 GST exemption available to allocate to trusts and section 2032A interests (subtract line 7 from
line 1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



























6/2/95 - Fund A
Reverse QTIP 61-0000002 385,000 0.000
10 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . .....-,;90=---.lL.-__~ _90 Total. May not exceed line 8, above
10 GST exemption available to allocate to section 2032A interests received by individual beneficiaries
subtract line 90 from line 8 . You must attach s ecial use allocation schedule see instructions
(The instructions to Schedule R are in the separate instructions.) Schedule R-Page 33
SCHEDULE R, Part I
Attachment
ESTATE OF FRANCIS J. SMITH
DOD: 05-01-01
Attached to and Made Part ofUnited States
Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return
ofFrancis J. Smith, Deceased
SSN: 000-11-2222
A. Francis J. Smith Revocable Trust
Article 4 of the Francis J. Smith Revocable Trust under agreement dated June 1, 1995,
divides the trust into two separate trusts, Fund A and Fund B, both for the primary benefit of his
wife, Kelly S. Smith, who survived him. At the death ofKelly S. Smith, the remaining assets ofthe
Fund A trust and the Fund B trust will be divided into equal shares, one for each then living child
ofFrancis J. Smith and one for each deceased child with descendants then living. Francis J. Smith
had three children living on the date ofhis death, and no child predeceased him. Each child's share
will continue in trust through the child's life and will tenninate after the child's death when the
youngest then living child of the deceased child is 25.
Pursuant to the executor's authority, the executor hereby makes the following allocation of
GST exemption (as defined above) to the Fund B Trust:
1. The executor hereby allocates to the Fund B Trust the smallest amount of GST
exemption necessary to produce an inclusion ratio that is as close as possible to°or ifpossible, that
is equal to 0. Based on the values as returned, the amount of GST exemption allocated hereby is
$675,000. This is a fonnula allocation that will change ifvalues are changed on audit.
B. Francis J. Smith Revocable Trust Fund A
Paragraph 12.1 authorizes the trustee to divide the Fund A trust into two separate trusts: one
ofthese trusts (to be known as the Fund A Reverse QTIP Trust) will be exempt from the generation-
skipping transfer tax because GST exemption is being allocated to it on Part 1 of Schedule R to
derive an inclusion ratio of "0" for that trust, and one of these trusts (to be known as the Fund A
J·38
Trust) will not be exempt from the generation-skipping transfer tax and will have an inclusion ratio
of"!".
Pursuant to the trustee's authority, the Fund A trust will be divided as follows:
1. On the date of division, a "fraction" (as defined in 2 below) of the property in the
trust at the time ofdivision will be designated for the Fund A Reverse QTIP Trust.
2. The "fraction" will have as its numerator the balance ofFrancis J. Smith's Available
GST Exemption (as defined below in 5) on his date of death less the amount of such exemption
allocated to the Fund B Trust. The fraction will have as its denominator the date ofdeath value (for
purposes of the federal estate tax) of the trust minus any federal estate tax and any state death tax
incurred by reason of the death of Francis J. Smith that is chargeable to the trust and actually
recovered from such trust.
3. The rest ofthe property in the trust on the date ofdivision will be designated·for the
Fund A Trust.
4. Each of the two trusts will be funded with a fractional share of each and every
substantial interest and right held by the trust.
5. "Available GST Exemption" refers to the amount equal to the GST exemption
provided in section 2631(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, that has not been
allocated by Francis J. Smith, by his executor (as provided in A. and B. above) or by operation of
law, to property transferred by Francis J. Smith during his lifetime.
6. The executorhereby allocates to the Fund A Reverse QTIP Trust the smallest amount
of GST exemption necessary to produce an inclusion ratio that is as close as possible to 0 or if
possible, that is equal to O. Based on the values as returned, the amount ofGST exemption allocated




Private Letter Ruling 200125040
Issued: June 22, 2001
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We received your submissions dated November 21,2000 and December 12,
2000, requesting (1) a ruling that the severance of Trust 1 into two separate trusts
pursuant to § 26.2654-1 (b)(1) of the Generation Skipping Transfer (GST) Tax
Regulations will be recognized for GST tax purposes; and (2) an extension of time
under § 301.9100 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations to make a "reverse"
qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) election under § 2652(a)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code with respect to the assets in Trust 3. This letter responds to your
request.
Decedent executed a trust agreement on Date 1 and amended the terms of the
trust agreement on Date 2, Date 3, and Date 4. Decedent executed a will on Date 5.
Decedent died testate on Date 6, survived by Spouse. Decedent's estate timely filed
the Federal Estate and Generation Skipping Transfer Tax Return (Form 706) on Date 7.
Article 5. 1 of Decedent's will directs that the residue of Decedent's estate,
including all lapsed legacies (but excluding property over which Decedent has a power
of appointment), is to be bequeathed to the t~,en acting trustee, as trustee, to be added
to and administered under the terms of the trust agreement signed by Decedent on
Date 1, and as amended to the date of Decedent's death.
Article 4.2 of the trust agreement provides that the trustee will allocate to Trust 2
a sum equal to the largest amount that can pass free of federal estate tax by reason of
the unified credit, after taking account of any adjusted taxable gifts made by Decedent,
and the state death tax credit allowable to Decedent's estate but no other credit,
reduced by the following:
(a) payments from or charges to the principal of Decedent's es~ate or this
trust that are not allowed as deductions in computing the amount of federal
estate taxes on Decedent's estate; and




Decedent's gross estate which pass in a manner that will not qualify for the
marital or charitable deductions.
The remaining trust property, or all of the trust property if there is no property allocated
to Trust 2, will be allocated to Trust 1. In making the computation to separate the trust
property, values as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes will control.
Article 5.5 of the trust agreement provides that upon Spouse's death, any
remaining income [from Trust 1] will be paid to Spouse's estate and the remaining
principal [of Trust 1] will be added to the principal of Trust 2.
Article 11.1 of the trust agreement provides that regardless of other provisions
herein to the contrary, the trustee will divide property held in any trust with a generation
skipping inclusion ratio of less than 100%·into separate fractional trusts, each to have
an inclusion ratio of 1000/0 or zero. Each such trust will be administered as a separate'
trust.
On Schedule M of Decedent's Form 706, Executrix made a QTIP election for
Trust 1. However, Executrix did not make a reverse QTIP election with respect to
Trust 1 and did not allocate Decedent's GST exemption. At the death of Decedent,
Trust 2 was not funded because Decedent's unified credit was exhausted otherwise.
Trust 1 was not severed prior to the date prescribed for filing the Form 706 and the
Form 706 did not contain a statement that Trust 1 would be severed.
Executrix, who had no knowledge or experience with estate tax matters, hired a
certified public accounting ("CPA") firm to file the Form 706 and accompanying
schedules. The CPA firm spends a significant amount of its practice in estate planning
and tax administration. The CPA firm was aware of all relevant facts regarding the
estate tax matters of Decedent's estate. The CPA firm admitted that it completed the
Form 706, Schedule M, but failed to prepare Schedule R to make the reverse QTIP
election, even though the estate intended to make the reverse QTIP election.
It is represented that Decedent allocated $g of Decedent's GST exemption
against Decedent's lifetime transfers. In addition, because Decedent bequeathed $Q. to
Decedent's grandson A, $12 of Decedent's G'ST e~emption is deemed allocated to that
direct skip to Decedent's grandson A. Therefore, it is represented that $.Q of Decedent's
GST exemption is available for further allocation.
You now propose to sever Trust 1 into,two trusts, Trust 3 and Trust 4. Trust 3




You have requested (1) a ruling that a severance of Trust 1 into Trust 3, a trust
with an inclusion ratio of zero, and Trust 4, a trust with an inclusion ratio of one. will be
recognized for GST tax purposes; and (2) an extension of time to make a reverse QTIP
election for Trust 3.
Section 2001 (a) imposes a tax on the transfer of the taxable estate of every
decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States.
Section 2056(a) provides that, for purposes of the tax imposed by § 2001, the
value of the taxable estate is determined, except as limited by § 2056(b), by deducting
from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in
property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse but
only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross
estate.
Section 2056(b)(7)(A) provides that in the case of qualified terminable interest
property -
(i) for purposes of § 2056(a), such property is treated as passing to the
sU.fviving spouse, and
(ii) for purposes of § 2056(b)(1)(A). no part of such property is treated as
passing to any person other'than the surviving spouse.
Section 2056(b)(7)(B)(i) provides that,in general, the term "qualified terminable
interest property" means property -
(I) which passes from the decedent,
(II) in which the surviving spouse has a qualifying iflcome interest for life,
and
(III) to which an election under § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) applies.
Section 2044(a) provides that the value of the gross estate shall include the
value of any property to which this section applies in which the decedent had a
qualifying income interest for life.
Section 2044(b)(1) provides that § 2044 applies to any property if a deduction





Section 2044(c) provides that for purposes of chapter 11 and chapter 13,
property includible in the gross estate of the decedent under § 2044(a) shall be treated
as property passing from the decedent.
Section 2601 imposes a tax on every generation-skipping transfer, defined in
§ 2611 as a taxable distribution, a taxable termination, and a direct skip.
Section 2652(a) provides in part that for purposes of this chapter-
(1) Except as provided in this subsection or § 2653(a), the term
"transferor" includes, in the case of any property subject to the tax imposed by
chapter 11, the decedent.
An individual shall be treated as transferring any property with respect to which
such individual is the transferor.
(3) In the case of any trust with respect to which a deduction is allowed to
the decedent under § 2056(b)(7), the estate of the decedent may elect to treat all
of the property in such trust for purposes of this chapter as if the election to be
treated as qualified terminable interest property had not been made.
Section 2631 (a) provides that, for purposes of determining the inclusion ratio,
every individual is allowed a GST exemption of $1,000,000 which may be allocated by
such individual (or his executor) to any property with respect to which such individual is
the transferor.
Section 2631(b) provides that any allocation under § 2631 (a), once made, is
irrevocable.
Section 2632(a)(1) provides that any allocation by an individual of his GST
exemption under § 2631(a) may be made at any time on or before the date prescribed
for filing the estate tax return for such individual's estate (determined with regard to
extensions), regardless of whether such a return is required to be filed.
Section 2632(c)(1) provides that any portion of an individual's GST exemption
that has not been allocated within the time prescribed by § 2632(a) is deemed to be
allocated as follows -





(8) second, to trusts with respect to which such individual is the transferor
and from which a taxable distribution or a taxable termination might occur at or
after such individual's death.
Section 26.2632-1 (d)(2) of the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Regulations
provides that a decedent's unused GST exemption is automatically allocated on the
due date for filing Form 706 or Form 706NA to the extent not otherwise allocated by the
decedent's executor on or before that date. The automatic allocation occurs whether or
not a return is actually required to be filed. Unused GST exemption is allocated pro
rata (subject to the rules of § 26.2642-2(b», on the basis of the value of the property as
finally determined for purposes of chapter 11 (chapter 11 value), first to direct skips
treated as occurring at the transferor's death. The balance, if any, of unused GST
exemption is allocated pro rata (subject to the rules of § 26.2642-2(b» on the basis of
the chapter 11 value of the nonexempt portion of the trust property (or in the case of
trusts that are not included in the gross estate, on the basis of the date of death value
of the trust) to trusts with respect to which a taxable termination may occur or from
which a taxable distribution may be made. The automatic allocation of GST exemption
is irrevocable, and an allocation made by the executor after the automatic allocation is
made is ineffective. No automatic allocation of GST exemption is made to a trust that
will have a new transferor with respect to the entire trust prior to the occurrence of any
GST with respect to the trust. In addition, no automatic allocation of GST exemption is
made to a trust if, during the nine month period ending immediately after the death of
the transferor -
(i) No GST has occurred with respect to the trusts; and
(ii) At the end of such period no future GST can occur with respect to the
trust.
Section 26.2652-2(b) provides in part that a reverse QTIP election is made on
the return on which the QTIP election is made.
Section 26.2654-1(b)(1) provides in part that the severance of a trust that is
included in the transferor's gross estate (or created under the transferor's will) into two
or more trusts is recognized for purposes of chapter 13 if -
(i) The trust is severed pursuant to a direction in the governing instrument
providing that the trust is to be divided upon the death of the transferor; or
(ii) The governing instrument does not require or otherwise direct
severance but the trust is severed pursuant to discretionary authority granted




(A) The terms of each of the new trusts provide in the aggregate
fractions for the same succession of interests and beneficiaries as are
provided in the original trust;
(B) The severance occurs (or a reformation proceeding, if required,
is commenced) prior to the date prescribed for filing the Federal estate tax
return (including extensions actually granted) for the estate of the
transferor; and
(C) (1) The new trusts are severed on a fractional basis. If severed
on a fractional basis, the separate trusts need not be funded with a pro
rata portion of each asset held by the undivided trust. The trusts may be
funded on a nonpro rata basis provided funding is based on either the fair
market value of the assets on the date of funding or in a manner that fairly
reflects the net appreciation 'or depreciation in the value of the assets
measured from the valuation date to the date of funding.
Section 301.9100-1(c) of the Procedure and Administration Regulations provides
that the Commissioner in exercising the Commissioner's discretion may grant a
reasonable extension of time under the rules set forth in §§ 301.9100-2 and 301.9100-3
to make a regulatory election, or a statutory election (but no more than 6 months except
in the case of a taxpayer who is abroad), under all subtitles of the Internal Revenue
Code except subtitles E, G, H, and I.
Section 301.9100-2 provides automatic extensions of time for certain elections.
Section 301.91 00-3(a) provides that, in general, requests for extensions of time
for regulatory elections that do not meet the requirements of § 301.9100-2 must be
made under the rules of § 301.9100-3. Requests for relief subject to this section will be
granted when the taxpayer provides the evidence to establish to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that the taxpayer acted reasonably and in good faith, and the grant of
relief will not prejudice the interests of the Government.
Section 301.9100-3(b)(1) provides that except as provided in paragraphs (b)(3)(i)
through (iii) of this section, a taxpayer is deemed to have acted reasonably and in good
faith if the taxpayer -
(i) Requests relief under this section before the failure to make the
regulatory election is discovered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS);





(iii) Failed to make the electiqn because, after exercising reasonable
diligence (taking into account the taxpayer's experience and the complexity of
the return or issue), the taxpayer was unaware of the necessity for the election;
(iv) Reasonably relied on the written advice of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS); or
(V) Reasonably relied on a qualified tax professional, including a tax
professional employed by the taxpayer, and the tax professional failed to make,
or advise the taxpayer to make, the election.
Section 301.91 00-3(b)(2) provides that a taxpayer will not be considered to have
reasonably relied on a qualified tax professional if the taxpayer knew or should have
known that the professional was not (i) Competent to render advice on the regulatory
election; or (ii) Aware of all relevant facts.
Section 301.91 00-3(c)(1 )(i) provides in part that the interests of the Government
are prejudiced if granting relief would result in a taxpayer having a lower tax liability in
the aggregate for all taxable years affected by the' election than the taxpayer would
have had if the election had been timely made (taking into account the time value of
money).
Based on the facts submitted and representations made, we conclude that the
requirements of § 26.2654-1 have been met in this case. Therefore, we conclude that
the severance of Trust 1 into Trust 3 and Trust 4, as provided, will be recognized for
GST tax purposes. We grant an extension of time to sever Trust 1 into Trust 3 and
Trust 4 within 60 days after the date of thiS letter. Based on the facts submitted and
representations made, we conclude that the requirements of § 301.9100-3 have been
met in this case. We grant an extension of time to make a reverse QTIP election for
Trust 3 under § 2652(a)(3) until 30 days after the d~ate of this letter. The extension of
time to make the reverse QTIP election under § 2652(a)(3) does not extend the time to
make an allocation- of any remaining GST exemptions. Consequently, Decedent's




Except as specifically ruled herein, we express or imply no opinion concerning
the federal tax consequences of this transaction under the cited provisions or any other
provisions of the Code.
This ruling is directed only to the taxpayer(s) requesting it. Section 611 O(k)(3) of





(Passthroughs and Special Industries)
Enclosure: Copy for § 6110 purposes
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Sample Notices of GST Exemption Allocation
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NOTICE OF GST EXEMPTION ALLOCATION
2000 GIFT TAX RETURN
The taxpayer is timely filing a Fonn 709 for gifts made in 2000 and allocates GST
Exemption of $ to those gifts. The taxpayer hereby states the following regarding his
2000 GST Exemption allocation:
The allocation ofGST Exemption on Schedule C, Part 2 is based on values set forth in the
2000 Fonn 709. The taxpayer believes that the amount ofGST Exemption necessary to create an
inclusion ratio ofzero is $ . The taxpayer hereby allocates to the Trust Name (EIN #-----)
listed on Fonn 709, Schedule A, Part 1, Items , the smallest amount ofthe taxpayer's
GST Exemption necessary to produce an inclusion ratio (IRC § 2642(a» which is closest to, or if
possible, equal to zero for the portion ofeach trust ofwhich taxpayer is considered transferor. This
is a fonnula allocation which will change ifvalues are changed on audit.
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NOTICE OF GST EXEMPTION ALLOCATION
2000 GIFT TAX RETURN
The taxpayer is timely filing a Form 709 for gifts made in 2000 and allocates GST
Exemption of $ to those gifts. The taxpayer hereby states the following regarding her
2000 GST Exemption allocation:
The allocation ofGST Exemption on Schedule C, Part 2 is based on values set forth in the
2000 Form 709. The taxpayer believes that the amount ofGST Exemption necessary to create an
inclusion ratio ofzero is $ . The taxpayer hereby allocates to the Trust Name (EIN #-----)
listed on Form 709, Schedule A, Part 1, Items , of the 2000 Form 709 filed by
Donor's Name, the smallest amount of the taxpayer's GST Exemption necessary to produce an
inclusion ratio (IRC § 2642(a» which is closest to, or if possible, equal to zero for the portion of
each trust ofwhich taxpayer is considered transferor. This is a formula allocation which will change
ifvalues are changed on audit.
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NOTICE OF LATE GST EXEMPTION ALLOCATION
199_ (- 199--> GIFT TAX RETURN(S)
The taxpayer is filing a Fonn 709 for gifts made in 199_, (199_ and 199--> and allocates
GST Exemption of $ to those gifts. The taxpayer hereby states the following regarding
his GST Exemption allocation:
The allocation ofGST Exemption on Schedule C, Part 2 is based on the present value ofthe
gifts set forth in the 199_ Fonn 709. The taxpayer believes that the amount ofGST Exemption
necessary to create an inclusion ratio of zero is $ . The taxpayer hereby allocates to the
Trust Name (EIN #-----) listed on his 199_ Fonn 709, Schedule A, Part 1, Items _
the smallest amount ofthe taxpayer's GST Exemption necessary to produce an inclusion ratio (IRC
§ 2642(a» which is closest to, or if possible, equal to zero for the portion of each trust of which
taxpayer is considered transferor. This is a fonnula allocation which will change if values are
changed on audit.
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NOTICE OF LATE GST EXEMPTION ALLOCATION
199_ (- 199~ GIFT TAX RETURN(S)
The taxpayer is filing a Fonn 709 for gifts made in 199_, (199_ and 199~ and allocates
GST Exemption of $ to those gifts. The taxpayer hereby states the following regarding
her GST Exemption allocation:
The allocation ofGST Exemption on Schedule C, Part 2 is based on the present value ofthe
gifts set forth in the 199_ Fonn 709. The taxpayer believes that the amount of GST Exemption
necessary to create an inclusion ratio of zero is $ . The taxpayer hereby allocates to the
Trust Name (EIN #-----) listed on Fonn 709, Schedule A, Part 1, Items ofthe 199
Fonn 709 filed by Donor's Name, the smallest amount ofthe taxpayer's GST Exemption necessary
to produce an inclusion ratio (IRe § 2642(a)) which is closest to, or ifpossible, equal to zero for the
portion ofeach trust ofwhich taxpayer is considered transferor. This is a fonnula allocation which
will change ifvalues are changed on audit.
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Sample Notice for a Late Allocation to Insurance Trust




NOTICE OF LATE GST EXEMPTION ALLOCATION
1998 - 1999 GIFT TAX RETURNS
The taxpayer is filing a Fonn 709 for gifts made in 1998 and 1999 and allocates GST
Exemption of $0 to those gifts. The taxpayer hereby states the following regarding his GST
Exemption allocation:
Francis J. Smith Irrevocable Trust dated September 1, 1998




The allocation ofGST Exemption on Schedule C, Part 2 is based on the present value ofthe
gifts set forth in the 1998 and 1999 Fonn 709. The taxpayer believes that the amount of GST
Exemption necessary to create an inclusion ratio ofzero is $474. The taxpayer hereby allocates to
the trust listed on his 1998 and 1999 Fonn 709, Schedule A, Part 1, Item 1 the smallest amount of
the taxpayer's GST Exemption necessary to produce an inclusion ratio (IRC § 2642(a» which is
closest to, or ifpossible, equal to zero for the portion ofeach trust ofwhich taxpayer is considered
transferor. This is a fonnula allocation which will change ifvalues are changed on audit.
I. Total Transfers to Trust
Gifts to this trust by the taxpayer were made on October 1, 1998 of$1 ,000, October 1, 1999
of $1,000, and October 1, 2000 of $1,000. The allocation on this Notice to the trust will only
include the portion of the trust's property attributable to property added to the trust in 1998 and
1999. GST exemption is not allocated on this return to the trust property attributable to the transfer
to the trust in 2000. Such allocation will be made on a timely filed return in 2001.
The portion ofthe trust attributable to the 1998 and 1999 gifts (which are all ofthe transfers
made before 2000) is a fraction of the trust valued on the date of the GST exemption allocation,
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December 1, 2000. The numerator of the fraction is the value of the trust immediately before the
2000 gift was made, and the denominator of the fraction is the value of the trust immediately after
the 2000 gift was made.
II. Calculation ofFraction Attributable to pre-2000 Transfers
The numerator of the fraction is the sum of the value of the assets of the trust immediately
before the 2000 gift was made on October 1, 2000. The asset then in the trust was XYZ Life
Insurance Company whole life insurance policy number 1234567 (the "policy"). The value of the
policy on October 1, 2000 was $500. The numerator is $500.
The denominator is the sum ofthe numerator, $500, and the value ofthe addition to the trust
of$I,OOO on October 1, 2000, or $1,500. The fraction is $500/ $1,500, or 0.333.
III. Value ofTrust on Date ofGST Allocation
For purposes of valuing the trust assets, the taxpayer elects under Treasury Regulation §
26.2642-2(a)(2) to treat the allocation as having been made on December 1, 2000. The trust asset
on December 1, 2000 is the life insurance policy. The value of the policy and, therefore, the total
value of the trust on the date of allocation is $1,422. (A copy ofFonn 712 is attached hereto.)
IV. Calculation ofGST Allocated Based on Values as Returned
Based on values as returned, applying the fraction, 0.333 to the value ofthe trust on the date
of allocation, $1,422, the value of the portion of the trust attributable to the 1998 and 1999 gifts is
$474.
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NOTICE OF LATE GST EXEMPTION ALLOCATION
1997 - 1999 GIFT TAX RETURNS
The taxpayer is filing a Form 709 for gifts made in 1997, 1998 and 1999 and allocates GST
Exemption of $6,728 to those gifts. The taxpayer hereby states the following regarding his GST
Exemption allocation:
The allocation ofGST Exemption on Schedule C, Part 2 is based on the present value ofthe
gifts set forth in the 1996 Form 709. The taxpayer believes that the amount of GST Exemption
necessary to create an inclusion ratio ofzero is $6,728. The taxpayer hereby allocates to the Francis
J. Smith Irrevocable Trust Agreement dated August 1, 1996 (EIN #61-0000004) listed on his 1996
Form 709, Schedule A, Part 1, Item 1 the smallest amount of the taxpayer's GST Exemption
necessary to produce an inclusion ratio (IRe § 2642(a» which is closest to, or ifpossible, equal to
zero for the portion of each trust of which taxpayer is considered transferor. This is a formula
allocation which will change if values are changed on audit.
CALCULATION OF ADDITIONAL GST EXEMPTION ALLOCATED
Total contributions made to Trust in 1996:
GST Exemption allocated on 1996 Gift
Returns ofFrancis J. and Kelly S. Smith:
Annual exclusion gifts made to Trust
after 1996:
Cash gifts for 1997
Cash gifts for 1998







GST Exemption allocated for 1997-99:
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$ o
Total contributions as ofOctober 1, 2000:
GST Exempt (75.0%)
GST Non-Exempt (25.0%)
Value ofTrust as of October 1, 2000:
GST Exempt Amount:
$30,000 x 75.0% =
GST Non-Exempt Amount
$30,000 x 25.0% =













CLOSE OF ESTATE TAX INCLUSION PERIOD
FOR 1992 GIFT
Kelly S. Smith Irrevocable Trust dated September 1, 1992






Francis J. Smith, Jr., Trustee
100 Oak Tree Lane
Louisville, Kentucky 40200
On September 1, 1992, the taxpayer created a grantor retained annuity trust ("GRAT"). The
taxpayer reported her gift to this trust on Schedule A, Part 1, Item 4 of the taxpayer's timely filed
Fonn 709 for 1992. According to the tenns ofthe trust, the taxpayer received an annuity payment
equal to 18.55% of the initial fair market value of the trust assets for a period of 8 years. The
taxpayer's interest in this trust tenninated on September 1, 2000, due to the expiration ofthe eight-
year period, and the trust assets were distributed in fee among the taxpayer's descendants, including
her granddaughter, Maria A. Smith.
Pursuant to section 2642(t)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code, the value for purposes of
allocating the taxpayer's GST exemption is the value of the trust on the date of the close of the
estate tax inclusion period, in this case, September 1, 2000. On that date, the trust assets consisted
ofa 50% undivided interest in real estate located in Louisville, Kentucky valued at $500,000. (An
appraisal of the real estate is attached hereto.)
The taxpayer's granddaughter received 20% ofthese assets, or a 10% undivided interest in
the real estate as a-whole. This 10% interest is valued at $50,000 ($500,000 x 10%). The amount
of GST Exemption being allocated to this gift is $50,000.
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Sample Form 709 - Timely Allocation of GST Exemption to Trust
Francis J. and Kelly S. Smith 2000 Form 709
Assume:
1. Three children, C. D. Smith, Francis J. Smith, Jr., and Katharine E. Smith; and three
grandchildren, Maria A. Smith, Lourdes E. Smith, and Andrew C. Smith.
2. Francis makes all gifts and Kelly consents to split gifts. No previous taxable gifts have been
made by either spouse.
3. Gift of $10,000 in cash to three children, Maria, Lourdes, and section 2503(c) trust for
Andrew.
4. Gift of $65,000 of marketable securities to irrevocable trust which is subject to the
withdrawal rights of Kelly ($5,000) and descendants. Trustee has the discretion to pay
income and principal among Kelly and descendants pursuant to ascertainable standards.
GST exemption will be allocated to the trust.
5. Timely filed gift tax return for 2000 gifts.
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Form 709 United States Gift (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return
(Section 6019 of the Internal Revenue Code) (For gifts made during calendar year 2000)
OMS No. 1545-0020
2000
p 1 Donor's first name and middle initial 2 Donor's last name 3 Donor's social security number
~ Francis J. Smith 000-11-2222
t 4 Address (number, street, and apartment number) 5 Legal residence (domicile) (county & state)
100 Oak Tree Lane Jefferson Co. KY
6 City, state, and ZIP code 7 Citizenship




Nameofconsentin souse Kell S. Smith 333-44-5555
Will a ift tax return for this calendar ear be filed b our souse? .
If the answer to 15 is "No " check whether D married D divorced or D widowed and ive date see instructions ~
Consent of Spouse -I consent to have the gifts (and generation-skipping transfers) made by me and by my spouse to third parties during the calendar year
considered as made one-half by each of us. We are both aware of the joint and several liability for tax created by the execution of this consent.
Were ou married to one another durin the entire calendar ear? see instructions . . . . . . . .
G 8 If the donor died during the year, check here ~ 0 and enter date of death ~_
~ 9 If you received an extension of time to file this Form 709, check here ~ 0 and attach the Form 4868, 2688, 2350, or extension letter
e 10 Enter the total number of se arate donees listed on Schedule A-count each erson onl once. ~ 7r
a 11a Have you (the donor) previously filed a Form 709 (or 709-A) for any other year? If the answer is "No," do not complete line 11 b.
I 11b If the answer to line 11 a is "Yes" has our address chan ad since ou last filed Form 709 or 709-A ? . . . . . .
12 Gifts by husband or wife to third parties.-Oo you consent to have the gifts (including generation-skipping transfers) made
by you and by your spouse to third parties during the calendar year considered as made one-half by each of you? (See
instructions.) (If the answer is "Yes", the following information must be furnished and your spouse must sign the consent























Total credits (add lines 12 and 13) .
Balance (subtract line 14 from line 6) (do not enter less than zero) .
Generation-skipping transfer taxes (from Schedule C, Part 3, col. H, Total)
Enter the amount from Schedule A, Part 3, line 15
Enter the amount from Schedule B, line 3 ....
Total taxable gifts (add lines 1 and 2) . . . . . .
Tax computed on amount on line 3 (see Table for Computing Tax in separate instructions)
Tax computed on amount on line 2 (see Table for Computing Tax in separate instructions)
Balance (subtract line 5 from line 4) .
Maximum unified credit (nonresident aliens, see instructions) .
Enter the unified credit against tax allowable for all prior periods (from Sch. B, line 1, col. C)
Balance (subtract line 8 from line 7) .
Enter 20% (.20) of the amount allowed as a specific exemption for gifts made after September 8,
1976, and before January 1, 1977 (see instructions)
Balance (subtract line 10 from line 9) . . . . .
Unified credit (enter the smaller of line 6 or line 11)
Credit for foreign gift taxes (see instructions)
Total tax (add lines 15 and 16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gift and generation-skipping transfer taxes prepaid with extension of time to file




































n 20 If line 18 is reater than line 17 enter amount to be refunded . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20
e ...........iiiiooii.-I--.......~......iiioojjjjI......-----iiiiiIoioii......................iiiioioiiiiiiiiioioooiii~ .......---......---~.....iiiiioiioii------------------.....----------........--"---------
y Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including any accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge
Si9n and belief, it is true, correct. and complete. Declaration of preparer (other than donor) is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge.
~ Here ~ I




P -d Preparer's Check if DH 81 signature self-employed ~
~ Preparer'st-----------------------------...L.o..--------L--------
e Use Only :~:~si~::If~:PIOyed),~ ON&W 1700 PNC Plaza KSH
address,andZIPCOder Louisville KY 40202 Phone no... 502 582-1601
For Disclosure, Privacy Act, and Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, '" P.,.tIge 11 of the separate Instructions for this form. Form 709 (2000)
D~ d - ti~
Francis J. Smith 000-11-2222 Pa e 2
~ Com utation of Taxable Gifts Includin Transfers in Trust
ADoes the value of any item listed on Schedule A reflect any valuation discount? If the answer is "Yes." see instructions .. .Yes 0 No IXI
B 0 < Check here if you elect under section 529(c)(2)(B) to treat any transfers made this year to a qualified state tuition program as made ratably
over a 5-year period beginning this year. See instructions. Attach explanation.





e Donee's name and address
e Relationship to donor (if any)
e Description of gift
elf the gift was made by means of a trust, enter trust's EIN and
attach a description or copy of the trust instrument (see instructions)
elf the gift was of securities, give CUSIP number
C D
Donor's adjusted Date




1 C. D. Smith
(Son)
200 Maple Leaf Drive
Louisville, Kentucky 40200
Cash 10,000 06/01/00 10,000
Total from continuation schedule(s) 85,000
Total of Part 1 (add amounts from Part 1. column E) ~ 95 , 000
Part 2.-Gifts That are Direct Skips and are Subject to 80th Gift Tax and Generation-8klpping Transfer Tax. You must list the gifts
in chronological order. Gifts less political organization, medical, and educational exclusions-see instructions. (Also list here direct skips
that are subiect onlv to the GST tax at this time as the result of the termination of an "estate tax inclusion Deried." See instrudions.)
A 8 C D
Item • Donee's name and address Donor's adjusted Date
number • Relationship to donor (if any) basis of gift of gift
e Description of gift
.If the gift was made by means of a trust, enter trust's EIN and
attach a description or copy of the trust instrument (see instructions)




1 Maria A. Smith
(Grandchild)
200 Maple Leaf Drive
Louisville, Kentucky 40200










Total from continuation schedule(s)
Total of Part 2 (add amounts from Part 2. column E) .
Part 3.-Taxable Gift Reconciliation
1 Total value of gifts of donor (add totals from column E of Parts 1 and 2) .
2 One-half of items J~g._J;:t__~.l__ ~_-_~J_~~_:.gJ__ R.C!~_t __~__ attributable to spouse (see instructions)
3 Balance (subtract line 2 from line 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 Gifts of spouse to be included (from Schedule A, Part 3, line 2 of spouse's return-see instructions)
If any of the gifts included on this line are also subject to the generation-skipping transfer tax, check
here ~ D and enter those gifts also on Schedule C, Part 1.
5 Total gifts (add lines 3 and 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6 Total annual exclusions for gifts listed on Schedule A (including line 4, above) (see instructions) . . . . .
7 Total included amount of gifts (subtract line 6 from line 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deductions (see instructions)
8 Gifts of interests to spouse for which a marital deduction will be claimed, based
on items of Schedule A . 1--...;:8~ _
9 Exclusions attributable to gifts on line 8. . . . . . . . 1--...;:9~ _
10 Marital deduction-subtract line 9 from line 8 . . . . . .........,:1:;..;:0~ _
11 Charitable deduction, based on items Jess exclusions . "'--0,;1 1 _
12 Total deductions-add lines 10 and 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .........,:1;;,,;;;;2~ O_
13 Subtract line 12 from line 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........,:1:..;:3~ 0_
14 Generation-skipping transfer taxes payable with this Form 709 (from Schedule C, Part 3, col. H, Total) . .........,:1:-::4~ O_
15 Taxable ifts add lines 13 and 14 . Enter here and on line 1 of the Tax Com utation on a e 1 15 a
(If more space is needed, attach additional sheets of same size.) J _64D1A Form 709 (2000)







• Donee's name and address
• Relationship to donor (if any)
• Description of gift
.,f the gift was made by means of a trust, enter trust's EIN and
attach a description or copy of the trust instrument (see instructions)















3 Katharine E. Smith
(Daughter)
400 Tea Rose Way
Louisville, Kentucky 40200
Cash
4 Worthy National Bank, Trustee
of the Francis J. Smith
Irrevocable Trust U/A dated
6/1/95
EIN: 61-0000004
65 shares of ABC Corporation
common stock at $l,OOO/share
CUSIP: 12345678ABC
A. Kelly S. Smith
(Spouse)
100 Oak Tree Lane
Louisville, Kentucky 40200
Withdrawal right
B. C. D. Smith
(Son)
200 Maple Leaf Drive
Louisville, Kentucky 40200
Withdrawal right










Donor: Francis J. Smith
CONTINUATION SCHEDULE





e Donee's name and address
e Relationship to donor (if any)
e Description of gift
elf the gift was made by means of a trust, enter trust's EIN and
attach a description or copy of the trust instrument (see instructions)
elf the gift was of securities, give CUSIP number














D. Katharine E. Smith
(Daughter)
400 Tea Rose Way
Louisville, Kentucky 40200
Withdrawal right
E. Maria A. Smith
(Grandchild)
200 Maple Leaf Drive
Louisville, Kentucky 40200
Withdrawal right
F. Lourdes E. Smith
(Grandchild)
200 Maple Leaf Drive
Louisville, Kentucky 40200
Withdrawal right


















Donor: Francis J. Smith
CONTINUATION SCHEDULE
000-11-2222
Continuation of Schedule A - PART 2
A
• Donee's name and address
B C 0 E
Item Donor's adjusted Date Value at
number • Relationship to donor (if any) basis of gift of gift date of gift
e Description of gift
elf the gift was made by means of a trust, enter trust's EIN and
attach a description or copy of the trust instrument (see instructions)
elf the gift was of securities, give CUSIP number
2 Lourdes E. Smith
(Grandchild)
200 Maple Leaf Drive
Louisville, Kentucky 40200
Cash 10,000 06/01/00 10,000
3 Francis J. Smith, Jr. , Trustee
of the Francis J. Smith
Irrevocable §2503(c) Trust







Cash 10,000 06/01/00 10,000
TOTAL. (Carry forward to main schedule.)
J - ']7
20,000
Francis J. Smith 000-11-2222 Pae3
Com utation of Taxable Gifts continued
16 Terminable Interest (QTIP) Marital Deduction. (See instructions for line 8 of Schedule A.)
If a trust (or other property) meets the requirements of qualified terminable interest property under section 2523(f), and
a. The trust (or other property) is listed on Schedule A, and
b. The value of the trust (or other property) is entered in whole or in part as a deduction on line 8, Part 3 of Schedule A,
then the donor shall be deemed to have made an election to have such trust (or other property) treated as qualified terminable interest property
under section 2523(1).
If less than the entire value of the trust (or other property) that the donor has included in Part 1 of Schedule A is entered as a deduction on
line 8, the donor shall be considered to have made an election only as to a fraction of the trust (or other property). The numerator of this fraction
is equal to the amount of the trust (or other property) deducted on line 10 of Part 3, Schedule A. The denominator is equal to the total value of the
trust (or other property) listed in Part 1 of Schedule A.
If you make the QTIP election (see instructions for line 8 of Schedule A), the terminable interest property involved will be included in your
spouse's gross estate upon his or her death (section 2044). If your spouse disposes (by gift or otherwise) of all or part of the qualifying life
income interest, he or she will be considered to have made a transfer of the entire property that is subject to the gift tax (see Transfer of Certain
Life Estates on page 3 of the instructions).
17 Election out of QTIP Treatment of Annuities
D < Check here if you elect under section 2523(1)(6) NOT to treat as qualified terminable interest property any joint and survivor annuities that
are reported on Schedule A and would otherwise be treated as qualified terminable interest property under section 2523(f). (see instructions.)
Enter the item numbers from Schedule A for the annuities for which ou are makin this election ~
Gifts From Prior Periods
If you answered "Yes" on line 11a of page 1, Part 1, see the instructions for completing Schedule B. If you answered "No,II skip to the
Tax ComDutation on Daae 1 (or Schedule C if aDDlicable).
A B C 0 E
Calendar year or Amount of unified Amount of specific
Internal Revenue office credit against gift tax exemption for prior Amount ofcalendar quarter for periods after periods ending before
(see instructions) where prior return was filed December 31,1976 January 1, 1977 taxable gifts
;
1 Totals for prior periods (without adjustment for reduced specific Iexemption) . 1 0 0 0
2 Amount, if any, by which total specific exemption, line 1, column 0, is more than $30,000. 2 0
3 Total amount of taxable gifts for prior periods (add amount, column E, line 1, and amount, if any, on
line 2), (Enter here and on line 2 of the Tax ComDutation on Daoe 1.) 3 0
(If more space is needed, attach additional sheets of same size.)
DIA
Form 709 (2000)
Francis J. Smith 000-11-2222
Computation of Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax
Pa e 4
Note: Inter vivos direct skips that are completely excluded by the GST exemption must still be fully reported
(including value and exemptions claimed) on Schedule C.
PiGart - eneratlon- IDDlna rans ers
A B C F
Item No. Value Split Gifts 0 E Net Transfer
(from Schedule A, (from Schedule A, (enter 1/2 of col. B) Subtract col. C Nontaxable (subtract col. E
Part 2, col. A) Part 2, col. E) (see instructions) from col. B portion of transfer from col. D)
1 10,000 5 000 5,000 5,000
2 10,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
3 10,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
If you elected gift splitting and your spouse
was required to file a separate Form 709 Split gifts from Value included Net transfer
(see the instructions for "Split Gifts"), you spouse's Form 709 from spouse's Nontaxable (subtract col. E
must enter all of the gifts shown on (enter item number) Form 709 portion of transfer from col. D)
Schedule A, Part 2, of your spouse's Form
709 here. S-
In column C, enter the item number of each
S-gift in the order it appears in column A of
your spouse's Schedule A, Part 2. We have
S-preprinted the prefix "S-" to distinguish your
spouse's item numbers from your own when S-
you complete column A of Schedule C, Part
S-3.
In column 0, for each gift, enter the amount
S-reported in column C, Schedule C, Part 1, of
your spouse's Form 709. S-
Part 2.-GST Exemption Reconciliation (Section 2631) and Sectio~12652la)(3)Election
Check box ~ D if you are making a section 2652(a)(3) (special QTIP) election (see instructions)
Enter the item numbers (from Schedule A) of the gifts for which you are making this election ~ _
1 Maximum allowable exemption (see instructions) .
2 Total exemption used for periods before filing this return
3 Exemption available for this return (subtract line 2 from line 1)
4 Exemption claimed on this return (from Part 3, col. C total, below) .
5 Exemption allocated to transfers not shown on Part 3, below. You must attach a Notice of Allocation. (See
instructions.)
6 Add lines 4 and 5








P rt 3 T C tatia .- ax ompu on
A B E G H
Item No. Net transfer C 0 Inclusion Ratio F Applicable Rate Generation-Skipping
(from Schedule (from Schedule C, GST Exemption Divide col. C (subtract col. 0 Maximum Estate (multiply col. E Transfer Tax
















Total exemption claimed. Enter
here and on line 4, Part 2, Total generation-skipping transfer tax. Enter here, on
above. May not exceed line 3,
0
line 14 of Schedule A, Part 3, and on line 16 of the Tax
0Part 2 above . . . . . . Comoutation on oaoe 1







NOTICE OF GST EXEMPTION ALLOCATION
2000 GIFT TAX RETURN
The taxpayer is timely filing a Form 709 for gifts made in 2000 and allocates GST
Exemption of $35,000 to those gifts. The taxpayer hereby states the following regarding his 2000
GST Exemption allocation:
The allocation ofGST Exemption on Schedule C, Part 2 is based on values set forth in the
2000 Form 709. The taxpayer believes that the amount ofGST Exemption necessary to create an
inclusion ratio ofzero is $35,000. The taxpayer hereby allocates to the Francis J. Smith Irrevocable
Trust under Agreement dated June 1, 1995 (EIN #61-0000004) listed on Form 709, Schedule A,
Part 1, Items 4A through 4F, the smallest amount of the taxpayer's GST Exemption necessary to
produce an inclusion ratio (IRe § 2642(a» which is closest to, or ifpossible, equal to zero for the
portion ofeach trust ofwhich taxpayer is considered transferor. This is a formula allocation which
will change ifvalues are changed on audit.
J .. 70
Form 709 United States Gift (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return






Nameofconsentin souse Francis J. Smith 000-11-2222
If the answer to 15 is "No" check whether D married D divorced or D widowed and ive date see instructions ~
Will a ift tax return for this calendar ear be filed b our souse? .
Consent of Spouse -I consent to have the gifts (and generation-skipping transfers) made by me and by my spouse to third parties during the calendar year
considered as made one-half by each of us. We are both aware of the joint and several liability for tax created by the execution of this consent.
Were ou married to one another durin the entire calendar ear? see instructions . . . . . . . .
G 8 If the donor died during the year, check here ~ D and enter date of death ...:._
~ 9 If you received an extension of time to file this Form 709, check here ~ D and attach the Form 4868, 2688, 2350, or extension letter
e 10 Enter the total number of se arate donees listed on Schedule A-count each erson onl once. ~ 6r
a 11a Have you (the donor) previously filed a Form 709 (or 709-A) for any other year? If the answer is "No," do not complete line 11b.
I 11 b If the answer to line 11 a is "Yes" has our address chan ed since ou last filed Form 709 or 709-A ? . . . . . .
12 Gifts by husband or wife to third parties.-Do you consent to have the gifts (including generation-skipping transfers) made
by you and by your spouse to third parties during the calendar year considered as made one-half by each of you? (See
instructions.) (If the answer is "Yes", the following information must be furnished and your spouse must sign the consent
shown below. If the answer is "No" ski lines 13-18 and 0 to Schedule A.. . . . . . .
P 1 Donor's first name and middle initial 2 Donor's last name 3 Donor's social security number
~ Kell S. Smith 333-44-5555
t 4 Address (number, street, and apartment number) 5 Legal residence (domicile) (county & state)
100 Oak Tree Lane Jefferson Co. KY
6 City, state, and ZIP code 7 Citizenship























Enter the amount from Schedule A, Part 3, line 15
Enter the amount from Schedule B, line 3 ....
Total taxable gifts (add lines 1 and 2) . . . . . .
Tax computed on amount on line 3 (see Table for Computing Tax in separate instructions)
Tax computed on amount on line 2 (see Table for Computing Tax in separate instructions)
Balance (subtract line 5 from line 4) .
Maximum unified credit (nonresident aliens, see instructions) .
Enter the unified credit against tax allowable for all prior periods (from Sch. B, line 1, col. C)
Balance (subtract line 8 from line 7) .
Enter 20% (.20) of the amount allowed as a specific exemption for gifts made after September 8,
1976, and before January 1, 1977 (see instructions)
Balance (subtract line 10 from line 9) . . . . . .
Unified credit (enter the smaller of line 6 or line 11)
Credit for foreign gift taxes (see instructions)
Total credits (add lines 12 and 13) .
Balance (subtract line 14 from line 6) (do not enter less than zero)
Generation-skipping transfer taxes (from Schedule C, Part 3, col. H, Total)
Total tax (add lines 15 and 16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gift and generation-skipping transfer taxes prepaid with extension of time to file
20 If line 18 is reater than line 17 enter amount to be refunded


































Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including any accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge
Si9n and belief, it is true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (other than donor) is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge.
He~ ~ I
~ , Signature of donor Datert-------tl-----.;;..----------------------------r-------.,.---------
Preparer's ~ Date
H Paid Signature' ~:::m~IOyed~ D
~ Preparer'st----------------------------01-------------------
e Use Only ~~~:i~::If~:PIOyed),~ ON&W 1700 PNC Plaza KSH
address,andzlPcode' Louisville KY 40202 Phone no. ~ 502 582-1601
D~or Disclosure, Privacy Act, and Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, r ,,~_e 11 of the separate Instructions for this form. Form 709 (2000)
S. Smith
utation of Taxable Gifts
333-44-5555 Pa e 2
A Does the value of any item listed on Schedule A reflect any valuation discount? If the answer is "Yes," see instructions .. .Yes 0 No 0
B D < Check here if you elect under section 529(c)(2)(B) to treat any transfers made this year to a qualified state tuition program as made ratably
over a 5-year period beginning this year. See instructions. Attach explanation.
a - I U llec nlV 0 ax. I s ess DO I lca oraanlza Ion me Ica an e uca lona exc uSlons-see Ins ru Ions
A 8 C D E
Item - Donee's name and address Donor's adjusted Date Value at
number - Relationship to donor (if any) basis of gift of gift date of gift
- Description of gift
-If the gift was made by means of a trust, enter trust's EIN and
attach a description or copy of the trust instrument (see instructions)
-If the gift was of securities, give CUSIP number
NONE
P rt 1 G·fts S b· t 0 I t Gift T G·ft I rr I . f d' I d d fl' . t cf
Total of Part 1 (add amounts from Part 1, column E) ~
Part 2.-Gifts That are Direct Skips and are Subject to 80th Gift Tax and Generation-8kipping Transfer Tax. You must list the gifts
in chronological order. Gifts less political organization, medical, and educational exclusions-see instructions. (Also list here direct skips
that are subiect onlv to the GST tax at this time as the result of the termination of an "estate tax inclusion Deriod." See instructions.)
A 8 C D E
Item e Donee's name and address Donor's adjusted Date Value at
number e Relationship to donor (if any) basis of gift of gift date of gift
e Description of gift
elf the gift was made by means of a trust, enter trust's EIN and
attach a description or copy of the trust instrument (see instructions)










Total of Part 2 (add amounts from Part 2, column E) .
Part 3.-Taxable Gift Reconciliation
1 Total value of gifts of donor (add totals from column E of Parts 1 and 2) .
2 One-half of items attributable to spouse (see instructions)
3 Balance (subtract line 2 from line 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 Gifts of spouse to be included (from Schedule A, Part 3, line 2 of spouse's return-see instructions)
If any of the gifts included on this line are also subject to the generation-skipping transfer tax, check
here ~ D and enter those gifts also on Schedule C, Part 1.
5 Total gifts (add lines 3 and 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6 Total annual exclusions for gifts listed on Schedule A (including line 4, above) (see instructions) . . . . .
7 Total included amount of gifts (subtract line 6 from line 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deductions (see instructions)
8 Gifts of interests to spouse for which a marital deduction will be claimed, based
on items of Schedule A . 1-- 8 _
9 Exclusions attributable to gifts on line 8. . . . . . . 1-- 9 _
10 Marital deduction-subtract line 9 from line 8 . . . . ~1;;..;::O~ _
11 Charitable deduction, based on items -'ess exclusions . '---0.;1;.,.;;1-£- _
12 Total deductions-add lines 10 and 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ~1;;.;;;2~ 0_
13 Subtract line 12 from line 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~1;;.;;;;3 0_
14 Generation-skipping transfer taxes payable with this Form 709 (from Schedule C, Part 3, col. H, Total) . ~14 0_
15 Taxable ifts add lines 13 and 14 . Enter here and on line 1 of the Tax Com utation on a e 1 .... 15 0
(If more space is needed, attach additional sheets of same size.) DIA Form 709 (2000)
~J - 72
S. Smith 333-44-5555 ~e3
Com utation of Taxable Gifts continued
16 Terminable Interest (QTIP) Marital Deduction. (See instructions for line 8 of Schedule A.)
If a trust (or other property) meets the requirements of qualified terminable interest property under section 2523(f), and
a. The trust (or other property) is listed on Schedule A, and
b. The value of the trust (or other property) is entered in whole or in part as a deduction on line 8, Part 3 of Schedule A,
then the donor shall be deemed to have made an election to have such trust (or other property) treated as qualified terminable interest property
under section 2523(1).
If less than the entire value of the trust (or other property) that the donor has included in Part 1 of Schedule A is entered as a deduction on
line 8, the donor shall be considered to have made an election only as to a fraction of the trust (or other property). The numerator of this fraction
is equal to the amount of the trust (or other property) deducted on line 10 of Part 3, Schedule A. The denominator is equal to the total value of the
trust (or other property) listed in Part 1 of Schedule A.
If you make the QTIP election (see instructions for line 8 of Schedule A), the terminable interest property involved will be included in your
spouse's gross estate upon his or her death (section 2044). If your spouse disposes (by gift or otherwise) of all or part of the qualifying life
income interest, he or she will be considered to have made a transfer of the entire property that is SUbject to the gift tax (see Transfer of Certain
Life Estates on page 3 of the instructions).
17 Election out of QTIP Treatment of Annuities
D< Check here if you elect under section 2523(1)(6) NOT to treat as qualified terminable interest property any joint and survivor annuities that
are reported on Schedule A and would otherwise be treated as qualified terminable interest property under section 2523(1). (See instructions.)
Enter the item numbers from Schedule A for the annuities for which au are makin this election ...
. Gifts From Prior Periods
If you answered "Yes" on line 11a of page 1, Part 1, see the instructions for completing Schedule B. If you answered "No," skip to the
Tax Comoutation on oaae 1 (or Schedule C if aoolicable).
A B C D E
Calendar year or Amount of unified Amount of specific
Internal Revenue office credit against gift tax exemption for prior Amount ofcalendar quarter for periods after periods ending before
(see instructions) where prior return was filed December 31,1976 January 1, 1977 taxable gifts
1 Totals for prior periods (Without adjustment for reduced specific Iexemption) . 1 0 0 0
2 Amount, if any, by which total specific exemption, line 1, column 0, is more than $30,000. 2 0
3 Total amount of taxable gifts for prior periods (add amount, column E, line 1, and amount, if any, on
line 2). (Enter here and on line 2 of the Tax Computation on Dace 1.) 3 0





Com utation of Generation-Ski in Transfer Tax
Pa 4
Note: Inter vivos direct skips that are completely excluded by the GST exemption must still be fUlly reported
(including value and exemptions claimed) on Schedule C.
-sPart i.-Generation kiDDina Transfers
A B C F
Item No. Value Split Gifts D E Net Transfer
(from Schedule A. (from Schedule A, (enter 1/2 of col. B) Subtract col. C Nontaxable (subtract col. E
Part 2. col. A) Part 2, col. E) (see instructions) from col. B portion of transfer from col. D)
If you elected gift splitting and your spouse
was required to file a separate Form 709 Split gifts from Value included Net transfer
(see the instructions for "Split Gifts"). you spouse's Form 709 from spouse's Nontaxable (subtract col. E
must enter all of the gifts shown on (enter item number) Form 709 portion of transfer from col. D)
Schedule A. Part 2. of your spouse's Form
709 here. S- 1 5,000 5,000
In column c. enter the item number of each
S- 2 5,000 5,000gift in the order it appears in column A of
your spousels Schedule A. Part 2. We have S- 3 5,000 5,000preprinted the prefix "S-" to distinguish your
spousels item numbers from your own when S-
you complete column A of Schedule C, Part
S-3.
In column 0, for each gift, enter the amount S-reported in column C, Schedule C, Part 1, of
your spousels Form 709. S-
Part 2.-GST ExemDtion Reconciliation (Section 2631) and Section 2652{a)l3) Election
Check box ~ 0 if you are making a section 2652(a)(3) (special QTIP) election (see instructions)
Enter the item numbers (from Schedule A) of the gifts for which you are making this election ~ _
1 Maximum allowable exemption (see instructions) .
2 Total exemption used for periods before filing this return
3 Exemption available for this return (subtract line 2 from line 1)
4 Exemption claimed on this return (from Part 3, col. C total, below)
5 Exemption allocated to transfers not shown on Part 3, below. You must attach a Notice of Allocation. (See
instructions.)
6 Add lines 4 and 5








P 3 T Cart .- ax omDutatlon
A B E G H
Item No. Net transfer C D Inclusion Ratio F Applicable Rate Generation-Skipping
(from Schedule (from Schedule C, GST Exemption Divide col. C (subtract col. 0 Maximum Estate (multiply col. E Transfer Tax
















Total exemption claimed. Enter
here and on line 4, Part 2, Total generation-skipping transfer tax. Enter here, on
above. May not exceed line 3,
0
line 14 of Schedule A, Part 3, and on line 16 of the Tax
0Part 2 above . . . . . . Comoutation on Dace 1







NOTICE OF GST EXEMPTION ALLOCATION
2000 GIFT TAX RETURN
The taxpayer is timely filing a Form 709 for gifts made in 2000 and allocates GST
Exemption of$30,000 to those gifts. The taxpayer hereby states the following regarding her 2000
GST Exemption allocation:
The allocation ofGST Exemption on Schedule C, Part 2 is based on values set forth in the
2000 Form 709. The taxpayer believes that the amount ofGST Exemption necessary to create an
inclusion ratio ofzero is $30,000. The taxpayer hereby allocates to the Francis J. Smith Irrevocable
Trust under Agreement dated June 1, 1995 (EIN #61-0000004) listed on Form 709, Schedule A,
Part 1, Items 4B - 4F, of the 2000 Form 709 filed by Francis J. Smith, the smallest amount of the
taxpayer's GST Exemption necessary to produce an inclusion ratio (IRe § 2642(a» which is closest
to, or if possible, equal to zero for the portion of each trust of which taxpayer is considered




Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001
H.R.1836





The committee of conference on the disagreeing
votes of the two I-louses on the amendment of the Senate
to the bill (H.R. 1836), to provide for reconciliation pur-
suant to section 104 of the concurrent resolution on the
budget for fiscal year 2002, having met, after full and
free conference, have agreed to reconlmend and do rec-
onlmelld to their respective Houses as follows:
That the House recede from its disagreement to the
amendmellt of the Senate and agree to the same with an
amendment as follows:
In lieu of tIle matter proposed to be inserted by the
Senate anlelldment, insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE,· REFERENCES; TABLE OF CON-
TENTS.
(a) SHORT TITLE.-This Act may be cited as the
"Economic Growth a1~d Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001".
(b) AMENDMENT OF 1986 CODE.-Except as otherwise
expressly provided, whe11ever in this Act an amendment or






of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be con-
st~dered to be made to a section or other provision of the
Interrtal Revenue Code of 1986.
(c) TABLE OF CONTENTS.-The table of contents of
this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short t'itle; 1"ejerences; table oj' contents.
TITLE I-INDIVID[TAL INCOME TA.--¥ RATE RED[TC1TIONS
Sec. 101. Redu,ction in income tax rates jar- 'individl1,als.
Sec. 102. Repeal oj' phaseout oj' per'sonal exempt'ions.
Sec. 103. Phaseout of overall li'mitation on 'itemized deductions.
TITLE II-7"'iL¥ BENEFITS RELA..TIJlG TO CHILDREN
Sec. 201. klod'ificat'ions to ch'ild tax cred'it.
Sec. 202. Expansion of' adoption credit and adoption assistanc"e pr·ograms.
Sec. 203. Rejund.~ dis'regarded ,in the administration of Fede1~al programs and
f'ede1--ally assisted programs.
Sec. 204. Dependent care credit.
Sec. 205. Allo'UJance of credit jar employer expenses for child care assistance.
TITLE III-lIl1!RRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF
Sec. 301. El'l:'fYt'inat'ion oj' 'marriage penalty ,in standard deduction.
Sec. 302. Phaseout of'marTiage penalty in 15-percent bracket.
Sec. 303. Jttlarriage penalty reUef'jo'Y' earned 1>ncome cred'it; earned ,income to in-
clu,de only arnounts 'includ17)le ,in gTOSS incom,e; simpl'ljication o.l
earned incomB (~"..edit.
TITI~E Ill-AFFORDriBLE EDrlC~TI01VPROVISIONS
Subt'itle A-Educat'ion Savings Incentives
Sec. 401. ~{od'iff,cations to education indi'lJ'idual retire'ment acc()'lrnts.
Sec. 402. Modijicat'ions to qual'iJied tuition pr'ograms.
Subtitle B-Educational Assistance
Extension of exclus'ion jar e-mployer-provided edu-cat'ional assistance.
Ehminaf1:on 0.1' 50--month l'imit and increase in 'in-eome linl,'itat'ion on
shulent loan interest deduct'ion.
Exclusion of' certain amounts rece'ived under the National flealth SeTv-
ice CO'l'1)S Schollt'rship Program and the F. Edward Hebert
il-rmed Forces IIealth P'rofess'ions Scholarship and Financ'ial As-
sistance Program.
Subt'itle C-L'ibernlizaNon o.l 'I'ax-Exenl,pt F'inancing Rules j'or Publ'ic Sc/wol
Construction
Sec. 4,'21. Add'itionat ,increase in arb'itrage rebate exception j'rn' governmental
bonds used to f~nance educat'ionalf'r1C'iliNes.
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Sec. 422. Treatment oj" qual'ified pubh".c educational jacility bonds as exem,pt fac,a-
ity bonds.
Subtitle D-Other Prov'is,ions
Sf£;. 431. Deduction j01' highe'r education expenses.
TITLE IT-ESTATE, GIFT, JWD GENERATION-S](IPPING TRANSFER T~¥
PROVISIOATS
Subt'ifle A-Repeal o.l Estate and Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes
Sec. 501. Repeal oj" estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes.
Subtitle B-Reductions oj" Estate and Gift Tax Rates
Sec. 511" Add'itional reductions oj' estate and gift tax rates.
Subtitle C-Increase in Exemption Amounts
Sec. 521. Increase in exemption equivalent oj" un'ijied credit, lifetirne gifts exemp-
tion, and GST e"Tempt'ion amounts.
Subtitle D-(}red'it for State Death Taxes
Sec. 531. Reduction oj" crred,it for' State death ta:res.
Sec. 532. Credit for State death taxes r-eplaced u,'ith deduct'ion jor such taxes.
Subt'itle E-(}a'rr:lJover Basis at Death; Other (}hanges Taking Effect ffTith Repeal
Sec. 541. 'lle'nninalion oj'step-up in bas'is at death.
Sec. 542. 'llreat1nent oj' proper·ty acquired jr-om a decedent dy'ing after December
31, /2009.
Subtitle F-Conse'rvafrion Easements
Sec. 551. Expans'ion oj" estate tax 'rule for conservation easements.





Deemed aUocat'ion oj" GST exempt'ion to l'ijldime transfers to t1rltsts; ret-
l"oactive allocations.
Severing of trusts.
lJilodijication oj" certain valuat'ion 1'~UleS.
ReUef pro'lyisions.
8u1Jt'itle [-[-Extens'ion oj' T'ime for Payrnent oj" Estate Tax
Sec. .571. Increase in nurnber' 0.1' aUou'able partne'rs and shareholders '~n closely
held businesses.
Sec. 572. Expans'ion of availab'iz.ity of installment payn~ent for estates u,ith 'inter-
ests q'tull'ifiJ'ing lending and finance businesses.
Sec. 572. Clarif'tcaf1:on oj' availability oj" 'installment payment.
Subt'ille I-Other- Provisions
Sec. 581. l,Va'iver of statute oj"l/imitation for taxes on certain fa'rm valu,at'ions.
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TITLE l'I-PENSION LIND INDlllID[T.!-lL RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENT
PROTlISIONS
Subt'itle A-Individual Retirem,ent Accounts
Sec. 601. lliodijication oj' IRA contribut'ion ['imits.





























Inc1"ease ,in lJenejit and contribution linl.its.
Plan loans jar subchapter S O1.vners, partners, and sole proprietors.
]J;fod'ij"icat'ion of't01J-heavy ru,les.
Elect'ive defer'rals not taken into account jar p11,r]Joses oj'deduction lim-
'its.
RelJeal oj' c(Jord'ination requ'i1"ernents for dejerr'ed cornpensation plans oj'
State and [(Jcal governl1'tents and tax-exempt or:qanizations.
Deduct'ion Umits,
Option to treat elect'ive dejerrnls as qfter-tax Roth contribut'ions.
Nonrefundable cr'ed,it to cer1ain indiv'iduals for elective deferrals and
IR.L4 cont1ibut'ions.
(}redit jor pension plan startup costs oj'small employers.
Elimination oj' user jee jar requests to IRS regmrding pens1:on plans,
Tr'eatment oj' nonresident aliens engaged ,in international transpor'-
tation se'rl)ices,
Subt'itle C-Enhancing Fa'irness jar lllomen
(}atch-up contributions fo'r 'indiv'iduals age 50 or over.
Equitable treatment JOT contributions oj' mnpl()yees to defined conf1"'ibu-
t'ion plans.
Paste'!' vest'ing o.f certain e1nployer matching contrilndions.
Nlod'~f~cat'ion to 'm"in'i'muml dist'ribut'ion rules,
(}larij1:cat'ion of' tax tTeat1nent oj'div'ision of section 457 plan ben~f~ts
upon divorce.
fY'/'ovis'ions relating to hardship distribut'ions.
lVa'ive'f' of tax on nondeductible contribulions for domestic or' s'irn'ilar
1.t'orkers.
Subtitle D-Increasing Portability for Partic'ipants
Rollove1"s allou'ed among various types oj' plans.
Rollove'l's of IRAs into workplace retirement plans.
Rollovers of ajle'f'-tax contr'ibutions.
Hardsh'ip except'ion to 60-day rule.
Treatment oj'fo'rrns oj' distribution.
Rationahzation of'restrictions on distribut'ions.
Purchase o.{ se'/~v'ice credit in governmental d~f~ned benejit plans.
Entployers 'nlay dis1"egard r'o!l(HJerS for purposes of cash-out amounts,
lJiI'in'imum d'istrilJut'ion and 'inclusion 'require1nents jor section 457
plans.
Su,bt'itle E-Strengthening Pens'ion Secu1"ity and Enjo'rcement
PART I-GENEIVU~PROVISIOJ.VS
Sec. 6'51. Repeal o.f 160 percent of current l'iability j1Lnd'ing ['im'it.
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Sec. 652. lIfa:rimum cont'r'l~but-ion deduct'ion 'fl1,les modij:ied and applied to all de-
j~ned benej~t plans.
Sec. 653. E:rc'ise ta:1~ 1"el-iej'for sound pension ,fund1:ng.
Sec. 654. Treatrnent oj'mult'iemployer plans under section 415.
Sec. 655. P'rotect'ion oj' 'investment oj' employee contributions to 401 (k) plans.
Sec. 656'. P'I"oh'ibited allocations oj' stock ,in S c()rporntion ESOP.
Sec. 657. ilutomatic 'f'ollove'f's oj' certain rnandato'ry dist'ributions.
Sec. 658. ()larification oj' treatment oj'cont',,~butions to mult'iemployer plan.
PART II-TREATJIE1VT OF [;)1dl1V AJfEiVI)JIE1VT8 REDue/iva FUTURE BE1VEF/T
ACCRUALS
Sec. 659. Exc'ise tax on jailure to provide notice by dejined benejit plans s'ign'ifi-
canfly 'reducing jit-ture benejit ac.cr"ltals.
Subtitle F-Reducing Regulatory Bll,rdens
Sec. 661. Mod'ijication oj't'irning oj' plan valuations.
Sec. 66'2. ESOP d'ividends may be reinvested u,ithout loss oj'd'ividend dedu,ction.
Sec, 66'3. Repeal oj·trans'ition rule relating to ceria'in highly compensated etnploy-
ees.
Sec. 664. Entployees oj'tax-e:l'empt entities.
Sec. 665. (}larijication oj'treatrnent oj' ernploye'f'-provided retirement advice.
Sec. 666. Repeal oj' the -multiple use test.
Subt'itle G-illiscellaneous Prov'isions
Sec. 671. Tax treatment and information requirernents oj'illaska Native Settle-
1nent T'I'usts,
TITLE lTII-ALTERNA-4TIVE lJfINIltI[TM T.A...¥
Sec. 701. Increase -in alternative 1nini'rnum tax e:1'empt1~on.
TITLE llIII-OTlIER PROllISIOftlS
Sec. 801. Ti1ne jor payment of corporate estirnated taxes.
Sec. 802. Expansion oj' autho'rity to postpone certain tax-related deadlines by -rea-
son oj' Pres'ident'ially declared disaster.
Sec. 803. iVO Federal inC01ne tax on restitut'ion received by 'V'ict'ims oj'the Nazi
'reg'inte 0'1" the'iT heirs 01' estates.
TITLE L:¥-()OllfPLIANCE FlITl! C01VGRESSIONAL BUDGET A()T
Sec. .901. Su,nset OJ'lJ'f"ovis'ions of ltct.
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of the date of the contribution referred to in paragraph
(8) (B). ".
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by




SEC. 561. DEEMED ALLOCATION OF GST EXEMPTION TO
LIFETIME TRANSFERS TO TRUSTS; RETRO-
ACTIVE ALLOCATIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 2632 (relating to special
rules for allocation of GST exemption) is amended by re-
desig'nating sllbsection (c) as subsectio1l (e) and by insert-
ing after subsection (b) the following new subsections:
"(c) DEEftfED ALLOCATION TO CERTAIN LIFETIftfE
TRrlNSFERS TO GST TRUSTS.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-If any individual makes an
i·ndirect skip during such individual's lifetime, any
u'1lused portion of suclt indit'idual's GST exemption
sltall be allocated to the property transferred to the ex-
tent necessary to make the inclusion ratio for such
property zero. If the amount of the indirect skip ex-
ceeds such unusecl portion, the entire unused portion
shall be allocated to the property transferred.
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"(2) UNUA9ED PORT/ON.-For purposes oj' para-
graph (1), the unused portion of an individual's GST
exe'mption is that portion of such exemption which
has not previously been-
"(A) allocated by suclt individual,
"(B) treated as allocated under subsection
(b) with respect to a direct skip occurring during
or before the calendar year in u'hich the indirect
skip is made, or
"(C) treated as allocated under paragraph
(1) with respect to a prior indirect skip.
"(3) DEFINITIOl\TS.-
"(A) INDIRECT SKIP.-For purposes of this
s1lbsection, the term 'indirect skip' n~eans any
transfer of property (other than a direct skip)
subject to the tax imposed by chapter 12 made
to a GST trust.
U(B) GST TRUl~T.-The term 'GST trust'
means a trust that could have a generation-skip-
pi'rLg transfer with respect to the transferor
unless-
Uri) the trust instru1nent provides that
more than 25 percent of the t"lSt corpus
must be distributed to or may be withdrawn
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by 01~e OT m,OTe individuals who aTe 1~01~-
s/~ip peTso'ns-
" (I) befoTe the date that the indi-
vidual attains age 46,
"(II) on OT before one or more
dates specified in the trust instrllment
that will occur before the date that
such individual attains age 46, or
"(III) upon the occurrence of an
event that, in accordance with regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary, may
reasonably be expected to occur before
the date that s'uch indit'idual attains
age 46,
"(ii) the trust instrument provides that
more than 25 percent of the trust corpus
1nust be distribu.ted to or may be withdrawn
by one or more individuals who are non-
sl~ip persons and who aTe living on the date
of death of anotlwr person identified in the
instrument (by name or by class) who is
mOTe tha'n 10 years older than such i1~divid­
uals,
"(iii) the trust instrzlment provides
that, if one or more individuals who are
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non-skip persons die on or before a date or
event described in clause (i) or (ii), more
than 25 percent of the trust corpus either
must be distributed to the estate or estates
oj· one or more of such individuals or is sub-
ject to a general power of appointment exer-
cisable by one or more of such individuals,
"(iv) the trust is a trust any portion
of which 1{Jould be inclttded in the gross es-
tate of a non-skip person (other than the
transferor) if such person died immediately
after the transfer,
"(v) the trust is a charitable lead an-
nuity trust (within the meaning of section
2642(e)(tJ)(A)) or a charitable remainder
annuity trust or a charitable remainder
unitrust (within tl1£ meaning Qf section
664(d)), or
"(vi) t/te trust is a trust with respect
to which a deductior~ was allowed under sec-
tion 2522 jor the amount of an interest in
the form of the right to receive annual pay-
ments of a fixed percentage of" the net fair
market value of the trust property (deter-
mined yearly) and which/ is required to pay
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principal to a non-skip perso'n if such per-
son is alive when the yearly payments for
which the deduction was allowed terminate.
For purposes of this subparagraph, the value of
transferred property shall not be considered to be
includible i'n the gross estate of a non-sll;ip per-
son or subject to a right of withdrawal by reason
of such person holding a right to withdraw so
much of such property as does not exceed the
amount referred to in section 2503(b) with re-
spect to any transferor, and it shall be ass'umed
that powers of appointment held by non-skip
persons will not be exercised.
"(4) ArTTOMATI(] ALLOCATIONS TO CEIlTAIN GST
TRUSTs.-For purposes oj' this subsection, an indirect
sltip to wh,ich section 2642(f) applies shall be deemed
to have been made only at the close of the estate tax
i'nclusion period. The fair market value of such tra'ns-
fer sJ~all be the fair marJcet valtte oj' the trust property
at the close of the estate tax i·nclusion period.
"(5) APPLICABILITY ~4ND EFFECT.-
"(AJ IN GENERAL.-An individual-
"(i) 1nay elect to ha1Je this subsection
1tot apply to-
"(1) a'n indirect skip, or
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"(II) any or all transfers made by
such i·ndividual to a particular trust,
and
"(ii) may elect to treat any trust as a
GST trust for purposes of this subsection
with respect to any or all transfers made by
sUlck individual to such trust.
"(B) ELECTIONS.-
"(i) EI~ECTIONS WITII RESPECT TO IN-
DIRECT l..';KIPS.-An election under subpara-
graph (A)(i)(I) shall be deemed to be timely
if filed o'n a timely filed gift tax return for
the calendar year in which the transfer was
made or deemed to have been made pursu-
ant to paragraph (4) or 01~ such later date
or dates as may be prescribed by the Sec-
retary.
"(ii) OTIIER ELECTIONS.-An election
under cla1lse (i)(II) or (ii) of subparag'raph
(A) may be m,ade on a timely filed gift tax
retu·rn for the calendar year for which the





"(A) a non-skip perSOTt has a1~ interest or a
future inteTest in a trust to which any tTansfer
has been made,
"(B) such person-
"(i) is a lineal descendant of a grand-
parent of the transferor 01' of a grandparent
of the tTansferor's spouse or former spouse,
and
"(ii) is assigned to a generation below
the ge'neration assignment of the transferor,
and
"(C) such person predeceases the transferor,
then the tra'nsferor may malre an allocation of any of
su,ch tTansferor's unused GST exemption to any pre-
vious transfer or transfers to the trust on a chrono-
logical basis.
"(2) SPECIAL ~ULES.-If the allocation undeT
paragraph (1) by the transferor is made on a gift tax
return filed on or before the date prescribed by section
6075(b) for gifts made within the calendar year with-
in which the non-sl-eip person's deatJ~ occurred-
"(A) the value of such transfer or transfers
jor purposes oj· section 2642(a) shall be deter-
mined as if such allocation had been made o'n a
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timely filed gift tax return for each calendar
year within which each transfer was made,
"(B) s'uch allocation shall be effective imme-
diately before such death, and
"(0) the amount of the transferor's unused
GST exemption available to be allocated shall be
determined i1nmediately before such death.
"(3) FrlTflRE INTEREA';T.-For purposes of this
s1.lbsection, a person /tas a future interest in a trust
if" the trust 'may permit income or corpus to be paid
to such perso'n on a date or dates in the future. ".
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-Paragraph (2) of
section 2632(b) is a1nended by strill;ing "with respect to a
prior direct skip" and inserting "or subsection (c)(l)".
(c) EFFECTIllE DATES.-
(1) DEEJfED ALLOCATIOlv.-Section 2632(c) of
the Internal Reven1le Code of 1986 (as added by sub-
sectio'n (a)), a1~d th.e a1nendment made by subsection
(b), sh,all apply to transfers subject to chapter 11 or
12 'made after December 31, 2000" and to estate tax
inclusio1~ periods ending after December 31, 2000.
(2) RETROr1CTIVE ALLOCATIONl{-Section
2632(d) of the Internal ReVentle Code of 1986 (as
added by subsection (a)) shall apply to deaths of non-
Sll;ip persons occurri'ng after December 31, 2000.
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SEC. 562. SEVERING OF TRUSTS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Subsection (aJ of section 2642 (re-
lating to inclusio'n ratio) is amended by adding at the end
the jollouJing 'new paragraph:
"(3) SEVEIlI1VG OF TRUSTS.-
"(A) IN GENERAL.-If a trust is severed in
a qualified severance, the trusts resulting from
such set'erance shall be treated as separate trusts
thereafter for purposes of this chapter.
"(B) QUALIFIED SEVERANCE.-For pur-
poses of subparagraph (A)-
"(i) IN GENERAL.-The term 'qualified
severance' means the division o.f a single
trust and the creation (by any means avail-
able under the governing instru1nent or
u,nder local law) of two or more trttsts ij-'
"(I) the single trust was divided
on a fractional basis, and
"(II) the terms of the new trusts,
in the aggregate, provide for the same
succession of interests of beneficiaries
as are provided in the original trust.
"(ii) TRlJSTS YlTITII INCLUSION RATIO
GREATER THflN ZERo.-If a trust has an
inclusion ratio of greater than zero and less
tJta,n 1, a severance is a qualified severance
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only if the sin,gle trust is divided into two
trusts, one qf which receives a fractional
share of the total value of all trust assets
equal to the applicable fraction of the single
trust immediately before the severance. In
such case, the trust receivi'ng such fractional
share shall have an inclusion ratio of zero
and the other trust shall have an inclusion
ratio oj' 1.
"(iii) REG[TLATIONS.-The -term
'qualified severance' includes any other sev-
erance pe-rmitted under regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary.
"(C) TIMING AND MANNER OF
SEVERANCES.-A severance pursuant to this
paragraph may be made at any time. The Sec-
retary shall prescribe by forms or regulations the
manner in which the qualified severance shall be
reported to the Secretary.".
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendment made by this
sectiort shall apply to severances after December 31, 2000.
SEC. 563. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN VALUATION RULES.
(a) GIFTS FOR WIIICI-I GIFT TAX RETURN FILED OR
DEEJJIED ALLOCATION MADE.-Paragraph (1) of section
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2642(b) (relati1~g to va,luation rules, etc.) is amended to
read as follows:
"(1) GIFTS FOR llTIIIClf GIFT TAX"" RETURN FILED
OR IJEEMED ALLOCATION jtfADE.-If the allocation of
the GST exemptio'n to any transfers of property is
made o·n a gift tax Ireturn filed on or before the date
prescribed by section 607/j(b) for such transfer or is
deemed to be made u·nder section 2632 (b)(1) or
(c) (1)-
"(A) the value of such property for purposes
of subsection (a) shall be its value as finally de-
termined for purposes of chapter 12 (within the
'meaning of section 2001(f)(2)), or, in the case of
an allocation deemed to have bee1~ made at the
close of an estate tax inclusion period, its value
at the time o.f the 'close of the estate tax inclusion
period, and
"(B) such allocation shall be effective on
and after the date of such transfer, or, in the
case of an allocation deemed to have been made
at the close of an estate tax inclusion period, on
and after the close of such estate tax inclusion
period. ".
(b) TRANA9FEIlS rlT DEL1Tlf.-Subparagraph (A) oj-
sect1:on 2(-;42(b)(2) is amended to read as follows:
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"(A) TRANSFERA'; LiT DEL!TH.-If property is
transferred as a result of the death of the trans-
feror, the value of such property for purposes of
subsectio'n (a) shall be its value as finally deter-
mined for purposes of chapter 11; except that, if
the requirements prescribed by the Secretary re-
specting allocation of post-death changes in value
are not met, the value of such property shall be
determined as of the time of the distribution con-
cerned. ".
(c) EFFE(]TIVE DATE.-The amendments made by
this sectiOlt shall apply to transfers SUQject to chapter 11
or 12 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1.986 made after De-
cember 31, 2000.
SEC. 564. RELIEF PROVISIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 2642 is amended by add-
ing at the end the following new subsection:
"(g) RELIEF PR011ISIONS.-
"(1) RELIEF FRO]Jf LATE ELECTIONS.-
"(A) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary shall by
regtllation prescribe such, circu'mstances and pro-




"(i) a·n allocation of GST exemption
described in paragraph (1) or (2) of sub-
section (b), and
"(ii) an election under subsectiort
(b)(3) or (c)(5) of section 2632.
Su,ch regulations shall include procedures for re-
questing comparable relief with respect to trans-
fers made before the date 0.[ the enactment of this
paragraph.
"(B) BASIS FOR DETElfJfINATIONS.-In de-
termining whether to grant relief under this
paragraph, the Secretary shall take into account
all relevant circumstances, including evidence of
intent contaifted in the trust instru1nent or in-
stru'ment of transfer and such other factors as the
Secretary deems relevant. For purposes of deter-
mining whether to gra'nt relief under tltis para-
graph, the time for mal~ing the allocation (or
election) shall be treated as if- not expressly pre-
scribed by statute.
"(2) SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.-An allocation
of GST exemption under section 2632 that dem-
onstrates an intent to have the lowest possible inclu-
sion ratio witl~ respect to a transfer or a trust shall
be deemed to be an allocation of so much of the trans-
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feror's tl1't1lsed GST exemption as produces the lowest
possible inclusion ratio. In determining u,hether there
has been substantial complia:nce, all relevant cir-
C11-mstances shall be ta/ron into account, including evi-
dence of intent contained in the trust instrument or
instrument of transfer and such other factors as the
Secretary deems rele'vant. ".
(b) EFFEfJTIVE DATES.-
(1) RELIEF FROM LATE ELECTIONE{-Section
2642(g)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as
added by subsection (a)) shall apply to requests pend-
i'ng on, or filed after, Dece'mber 31, 2000.
(2) S[TBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.-Section
2642(g)(2) of· such Code (as so added) shall apply to
transfers subject to chapter 11 or 12 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 made after December 31, 2000.
No implication is intended with respect to the avail-
ability of relief· from late elections or the application
of a rule of substantial compliance on or b~fore such
date.
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PROBLEM: CHARITABLE REMAINDER TRUST DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION.
At her death Theresa Testatrix, a widow who had no living descendants, lived with her
sister, Mary, also a widow, and her bachelor brother, George. In her Will, Theresa leaves her
residuary estate to a trust from which Mary and George, aged 85 and 80, respectively, are to
receive all of the net income in equal shares as long as both are living, and the survivor is to
receive all of the net income until his/her death. The trustee is authorized to use the principal of
the trust in its discretion to pay reasonable health care expenses ofMary and George.
At the death of the survivor, the principal of the trust is to be distributed outright in equal
shares to the Kentucky Historical Society and the Kentucky Chapter of The Nature Conservancy.
Theresa's Will did not contain any provision authorizing the trustee to amend the trust in order
for it to qualify for more favorable tax treatment.
The trust as drafted did not qualify as a charitable remainder trust as defined in Code
Section 664(d)(I), and Theresa's estate will not be entitled to an estate tax charitable deduction
for the significant value of the remainder interests that will pass to the charitable organizations
after her sister and brother are deceased. The estate tax that will have to be paid will not only
reduce the amounts that will ultimately go to the charities, it will also reduce the assets from
which her sister and brother will receive the income during their lives.
SOLUTION:
Code Section 2055(e)(3), as amended by the 1984 Tax Reform Act, sets out permanent
rules governing the reformation of charitable remainder trusts that do not comply with the
requirements first imposed by the 1969 Tax Reform Act. Subsection (e)(3)(J) was added in 1997 .
to allow reformation of a charitable remainder trust that does not meet the minimum charitable
benefit rules imposed at that time.
In order to be eligible for reformation, the otherwise nonqualifying interest must
constitute a "reformable interest." Section 2055(c)(3)(C)(i) states that "in general" a "reformable
interest" is an interest for which an estate tax charitable deduction would have been allowed
before enactment of the 1969 Act.
This "general rule" is subject to a number ofqualifications:
1. Prior to the 1969 Act an estate tax charitable deduction was allowed even though
the trustee could invade principal for the benefit of a life income beneficiary, if that power was
limited by an ascertainable standard. However, the presence of any power of invasion will
disqualify a trust as a charitable remainder trust under § 664(d). Consequently, before a
qualified refonnation may take place in such a situation the noncharitable beneficiary must
execute a tilnely qualified disclaimer pursuant to § 2518 of his/her right to receive any principal
distribution.
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2. If the trustee is given completely discretionary authority (i.e., not limited by an
ascertainable standard) to distribute principal to the noncharitable beneficiary, such beneficiary's
interest would not have qualified for a charitable deduction prior to 1969 and, therefore, does not
meet the definition of a "reformable interest." A timely qualified disclaimer by the noncharitable
beneficiary of any right to receive principal distributions should transform such beneficiary's
interest into a "reformable interest." (Section 2518(a) states that "[I]f a person makes a qualified
disclaimer with respect to any interest in property, this subtitle [Subtitle B-Estate and Gift Taxes]
shall apply with respect to such interest as if the interest had never been transferred to such
person.n) However, there does not appear to be any specific authority for this position. In
addition, prudence dictates that in both of these situations, the trustee should also execute a
timely qualified disclaimer of the right to make discretionary distributions ofprincipal.
3. Subsection 2055(e)(3)(C)(ii), added in 1978, provides that in order for an interest
to be a "reformable interest" all payments to noncharitable beneficiaries must be expressed either
in specific dollar amounts or a fixed percentage of the fair market value of the property (in other
words, either as an annuity or a unitrust amount). Standing alone, this requirement would keep a
substantial percentage of noncharitable interests from being "reformable interests." However,·
the statute itself contains two exceptions to the application of this requirement:
(a) Subsection 2055(e)(3)(C)(iv) provides that subsection 2055(e)(3)(C)(ii) shall not
apply to any interest passing under a will executed before January 1, 1979, or under a trust
created before such date, and there are still a few of those left around; and
(b) More importantly, subsection 2055(e)(3)(C)(iii) states that subsection
2055(e)(3)(C)(ii) shall not apply to an interest if a judicial proceeding is commenced to change
such interest into a qualified interest not later than the 90th day after (1) the last date (including
extensions) for filing the federal estate tax return, if one is required, or (2) if no federal estate tax
return is required, the last date (including extensions) for filing the income tax return for the first
taxable year for which such a retum_ is required to be filed by the trust.
Consequently, the interests ofMary and George may be reformed if
(1) Timely qualified disclaimers of their ability to receive discretionary distributions
of principal are executed by them (or effectively on their behalf), generally before they have
received any benefit therefrom and within nine months after Theresa's death; and
(2) A judicial proceeding to reform their interests is commenced within the time
limits set out in subsection 2055(e)(3)(C)(iii).
KRS 386.360 authorizes the "amendment" of the governing instrument of a charitable
trust "to permit the trust to conform to the requirements of, or to obtain benefits available under,
applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code." The efficacy of this statute is somewhat
impaired by the fact that as used therein "Internal Revenue Code" is defined in KRS 386.350 to
mean the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in effect on January 1, 1970, including all appropriate
provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 exclusive of any amendments made subsequent to
December 31,1969. Nevertheless, on account of both KRS 386.360 and the general oversight of
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charitable trusts vested in the Attorney General, the Attorney General should be joined as a
respondent in any action to reform a charitable remainder trust pursuant to § 2055(e)(3).
Unless the reformation action is completed prior to the filing of the federal estate tax
return, the personal representative is obliged to file the return on the basis of the unreformed
trust, pay any tax due in a timely manner and then assert a claim for refund after reformation has 0
been completed. A possible alternative is to obtain timely extensions both to file the return and
to pay the tax, paying only the tax (if any) that will be due after the pending reformation. The
personal representative will thereby assume the risk that the reformation will be completed
before the extended due date of the return. If not, the personal representative may be liable for
interest on any pre-reformation tax liability from the original due date of the return for which a
refund should be obtainable once the reformation is completed.
A charitable remainder trust reformation pursuant to § 2055(e)(3) must also comply with
the following requirements:
1. The reformation must be effective as of the date of the decedent's death.
2. The nonremainder interest must terminate at the same time before and after the
reformation (except that a charitable remainder trust for a term in excess of twenty years may be
reformed so as to have a twenty-year term).
3. Any difference between the date of death actuarial value of the refonned
charitable remainder interest and the actuarial value of the charitable remainder interest prior to
reformation may not exceed five percent of the actuarial value of the charitable remainder
interest prior to reformation.
4. In any event the amount of the charitable deduction after reformation will not
exceed the amount of the deducti.on that would have been generated under the pre-I970 rules.
Some additional noteworthy comments:
1. Non-qualifying charitable lead trusts may be reformed under § 2055(e)(3) in
much the same manner as non-qualifying charitCl:ble remainder trusts.
2. Section 2522(c)(4) provides for the reformation for gift tax purposes of non-
qualifying charitable remainder trusts and charitable lead trusts created by intervivos transfers
and states that "rules similar to the rules of section 2055(e)(3) shall apply."
(a) In this situation, the effective date of the reformation must be the date of
the transfer (in lieu of the date of the decedent's death).
(b) Since no federal estate tax return is involved, where payments to non-
charitable beneficiaries are not expressed either as an annuity or as a unitrust amount, the judicial
proceeding for the reformation must be commellced not later than the 90th day after the last date .
(including extensions) for filing the income tax return for the trust's first taxable year.
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PROBLEM: TRANSFER TO NON-CITIZEN SPOUSE DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR
MARITAL DEDUCTION.
In 1987 Harry Husband executed a will and a revocable trust agreement under which he
established a classic QTIP marital deduction trust and a "credit shelter" nonmarital trust for the
benefit of his spouse, Winifred Wife, whom he had met and married while he was stationed in
England during World War II. Since no significant changes had taken place in their assets or
family situation, these documents were in place when Harry died earlier this year. In addition,
he and Winnie still lived in the residence that they had purchased with Harry's funds in 1982,
taking title as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Despite the fact that Winnie had lived in
this country for over 50 years and had mothered several children here, Winnie had remained a
British subject.
Under § 2056(d)(I) enacted in 1988, since Winnie is not a U. S. citizen, the estate tax
marital deduction will not be allowed for any property passing to Winnie by reason of Harry's'
death unless
(a) Winnie remains a resident of this country at all times after Harry's death and
becomes a U. S. citizen before the federal estate tax return is filed or
(b)
§ 2056A.
Such property passes to Winnie in a qualified domestic trust (QDOT) described in
The QTIP marital trust in Harry's 1987 will and trust agreement does no(meet the QDOT
requirements. Obviously, neither does the residence passing directly to Winnie by survivorship.
SOLUTION:
Winnie's becoming a U. S. citizen in a timely manner is an obvious solution, but one that
is not always available for personal, technical or tax reasons. Moreover, complications may arise
that delay the process beyond the due date of the return (even with extensions).
Fortunately, two other avenues are available to Winnie and Harry's estate:
1. Section 2056(d)(5) provides for the judicial refonnation into a QDOT of a trust
that would otherwise qualify for the marital deduction if Winnie were a U. S. citizen:
(a) Such a proceeding must be commenced on or before the due date of the
federal estate tax return (detennined with regard to extension actually granted) regardless of the
date that the return is actually filed.
(b) The refonnation "must result in a trust that is effective under local law."
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(c) The reformed trust may be revocable by Winnie or subject to Winnie's
general power of appointment, except that neither Winnie nor anyone else may have the power to
amend the trust during its continued existence so that it would no longer qualify as a QDOT.
(d) Prior to the time that the judicial reformation is completed, the trust must
be treated as a QDOT.
2. Section 2056(d)(2)(B), as expanded by Treas. Reg. § 20.2056A-4(b), sets out a
"special rule" under which assets that passed directly to Winnie (such as the residence) in such a
manner that they would otherwise qualify for a marital deduction will be regarded as having
passed to Winnie in a QDOT if she either assigns or transfers the property to a QDOT before the
estate tax return is filed and on or before the last date for making the QDOT election.
(a) This transfer or assignment may be made either by Winnie, by her
guardian or conservator (if she is incapacitated) or by her personal representative (if she dies).
(b) The QDOT to which the property is transferred may have been created by
the decedent or may be created by Winnie or her personal representative.
(c) Under Treas. Reg. § 20.2056A-I0(a), if Winnie later becomes a U. S.
citizen, any QDOT ofwhich she is a beneficiary will no longer be subject to the special § 2056A
estate tax on distributions ofprincipal made to her if she either
(1)
becoming a citizen or
(2)
citizen.
Was a U. S. resident at all times after Harry's death and before.
No taxable distributions were made to her before she became a
PROBLEM: EXERCISE OF POWER OF APPOINTMENT VIOLATES RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES.
In 1940 Fred Father executed a revocable trust agreement setting up a modest trust for the
benefit of Daisy Daughter for her life, with remainder at her death to her surviving descendants,
per stirpes. Daisy then had a young daughter. Fred gave Daisy a special testamentary power of
appointment over the assets in the trust at her death exercisable in favor ofher descendants.
The revocable trust agreement provided that no trust estate created by the exercise of
Daisy's power of appointment could extend for more than twenty-one years after the death of the
last survivor of Fred's descendants who were living at his death. Then in 1961 Fred amended the
trust agreement so as to make it irrevocable. When he died in 1965 he was survived by Daisy,
her daughter and two grandchildren, who were born in 1962 and 1964, respectively.
By her Will executed in 1986, Daisy appointed the trust assets to a trust for the benefit of
her descendants that she provided would tenninate twenty-one years after the death of the last of
her descendants who was living at Fred's death. Daisy died late last year survived by her
K·6
daughter and the two grandchildren born in 1962 and 1964. Her daughter died four months after
Daisy's death. The trust assets are now worth over $6 million.
Daisy's exercise of the power of appointment over the trust potentially violated the
common law rule against perpetuities in that it extended the possible vesting of the trust's
remainder interest beyond twenty-one years after the death of lives in being when the trust
became irrevocable in 1961. If her exercise of the power is ineffective, the trust remainder will
vest in her daughter and will be includible in the daughter's estate for federal estate tax purposes.
SOLUTION:
KRS 381.216 provides that in detennining whether an interest violates the rule against
perpetuities the period ofperpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than possible events -
the so-called "wait-and-see" doctrine. Under this doctrine Daisy's exercise of her power of
appointment would not have violated the rule against perpetuities if Daisy's grandchildren who'
were born in 1962 and 1964 had predeceased Daisy's daughter. Since that did not actually occur,
Daisy's exercise of her power of appointment will be ineffective unless it is refonned so as to
approximate most closely Fred's intent within the limits of the rule. Presumably, this would
involve refonning both Fred's trust agreement and Daisy's Will to provide that the trust created
by Daisy's exercise of her power of appointment must tenninate within twenty-one years after
the death of the last survivor of Fred's descendants who were living in 1961 when the trust
became irrevocable (that is, Daisy and Daisy's daughter).
Note that KRS 381.223 provides that KRS 381.216 applies only to intervivos
instruments and wills taking effect after July 1, 1960, and to appointments made after July 1,
1960, including appointments under powers created before July 1, 1960.
PROBLEM: EFFECT OF TRUST REFORMATION ON GST TAX EXEMPT STATUS.
The question arises as to whether Daisy's exercise of her power of appointment, despite
its refonnation in accordance with KRS 386.216, will cause Fred's trust to cease to be exempt
from the generation-skipping transfer tax (GSTT) imposed by the 1986 Tax Reform Act because
it no longer complies with § 1433(b)(2)(A) of that Act.
Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(I)(v)(B) states that the exercise of a nongeneral power of
appointment will not be treated as an addition to an otherwise GSTT exempt trust if such power
of appointment was created under such a trust and is not exercised in a manner that may
postpone the vesting of an interest in property for a period extending beyond any life in being at
the date of the trust's creation plus twenty-one years - the so-called "perpetuities period."
Exercise of such a power of appointment that validly postpones vesting for a tenn of not more
than ninety years (measured from the creation of the trust) will not be considered an exercise that
postpones vesting beyond the perpetuities period.
In undertaking to detennine if Daisy's exercise of her power of appointment causes Fred's
trust to lose its GSTT exempt status, the following factors must be considered:
K - 7
I. If Daisy had not exercised her power of appointment, its mere existence would not
appear to have deprived Fred's trust of its GSTT exempt status. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-
l(b)(I)(v)(B) seems to say that the lapse of a nongeneral power of appointment created under an
otherwise GSTT exempt trust will not be treated as a non-exempt addition to such trust. .
2. It appears that for purposes of detennining its GSTT exempt status, Fred's trust
will be regarded as having been created when it became irrevocable in 1961. See Treas. Reg.·§
26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(2), which now provides that the distribution of trust principal from an
exempt trust to a new trust will not cause the new trust to be subject to GSTT if the tenns of the
new trust do not extend the time for vesting of any beneficial interest in the trust beyond the
perpetuities period "measured from the date the original trust became irrevocable."
3. Example 7 in Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(I)(v)(B) discusses a situation where a
nongeneral power of appointment has been exercised that might extend the trust involved for
longer than the perpetuities period "except local law provides that the effect of [the] exercise is
to extend the trust until [a date that is within the perpetuities period]." Hopefully the IRS will
regard KRS 381.216 (including a reformation thereunder) as "local law" that provides that the
"effect" of Daisy's exercise of her power of appointment is to extend Fred's trust to a date that is
within the perpetuities period as measured from the "creation" of the trust - namely, twenty-one
years after the death of Daisy's daughter, who happens to have been in being both when the trust
was originally set up in 1940 and when it became irrevocable in 1961.
4. In T.D. 8912, published on December 20,2000, the IRS issued final regulations in'
which it undertook to provide guidance to taxpayers with respect to the type of trust
modifications that will not affect a trust's GSTT exempt status. The avowed purpose of these
regulations is to furnish "safe harbors" for many trust reformations and thereby avoid (or at least
reduce) the need to ob~ain a private letter ruling in connection with such a refonnation.
5. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1 (b)(4)(i)(C) and (D) provide:
(a) A judicial construction of a trust's governing instrument to resolve an
ambiguity in its terms or to correct a scrivener's error will not cause the trust to lose its GSTT
exempt status if
(1) The judicial action Involves a bona fide issue; and
(2) The construction is consistent with applicable state law that
would be applied by the highest court of the state.
(b) A modification of the governing instrument of an exempt trust by judicial
reformation will not cause the trust to lose its GSTT exempt status if
(1) The modification does not shift a beneficial interest in the trust to
any beneficiary who occupies a lower generation than the person or persons who held the
beneficial interest prior to the modification and
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(2) The modification does not extend the time for vesting of any
beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the original trust.
(c) A modification of a GSTT exempt trust will result in a shift in beneficial
interest to a lower generation beneficiary if the modification can result in either
(1) An increase in the amount ofa generation-skipping transfer or
(2) The creation ofa new generation-skipping transfer.
(d) A trust modification which is administrative in nature that only indirectly
increases the amount of a generation-skipping transfer (such as by reducing administrative
expenses or income taxes) will not be considered to shift a beneficial interest in the trust. .
6. The "modification" of Fred's trust resulting from the reformation of it and of
Daisy's exercise of her power of appointment pursuant to KRS 381.216 does not appear to fall
within any of the "safe harbors" delineated in the new regulations. Consequently, prudence
dictates that a private letter ruling be obtained to the effect that such a refonnation will not cause
Fred's trust to lose its GSTT exempt status.
PROBLEM: TRUST FOR SURVIVING SPOUSE FAILS TO QUALIFY FOR
MARITAL DEDUCTION
When Larry Lawyer was fresh out of law school, he drafted his own estate plan for the
benefit of his spouse, Sally, and his infant son, Sam. He set up a trust from which Sally will
receive all of the illcome for her life and the trustee (initially his law partner) can make
discretionary distributions to Sally and Sam for their maintenance, support and education. Sally
is given a general testamentary power of appointment over the assets in the trust at her death. If
she does not exercise this power, the assets will remain in trust for S3J.'11 until he reaches age
thirty, or ifhe dies before reaching thirty, for his descendants until they reach thirty.
Larry subsequently became so busy winning large verdicts in toxic tort cases that he'
"never got around" to updating his estate plan before he died suddenly, and prematurely, earlier
this year, leaving a $4 million estate. Meanwhil~, Sam had sense enough not to follow his father
into the law. Instead, he established a dot.com company that he sold just in time, receiving $6
million after taxes. He is also the proud father of triplets.
Unfortunately, Larry's trust in its present fonn will not qualify for the estate tax marital
deduction because of the trustee's authority to make discretionary distributions of principal to
Sam during Sally's life. Equally unfortunately, the assets in the trust at Sally's death will be
included in her estate for federal estate tax purposes, precluding use of Larry's effective




By effective use ofqualified disclaimers in accordance with Code § 2518, Sam and Sally
may modify Larry's trust so as to accomplish the following:
(1) Enable the trust to qualify for the estate tax marital deduction;
(2) Obtain the benefit of Larry's effective exemption amount; and
(3) Obtain the benefit to the extent desired of Larry's GST exemption.
1. If Sam executes a qualified disclaimer of the possibility of receiving any
discretionary distributions ofprincipal from the portion of the trust for which a marital deduction
is desired, that portion will otherwise qualify for the marital deduction.
2. If Sally effectively disclaims her general power of appointment over the portion
of the trust for which the marital deduction is not taken (presumably because it is covered at least
in part by Larry's effective exemption amount), to the extent of that exemption it will not be
subject to tax at Larry's death and will also be excluded from Sally's estate at her death.
However, if Sam survives Sally, no effective use will have been made of Larry's GST
exemption, unless Sam now effectively disclaims his remainder interest in this portion, allowing
it to pass to his descendants at Sally's death, either outright or in trust for their benefit, depending·
on their ages.
3. If Sally is willing to forego any interest in the nonmarital portion of the trust, both
she and Sam may disclaim all of their interest in that portion, enabling it to pass at this time into
trusts for Sam's triplets without any adverse estate, gift or GST tax consequences. This will also
avoid the otherwise potentially tricky question of whether under Larry's trust agreement the trust
ma.y be divided into separate marital a..TJ.d nonmarita! trusts, at least ,vithout court approval, in the
absence of any Kentucky statute authorizing such a division. The provision of the 2001 Tax Act
authorizing the severance of a trust into GST exempt and nonexempt trusts may offer some
assistance in this effort.
Please note that there are a number of c~nditions that must be complied with in order to
effectuate a qualified disclaimer, a detailed discussion of which is beyond the scope of this
presentation.
PROBLEM: INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH TERMS OF CHARITABLE GIFf.
Donald Donor has given a large parcel of pristine woodland to the Kentucky Chapter of
The Nature Conservancy. He also established a trust, which became irrevocable upon his death .
earlier this year, by which he created an endowment fund to be used for the maintenance and
conservation of the woodland, including development of limited facilities so as to make it
accessible to members of the public under controlled conditions. The trust also specifies that
when the endowment fund reaches $5 million in value, the sum of $500,000.00 is to be used to
construct an indoor interpretive exhibit on the edge of the woodland in accordance with plans
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that Donald has thoughtfully had prepared. Following construction of this exhibit, a designated
portion of the income from the endowment fund is to be devoted to maintenance of the exhibit.
At Donald's death, the value of the endowment fund was well in excess of $5 million.
However, a conservative estimate of the cost of constructing the exhibit according to Donald's
plans is in excess of $1 million and it appears unlikely that it can ever be constructed for
anything approaching $500,000.00. Will this cause the charitable gift to fail, either in its entirety
or at least to the extent of the $500,000.00 eannarked for construction of the exhibit? If so, what
will become of the failed portion of the gift?
SOLUTION:
Under Kentucky's version of what has historically been referred to as the "cy pres"
doctrine, the trustee of Donald's trust may institute an action seeking a declaration of rights and
construction of the trust agreement, including the powers and duties of the trustee to accomplish
Donald's intentions as nearly as possible under the circumstances, either by authorizing the
expenditure ofmore than $500,000.00 for construction of the exhibit or deferring construction of
the exhibit indefinitely, in order to be able to carry out the other purposes for which the trust was
established. See Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Isaac W. Bernheim Foundation, 305 Ky.
802, 205 S.W.2d 1003 (1947).
In applying this doctrine (which literally means "as nearly as may be"), the Kentucky
courts have limited it to situations where the donor's specific charitable object or ascertainable
charitable objective has been identified, but the mode or method prescribed for accomplishing
the objective is inadequate, impossible or inappropriate. In such a case, the court has concluded
that it nlay substitute a more suitable mode or method that will effectuate the donor's intent.
However, the court may not supply a charitable beneficiary or purpose where the donor has not
done so, but only manifested a general charitable interest.
See Defenders of Furbearers v. First National Bank and Trust Company of Lexington, .
Ky., 306 S.W.2d 100 (1957), where under a will written in December, 1953, a trust was
established for the benefit of the Lexington/Fayette County Humane Society for ten years for the
purpose of hiring an agent to work the streets of Lexington to try to relieve the condition of
overworked and mistreated horses - a situation that everyone seems to have agreed did not exist.
The will went on to say that if the Humane Society declined this "request" under the stated
conditions, the trust funds were to be divided equally between the National S.P.C.A. and the
Defenders of Furbearers.
The Court ofAppeals found two reasons for not applying the Kentucky cy pres doctrine:
(1) The doctrine applies only where the failtlre or impossibility relates to the
method or mode of carrying out the charitable purpose and not where the purpose itself fails or is
incapable of accomplishment; and
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(2) The doctrine will not be applied where there is an express provision in the.
governing instrument for an alternative disposition of the gift if the designated charity or
charitable purpose proves impossible, inexpedient or impractical.
See also Orphan Society of Lexington v. Board of Education of Lexington, Ky., 437
S.W.2d 194 (1969), where the Court ofAppeals adopted the opinion of Circuit Judge Scott Reed
(who by the time the appeal was heard had become a member of the Court) in which he.held that
where a trust had been established for the benefit of a school that was designed to meet the needs
of the children of a particular area, the subsequent closing of that school and the transfer of its
facilities to another school did not render the trust's specific restricted purpose impossible of
performance, so as to necessitate resort to the cy pres doctrine "as such." Instead, Judge Reed
concluded that the donor's "primary specific purpose" could be performed by applying the trust
income to the needs of the children from the particular area who were attending the successor
school.
PROBLEM: FAILURE OF EITHER LIFETIME OR TESTAMENTARY TRUST FOR
SURVIVING SPOUSE TO QUALIFY FOR MARITAL DEDUCTION.
Mary executed a revocable trust agreement that contained a QTIP trust for her husband,
John. She then executed an amendment to that trust in which she revoked the QTIP trust
conditioned upon the "execution, completion and funding" of an irrevocable lifetime QTIP trust'
for John's benefit. The amendment further provided that if for some reason the lifetime QTIP
trust was not "executed, completed or funded" prior to Mary's death, the revocable trust QTIP
trust would be "revived."
Mary then executed and funded the irrevocable lifetime QTIP trust, which recited that it
was her intent that property transferred to this trust be construed as qualified terminable interest
property and that any provision to the contrary would be null and void. She then filed a
Fonn 709 in which she claimed a gift tax marital deduction for the irrevocable lifetime QTIP
trust. However, for some reason that gift tax return was not timely filed (perhaps due to the fact
that Mary died ofa brain tumor some three months after its due date). The IRS took the position
that the lifetime QTIP trust did not qualify for the gift tax marital deduction and asserted a gift
tax deficiency. (First Security Bank of Southern New Mexico, N.A., Personal Representative of
the Estate ofMary Kate Nielson, v. United State~, 2001-1 USTC 1 60, 406 (D.N.M., 2001)).
SOLUTION:
Mary's estate filed a Form 706 on which it made a protective QTIP election and claimed
a marital deduction for the revocable trust QTIP trust. It then paid the gift tax deficiency and
filed for a refund. Next it instituted a state court action in which it successfully obtained a .
detennination that because creation of the irrevocable lifetime QTIP trust was expressly
conditioned on treatment of the assets transferred to it as qualified terminable interest property,
completion of the transfer to the lifetime QTIP trust had not occurred and could not occur to
fulfill Mary's intent and that the transfer was incomplete, invalid and void under state law.
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In the ensuing federal district court refund action, the court found that the state court's
ruling was not binding on it, but it nevertheless reached the same conclusion. It then ruled:
(1) The revocable trust QTIP trust was revived by the express provisions of
the trust amendment that revoked it.
(2) The assets that had been transferred to the irrevocable lifetime trust
returned to Mary's estate, from which they passed under the residuary provision of her will to the
revocable trust QTIP trust.
(3) The protective QTIP election for the revocable trust QTIP trust was proper
and should have been allowed.
(4) The estate was entitled to a refund of the taxes paid.
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